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Abstract
In this thesis I attempt to explore some consequences of the nineteenth century loss of 
religious certainty, as its effects are reflected and worked through in literary works of 
the period. Since a comprehensive treatment is impossible within the scope of a thesis,
I have chosen to concentrate on just two very different authors, the English poet Arthur 
Hugh Clough, and the Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky. As wide apart as these 
authors’ works are in scope, ambition, literary mode, tone and attitude, and as wide 
apart as the authors are in historical background and cultural tradition, they nevertheless 
share key insights into the plight of idealistic, intellectually self-conscious individuals in 
the period. For such individuals, the absolute certitudes available in earlier times - 
certitudes which might have provided foundations for personal beliefs and life-goals 
and also for acceptance of social roles and conventions - could no longer serve.
Clough’s and Dostoevsky’s depictions of the commitment of self-conscious idealists 
(consequent on this loss of foundations) to describe and define their intellectual and 
emotional disorientation (and their searches for new certitudes), reveal and clarify some 
of the dilemmas of conviction and idealistic commitment which were generated by the 
disruption of what had previously appeared an authoritative source of moral absolutes 
and transcendent ideals.
Both authors’ works illuminate the role transcendent ideals and abstractions 
sometimes play in individuals’ relationships with others and with the world of 
ambivalent fact. In many ways, the reactions of Clough’s and Dostoevsky’s characters 
to disputed frameworks of traditionally authoritative belief and conduct present 
complementary extremes, respectively, those of uncertain conviction and passionate 
intensity (to borrow Yeats’ dichotomy from “The Second Coming”). These extremes 
are bound by the characters’ fundamentally sympathetic relationship, in the works of 
both authors, to idealism and to an abstract critical engagement with their respective 
realities; in a world that lacks a commonly accepted external authority, such 
engagement is maintained as a problematic but invaluable moral duty.
In such periods, where any absolute conviction or ideal can appear intrinsically guilty of 
having overlooked, or of disregarding, an array of equally credible alternative 
perspectives, attempts to sustain postures of absolute faith in subjectively affirmed or 
habitually maintained ideals are often beset with problems of “passionate intensity”.
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While esteem for absolute convictions is readily augmented by nostalgic idealisation of 
the security which the clear moral code and worldview provided by divine faith had 
formerly provided, the dangers which absolutist postures often engender can be 
attributed to habits of absolutism which this esteem tends to maintain. I hope to show 
that it is these habits which, incompatible with an ambivalent natural world, actually 
elicit, as much as they disclose, the specific shortcomings which often seem intrinsic to 
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1995). Specifically: Amours de Voyage, Clough - Selected 
Poems, 75-154, and Dipsychus and The Spirit, Clough - 
Selected Poems, 155-234. Where possible I have also 
used Phelan’s edition as my source for Clough’s shorter 
poems. Alternative sources and works which are 
discussed only briefly will be cited as necessary.
For Dostoevsky’s main works I have used Pevear’s 
and Volokhonsky’s translations of Notes from 
Underground (New York: Vintage Books. 1994) and 
Crime and Punishment (London: Vintage, 1993), and Alan 
Myers’ translation of The Idiot (Oxford & New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992). I have also used 
translations by Ignat Avsey, A.D. Briggs, Jessie Coulson, 
Kyril Fitzlyon, Richard Freeborn, Constance Garnett, C.J. 
Hogarth, Jane Kentish, Kenneth Lantz, David McDuff, 
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N.B. Due to the vagaries of the word-processing software 
I have used, footnotes will occasionally be held over to a 
following page. I apologise for any irritation this might 
cause but assure the reader that the footnotes are all there, 
but sometimes at a slight remove.
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Introduction
The burden of absolutism, as I shall discuss it throughout this thesis, is experienced by 
individuals who find themselves bereft of external ideals: that is, ideals -  or rules of life 
-  derived from some source outside themselves, which they might have taken to carry 
an absolute authority. Dostoevsky’s Underground Man worries that without the 
guidance provided by external absolutes “we won’t know what to join, what to hold to, 
what to love and what to hate, what to respect and what to despise” . 1 When these 
characters confront the moral void which they feel God’s death has exposed them to and 
ask themselves “What are we to resist, and what are we to be friends with?” (as Phillip 
does in Clough’s The Bothie2), they ask this question with expectations, needs and 
desires forged by a tradition of moral imperatives and life goals that had been 
considered to owe their higher authority to a supernatural origin. Accordingly, the 
scope of the answers these characters seek, and of the moral imperatives through which 
they attempt to orient themselves (surrogates for values that had marked the line 
between eternal salvation and perdition), reflect the fastidious commitment to moral 
absolutism they have inherited: they seek ideal codes, general directives. From the 
outset, then, they appear unable to engage in the kind of pragmatic moral wranglings 
with uncertainty that might have provided at least something of the assurance they long 
for. The burden they take upon themselves imposes a highly distorting influence on 
their relationship to ambivalent reality. It is the nature of these distortions, and their 
origin in the incompatibility of absolutism with a clear view of ambivalent reality, with 
which I shall primarily be concerned. It is a premise of this thesis that acceptance of 
uncertainty and the challenging ambiguities of the natural world might offer a means of 
avoiding or defusing the individual dilemmas which these distortions specifically 
engender.
In Dostoevsky’s work the ‘new words’ and surrogate consolations with which 
individuals seek to convince themselves (sometimes with success) that they have 
discovered what to love, what to hate, what to join, and what to oppose, prove 
essentially inadequate to the absolutist purposes they inherit. Both Dostoevsky and 
Clough show how these surrogate ideals can deliver the kind of absolute assurances 
these characters require only through the characters’ tacit consent to solipsistic
1 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground (1864), trans. Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky; 1993
(New York: Vintage Classics, 1994), 130.
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seclusion from shared reality or their capricious denial of selective aspects of it. Clough 
and Dostoevsky each shows that these are habits which typically unravel in the face of 
worldly experience and interaction with other people.
I shall be focusing on depictions of how characters, deprived of faith in an 
external authority and order, but still beholden to the consolations and authoritative 
moral guidelines it had provided, react firstly to their individual intimations of 
transcendent ideals and order, and secondly to the uncertainty they confront in the 
absence of such.
* * * * *
To see the gods dispelled in mid-air and dissolve like clouds is one of the great 
human experiences. It is not as if they had gone over the horizon to disappear for a 
time; nor as if they had been overcome by other gods of greater power and 
profounder knowledge. It is simply that they came to nothing .... It was their 
annihilation, not ours, and yet it left us feeling that we, too, had been annihilated. It 
left us feeling dispossessed and alone in a solitude, like children without parents, in 
a home that seemed deserted ...
Wallace Stevens - “Two or Three Ideas”/
From the midst of these feelings of dispossession, man is left “to resolve life and the 
world in his own terms”.2 34 And though Stevens, in 1951, can retrospectively correlate 
the anxiety of abandonment with a phase of cultural evolution, for those in the grip of 
this anxiety it is uncertainty - the absence of explanations, systems and consolations - 
that compels their quests for moral orientation and sustaining traditions. This 
uncertainty contains all that Stevens associates with it -  feelings of annihilation and 
abandonment - but it contains more: moral and spiritual uncertainty poses 
uncomfortable propositions to individuals seeking transcendent ideals, and it provokes, 
precipitates and otherwise harries their ‘idealistic’ reactions. The strong emotional 
inertia which influences individuals’ relationship to religious assurances, to the moral 
order, and to the patterns of individual consolation which divine authority had 
guaranteed, ensures that reactions to this disorientation are moulded equally by the 
desire either to rectify, or to deny and defuse, the problems of fact and interpretation 
which arise when the gods disappear. This urge to rectify includes attempts both to
2 Clough, The Bothie (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1976), IX.79.
3 Wallace Stevens, Opus Posthumous (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 260.
4 Stevens, Opus Posthumous, 260.
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prove the persistent credibility of divine authority, and to activate new frames of 
authority capable of ensuring the same subordination of sociopathically individualistic 
behaviour.
Given the very different status and associations of their respective positions in current 
conceptions of nineteenth century literature, founding an argument on the works of 
Arthur Hugh Clough (1819-61), an English poet with a modest reputation and relatively 
limited audience, and Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-81), one of the most revered and 
enduring writers of the late nineteenth century, perhaps invites the reader into what 
seems from the outset a disorienting endeavour.3 From this outset then I would request 
my readers’ indulgence in temporarily surrendering preconceptions of the relative 
merits or unshiftable particularity of these authors as I proceed throughout this 
introduction to elaborate the set of concerns for which this pairing provides a 
particularly salient resource of characters and circumstance.5 6
Until recently Clough has been treated as something of an oddity of Victorian literature, 
perhaps because of the displaced manner in which he addresses the domestic relevance 
of his concerns, and because of his cosmopolitan engagement with continental politics 
and philosophy. Encouraged by Carlyle’s dissemination of contemporary German 
philosophy and literature (including, for example, the higher criticism of the Bible, 
Fichte’s transcendental idealism, and the writings of Goethe), Clough engaged 
enthusiastically with the socially reformist discourses of European letters.
It is for this reason that the concerns which dominate Clough’s work seem so 
readily to parallel predominant concerns across the western thought and literature of his 
era. And for this reason also, it is particularly rewarding to approach Clough as an 
English poet addressing abstract or metaphysical problems which span geographical
5 1 have chosen to focus on Clough, as opposed to other poets and writers of the period who wrestle with 
the personal, social and historical implications of spiritual uncertainties (Browning, Tennyson or Matthew 
Arnold, for example) because Clough, as I shall discuss at greater length throughout this thesis, seems 
least inclined to prematurely curtail, simplify or delimit the ambiguities which his scepticism, and the 
scepticism of his characters, runs up against in the world of ambivalent facts. These same sorts of 
uncertainty, along with their factual bases are depicted by Dostoevsky in relation to a much wider range 
of circumstance and character, but in stark contrast this range and rigour are given a moral significance 
which amounts to precisely the kind of insistence on a singular absolute and synchronising certainty 
which is so antithetical to Clough’s secular scepticism.
6 Given the nature of my use of foreign works in this thesis, stressing primarily circumstances of plot, 
character reactions and characterisation, it has appeared sufficient to rely on translations into English. In 
my closer reading of Dostoevsky’s work I have relied on cross checking passages to avoid idiosyncratic 
translations. Where particular words and sentences have appeared potentially contentious I have 
gratefully relied on Professor Iain Wright’s translations from the Soviet Academy of Sciences’ edition of
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borders and relate to shared aspects of cultural and spiritual traditions throughout the 
liberal West. There is simply no other English poet who depicts the complex interaction 
between emotion and intellect in the face of uncertainty so uncompromisingly at the 
time.* 7
This thesis will primarily be concerned with depictions of the capacity of transcendent 
(and typically abstract) ideals to compensate for the ‘death’ of God. This capacity will 
be explored through the individual characters, who act as the registers, but are 
ultimately the origins of these abstract codes, and are therefore both the agents and 
locales in which this project of reorientation is played out. Focusing on these 
disoriented individuals as participants in a relationship with the ostensibly theoretical 
and scholarly pursuit of abstract ideals reveals how various imprinted anxieties and 
needs are being ministered to or placated under the guise of abstract disinterested 
metaphysical quests.
My usage of the term “transcendent idealism” is probably best defined through the 
people who are committed to it. Transcendent idealists demonstrate a desire to 
recognise ideals: sources, that is, of meaningful life-goals and moral values which 
transcend their individual circumstances and interests. Often, particularly in the 
absence of any commonly accepted authority, this desire leads to a tendency to idealise 
mere intimations or partial notions of such abstract and transcendent moral codes and 
life-goals. This desire is formed, perhaps, by influences of tradition, religious 
indoctrination, or merely by an individual’s desire for clear order sparked by 
confrontation with a world that seems reprehensibly chaotic or unjust. Transcendent 
idealisms, then, are extrapolations of particular intuitions, beliefs and prejudices into 
the form of general principles that ostensibly offer rules abstracted from the 
particularities which might necessitate acknowledgment of the ambiguity or partiality of 
the resulting principles. Formed in abstraction from ambivalent reality, such ideals 
offer modes of conduct and life-goals which appear qualified to authoritatively direct
Dostoevsky’s complete works: F.M. Dostoevsky, Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii v Tridtzati Tomakh
(Leningrad 1972-1990).
7 Early in the twentieth century T.S. Eliot utilised a similar array of semi-alienated, sympathetically 
critical characters and characterisations of individual and intellectual conditions (as did Ezra Pound in his 
Hugh Selwyn Mauberley poems). In the late nineteenth-century, George Gissing touched on these kinds 
of dilemmas (particularly in Bom in Exile (1892)), though without the level of attention that we see in 
Clough’s work to these characters’ entanglement in ideological and metaphysical abstractions. Gissing 
emphasises, rather, the social reality and the practical implications of romantic and noble ideals and 
altruistic tendencies in an increasingly materialistic society, and the embeddedness in concrete 
circumstances (of class, money and ambition for example) of the ideologies with which individuals
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individuals in their moral equivocations, regardless of circumstantial complexities; they 
dismiss the anxiety of establishing, perpetually, what is proper or right in a particular 
circumstance, and replace it with a ready certitude that relates to all circumstances as 
instances of general rules. In reflection of these characters’ common commitment to 
pursue authoritative moral directives and ideals at a level of intellectual abstraction from 
circumstantial contingencies I will at times refer to characters’ ‘abstract ideals’, or their 
‘abstract idealism’, and their commitment (or recourse) to abstraction. The idealists I 
shall focus on exemplify how, in the absence of a commonly accepted transcendent 
authority, these types of rules often tend rather to reflect rationalisations of merely 
desired absolute certainties. These desired certainties, though essentially expressions of 
reaction against a paralysing uncertainty, have been generalised into images of external 
objective truth.
I bring together Clough and Dostoevsky as two authors depicting explicitly and 
relentlessly the emotional and intellectual experience of individuals existing in what 
appears to be the moral void of divine disinheritance and spiritual uncertainty. Clough 
explores the situation of individuals who, in positions of personal abstraction from the 
imperatives of social involvement and domestic responsibility, from their particular 
social position, and from any broader sense of community, interrogate their own 
capacity to distinguish truth, express truth and maintain their conviction of what appears 
to be truth.* 8 Clough’s major works are almost entirely concerned with the subjective 
perspective of this type of character; his works provide a distilled, highly abstract 
persona which nevertheless remains bound to a reality it finds unsatisfactory. 9 The 
poems maintain and interrogate the tension between worldly limitation and the 
transcendent urges of idealistic devotion. Such circumstances are amenable to Clough’s 
sceptical approach to self-conception and, given the suspension from their everyday
tended, whether cynically or sincerely, to rationalise, or at least reconcile themselves to, the iniquities and
injustices of capitalist materialism so as to flourish or survive under it).
8 By “community” in this instance I am referring to the actual broad community the characters are a part 
of, English Victorians, for instance, as opposed to notions of the community of mankind. “Brotherhood”, 
in that it avoids the obvious sense of distinction and alienation from the actual populace they live in, is a 
much more appealing concept to their impulses to express themselves in terms of general human 
significance. Arnold’s brotherhood of a ‘classless’ humanity relies on the indoctrination of all members 
in the terms of right reason, individuals have to meet the criteria to be embraced in the human democracy.
9 Discussing Amours de Voyage in The Poetry of Clough: An Essay in Revaluation (New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 1963), Walter E. Houghton pays particular attention to Clough’s 
depiction of Claude’s character as a self-conscious and self-critical manifestation of some typical habits 
of the anti-hero and the uncommitted intellectual. “By calling Claude an intellectual, I mean to deny that 
he is a dilettante but not that he possesses certain characteristics of the breed which some people find 
unattractive” (119). Houghton describes Dipsychus also as a “highly educated intellectual”, with a “deep
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selves and situations, to the characters’ recognitions and admissions of a dependency on 
factitious ‘truths’. The potential trauma of admitting that conventions of purpose, 
employment, or personality are based on false certainties is liberated from the inertia 
imposed both by the conventions themselves and the prospect of taking one’s place 
among them. The temptation to acknowledge factitious conventions as essentially valid 
(idealising what merely is), in order to ennoble or at least dignify one’s participation, is 
at its most diffuse in Claude’s remoteness, in Amours de Voyage (1849), from domestic 
habits, locales and attachments, but can be seen asserting a gravitational pull as 
Dipsychus contemplates a return to England and the imminent necessity of 
employment. In the space of their limbo Clough’s characters are able to see and admit 
the rationalisations and contingencies which sustain many of the ostensibly sound 
‘reasons’ and convictions they feel or expect to feel.10 In expediting Dipsychus’ 
transition, in Dipsychus and The Spirit,n to a worldly and domestic reality, though, The 
Spirit’s idealisation of middle-class necessity allows factitious conventions a semblance 
of authority. Answering his own need for both certainty and a rationale for his 
concessions to necessity, Dipsychus transfers his allegiance from solipsistic idealism to 
solipsistic cynicism, blaming the world for his compromise.
What for Clough is a crisis of the individual’s ability to discern a role in society, 
brought about by challenges to previously absolute authorities, is extended in 
Dostoevsky’s world view to a challenge against the core of social cohesion. Clough’s 
longer poems depict the attempts of individuals to justify and sustain their idealistic
desire to preserve a kind of high integrity from contamination, whether by society or the exigencies of 
human existence” (160).
10 The effects of immediate and concrete social and domestic responsibilities on Dostoevsky’s idealists 
are notably absent from Clough’s depictions of relations between his idealists and reality. In his personal 
life, though, Clough was forced to make his own decisions and compromises and, having resigned his 
tutorship at Oxford in conscientious objection to subscription, was forced to seek employment, like 
Arnold, in a “growing bureaucracy of civil servants and government employees” (Armstrong, Victorian 
Poetry, 167). In noting this fact, Armstrong contrasts it with Browning’s expatriate position and 
Tennyson’s freedom, as Poet Laureate, from the necessity of subsidising his literary activities through 
worldly employment. The contrast alludes to a different type of engagement with society in the writings 
of the wage labourers and vocational intellectuals and the more removed and aesthetic focus of the more 
independent men of letters.
11 Dipsychus and The Spirit was never finalised by Clough, it was first published posthumously in Letters 
and Remains o f Arthur Hugh Clough (1865). Consequently there is ambiguity about the order in which 
Clough intended the various scenes to proceed. In J.P. Phelan’s prefatory notes to the version of the 
poem in the Longman selection of Clough’s works, the version I refer to throughout, he discusses these 
textual complexities in detail, along with the poem’s literary background and its biographical and 
historical resonances (see: Clough - Selected Poems, ed. J.P. Phelan (Longman Annotated Texts. London 
and New York: Longman, 1995), 155-58). Phelan explains that his own editorial decisions have been 
guided by an attempt to provide a version of the poem which is consistent “with the textual evidence” 
available in each of the four stages of its evolution (reinstating bowdlerised material, for example) and 
“supported by literary and structural evidence” (156). A more extensive account of the evolution of 
Dipsychus and The Spirit is given, again by Phelan, in “The Textual Evolution of Clough’s Dipsychus
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notion of the dignity of selfless duty to external absolutes. As Clough’s characters 
explore the directives and assurances they have associated with this notion, though, they 
can find no values or directives that seem convincingly to justify such dutiful 
subservience. Clough shows these characters to be inhibited by a burdensome 
dependence on, or commitment to, an essential schema of externally given absolutes. In 
Dostoevsky’s work, though, secular individualism is envisaged as a distraction from 
what remains, for him, a legitimate faith. It is a distraction, a lapse into dissociated 
somnambulism, which leads to moral isolation and the disintegration of the medium of 
moral agreement, self-denial or common purpose.
Dostoevsky’s idealist activists exist in social and historical circumstances which 
necessitate, or at least encourage, the catalytic faustian compromise (a term I shall 
explain later), through which individuals can maintain their idea or ideal, and meet their 
world’s demand for participation in a reality which is hostile to such fidelities. 
Dostoevsky’s earlier works - contemporary with Clough’s and each influenced in their 
way by the deterioration of the French Republic (in which abstract concerns seemed 
eclipsed by materialistic interests) - remain concerned with dreamers and thwarted 
idealists. Dostoevsky’s reaction against the encroachments of secular individualism and 
‘Western’ rationalism in Russia, exacerbated by the social upheavals leading up to and 
after the liberation of the serfs in 1861, translate in his novels to backgrounds of 
emergency and intellectual, spiritual and moral turmoil. The pressures experienced by 
Dostoevsky’s characters, in relation to their rights and responsibilities to their 
communities and themselves, are extreme. Their propensity is towards discovery 
through action and transgression whereas Clough’s poems anatomise conviction and 
commitment in more mundane and personal circumstances and in positions of rarefied 
abstraction from the kinds of pressures which precipitate the false certainties of 
Dostoevsky’s characters.12
and The Spirit” (Review of English Studies: A Quarterly Journal of English Literature and the English 
Language, 46:182 (1995), 230-39).
12 Russia’s extraordinary cultural, historical and social development, particularly throughout the 
nineteenth-century, is often stressed; sometimes to the extent that the phenomena this development 
produced can seem to be subjects which are impenetrably remote and obscure to external examination. In 
Joseph Conrad’s Under Western Eyes (1911), for example, the English narrator repeatedly stresses the 
notion that the experiences and effects of having been bred into, and existing in, a state of autocracy, such 
as Tsarist Russia, are impenetrable to “western eyes”, such as his own, and beyond the comprehension of 
those who have grown up with freedom of expression and thought. In a state of autocracy, for example, it 
is conceivable that knowing conformity could be perceived or judged to be a culpable act of complicity. 
Though reasons why individuals would be unable to express their dissent against repressive totalitarian 
regimes are countless (fear for themselves and those close to them, for example), the implied pressure on 
any critically aware and just-minded individual to oppose such repression is one example of the kind of 
ingrained idiosyncracies which Conrad’s narrator alludes to. Between the implicit burden of an 
obligatory conscientious objection and the pressure engendered by a thorough comprehension of the
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This thesis is not a study of influence or direct relationships between these two disparate 
authors (none are recorded or directly apparent), rather it is an exploration of their 
respective reactions to the failure of conventional governors of individual and 
communal moral agreement. Along with many other authors of the period, Clough and 
Dostoevsky share many common intellectual and cultural influences (John Stuart Mill’s 
utilitarian philosophy, for instance, was enormously influential on the late nineteenth 
century Russian radicals), but these particular common influences, while important, are 
incidental instances of their implicit involvement in a broad cultural and intellectual 
milieu. Dostoevsky’s insistent and urgent antagonism towards secular arrogation of 
spiritual authority, and the robust subtlety of Clough’s scrutiny of received certainties, 
underpin depictions of the quest to ascertain the role of abstract ideals in a secular moral 
atmosphere. Dostoevsky’s opposition to finite positivism furnishes him with a 
rhetorical position from which to serve his faith; he conducts this service with verve and 
a relentless penetration into the flaws and redemptive potential of the human subjects 
this service addresses. Clough’s rejection of finite positivism is more extensive, it 
subjects his own prejudices and preferences to an erosive scepticism. He has no 
spiritual orientation analogous to Dostoevsky’s, and this is why Dostoevsky’s type of 
repudiation of a secular capacity for moral independence does not cloud Clough’s 
depiction of the secular moral scene. In Clough’s work, conclusions, or founding 
certainties (Dipsychus’ commitment to the world, or Phillip’s and Elspie’s escape to a 
’new world’ in the colonies), can only be brought about through emotional and strategic 
approval of conventions in which conviction and idealism constitute the good manners 
of secular moral order. The difference between Dipsychus’ resignation to these 
manners and Clough’s representation of their role as terms of conscious moral 
agreement is the difference between a strategy for maintaining a persisting prestige for a 
dignifying idealistic service and an acceptance of the compromising pragmatism of 
finite moral responsibilities. But again, that strategy is not unequivocally decried: 
through its motivations and achievements it is revealed as a human utility overburdened 
by the obsolete heritage of divine authority. Dipsychus’ desire to serve is admirable but
ruthlessly upheld conservativism of autocracy, dissent is potentially fraught with feelings of anguished 
moral compulsion or with justifications for unhappy acts of evasive compromise. Such postures, though 
not impenetrable or inconceivable in a democratic society, are at least not as uniform or unilaterally 
applicable as they are in an oppressive state such as Tsarist Russia.
Aspects of this kind of argument over cultural boundaries are noted by the Russian critic S. 
Zhozhikashvili, as he surveys (with a good deal of dismay) contemporary Dostoevsky scholarship in 
Russia and, albeit incidentally, notes the comparative merits of many foreign language studies (“Notes on 
Contemporary Dostoevsky Studies”, Russian Studies in Literature, 54, 4 (1998), 56-92).
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his insistence that what he serves be of absolute authority involves him in isolating and 
self-deluding rationalisations, leaving him vulnerable to worldly and cynical 
manipulation.
These authors depict experiences, common both in nineteenth century Europe and 
more generally, relating to a loss of moorings in conventional or personal faith. Given 
the limitations of a doctoral thesis, my scope will remain within the nineteenth century 
as the period not necessarily most beset by change but perhaps the least conceptually 
equipped to deal with the idea of change as an ongoing condition rather than a means of 
transition between otherwise stable epochs.
The characters I shall examine share the background of a revolutionised Europe in 
which traditional political conventions have been shattered. They are confronted by a 
pervading spiritual unease as the literal truth of the Bible is brought into question and 
foundations of religious faith shaken. They consequently wrestle with, and thereby 
demonstrate, an acceleration of ideological awareness relating to the individual self as a 
potential reservoir of spiritual and cultural self-reliance, and as a focus of secular 
attempts to validate spiritual desires and dimensions of experience without resorting to 
external frames of authority. 13
The nineteenth century finds the individual struggling to come to terms with 
upheavals in religious and political convention, and with new notions of person-hood 
(that is, the theoretical rights and obligations of the individual). These struggles 
naturally placed strain on conventional or traditional habits of self-orientation and self­
representation. The characters I am discussing exist, therefore, in an atmosphere of 
revaluation and reorientation of personal and social moral obligations. 14 They are pre-
13 The romantic spirituality of the sublime, and the concern for the development of individual culture, 
incorporate attitudes towards the self inherited from Rousseau’s suggestions of the paramount 
significance of the subjective individual as both determining and adjudicating over abstract moral 
conduct. The subjective confession effects the arrogation, by the individual conscience, of the moral 
jurisdiction of stable absolute laws. The minutiae of the individual’s self-consciousness become the 
potential source of its moral enlightenment, but not as the provision of an underlying moral core, rather 
through the awareness of the strategic and distorting involvement of the individual self with its own 
conscience and self scrutiny.
14 In the early nineteenth century, Hegel had suggested the possibility that the tide of history and the force 
of cultural development could legitimately be proposed as consequences of the expression of an 
individual will. Napoleon was the provocation for this notion and is then offered as an exemplary 
affirmation of it. In The Historical Novel (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 
Lukäcs notes that “Hegelian philosophy draws all the inferences from the new progressive historicism. It 
sees man as a product of himself and of his own activity in history” (28). Which means that humanity 
evolves along with the changes in its circumstances. Lukäcs observes that Hegel’s conception of 
historical development was generated to justify the French Revolution against those who considered 
revolution to be incompatible with historical progress. Lukäcs notes also that from the French Revolution 
onwards cultural progress requires, or is felt to require, ideological justification of its legitimacy as a part 
of a historical sequence. The nature of these justifications is inherently abstract and generalising, they
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eminently concerned with their own isolated attempts to invest existence with meaning, 
beyond material needs and pleasures, and with their adopted duty (or a troubling 
intuition thereof) to elicit from these attempts a broader framework of individual 
responsibility to society or to a generalised principle of meaning (a transcendent ideal). 
But these desires, recognitions and responsibilities all encode the persistence of 
uncertainty as the backdrop of human idealism. Essentially, they confront the spiritual 
and social moral scenario which suggests to Dmitry Karamazov that perhaps “all is 
permitted”, and apply themselves to it in the hope and intention of discriminating and 
validating a vital and pertinent code of moral conduct capable of justifying moral 
limitations and responsibility for self-control.
In 1822 Stendhal noted: “The new generation has nothing to continue but everything to 
create. The great merit of Napoleon is that he made a clean sweep”.15 Stendhal’s 
pronouncement on the political carte blanche facing the post-revolutionary generation 
evokes the liberating effect of the void left in the cessation of Napoleon’s Empire. By 
the end of the revolutions of 1848 and 1849 the liberty to create had, for many, soured 
into a burdensome esteem for an increasingly futile project. Creating any ideology or 
abstract binding idea more compelling than the free exploitation and competition of 
laissez-faire economics became a more and more daunting prospect as prosperity 
increased and larger segments of society became dependent on the benefits of 
commerce at some level. The liberating challenge of a secular carte blanche seems to 
crystallise into the undifferentiated cacophony of special pleading which characterises 
attempts to decipher the indistinct sensations of doing battle by night.
Uncertainty is the adversary that provokes Dostoevsky’s attempts to reinvigorate 
absolute moral guidelines. Uncertainty is also, therefore, the essence of the worlds in 
which his characters exist and conduct their own searches for credible moral orientation 
and life-goals.
In order to demonstrate the embeddedness of Clough and Dostoevsky in a pervasive 
discourse concerning the legitimacy of the traditional roles of abstract idealism in the 
absence of common certainties, I shall refer also to other nineteenth century European 
authors who share a commitment to evaluating, modernising and sustaining a tradition 
of Western culture and individual liberty within their particular communities. A
impose an atmosphere in which this becomes the habitual tenor of ideology and cultural criticism. This 
habit is evident, for example, in the inflation of individual culture into a spiritual pursuit.
15 Stendhal, Love, trans. Gilbert & Suzanne Sale (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1975), 
Book II, Aphorism 133, 25.
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cosmopolitanism of abstract thought and literature becomes the basis of parallel 
reactions to upheavals in abstract frameworks, across cultural and national borders. 
This “cosmopolitanism” generates a community wherein external cultural materials are 
studied and imbibed with as much reverence as local realities, if not more (a facet which 
depictions of these characters is able to use for the full delineation of the motivations 
behind such selective appetites).
Tensions between abstract and practical moral validity implicit in the 
interrelationship of custom, conformity, compromise and criticism are not specific to 
any one time or nation. These are symptoms of metaphysical unrest and upheaval.
“Modem environments and experiences cut across all boundaries of geography 
and ethnicity, of class and nationality, of religion and ideology: in this sense, modernity 
can be said to unite all mankind” in a “maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and 
renewal” . 16 Under this presumption, Marshall Berman gathers a variety of 
representatives, both authors and fictitious characters, of the experience of modernism. 
Rather than uniting “mankind”, though, this kind of intellectual experience of 
uncertainty unifies the class who are given to such generalisations; the unification is 
implied, rather than achieved, in the common discourse of abstract engagement with 
reality. These registers share a common exposure to cultural upheaval in the nineteenth- 
century, and considered together provide an interrelationship in which patterns of 
disorientation and reaction appear. Though particular cultural analogies and sub-types 
which are more literally similar emerge through such a method as Berman’s, these are 
not fundamental to its more general fertility. And ‘general’ in this sense is a mildly 
deceiving term in that the patterns I intend to explore will become apparent through an 
essentially particularising focus on individual reactions to metaphysical disorientation. 
The common experiences and habitual reactions which emerge through this 
particularising focus are not intended to suggest any broad underlying cultural 
homogeneity; rather, they serve to demonstrate a widespread susceptibility, among the 
intellectual idealists I am discussing, to common emotional and intellectual dilemmas. 
The depictions of these characters, and their abstract dilemmas, offer representations of 
a type of problematic relationship between idealistic affinities and the realistic 
possibilities of expression which confront those individuals who confront and struggle 
with uncertainty in the hope of re-conceiving an absolute ideal.
16 Marshal Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air. The Experience of Modernity (London & New York: 
Verso, 1983), 15.
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In Turgenev’s On The Eve, Pavel Shubin (a ‘superfluous man’) responds to a 
friend’s reproach - “We were talking about the others, but you... I mean ... you start 
talking about yourself’17 - with an apology on behalf of a general situation of which 
(having been formed by it) he considers himself emblematic:
How justly you struck at my egoism and self-esteem. You’re right, you’re right: its 
no good bragging and talking about oneself. We haven’t got anything among us, no 
real people, wherever you look. It’s all either minnows and mice and little Hamlets 
feeding on themselves in ignorance and dark obscurity, or braggarts throwing their 
weight about, wasting time and breath and blowing their own trumpets. Or else 
there’s the other kind, always studying themselves: “That’s how I feel, and that’s 
what I think.” What a useful, sensible sort of occupation.18
The notion that the qualities and failings associated with “us” imply a distinctly Russian 
character gives an example of the at once particular and accurate and at the same time 
grossly over-simplifying and generalising habits which often influence the responses of 
this type of individuals to their subjectivity and self-awareness. Such elegies are 
typically uttered by particular types of characters, whose actual cultural peer group, to 
whom the “we” more accurately applies, represents a class of individuals rather than a 
nationality: intelligentsia and aesthetes; scrutineers of the respective abstract bases of 
their cultures’ prevailing values.19 The Underground Man, for instance, considers 
himself a “practitioner” of thought. His peers, in a general sense, are those who identify 
with a similar practice: characters like Raskolnikov, whose vocation is to think things
17 Ivan Turgenev, On the Eve, trans. Gilbert Gardiner (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 
1950), 197.
18 On the Eve, 197.
19 It is worth noting that the word “intelligentsia”, and the connotations that attend the basic, and rather 
vague, meaning it communicates, are both taken directly from Russia, and from its specialised 
significance as the label for the type of individuals and groups of individuals who undertook the critical 
investigation of, and often opposition to, the conventions and sanctioned truths which were utilised to 
rationalise the totalitarian authority of the Tsarist state.
The Russian intelligentsia developed with their self-image formed both in esteem of certain 
abstract principles and equally in opposition to the authoritarian regime which conforming society seemed 
tacitly to approve; generalised protests of idealism are fused with a circumstance of immediate hostility 
and tyranny. In their introduction to Chemyshevsky’s radical reformist novel What Is to Be Done? 
(Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1989), Michael Katz and William Wagner discuss the 
distinguishing particularities of the active radical intelligentsia (on whose behalf Chemyshevsky 
proselytises) in relation to the context of Russian social history of the period. The characteristics 
attributed to the younger intelligentsia (the 1860s radicals; the ‘sons’ as opposed to the ‘fathers’ of the 
1840s), such as their “sense of mission and alienation from the state” (Katz & Wagner, 2), reflects a 
posture which becomes common among the intelligentsia as modern secular ideologies come to dominate 
and superficially validate the conventions of the broader community, in the divorce of social convention 
from a credible external authority. Katz & Wagner refer to the “sociological process of education”, “the 
formulation of ideological beliefs”, and “the psychological experience of alienation” as possible factors in 
the formation and the particular nature of such groups (2).
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out in his room, and Claude, in Amours, who judges his detachment from active life as 
an inevitability of his role as a contemplative creature.
In relation to the broader community in which they live -  urbanising, 
bureaucratic, industrial and commercial - the attitudes adopted by intellectuals in the 
modernising Western nations exhibit some common ways of reacting to 
modernisation’s serial patterns of cultural disruption. Turgenev’s or Chekhov’s middle- 
class intellectuals have more abstract dilemmas, solutions or solaces in common with 
similar characters in the works of Clough, Gissing or Goethe, than with ‘the people’ 
whose national tradition they ostensibly share.20
My case is selective and tentative. It is not my intention to establish the existence of 
broad historical or sociological phenomena, or reductively to abduct these characters 
and works from their cultural and social circumstances. I shall be focusing on the 
striking similarities, and parallels which emerge through these authors’ depictions of 
intellectuals and idealists as registers of social upheaval and spiritual displacement 
brought about by common uncertainties surrounding religious creeds and moral codes 
(the whole assemblage of beliefs, ideals, values and aspirations which had formerly 
seemed authoritative).
The characters I am focusing on - educated, introspective and idealistic - esteem 
and seek to validate notions of abstract duty, spiritual dignity, and an idea of moral 
order. This determines their receptiveness to the signs and implications of moral 
uncertainty and their tendency to react to these signs in ways that fall into patterns for 
coping with, or dispersing, feelings of emotional and intellectual deprivation and 
anxiety. These patterns will be discussed at length in the body of this thesis.
20 Dostoevsky’s recurring diagnoses of self-consciousness as an alien cultural sickness are made in 
relation to an idealisation of the purity of the Russian soul. These diagnoses rely also on allowing that a 
generalised image of the Russian historical and cultural situation will always dominate the fact that it is 
made-up of human individuals, with hopes, anxieties and appetites similar to those of individuals in 
disparate cultures, who Dostoevsky is relying on to fulfil his prophecy, by producing the “new word” 
which will redeem Europe. To maintain that the Russian heart - unregenerate, fallible, human - is 
essentially different in conformation as opposed to preoccupation (the directions of its “interests”) is 
somewhat outlandish. It is true that Dostoevsky frequently claims precisely this; Gogol, though, in 
registering similar crises in the “Russian personality”, could allow that it reflected a human “spiritual” 
necessity, which was not particular to race or geography (he condemned the fading spirituality of 
humanity as a unilateral blight). The difference between Gogol’s attribution and Dostoevsky’s is due, 
perhaps, to Dostoevsky’s conviction that the Russian personality contained the seeds o f a solution to the 
spiritual sickness he associated with Western culture. For this to be possible Dostoevsky must think of 
the Russians as having been infected by a sickness which is alien to their intrinsic national character.
It is interesting to note that the gradual purging of the Russian bourgeoisie after the 1917 
Revolution essentially conferred on them this status of infected, un-Russian intruders; the exorcism of 
western individualism which Dostoevsky had allegorised in Demons is acted out bodily.
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Due to their relationship with abstract disciplines, it is typically intellectuals who 
perceive the “battle by night” which, taking place in the relatively obscure realm of 
universal values, proceeds “behind” convention. Similarly, it is this tacit community 
which, while familiar with the implausibility and limitations which absolutes rely on for 
credibility, is nevertheless (along with the credulous) most typically attracted, 
emotionally and intellectually, to the certainty they represent. Scepticism’s unsettling 
effect of placing moral responsibility in a constantly fluid and multifaceted environment 
requiring persistent re-evaluation (or deliberate non-participation rather than 
unpregnancy), inclines sceptics to envy the comforting certainty of faith. Through the 
distortions with which people unwittingly sanctify their self-interests and become 
unable to formulate or acknowledge the true nature of this moral burden, Dostoevsky 
depicts the divisive separateness of secular individualism. The effects on human 
relationships of an increasingly sceptical and secular culture prompt his rhetorical 
promotion of the notable absentee, faith, as the cornerstone of social stability and 
cultural well-being.
As registers of an upheaval and an apparent absence of unimpeachable moral and 
abstract comforts, these characters -  marginal intellectual figures - are used to enact and 
express the unsettling awareness, and the denied awareness, of the problematic role of 
secularised abstract ideals in sustaining a desired relationship to moral absolutes. This 
problem is most apparent in the difficulties which individuals experience in attempts to 
locate or elaborate a system of moral limitations and goals without a common external 
authority (particularly in the consequences that ensue when these difficulties are 
factitiously surmounted, or allowed to stand but deemed a sign of the impoverishment 
of secular morality).
It is one of the main problems in any crisis of faith that individuals begin to 
recognise the emotional particularity of their bonds to dictates that had seemed 
intrinsically authoritative. In their persisting attachment to such dictates and 
worldviews, in spite of rational repudiation of their transcendent authority, individuals 
are confronted by the implication that their approval had always contained a merely 
emotional element. Individuals’ consequent loss of confidence in their capacity to 
objectively recognise the absolute order they long for so ardently introduces a further 
source of stifling anxieties.
The depiction and exploration of this circumstance is certainly not particular to 
Clough and Dostoevsky; it is a recurrent and pervasive concern in the period. While 
characters in the works of Turgenev and Tolstoy, for example, have more of the
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gentrified ease on which Clough’s depictions of the displaced Claude and Dipsychus 
nevertheless rest, in Dostoevsky’s work the kind of aesthetic inner life and the dreams 
and protests of the abstract idealist are reified and tested against reality under the 
conditions of the authority to which they aspire.
Rather than seeking to combine Clough and Dostoevsky as instances of a common
circumstance, the benefit of exploring their respective reactions to moral relativism
together is in their extreme and readily apparent differences. In the distemper of their
characters’ idealistic alienation from reality, and in the habits of these characters’
supervision of the relationship between reality and their ideals, the function of
21transcendent ideals in the secular world becomes suggestively apparent.
Both Dostoevsky and Clough depict their characters’ fidelity to abstractions 
alongside reality’s resistance to the postures and expectations which these abstractions 
approve. The role of ideas is to the fore in these authors’ methods of characterisation 
not in the manner of a roman ä these, but as an element of the individual drama of 
character formation and individual orientation to the world.
In both authors’ works, the language and attitudes of transcendent abstract 
idealism come to suggest the tools of a particular type of quixotic relationship with 
subjectively reified desires for assuring models of hierarchical knowledge and absolute 
moral verities. Something similar to Cervantes’ methodology for revealing the schism 
between Don Quixote’s subjective vision and the world it eclipses is apparent in both 
Clough’s and Dostoevsky’s depiction of the function which abstract ideology has in the 
reactions of a class of intellectuals and idealists, to uncertainties which pervade their 
identity, their worldly role, and their spiritual allegiances. In depicting it as such, both 
Clough and Dostoevsky dismantle the foundations of secular absolutism and expose the
21 My usage of the word ‘distemper’ throughout this thesis, draws on an epigram at the start of Amours: 
“Oh, you are sick of self-love, Malvolio, / And taste with a distempered appetite!” (Clough - Selected 
Poems, 77; the quote is taken from Twelfth Night, I.v.89-90). The epigram reflects the distorting 
influence of fixed-ideas, such as Malvolio’s self-love, on the fixated individuals’ relationship with, and 
capacity to judge, ambivalent factual realities. Such fixations mediate individuals’ attribution of 
ambivalent fact, affecting the way individuals perceive and react to it; the paramount importance such 
individuals ascribe to their fixed-idea consigns them to exist within a kind of false version o f reality, 
which resists dimensions of actual reality and consequently deems it unpalatable. I mean ‘distempered’ 
to imply a state in which individuals’ reactions to their surroundings, to other people, and to ambivalent 
facts are in some way negatively distorted by their fixation with, or commitment to, some ostensibly 
absolute and external code of general values. Where abstract idealists’ abilities to register facts clearly is 
submerged beneath a fixation with the ultimate needfulness of absolutes, a distempered view of 
ambivalent reality as an outpost from the potent support of stable and credible abstractions often takes 
hold. This kind of distemper implies, then, a propensity to misapprehend reality or wrongly attribute the 
implications of ambivalent facts, which is determined by (and often indicative of) an idiosyncratic 
ideological perspective or worldview. Dipsychus’ distempered palate, for example, is formed by his 
commitment to the kind of absolute assurances divine authority had seemed to provide. The effect o f this 
distemper is apparent in his hostility to ambivalent reality, but more so in his adversarial relationship with 
whichever elements o f reality thwart his desire to perceive the world as the home of his ideal.
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influence of finite circumstance and individual preferences and desires which are 
encrypted and camouflaged within individuals’ quixotic deference to secular ideals. It 
is this concern which defines the common ground between Clough and Dostoevsky. 
The same could perhaps be said of a good number of their contemporaries, and 
comparisons of more overt sympathies in manner are apparent, Clough and Turgenev, 
for instance, or Dostoevsky and Gissing. Between Clough and Dostoevsky, though, 
both the commonalities and their marked differences provide echoes and complements 
which fill-out, rather than simply reiterate, the profile of individuals gradually exposed 
to the inadequacy of their ideal.
Clough’s most productive period as a poet was in the initial years of his displacement 
from the sphere in which both his vocation and career path had seemed to lie. He 
resigned from his Oxford tutorship in April of 1848, and gave up his fellowship in 
October. In the time between he had begun The Bothie (1848), and in the following 
four years of travel and temporary employment wrote Amours de Voyage and Dipsychus 
and The Spirit (henceforth Amours and Dipsychus respectively). The initial enthusiasm 
of liberation evident in The Bothie does not last beyond the final extinction of the 
uprisings throughout 1848 and into 1849. The fortunes of republicanism, something of 
an emblem, perhaps, of the possibility of secular reform, sour leaving him, in the later 
poems of confusion and displacement, to sort through the postures and convictions of 
individual and communal purpose as a kind of post mortem of the extinct possibility of 
clear moral absolutes and life-goals.
In March of 1848, wearied by the last obligations of his tutorship, Clough wrote 
to J.C.Shairp: “If it were not for all these blessed revolutions, I should sink into
22 A clear denunciation of this kind of idealisation is apparent in Gogol’s Petersburg tales; “The 
Overcoat” in particular gives a very clear depiction of the relationship with finite, synthetic, or worldly 
comforts which criticism of secular Idealism aims to ridicule. Akaky Akakievich, with nothing else in 
his life, invests his spiritual and personal love in his new coat. Though Akaky is a charmingly pathetic 
fool, Gogol is essentially mocking him and offering the reader his life as a travesty of the genuine dignity 
available in spirituality. Akaky is also a victim, though, and in his role in the bureaucratic and 
authoritarian department we can sympathise with him against the world that nurtured and exploits his 
travestied personality. As a ghost Akaky is far more spirited, attacking officials to deprive them of their 
warm coats, but he has nothing to lose, and there is still something pitiful about his fixation with the rank 
and privilege (and right to be warm) which defines eternity for him. Similarly, in Dostoevsky’s short 
story “Bobok”, a man asleep on a tombstone listens in on the petty bickering and social snobbery of the 
various corpses reposing in eternal rest beneath him. The eternal perpetuation of worldly squabbles 
travesties the afterlife’s potency as an incentive to moral virtue through the guarantee of a better world to 
come. Through their grotesqueries of contemporary conventions and social values, both stories seem to
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hopeless lethargy”.23 To Tom Arnold he suggested that the failed revolution of June, 
1848, might at least “accelerate change in England”.24 The prospect of change consoled 
Clough for his personal ambivalence over career, duty, and prospects: “I am loose in the 
world and being just out of my old place, I am ready to look at every new place, and 
likely enough to go to none”.25 The final revolutions of 1849 provide a backdrop to 
Amours in which the extinction of this optimism for change on a national scale is fused 
to a personal displacement from the terms of moral agreement and the possibilities of 
common recognition of any abstract moral order. Nevertheless, as the inadvertent post 
mortem of external authority, Clough’s sceptical uncertainty manages to remain 
sanguine and fertile, rather than hysterical or retrograde.
In the their initial bereavement from old forms, Clough’s characters feel all the 
responsibility of relocating a cohesive moral frame and none of the liberation. Clough 
depicts a dysfunction of traditional tropes of noble altruism through their failure to meet 
the demands his characters’ make in their attempts to found absolute convictions on 
them. In the discord between received expectations and actual possibilities which 
emerges in this dysfunction, the obsolescence of the worldview these tropes had upheld 
and been empowered by is implicit, and the shadow such worldviews cast over 
ambivalence and ambiguity comes to suggest a disruptive anachronism.
Just as Clough’s acceptance of uncertainty illuminates aspects of the motivations 
which force Dostoevsky’s characters away from the possibility of stoic wit and into 
tragic delusion, the circumstances with which Dostoevsky’s characters struggle 
illuminate particular factors that allow Claude, for instance, to avoid absolute devotion 
to any secular ideology.
Dostoevsky began his literary career in the 1840s when aesthetes and thinkers were 
faced with the authoritarian repression of ‘Western’ liberalism in response to European 
unrest. By the time Dostoevsky returned from jail and then exile in Siberia, in 1849, the 
Russian authorities were becoming more lenient towards expressions of dissent in an 
attempt to placate calls for radical change by encouraging the perception (somewhat 
cynically) that they were embracing and expediting reform. After the Emancipation of 
the Peasants early in 1862, the perception of the traditional Tsarist system as an external
challenge the reader to reject the values he ascribes to contemporary ‘reality’ and commit to something 
higher than social status and transient gratification.
23 Clough, Prose Remains of Arthur Hugh Clough: With a Selection from His Letters and a Memoir, ed. 
Blanche Clough (London & New York: Macmillan, 1888), 123.
24 Prose Remains, 137.
25 Prose Remains, 138.
17
order impervious to protest and opposition began to crumble. The presumption of the 
omnipotence of the state, and the stifling experience of the futile travail which had 
confined the idealistic anti-authoritarian criticism of the 1840s liberals to obscure 
allusiveness and abstraction, and a self-consoling, dreamy superfluity, gave way 
initially to an exaggerated belief in the new potency of populist political leverage.
To recall Stendhal’s reflection on the political scenario facing those taking over 
power after Napoleon’s Republic, the generation of idealists at this time look on their 
obligation not to continue but to create, with the additional luxury of considering 
themselves equipped with the knowledge and right to do so.
In Dostoevsky’s work revolutionaries and rebels are punished for their adolescent 
egotism with a fervour that suggests, perhaps, his own need to mortify himself for his 
own transgression of the status quo. The missionary strategy of debunking idols by 
offending them short-circuits: Dostoevsky fell in with the Petrashevsky circle, adopted 
Belinsky’s charismatic principles of reform through beauty and brotherhood, and found 
himself facing the firing squad. In the ensuing years of prison and army service (also a 
part of his sentence) Dostoevsky seems to respond to the suggestive cause and effect of 
his situation with an irascible often bombastic anathematisation of the pride and naivete 
he associated with his own radicalism.
After his return from Siberia, the solipsistic idealists in Dostoevsky’s work tend to 
participate in the world, pursuing active expressions of their inspirations in a desperate 
and explicit, but also naturalised, way. The repercussions of their disunity with reality 
are inflicted as a function of the chaos and suffering necessary to generate the emotional 
momentum for a repenting return to an order inherent in the reality which, under 
Dostoevsky’s control, exudes this corrective intolerance of individualism.
Though I shall refer in passing to a wide range of Dostoevsky’s work, Notes from 
Underground (1864) and Crime and Punishment (1866). provide the most salient 
depictions of the character type through which I intend to examine the relationship 
between abstract idealism and abstract uncertainties in the absence of God. In 
comparison to the broader canvas on which Dostoevsky explores related themes in The 
Idiot (1868), Demons (1872), and The Brothers Karamazov (1880), these works offer 
relatively clear and distilled examples of his concerns. The individual focus of Notes
26 It might seem that my thesis would have been ideally served by focusing on The Brothers Karamazov. 
However, to do justice to this novel, in which Dostoevsky evokes so many facets of the social and 
individual implications of an increasing disjunction of religious faith and worldly conventions in 
modernising Russia, would have required a sacrifice of the broader scope I hope to achieve through
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from Underground offers a useful point of progression from the journal-like self-portrait 
contained in Claude’s letters to Eustace, and the at once more ambiguous and more 
overtly solipsistic internal dialogue of Dipsychus. Crime and Punishment then offers a 
situation in which the individualistic engagement with moral rights and responsibilities, 
while still highly focused on the subjective processes of supporting a solipsistic relation 
to the world, is shown to require the moulding influence and demands of inter-personal 
relationships and pressing social circumstances. The relative diffuseness of these kinds 
of moulding circumstance in Claude’s and Dipsychus’ isolation from domestic 
responsibility, is fundamental to the effect of Clough’s work.
In close studies of Amours and Dipsychus I shall explore Clough’s depiction of the 
effects of the loss of certainty on the individual. I shall show how Clough alludes to a 
credible secular role for abstract quests and consolations, by depicting the distempering 
influences of persisting standards of absolute certainty. With this influence in view, the 
status of these truths is anatomised as these characters seek to activate emotionally 
esteemed and intellectually imprinted assurances, and instead discover that the literal 
authority these assurances depend upon and perpetuate is obsolete. Having established 
this feeling of existing in a void of moral absolutes as a potential consequence of secular 
scepticism, I shall discuss Crime and Punishment as an active protest against what 
Dostoevsky sees as the moral confusion of secular absolutism. Beneath the various 
motivations for Raskolnikov’s crime, it is his desperation to curtail an intractable 
uncertainty which provides him with the compulsion to compromise his awareness of 
reality’s ambiguities, in the hope of precipitating conviction. The strategies with which 
Raskolnikov seeks to rationalise away his crime and his guilt, and to give his 
mortification the appearance of liberation, disparage precisely those finite human 
conventions he feels himself so desperately in need of. As I shall argue, this 
disparagement reflects the isolating compromises necessitated by attempts at sustaining 
essentially finite inspirations pertaining to the role of external moral authorities. Only
drawing specific inferences from a broader range of Dostoevsky’s works, dealing more exclusively with 
some of the motivating concerns of my discussion of metaphysical uncertainty. Furthermore, though in 
many ways The Brothers Karamazov offers a kind of distillation or drawing together of the themes that 
preoccupied Dostoevsky throughout his work, I feel that in many of the earlier manifestations these 
themes, in their very formativeness, appear less the subject of what seems the more deliberate or resolved 
ideological stance of his final work.
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in essentially hostile solipsisms, or monologues, can the individual maintain their
27secular image of the divine authority they feel deprived of.
Clough and Dostoevsky each presents an extreme and unique voice: Dostoevsky’s 
attempts, through depictions of ostensibly normal reality, to induce or galvanise 
reactionary moral fervour involve the reader with the morbid disorientation of 
individuals who directly or indirectly attempt to transcend their moral bonds; while 
Clough, with his refusal to impose closure or certainty where it no longer seemed 
justified, writes with an anomalous facility for the unsullied depiction of the clash 
between uncertainty and a desire for order. Through this he demonstrates the 
pervasiveness of banal and fundamental, and therefore unavoidable, necessities of 
secular existence. In a sense, the perpetuation of absolutism which Dostoevsky’s 
characters (and Dostoevsky) undertake are attempts to avoid acknowledging this banal 
situation.
The dilemma between upholding abstract ideals and consenting to the limitations 
of worldly commitments which Clough’s characters typically recognise is approached 
from a position of literal remoteness from longstanding social ties. This approach, 
furthermore, is conducted in abstract and general terms which are free to find in Italian 
society, as they might in any alien culture, a social background in which commonly 
accepted conventions and values can be dissected as merely forms of the idea of 
community.
In Dostoevsky’s work, though, similar dilemmas take place within an actual 
community of autonomous others to whom he gives the right to demand that recalcitrant 
individuals recognise kinds of obligations from which Claude and Dipsychus (initially) 
are physically and, to some extent, socially removed. Claude and Dipsychus are 
physically remote from the kind of duties which, for instance, gradually outweigh 
Myshkin’s right and capacity to live by his ideal.28
The individual crises attending Clough’s characters’ confrontation of uncertainty 
take place in circumstances which seem particularly conducive to open equivocation:
27 In Myshkin’s chaotic attempt to convey a benevolent new order, in The Idiot, Dostoevsky depicts the 
results of the stifling ambiguity engendered by the emotional particularity which underlies the overt 
gestures intended to convey individual secular certainties as if they were general truths.
It was my intention that a thorough discussion of the implications of Myshkin’s attempt to purvey 
his ethic of compassion and openness would be included in this thesis as a point of contrast to 
Raskolnikov’s more overtly individualistic attempt to reify his ideal. Unfortunately there simply was not 
enough space to do justice to this comparison; the influence of the problems raised in The Idiot 
nevertheless remains apparent in my discussion of Crime and Punishment, and aspects of Myshkin’s 
character and role will be discussed throughout the thesis.
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they are isolated from immediate responsibility (single, unemployed, tourists), and 
while individual anxiety remains, the social pressures are diffuse. Dostoevsky’s 
alienated idealists are, in contrast, denied precisely the kind of recourse to “stoic 
epicureanism’’ which Claude’s circumstances allow him to cultivate.
The comic discrepancies which Amours and Dipsychus reveal at the heart of 
techniques through which desires for absolute comfort and consolation seek 
gratification in a recalcitrant reality, reappear in Dostoevsky’s work as fractures capable 
of provoking extreme angst. These fractures arise from and attest to the frustration of 
idealists, generated by their perceptions of a dwindling tolerance, implicit in everyday 
conventions of truth, for the credibility of moral codes based in abstract values, or for 
the possibility of certainty beyond merely material concerns.
Abstracted Idealism -  The Shadow of a Higher Duty
In the experiences of Clough’s idealistic characters (confusions of isolation, 
abandonment and liberation), habits which had formed during periods of subservience 
to ostensibly authoritative abstract goals and values are anatomised in a way that reveals 
the particular needs and pretences that typically invest such abstractions with “external” 
authority. This ‘anatomising’ implies, furthermore, that the only credible or defensible 
codes of purpose and moral behaviour are particular and finite; conscious and 
considered responses to the coercion of abstract ideals by circumstance, which accept 
the limited options available in any actual moral choice as a prompt to decision rather 
than as a justification for idealistic disengagement from a non-ideal world. In Amours, 
Claude is privileged with time and space enough to recognise the factitiousness of 
received models and terms of conviction, and the subjectivity and relativism of his 
relationship with them. The interactions of Clough’s characters with the reality which 
their abstractions aim to order, reveal uncertainty as an ambivalent condition of the 
moral environment, its natural state, not a personal deficiency. In Dostoevsky’s work, 
similar attitudes and desires are catalysed by psychological and social necessities in 
such a way that the characters affiliated with these attitudes feel encouraged, even 
compelled, to act out the agendas these affiliations provide as if they were external 
certainties rather than externalised expressions of desire.
28 The ethic through which Myshkin tries to live better than others, his ideal of compassion, is generated 
in a similar state of abstraction and isolation from the awkward realities of human interaction. When this 
ethic is forced to engage with these realities the limitations of its abstract inception begin to tell against it.
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Through my focus on the types of self-representation and habits of interaction with 
other people which habitually accompany idealists’ self-conscious affiliation with a 
higher authority, I seek to explore an impression that the persuasive potency and 
emotional energy of idealism and ideologies (both for individuals and as an evangelised 
creed) is generated by underlying fixations beneath their explicit concerns. The 
compelling prestige of this ‘language’, therefore, is not inspired by qualities inherent in 
the abstractions it invokes, but in the indirect expression of personal and emotional 
orientation they provide to those who make use of them. This relationship is 
simultaneously disguised and indulged by the formal implications of the terms of 
abstract discourse. Through their use of abstractions the characters and people I refer to 
attempt to make their personal desires and expectations seem objective and universal (in 
a manner compelling to themselves as well as others). Consequently, their personal 
preferences appear in variously subtle guises as absolute principles, allowing them to 
act as if in accord with an external authority. For the individual who constructs or 
approves them, subjective ideals and the ideological attitudes which they promote have 
the same appeal and function as more directly social or political directives. Julien Sorel, 
in Stendhal’s Scarlet and Black, approves and imitates Rousseau’s “horror of eating 
with servants”, due to the role of The Confessions in helping “his imagination to form a 
picture of society” (Scarlet and Black, 40). Julien is drawn to the convenient ready­
made construct of propriety (interpreted from Rousseau’s “picture”) with a feeling of 
vindicating his distaste for his present position and with the thrill of recognising a viable 
and estimable framework of conduct in the aspirations this picture encourages. A 
similar disgruntled alienation is apparent also in the purportedly rational and sceptical 
scrutiny which determines the discourse and conduct of absolute idealists struggling to 
regenerate a rational founding framework for their esteemed individual association with 
abstract moral propriety. The unwillingness to accept the purely material world as the 
sole resource of moral precepts and value judgements, generates a class of individuals 
who conduct their discourse and campaigns with an equal thrill of vindication and 
enthusiasm.
I shall therefore be exploring ideological formulations as a type of idiom, 
indirectly affirming subjectively privileged attitudes, rather than as systematic 
propositions to be evaluated abstractly in terms of their feasibility or otherwise.
In confronting uncertainty and ideological and moral ambiguities, Dostoevsky and 
Clough both depict, both deliberately and unwittingly, potential avenues of advance in
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the conception of idealism’s role as a mode of solely human expression, and the 
limitations this role simultaneously imposes.
In my discussion of these characters’ typical habits of abstract interpretation and 
expression of their responsibilities to reality, and of the ‘reality’ they envisage in 
response, the revealing interrelation between expression, circumstance and effect 
(particularly the discrepancy between desired and actual effects) will therefore play a 
major part.
The confusions inherent in the language and attitudes which sustain the ‘prestige’ 
of transcendent ideals, do not originate in cultural or even denominational 
particularities, but reflect, rather, the disrupted metaphysical context which had initially 
invested certain terms and attitudes with an otherworldly significance. Ultimately, the 
trauma of this dismption is founded in a modem “Western” spiritual self-conception, 
rather than in particular dispensations of the Russian or English, French or German 
language and culture. The tension between desired patterns of certainty and a reality 
which lacks any unimpeachable authority to sanction them, manifests in difficulties, 
partly of language, but essentially of self-expression and cogent communication of 
subjective moral positions. The strategies through which these characters can be seen to 
circumvent or rationalise these difficulties reveal the problematic relationship to 
external reality, which is engendered by secular “truths” that aim to efface the traces 
and implications of the finite human expression which is their essence.
Esteem for the potentially fertile role of abstract ideals implies approval of the benefits 
attainable through altruistically self-imposed responsibilities. The symbolic absolutes 
to which these responsibilities metaphorically defer are activated by this devotion; 
although considered real, they are plainly incapable of imposing on real life in the way 
an omnipotent God could. This act of self-resignation to abstract ideals also offers an 
active feeling of allegiance to a disparate community of similarly initiate individuals, 
real or imaginary, alive or dead. The ability or intention to sustain a faith in 
something beyond material circumstance (be it through independence from or
29 It is perceptions of this kind of shared devotion which encourage reflective and introspective 
individuals’ feelings of identification and intimacy with figures they are acquainted with merely through 
the figures’ history or their works: as Stendhal’s Julien Sorel took his cues from the writings of 
Rousseau; so Goethe identified and sympathised with Montaigne; for both Julien and Goethe these 
influences involve more than just intellectual approval or agreement, they include an emotional 
attachment through which these individuals claim the authors as their peers. Goethe observes in his 
autobiography that “Montaigne, Amyot, Rabelais, Marot, were my friends, and excited in me sympathy 
and delight” {The Autobiography of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, volume II, transl. John Oxenford 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), 97).
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compromise with social reality) becomes a source of pride.30 To the individuals 
involved, this “ability” often comes to suggest a calling and an esoteric mark of 
distinction, and therein, a potential source of distorting affectation. The significance 
invested in the capacity (and need) for faith is suggestive of a kind of indoctrinated 
reverence for the service of a higher purpose: whether as a military officer, a ship’s 
captain, a clergyman, a scientist, or a Rugby School prefect, a pseudo-aristocratic 
burden of honourable conduct becomes interwoven with standards of personal dignity 
and belonging. The capacity of these individuals to sustain their devotion to an abstract 
moral code becomes a standard against which they measure and affirm their self esteem 
and their worthiness of abstract duty.
I do not intend to suggest that such codes are intrinsically dangerous or untenable, 
but merely that they become so when their authority is accepted uncritically to the 
extent of denying or neglecting good reasons to temper their directives. There are of 
course a variety of reasons for individuals’ dependence in this fashion, but the 
consequences can be organised into a common pattern: the inability to acknowledge 
elements of experience and fact that contradict the terms of the code on which these 
individuals depend, results in a compromised relationship with reality and others (a
o  i
compromise which tells in their thinking and actions).
Abstract idealism permits individuals the self-perception of a kind of chivalric 
brotherhood, elevated from the conventional forms that bind the community in which 
they exist, and providing an ostensibly disinterested abstract standard against which the 
absolute value of these conventional forms can be measured and, typically, criticised.
301 shall explore this dimension further in Chapter 5 - “A Dignified Occupation”.
31 The idealist’s feelings of homelessness amidst the merely pragmatic contingencies of worldliness can 
also reflect a proud posture of resistance to self-interest and material motivation; a posture of protest 
against what are felt to be the wider community’s abuses of abstract virtues. The role of any idea capable 
of providing individuals or groups with reasons to oppose material conventions is a potential source of 
dissent and disruption. Idealism sustains the kind of irrational sacrifices necessary to disruptions of status 
quo and individuals’ self-interest. For example, in Griboyedov’s Chatsky or The Misery o f Having a 
Mind (1823) (The Government Inspector and Other Russian Plays: Fonvizin: The Infant; Griboyedov: 
Chatsky; Gogol: The Government Inspector; Ostrovsky: Thunder, transl. Joshua Cooper; 1972, 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1990), 125-213), the self-imposed exile of the titular hero 
acts out his conviction that the critical intellect is superfluous in a world of blind conformity and material 
determinism: “I’ve gone to search the world, / To find some niche, where outraged sense can shelter!” 
(Chatsky, Act 4, 211). Chatsky’s “outraged sense” reflects his feeling that living heritage has been 
replaced by an appropriated and superficial culture. Such complaints invoke idealised standards (in 
varied forms, such as disinterested rationalism, communism, or the return to the soil) to authorise and 
bolster a criticism of a self-aggrandising culture of hypocrisy and formalised delusion. (Alexander 
Griboyedov was a contemporary of Alexander Pushkin; in 1825 he was arrested in the wake of the 
Decembrist Uprising, but eventually was cleared of any seditious activity and released.) Dostoevsky’s 
various characterisations (in Notes from Underground and “White Nights” (1846), for example) of 
Petersburg as an artificial or premeditated city, produced from ephemera, founded on ephemera and 
potentially at any moment to go the way of ephemera, express a similarly uneasy response to urban 
modernity.
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In this self-perception, the sometimes quixotic heroes of cultural criticism evince the 
sort of spiritual pride which so readily disrupts their commitment to disinterested 
scepticism.
The realm of abstract thought often comes to suggest to the idealist their natural 
element, both their calling and their place (or “home”), and though its consolations are 
undeniable they are seductive and isolating.
For example, as Arkady Dolgoruky, in Dostoevsky’s An Accidental Family 
(1875), reflects, “My idea is the comer I live in”;32 he observes also that his loyalty to 
this “comer”, and to justifying its “reality” at the expense of fact if need be, is all- 
consuming: “I just can’t live among people -  that’s what I think now and I’ll say the 
same thing in forty years”.33 Arkady (much like Raskolnikov) nurtures the authority of 
his idea through isolation, and ultimately finds himself imprisoned within this solitude 
and within a sterile charade of the desired self-image it allows him to sustain.34 Just as 
an idea provides Arkady with his own ‘place’ (his comer), strict fidelity to the ‘ideas’ 
on which they are emotionally dependent often incarcerates abstract idealists in a 
‘necessary’ isolation.
In a similar way to that in which Arkady’s devotion to his idea reifies it as a 
shelter from an unsatisfying reality, the emotional relationships individuals form with 
their “ideas” can reify them as comrades. Steeped in the psychology of attachment, loss 
and emotional (not merely intellectual) uncertainty, these relationships can become 
sources of genuine feelings of pleasure, belonging and comfort.
The majority of individuals who depend on these feelings, though, are also aware 
that they deviate from conventional or communal patterns of emotional life. Hence the 
tendency to seek out peers, or form friendships with others capable at least of 
understanding the literal meaning of their enthusiasms.35 The poetry and inclusiveness
32 Dostoevsky, An Accidental Family, trans. Richard Freeborn (Oxford & New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 58. This work has also been translated under the titles A Rctw Youth, and The Adolescent.
33 An Accidental Family, 58.
34 Predominantly, Arkady’s dependence on the notion that his life is intrinsically an act of devotion to an 
abstract ideal, allows him to maintain a good opinion of himself, regardless of his actions. “The main 
thing was”, he admits, “that I always had an excuse. No matter how much I upset my mother at this time, 
or how shamefully I neglected my sister, I would always tell myself: ‘Well, I have my “Idea” and 
everything else is nonsense.’ If I were ever told off -  and badly told off at that - 1 would go away feeling 
humiliated and later I’d suddenly say to myself: ‘Oh, I may be a low down bastard, but I’ve still got my 
“Idea” and they know nothing about that.’ ” (An Accidental Family, 101).
35 In Crime and Punishment this kind of attraction is apparent between Raskolnikov and Svidrigailov: 
they are each drawn to the other in the hope of establishing a sympathetic bond of transgressive disdain 
for conventional morality. Similarly, in Demons, the members of Pyotr Verkhovensky’s insurgent cell 
are bound solely by the fact of their insurgent relationship with convention; beyond this relationship their 
actual systems of belief are various and personal. The nature of this bond reflects a common pattem in 
the critical and abstract community: their orientation to reality, rather than any particular common 
conclusion, is the fundamental distinguishing factor.
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of the coven of abstract devotees is attainable simply by awareness and sympathy; as
o r
ideas, its iconic figureheads and virtues, are potentially accessible by anyone.
In Amours, Mary Trevellyn reflects that Claude speaks of ideas with vitality: “it is 
but when he talks of ideas, / That he is quite unaffected, and free, and expansive, and 
easy;” (Hü.32-33). This is not simply the sign of a “cold intellectual” dissector of 
emotions (III.i.34), it is the enthusiasm for an adopted mother tongue, the pleasure at 
being invited to move in the realm associated with proud self-esteem and a capacity to 
engage with others. Though it gives the impression of a lack of sympathy and aloofness 
(quite deliberately) from surface manners and simple chatter, Claude’s preferred idiom 
is not esteemed by him solely for its abstractness and devotion to profound thought, it is 
also, for Claude, a far more familiar and emotionally gratifying mode of interaction. 
Talk “of ideas” affords Claude a secure foundation which offers him a means of 
attempting to establish a rapport with the Trevellyns from a position of personal 
confidence. Rather than abstraction itself being intrinsically inhibiting, though, it is the 
dependence on the familiar security of his preferred attitudes which keeps Claude from 
surrendering to spontaneous interaction. The tendency to abstract individual 
experiences from their particularity allows individuals to distance emotion and, in 
generalising personal desires, pains and obligations, also forestalls decisive individual 
engagement. Claude’s rarefied language and abstracted reflections, though, in their 
very ongoing-ness and thematic fixations show their incapacity to quiet the uncertainty 
and anxiety that provokes their attempts to impose order. Because his critical idiom is 
still a register, or language, of personal circumstance and individual confusion, Claude 
cannot efface the decisive awareness that this curiously ambivalent state relates to him. 
While seeming somehow external to him, the void of absolutes (the ambivalent world) 
requires his personal collaboration with his particular circumstances to both learn and 
engage with finite moral directives.
Later in this thesis I shall focus on Dostoevsky’s representations of these almost reified 
relationships with ideas and abstract systems, wherein abstract subjective “ideals” come to play the part 
of real external presences in individuals’ lives, rather than remaining as gestures or symbols which the 
individual uses, controls and originates.
36 Dostoevsky’s description of a revolutionary’s raided apartment, in Demons, clearly points up the 
utilisation of secular ideas and thinkers in the role of iconic totems. The revolutionary has smashed his 
landlord’s icon with an axe (Demons, transl. Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky (London: Vintage, 
1994), 346). In arranging three books, by Vogt, Moleschott and Büchner (all scientistic rational 
positivists), as secular symbols for iconic veneration, the religiosity of his revolutionary iconoclasm 
attests to a reactionary dependence on the rituals of prestige belonging to the structures it opposes. While 
implications of subversive parody are available (both by or of the revolutionary), the revolutionary’s 
surrogate icons seem to suggest a spontaneous and intrinsic dependence on the pattern of subordination,
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I do not intend in focusing on these various characters to reduce them to a common 
explanation of their habits and their recourse to abstraction. I aim, rather, to signal the 
fact of this significant common recourse to abstract idealism, and by exploring the 
nature of this fact, to show both how idealistic intellectuals desire to react to a 
circumstance of pervasive uncertainty, and how they are legitimately able to do so, and 
the tension between the two. I shall be exploring idealism, therefore, in relation to its 
formulation and justification by individuals who are dependent, in one way or another, 
on validating a relationship to a higher -knowledge in order to curtail the pain of 
uncertainty and undirected choice. This exploration is not undertaken as an evaluation 
of the validity of the various ideals as philosophical positions, but rather to suggest a 
common pattern in the interaction between intellect, emotion, and psychology, which 
underlies these particular expressions. Registering this pattem suggests a means to 
interpret and understand the deliberate and indirect portrayals of the role of idealism in 
expressing the disorientation of individuals committed to moral quests in a period which 
is essentially the dawn of widespread secular moral relativism. Idealism and abstraction 
become recourses for expressions of the loss of co-ordinates rather than a fertile 
resource of systems and projects for their reintroduction.
In spite of their differences, these characters have in common their involvement 
with the problems of utilizing abstraction as a medium of individual discourse and 
orientation to their community. The subsequent consciousness of a divide between 
desire and reality (relating to self and the world) leads to parallel experiences of 
displacement and superfluity. In relation to these experiences, extremes of non­
conformity, such as revolution or withdrawal, are equally representative of strategies 
with which particular individuals cope with the dispersal of certainty, and the 
undermining of an esteemed code of conduct.
To this end, my focus is on characters’ use of abstract and transcendent idealism 
as a privileged tool, the circumstances in which they apply this tool, and the role which 
their desiring emotional selves play as both superintendent and conduit of the 
“objective” idealistic discourse they crave. The characters’ relationships with reality are 
depicted alongside a reality in which their authors enable the reader to recognise 
discrepancies between individualistic images both of reality and of self, and the actual 
circumstances to which these are a response.
of which the ideological opposition between the materialist doctrines represented by the new icons and 
the spiritual doctrine it replaces hides an essentially similar practice.
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In depicting the undesirable consequences that often arise from the passionate 
intensity which sustains these individualistic images, there is often an ambiguous 
moralistic reinforcement of the status quo. It is effected through a kind of narrative 
backlash, unintentional at times no doubt, which, in castigating the particular 
consequences precipitated by an individual’s actions seems at the same time to 
recommend or endorse the conservative stasis which these actions transgress. I am 
aware that my own criticisms of idealistic absolutism may at times suffer from a similar 
backlash. This is unintended and undesirable. My criticisms are aimed at
demonstrating the particular manner which absolutism (deprived of divine foundations) 
imposes on idealistic impulses, and exploring the postures its weight forces individuals 
to adopt in order to sustain a feeling of fidelity to their ideals. Unto themselves these 
impulses suggest estimable attempts to engage in a disinterested constructive criticism 
of humanity’s position in the world and individuals’ relationship to other individuals. 
As far as I have any ideological intent, then, it is rather to demonstrate that the disrepute 
into which this kind of abstract posture so often falls (both when it precipitates action 
and when it fails to) is a reflection of the distempering expectations which intellectual 
and emotional habits of absolutism lead idealists to impose on their own ideals.
It is a fundamental presumption of my thesis that intellectual idealism is a 
valuable activity. The criticism I may at times appear to heap on its devotees is rather to 
expose particular inherited habits that appear to corrupt this activity, and bind it 
unnecessarily to unhappy and often destructive results.
In the cases I shall examine, I hope to show that idealism involves choices and 
preferences for which the individual idealist is always ultimately accountable, but which 
they often seek to deflect onto impersonal objective principles. I hope also to suggest 
that the problems idealists often experience in a world of ambivalent facts which 
intrinsically opposes any single and absolute ideal, typically stem from their desire to 
avoid (by surrendering to the idea of a higher authority) a burdensome responsibility to 
accept that they are themselves making choices from the midst of various and 
conflicting ‘moral’ impulses.37
37 In the absence of any absolute authority, idealism requires conscious sacrifices and compromises, and 
cannot provide a template for unimpeachable moral conduct. Where individual responsibility for 
approving a particular ideal is admitted, so that any negative or uncomfortable consequences are expected 
and accepted beforehand, these problems might be avoided. This is not pragmatism under the name of 
idealism, but merely a pragmatic approach to the role of idealism. It is an approach that might enable 
idealists to avoid the dissatisfaction and disillusion which so often sours a commitment to principles 
which, though not ideal, are in themselves worth the reverence the idealist feels for them (as is the case 
with Dipsychus).
This implied distinction, between pragmatic idealism and absolute idealism, also suggests the 
resilience (and desirability) o f idealism that accepts its foundation in protest and its bond to a finite
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Two terms I am using to denote particular habitual responses to uncertainty are the 
‘faustian compromise’ and the ‘unpregnant pause’. These terms refer to particular 
patterns into which the consequences of individual confrontations with the limitations 
imposed by uncertainty appear to fall. I shall briefly explain these terms here, and then 
again in greater detail in the chapter “Framework”. The names I have given to these 
patterns are suggested by the habits of identification utilised both deliberately and 
unwittingly by these characters, and similarly, therefore, by the authors who depict 
them.38 However, the terms as I use them will also come gradually to emphasise some 
implicit patterns and implications within these tropes of the intellectual, emotional and 
moral impact of seeking moral absolutes and finding only uncertainty. The faustian 
compromise relates to a circumstance of wilful action undertaken as if with a foundation 
of certainty, in rebellion against what is unwittingly recognised as a circumstance of 
legitimate ambiguity. The unpregnant pause, drawing on the particular attraction 
Hamlet held for many of the characters I shall be discussing, reflects the inability to act 
in response to an intractable registering of relativism and confusion.
The ostensibly unlikely pairing of Clough’s and Dostoevsky’s work offers a 
fruitful contrast through which the essential contingency of this language of 
transcendent abstractions can be made apparent.
Identifying Clough with the unpregnant pause, and Dostoevsky with the faustian 
compromise, serves to clarify the conditions under which these two radically dissimilar 
authors offer striking elaborations of an either/or of the options open to abstract idealists 
in an atmosphere of contestable moral authority. The dubious foundations of secular 
conviction are ultimately apparent in the uncommitted non-ideology of Clough’s work. 
In Dostoevsky’s work this dubiousness is proclaimed through the consequences of his 
characters’ application of their individualistic and secular convictions to reality. These 
applications are conducted in a manner which, while supported and promoted by the 
habitual patterns of their formulation, they are essentially incapable of sustaining 
without resorting to a selective relationship to their actual consequences. In Dipsychus, 
Clough depicts the emotional persuasions typical of faustian compromises, and in
criticism of particular discontents, and does not seek or depend on the moral superintendence of an 
external sanction.
*  *  *  *  *
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Dostoevsky the problematic conditions of the unpregnant pause are implicit in his 
disparagement of secular ideology. Having established the dilemma of esteeming once- 
authoritative absolutes in the clarity of abstraction afforded by Clough’s non-ideology, I 
shall explore the role of secular absolutism in Dostoevsky’s work as the inappropriate 
foundations of idealistic commitment.
The conditions which promote the faustian compromise are heightened in Dostoevsky’s 
Russia but exist wherever the necessity of acting out of a desire for certainty, and in the 
hope of thereby precipitating the desired conviction, is more compelling than the need 
to acknowledge the legitimate ambiguity that undermines any formulation of absolute 
conviction. Moral choices are intellectually laid out before Clough’s characters with no 
externally compelling need to make one: to do so then becomes an act of conscience 
and, potentially, of subjective self-solacing. As much as discovering the reliance of 
conviction and self-sacrifice in the name of conviction on ambiguous and emotive 
arguments, Claude, in Amours, discovers an inability to react genuinely to these emotive 
models from the transience which is a fundamental part of both his intellectual plasticity 
and his physical and cultural remoteness.
The unpregnant pause reflects a privileged position of freedom from (or 
imperviousness to) immediate obligation, and a freedom therefore from any 
circumstances which directly accuse it of negligently over-scrupulous moral 
fastidiousness (an accusation which, as I shall discuss later, The Spirit levels 
relentlessly at Dipsychus’ devotion to abstract ideals). The dreamer, as Dostoevsky 
portrays this type in his earliest fiction, is deprived of the privilege of such negligence. 
Rather than committing themselves to reify their desired reality by acting as if it were 
real, or sacrificing it in deference to what is perceived as an unpleasant reality, the 
dreamers indulge passively in a dual existence of solipsistically approved artifice. Their 
dreams are segregated from the compromises their real situation demands of them (such 
as mundane employment, living within their means etc.), and esteemed as the reality 
more suited to their personal measure of their self-worth and entitlements.
Unlike “dreamers”, faustian activists in the service of a “new word” seek to 
support ideas and interpretations which are ostensibly capable of affirming their 
particular ideal as a reality which exists as much for others as it does for them. Rather 
than retreating into solipsism (after the disorientation that ensues in the loss of a divine
38 In depicting these habits of identification, authors’ motivations can vary from naturalistic registering of 
a specimen to sympathetic approval of the character type, or the critical interpretation of the emotional
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authority, for example), these active idealists act out their individual need for order as a 
general and public concern. The two types share a fundamental esteem for their 
individually approved versions of an ideal order but the active idealists feel compelled 
to impose this esteemed vision on actual reality and, therefore, other people.
and psychological circumstances behind this characteristic habit.
CHAPTER 2 -  Fram ew ork
Apparatus Briefly
To describe some patterns in the relationships which these characters form with abstract 
attitudes and systems I shall be using a framework of terms which, though probably 
familiar to the reader, will be used to designate particular meanings in this thesis. I 
shall here give a brief introduction to these terms before dealing with them individually.
“Emotivism” is a term I have borrowed from Alasdair MacIntyre’s special 
redefinition, in After Virtue, of the philosophy of Moore, Stevenson, Duncan and 
Ramsey. I shall explain this relationship in more detail shortly, and expand on it in my 
argument. Similarly, “monologue” is a term which unavoidably evokes Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s work on the significance of monologic and dialogic authority and their 
relation, respectively, to worldviews he distinguishes as epic and novelistic. My own 
usage of monologue has parallels with Bakhtin but I am not employing it as a 
Bakhtinian term; the differences in my usage of the term will be explored in the section 
“Emotivism and Monologues”.
I am using the notion of little-fausts and little-hamlets, and, respectively, their 
characteristic compromises for the sake of action and their unpregnant pauses, to 
suggest two patterns of response to individual feelings of having been deprived of 
cogent moral proofs and abstract convictions. 1 Both these reactions are prompted by a
1 The little-hamlet (gamletik in Russian) we have already met in Shubin’s self-diagnosis as a 
representative of the superfluous generation of Russian intelligentsia to which he belongs. The little- 
hamlet was a particularly popular trope of intellectual disaffection and discontent in mid nineteenth- 
century Russia, as it was throughout Europe. The hero of Tennyson’s Maud also refers to himself as a 
little hamlet, but it is by behaviour, rather than specific self-identification, that most of the little-hamlets 
reveal their shared status.
“Faustuli” (little-faust), is the name under which Dipsychus’ character, and his part in the dialogue 
with The Spirit, developed in Clough’s manuscripts. Again, it is a convenient name for the pattem of 
behaviour that I shall explain further in the body of this thesis. Both terms incorporate diminutive 
implications, which reflect a kind of trickle-down process of identification wherein a large population of 
educated but predominantly anonymous individuals feel justified in making sense of their circumstance 
by identifying with parallel elements in the situation, decisions and fate of these grandiose intellectual 
heroes. In The Proud Knowledge: Poetry, Insight and the Self, 1620-1920 (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1977), John Holloway notes similarly that as “Faust the Little”, Dipsychus has “shrunk from the 
stature of heroic enquirer and seeker to that of diminutive manikin, all doubt and hesitation” (149). 
Characters such as Faust, Hamlet and Don Quixote offered (and still offer) evocative emblems of certain 
types of behaviour, or habits of thought (much as Napoleon did), which were available to the ever 
increasing population of literate middle class aspirants, to dignify the analogy these individuals felt to 
exist between their own and their heroes’ challenges and qualities.
Matthew Arnold’s allusive complaint (in the preface to his collected poems in 1853) that, in the 
fragments of the philosopher Empedocles, “the dialogue of the mind with itself has commenced; modern 
problems have presented themselves, we hear already the doubts, we witness the discouragement, of
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paramount desire for a clear moral authority: the little-hamlets refuse to act except in the 
name of an authoritative conviction, and will not tamper with uncertainty to convince 
themselves of its existence; the little-fausts act, be it on their idea of the world or on the 
world itself, in order to make the world ostensibly comply with the conditions necessary 
for the absolute credibility of their subjective conviction. Primarily, though, the 
experiences of the little-fausts are distinguished by the subsequent reactions to this 
action, through which they seek to evade the failures of their proposed absolute and are 
exposed in the capricious compromise on which it had been founded.
In the characters of Hamlet and Don Quixote, Ivan Turgenev perceived “the twin 
antitypes of human nature,” rhetorically pondering: “Do not all men belong more or less 
to one type or the other?”. Turgenev’s over-generalisation is blatant; nevertheless in 
his complaint that his own time is marked by rather more Hamlets than Don Quixotes, 
the characters are formed into Turgenev’s own symbols of a contrasting relationship 
between irony and faith. For Turgenev the proliferation of ironic self-awareness and the 
apparently overwhelming (though perhaps circumstantial) evidence linking it to over- 
scrupulous, and therefore interminable, equivocation seems to confer on quixotic 
behaviour the prestige of a rare determination to reify idealism and live in complete 
subjection to it.* 23
The Russian critic Vissarion Belinsky saw in Hamlet a reflection of the 
introspective idealist mindset, which he juxtaposed with the mature and worldly life-of- 
the-mind of Faust.4 Though Belinsky’s response to Faust, like Turgenev’s to Don
Hamlet and of Faust”, further accentuates the fertile status of these two characters as points of reference, 
identification and self-definition (“Preface to the First Edition of Poems (1853)”, The Poems o f Matthew 
Arnold, ed. Kenneth Allot (London: Longmans, 1965), Appendix A, 589-609, 591). Arnold felt his 
interpretation of Empedocles’ despairing state of mind, in “Empedocles on Aetna” had become 
inappropriate for the contemporary intellectual scene, in which he felt it stood as a dangerous affirmation 
of its least worthy traits. Consequently, the poem, as explained in the 1853 preface, was ceremonially 
excluded from a volume of Arnold’s collected works.
2 Ivan Turgenev, Hamlet and Don Quixote, trans. Robert Nichols (London: Hendersons, 1930), 11.
3 The desire for a correction to the ‘imbalance’ generated by the proliferation of scepticism stimulates 
Turgenev’s rather extravagant idealisation of the alternative “antitype” and the remedy of faith which 
Don Quixote’s idealism appears to him to represent: Quixote becomes a great and humble hero, whose 
one goal is “to establish the triumph of truth and reign of justice upon earth” (Hamlet and Don Quixote, 
13). In Prince Myshkin’s development throughout The Idiot one could see a desire to redress this same 
imbalance, stifled by the reality of an atmosphere inhospitable to proofs of faith. From the holy fool 
naivete of “the knight of the sad countenance”, Myshkin’s experience of an imperviously ambivalent 
reality delivers him into the morass of the double mind. Turgenev’s criticism, itself subject to the cultural 
phenomenon of which he writes, shows signs of an Individualism which, in terms similar to McGann’s 
distinction, in The Romantic Ideology, between Romantic practice and Romantic Ideology 
(Romanticism), exists as a symptom of uncritical approval or allegiance to the predicates it examines.
4 In “Shakespeare’s Hamlet” (1835), the Russian critic Vissarion Belinsky used Hamlet and Faust to 
distinguish a seeking in the world and a seeking in the self for the harmonious affirmation of idealism
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Quixote, romanticises him almost out of recognition, he brings them together as 
counterpoints in the explanation of a type, rather than as twin antitypes of human 
nature. The little-hamlets and little-fausts take shape in the self-defining responses of 
idealists to reality’s resistance to the forms of their ideals. In contrast to the Quixotic 
image of singular action sanctified by individual faith, the consequences of Faust’s 
disappointed and distempered idealism render him an emblem of the fate of secular 
decisiveness compelled by the strategic image of absolute certainty. The unpregnant 
pause of the gamletik reflects an environment shared by, and factitiously resolved in, the 
faustian compromise.* 5
(Allen & Clark, Literary Criticism: Pope to Croce (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), 442- 
48).
Writing on the nineteenth-century Russian dissident author Alexander Herzen, Isaiah Berlin refers 
briefly to a character in Herzen’s Who Is To Blame? as a “prototype” of the “Russian Hamlet” (see “A 
Revolutionary Without Fanaticism”, The Power o f Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (London: Pimlico, 2001), SB- 
102). A familiar figure in the novels also of Goncharov, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Turgenev, the “Russian 
Hamlet” is “too idealistic and too honest to accept the squalor and the lies of conventional society; too 
weak and too civilised to work effectively for their destruction, and consequently displaced from his 
proper function and doomed to poison his own life and the lives of others by neurotic behaviour” (The 
Power of Ideas, 90).
In other writings on the role of the intelligentsia, particularly in nineteenth-century Russia, Berlin 
elaborates on the unusual role ideas played in Russian intellectual history. Berlin attributes the tendency 
among nineteenth-century Russian intellectuals towards reifying abstract theories and intellectual systems 
(a tendency he represents as in some way determined as a kind of national mentality) to an enthusiastic 
faith in the attainability of generalised ideals and absolutes. Ideological activity was inherently geared, 
therefore, to the attainment of an actual endpoint (the truth, or the best truth, for instance), and ideological 
inspirations, accordingly, were frequently mistaken, misrepresented, and misused as natural laws (like the 
law of gravity). See also Berlin’s “Russian Intellectual History” (The Power of Ideas, 68-78), and “The 
Role of the Intelligentsia” (The Power of Ideas, 103-10). Towards the end of the nineteenth century the
figure persists in Anton Chekhov’s plays and stories; in the superfluous and self loathing Ivanov (in 
Ivanov), for example, and the young aesthete, Kostia Trepliov, whose suicide brings The Seagull to its 
close.
5 The gamletiks that proliferate throughout Turgenev’s fiction share an almost ubiquitous deference (half 
envy, half disdain) to men of action, and to the semblance of conviction that adheres to their activities. 
These men of action suggest characters whose devotion to a cause indicates a vitality and determination 
which inevitably also wins them the intellectual’s or aesthete’s cherished (from afar) ideal love. In On 
the Eve, Smoke, and Virgin Soil a similar pattern of almost willed, and certainly approved, romantic 
failure sees the hero’s female counterpart, a worthy help-meet, won from the aesthete by the man of 
action. The aesthetes’ approval acknowledges a sense that their own practical or domestic ineptitude 
would ultimately mark their partnership with this help-meet as a negligent misappropriation of an 
otherwise useful contributor to the common good. In Ivan Goncharov’s Oblomov this conscientious 
bachelorhood is imposed on Ilya Oblomov and approved by him in recognition of the incurable indolence 
that attends his day-dreaming detachment from real life. The natural partner of the “hero”, as suggested 
by conventions of romance, marries the efficient German instead, and together they reflect sadly on 
Oblomov’s continued dissipation, with parental tenderness and despair. In this deviation of focus from 
the standard order of romantic plot (an order which, were it desired, could have been salvaged by 
redirecting the reader’s interest to the effective couple) the disruptive presence of the antihero is 
formulaically laid out. Oblomov’s negligence, his isolation, his aversion to change, and his 
disproportionate love of his cloistered certainties, are all apparent in this marginalisation from his 
traditional social (and literary) obligations. In Virgin Soil, and in Chernyyshevsky’s What Is To Be 
Done?, the self-conscious abstract idealists, Nejdanov and Lopukhov respectively, have won their ideal 
female counterparts (refined, emancipated and committed), but each conscientiously surrenders them to 
the men of action, to whom the women, they supposed, are better suited. Nejdanov extends the surrender 
of his own interests to that of his “cause” by surrendering his life: he commits suicide to blot out and 
curtail his failure to live up to his ideal. Nejdanov’s inability to become “simplified” is a repudiation of 
his most cherished ideas which he cannot abide. The commonplace naivete and ambiguous altruism that
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The faustian compromise entails a situation in which individuals attempt to 
arrogate to themselves, or to their subjectively affirmed ideals, the absolute authority of 
an external or supernatural creator, and (more importantly perhaps) the consequences of 
these attempts in which the delusions that the pursuit of absolutes thrives on and 
attempts to perpetuate are revealed. The faustian situation is not one of power 
corrupting but rather of power wrongly apportioned. The decisiveness and commitment 
of faustian activity bases itself on a presumption of absolute certainty, the absence of 
which is evinced in the unpregnant pause of the gamletiki. Faust shares Don Quixote’s 
determination to subject the world to a willed ideal, but is further seduced by the 
supernatural power Mephistopheles makes available to him and his conviction in his 
authority to wield it over reality. Faust’s capacity to take protean control of an 
otherwise dissatisfying reality allows him to reify his fabricated ideological rightness as 
the defining truth of a shared reality, and to demonstrate an aggressive sociopathic 
tendency which, in Don Quixote’s devotions, cannot graduate from the lonely and 
pitiable self-dependence of merely interior idealism. In a sense the faustian 
compromise, as utilised by Goethe and Clough, is quite in harmony with the 
implication’s of Don Quixote’s delusions prior to the essentially Romantic tendency to 
idealise Quixote’s individualistic ‘triumph’ over the merely actual world.* 6 Don Quixote 
is mostly pitiful, isolated and, ultimately, a disappointed denouncer of his own surrender 
to fancy; he does not share in Cervantes’ comedy of the vainglory of idealistic vision, 
he is its unwitting butt. Neither Don Quixote, Faust, nor Dipsychus the faustuli, 
acknowledge personal choice in their “fated” role: Don Quixote is “inspired”, Faust 
entitled and Dipsychus compelled. Though the commitments of each are founded on 
personal desire all three can be seen to evade, through the implied presence of absolute 
forces determining the propriety of their actions, the personal accountability which 
acknowledging this personal element would invite.
In an atmosphere of moral relativism, the faith and devotion of Don Quixote 
amounts to delusion, while Faust’s committed activism involves him recurrently in 
reburying the vestiges of prematurely solved uncertainties under ritualised affirmations
saw the Russian countryside flooded with narodniks (students and intellectuals who espoused
simplification and went to live like peasants, upholding their idealised versions of unspoiled rural
traditions) like Nejdanov, are equally evident in the bankruptcy of imagination and hope, or narrowness
of purpose, which determines that suicide is his only alternative. Turgenev’s tacit approval of the barren
fate of his superfluous men mirrors their own reactionary approval of their unworthiness and social 
irrelevance.
6 For a more comprehensive articulation of the evolution of critical interpretations and individual 
responses to the figure of Don Quixote see the chapters on Don Quixote in Ian Watt’s Myths o f M odem  
Individualism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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of the absolute propriety of his personal inspirations. There are recognisably quixotic 
elements in Faust’s characteristic compromise, but an underlying awareness of the 
conditions which generate the unpregnant pause, reflects the tension which intellectual 
penetration and critical rigour generate with specific expectations and desires for a lucid 
and absolute outcome to this devotion to knowledge. The unpregnant pause and the 
faustian compromise reflect two distorting effects of an anachronistic esteem for 
external certainties. They are haunted by their inability to admit finite inspiration as the 
inevitable foundation of the absolutist moral framework they crave.
These tropes, embracing isolation, imprisonment, superfluity and displacement, 
reflect a condition of unwitting excommunication from the collaborative discourse of 
moral interaction in deference to a solipsism approved as an abstract authority. The 
unpregnant pause accepts, often unhappily, a sceptical endurance of uncertainty and 
therein holds at least the prospect of evolving a progressive perspective of idealism as a 
personal expression, relating to character and circumstance and the relationship between 
the two.
Admitting Uncertainty
Moral scepticism implies a critical overview of the moral plane as a realm of abundant 
and equal possibilities. Moral choices can be made for good, or at least satisfactory, 
reasons but the presence of alternative choices, regardless, requires individuals to accept 
responsibility for the outcomes of their choices no matter how reluctantly or 
ambivalently they might have made them. If the special pleading which discriminates 
various choices as right or wrong (and on which the sceptic considers all certainties to 
be founded) is disrupted, allegedly objective preferences and proprieties are revealed to 
be dependent on persuasive combinations of circumstance and emotion and all possible 
moral positions or systems must be consciously chosen by the individual who favours 
them; as none will, or rationally can, command unequivocal obedience. Individuals can 
feel themselves obliged and even compelled to observe common moral standards, 
standards of social cohesion for instance, to which their own personal desires are 
subordinated, but these standards remain merely worldly or necessary, they do not 
warrant the absolute reverence or faith of the devoted individual. But for absolute 
idealists, who long to surrender self-interest and personal accountability in service to 
something greater, this exposure debases the act of moral commitment: one can still
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make good and bad moral decisions, but there is no longer any prospect that they will 
align the individual with an abstract fund of irreproachable directives.
For goodness’ sake, dear Wilhelm, I did not mean you when I complained that 
people who urge us to be resigned to inevitable fate are unbearable.... Basically you 
are right, of course. But, dear friend, with this one proviso: things in this world 
seldom come down to an either-or decision, and possible courses of action, and 
feelings, are as infinitely various as kinds of noses on the gamut from hooked to 
snub.
Forgive me, then, if I concede your entire argument and still try to find a 
loophole between the either and the or.7
Young Weither’s observation that nothing is really either-or, though seemingly one of 
glib consent to the relativism of “this world”, merely re-establishes his commitment to 
the privilege of holding aloof in expectation of a higher calling. The need for individual 
equivocation and choice from a collection of equally legitimate courses is a daunting 
sign of the dispersal of the aristocratic prestige of inspiration to which he feels entitled. 
Weither’s loophole shirks this democratic indignity in the guise of an apology for his 
impracticaiity; he is, of course, ruthless in pursuing his desired image of himself as the 
recipient of inspiration, ‘my duty is to wait’, he seems to suggest with convenient 
humility. In its actual absence Weither defers to the prospect of an external resolution 
of the either-or cacophony, and takes solace in the pre-emptive nobility of holding aloof 
in the name of the imminent distinction of conviction. In Weither’s attitude it is 
possible to see a pattern of absolutist resistance to a recognised relativism in the field of 
worldly action. From these infinitely various courses of action, though, there appears 
no prospect of acting out a role of lucid, and therefore commonly approved, absolute 
moral propriety. Absolutists need to believe absolutes exist in order to justify their 
participation in the world: without absolutes activity is merely pride and self-interest, 
with absolutes activity suggests duty and vocation. It is with a similar kind of need that 
Dostoevsky confronts the pervasive effects of the ambivalent moral relativism of the 
secular world. His characters share his need but, fastening on the mirages of secular 
absolutes, they commit themselves to the deification of their pride and self-interest in 
order to sustain the mirage of duty.
To sustain this deification (often of an arrested, solipsistically cloistered virtue), 
these characters are unwittingly required to spurn some facets of communal association.
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Refusing the mutually assured, but undifferentiating, significance of conventional 
association, they need some form of emotional surrogacy. To compensate and support 
them in their resistance to what they perceive as the debased investiture of convention 
and conservativism with the residual authority of universal meaning and purpose, these 
individuals desire (avidly) assurances of the general and essential significance of their 
subjective intuitions of morality and truth.
The advance from the solipsistic romanticism of Goethe’s Weither, for example, to 
Clough’s inward looking and uncommitted heroes brings us to a field of introspection 
less distorted by the subject’s self-infatuation or by any enthusiasm for the authenticity 
of an individuals’ self-knowledge. While Weither seems trapped within his internal 
impressions of exterior reality, Clough’s heroes have a sturdy disinclination to believe 
in the authenticity of their impulses. The individual who perceives the gamut of his or 
her inspirations amidst the circumstantial origins and strategies they emerge from is 
perched on the brink of clarity and proportion. Perched on this brink, Clough’s heroes 
are nevertheless deprived of equanimity by an emotional affiliation to a grand narrative 
or external authority which demands their participation in a charade of conviction. The 
distorting influence of this demand accompanies the relentless undermining of any 
single truth, role or compulsion which Clough, without a hint of distemper or casuistry, 
undertakes.
Dipsychus and Claude are full of trepidation in relation to the future, to 
movement, and to change. Both are equally fond of and strongly attached to their 
present mode of living. In Claude’s, “bid me not venture on aught that could alter or 
end what is present!... drive me not out... from my Eden”, it is essentially all artificial
o
prompting that he proposes resisting. Essentially, Claude proclaims that if he is to give 
up his idyll of innocent abstraction it will have to be for something pure and precious, a 
transcendent distillate and inspiration of love, for instance, not the artificial promptings 
of social expectation. Claude himself, though, is uncertain of his ability to distinguish 
the real from the artificial, “I have had pain, it is true; have wept; and so have the 
actors” .7 89
7 Johan Wolfgang von Goethe, The Sorrows of Young Werther, transl. Michael Hulse (Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1989), 58.
8 Clough, Amours de Voyage, Clough - Selected Poems (London and New York: Longman, 1995), 75- 
154, n.xii.275-77.
9 Clough, Amours, V.viii.165.
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The inability to attain constancy of purpose is a principal concern throughout Clough’s 
poetry.10 The recurring formulation of the problem reflects a persisting dilemma that 
becomes an almost standardised challenge to activity and to the role of self- 
consciousness in times of uncertainty. In The Bothie, Phillip Hewson expresses this 
feeling of existing devoid of clearly sanctioned purpose or moral direction:
What are we to resist, and what are we to be friends with?
If there is battle, ‘tis battle by night: I stand in the darkness,
Here in the melee of men, Ionian and Dorian on both sides,
Signal and password known; which is friend and which is foeman?11
To the individual seeking to undertake decisive action there is “Only infinite jumble and 
mess and dislocation”. This same tableau registers the same confused deprivation in 
Matthew Arnold’s “Dover Beach” (ca. 1851): “we are here as on a darkling plain / 
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, / Where ignorant armies clash by 
night”. Regardless of the somewhat different conclusions drawn from this trope 
(pragmatic acceptance versus romanticised pessimism), both treatments register the 
challenge of an uncertain moral environment.
10 Stefanie Markovits’ recent essay “Arthur Hugh Clough, Amours de Voyage, and the Victorian Crisis of 
Inaction” (Nineteenth-Century Literature, 53, 4 (2001), 445-78), contains a concise contextualisation of 
parallels that exist between Clough’s biography and some of the dilemmas explored throughout his 
works, and also a brief survey of some trends and conventions in critical responses to Clough’s literary 
career. Marko vits explores the myth of Clough’s unfulfilled promise (noting, for example, the strong 
influence this myth exerted over the “critical imagination” of many of his Victorian critics) in order to 
emphasise the relationship of this myth to an intellectual climate in which some critics had begun to exalt 
action and productive engagement in reaction against what Matthew Arnold called the dialogue of the 
mind with itself (a kind of overwrought and inert interiority). Markovits’ purpose appears to be a 
juxtaposing of this myth, and the conventions that provoked it, with a reading of Clough’s work that 
emphasises his engagement with the dilemmas entailed in what she calls “the crisis of inaction” (447). 
Markovits focuses on Clough’s exploration of this crisis in Amours de Voyage, as played out in Claude’s 
epistolary reflections (which are variously both deliberate and unwitting) of his inward life. Markovits 
touches on Clough’s depictions of some of the effects on individuals of the disorientation of abstract 
frameworks of belief, propriety and morality from the order imposed by an absolute endpoint or guiding 
principle such as God’s divine authority. She explores Claude’s attempts to conceive of political and 
emotional “feelings” strong enough and justifiable enough to precipitate worthwhile and credible courses 
of action. In focusing on Claude’s failures, though, Markovits appears to seriously neglect and devalue 
the significance of the medium in which Claude’s half-performances take place: he writes letters to 
Eustace, and attempts to explain and make sense of his uncertainty. This is in itself action, and though he 
fails to hit upon any absolute solution, solace or explanation which can dispel his feelings of 
disinheritance or satiate his desire for certainty, this action is, nevertheless, productive. I shall explore 
this element of Clough’s depictions of uncertainty and isolation from moral support in the sections 
concerned specifically with Clough.
11 Clough, The Bothie, IX, 79-82.
12 The Bothie, IX, 94.
13 Matthew Arnold, “Dover Beach”, ln.35-37. As observed by Mary Schneider in “Plutarch’s Night 
Battle in Arnold, Clough and Tennyson” {The Amoldian, 9, 2 (1982), 32-38), the battle by night - 
originally from Thucydides, but which is also depicted by Plutarch - serves Tennyson to similar ends in 
The Passing of Arthur (1869).
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The characters of Hamlet and Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus both reflect circumstances in 
which credible beliefs, and the moral orientation they support, are challenged by new 
perspectives. It is a challenge which is perpetuated and reinforced by the consequential 
increase in sceptical detachment from traditional models of moral accountability and 
order. Those schooled and steeped in religion’s inter-relationship with abstract moral 
order were both disoriented and becalmed by the new knowledge (primarily based in 
science and New Criticism of the Bible) that gradually suffocated the vitality of their 
divinely assured ethics. After their initial veneration for the kind of moral structure 
justified by divine authority, their subsequent critical disassociation and feelings of 
disinheritance from a role they desire but cannot affirm, generate responses fraught with 
a problematic dissatisfaction with the ‘truths’ they register. To the confused and 
uncommitted nineteenth century intellectual, uncertain of their individual rights and 
their social obligations, the malcontent in Jacobean drama (particularly the disinherited 
and disillusioned Hamlet) suggests a sympathetic ancestor and a dignifying lineage. 
With their characteristic mixture of dignity, originality, charisma and profound (often 
aggressive) uncertainty, displayed by these characters, it is hardly surprising that, in a 
circumstance defined by its sceptical detachment from contemporary modes of 
conviction and estimable social roles, they might have appeared to offer desirable co­
ordinates, or supported feelings of orientation, to an intellectual tradition defined by its 
open confrontation of uncertainty and the ambiguous virtues of convention. Such 
recognition holds the potential both for glorification and proportion: in identifying with 
Hamlet, for instance, both the straightforward joy of recognition and affinity, and the 
critical association of experiencing a similar symptom due to a similar circumstance are 
available. Faustuli and gamletiki are diminutive “types”, the imitators en masse and 
corruptions of the archetype. And in these corruptions they reveal themselves.
“Unpregnant of my cause” 14
If the precondition for action is certainty, Hamlet’s suggestion that “conscience does 
make cowards of us all”, would seem to hold true.15 Conscience, whether interpreted as
14 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, (1605 Quarto), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, 2.2.571.
15 Hamlet, 3.1.83. The precise meaning of “conscience” in this context is a source of much contention. I 
take conscience to mean more than solely moral conscience, and to include a capacity to intellectually 
entertain, in any one circumstance, the multiplicity of possible and credible actions, or perspectives, and 
similarly to weigh the respective costs of these possibilities prior to acting on them. It is a quality, as I 
will discuss later, which compels individuals to look at any situation from a multitude of vantages, as
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a prescient reckoning of the various possible alternatives and consequences of action, as 
the awareness and anticipation of responsibility and guilt, or simply another word for 
thought, suggests a disruptive mediation between stimulation and action. Either through 
the habitual preliminary response of reflection, or through the subsequent discovery of 
grounds for any number of legitimate responses, the moment and the grounds for action 
both dissipate into myriad channels of possibility and consequence. In contrast, 
certainty and action will proceed from the absence or depletion of conscience’s 
consuming devotion to thought. Alternatively, as in Faust’s case, action will proceed in 
spite of underlying uncertainty through a necessary thoughtlessness and a diminished 
capacity to care for others.16 Conscientious objection to the compromise required by 
action, suggests a chosen moral independence from the dilemma of the unpregnant 
pause. It does not, however, alleviate the moral condition it reacts against. The 
conscientious objection is not made on behalf of a specific moral vantage, but rather, as 
in Clough’s poems, against the conventions which presume the necessity of moral 
absolutes. It accepts the primacy of conscience and rejects the esteem for stable 
certainties which drives individuals to surrender their moral choices to an external 
ideological program. Whether in passive resistance, or direct action, this type of 
conscientious objection eschews the self-preservation of non-commitment in the 
absence of absolute certainty, and similarly avoids the faustian eradication of 
equivocation which facilitates the impression of their presence.
Preoccupation with the possibility of consolation suggests a response to the 
disappointment and deprivation engendered by a presumption of entitlement (ie. to 
transcendent authorities) alloyed with a feeling of loss. The great expectations nurtured 
by the higher line of Tractarian evangelism, or equally by the discovery of the buried 
self, devotion to the sublime, or strict observance of the greatest good for the greatest 
number, each project a direct causal relation between ideological commitment and 
feelings of selfless fulfillment. To those accustomed to observe virtues as the 
dispensations of transcendent authority, the disruption of this causal relationship 
suggests an unpalatable breach between virtue and absolute good. The dissolution of
opposed to the tunnel vision which is often so instrumental in attaining and maintaining absolute 
conviction or commitment. Hamlet’s observation brings into focus a relationship to moral confusion 
which W.B. Yeats reiterates in “The Second Coming”; both essentially recognise or suggest, that, as a 
corollary of moral confusion, “the best lack all conviction”. Apparent in Yeats’ poem’s designation of 
“the best”, is the sceptical suspension of conviction, commitment or belief by those who are most 
scrupulously honest and true to the ambiguities with which secular reality presents them.
16 I shall discuss the significance of solipsistic idealists’ capacity to care, both emotionally and practically, 
for others at greater length in the section “Care”.
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these positivistic expectations reduces individuals to their own capacity to discriminate 
among the nebulous gradations of moral choices; the “right” choice is no longer 
provided by their higher line.
The need for consolation then, or the assurance provided by transcendent 
certainties, is common to the idealising urges of both the little-Hamlets and the little- 
Fausts. These characters’ desire to affiliate themselves with authorities which allegedly 
draw their potency from something “higher” than circumstantial utility or contingency, 
leads them to respond in particular ways to the substantive uncertainty which confronts 
them. The two broad types of response I am suggesting, the faustian compromise and 
the unpregnant pause, are distinct reactions to this fundamental condition of 
disorientation. The unpregnant pause refers to the experience, through an openness and 
scrupulous fidelity to the simultaneously valid claims of contending inspirations, 
convictions, beliefs and ideas, of an incapacity to commit to a single path of satisfactory 
activity. It is what Hamlet notes as the apparent cowardice, or shrinking from action, 
engendered by conscience. Or alternatively the consequence, as Dipsychus observes, of 
a circumstance in which “we cannot act without assuming x / And at the same time y its 
contradictory” ; 17 acting out of absolute conviction, Dipsychus complains, has become 
an untenable anachronism. The faustian compromise, though, performs this necessary 
prelude to action by undermining the given background of uncertainty by selecting 
elements of reality as “truth” in order to formulate a semblance of conviction or 
absolute compulsion to act in the manner one is already inclined towards or desirous of 
at some level (as with Dipsychus, whose desire for certainty dominates his desire to 
remain true to his ideal and deems it untenable accordingly). Actions which would 
most likely have been performed regardless are justified as manifestations of principled 
behaviour, allowing the individual to guard their self-esteem from having to admit its 
inconsistency to itself or face any consequences as resulting from a purely personal 
decision. The blinkered commitment of the faustian is a reaction against uncertainty, 
but it refuses to acknowledge the elements of reality it has compromised in order to 
attain this semblance of certainty.
I have of late, but where­
fore I know not, lost all my mirth, forgone all custom of 
exercises: and indeed it goes so heavily with my dis­
position that this goodly frame the earth seems to me




H am let’s malaise offered an emblem of a breach from smooth custom and accepted 
convention, a disruption which both leads to and accompanies the awkward detachment 
from a harmonious relationship between custom and personal impulse. The inability to 
match the suitable response to the “cue for passion” generates Hamlet’s sense that social 
order has been disrupted, and also the anxiety over whether he is fitted for the heroic 
role -  “The time is out of joint, O cursed spite, / That ever I was bom  to set it right!” 19 - 
which his personal circumstance appears to require o f him. This intuition is practically 
galling, though not as a recognition specifically of weakness but rather of the plain fact 
of his inability to feel confident in a means of fulfilling his obligation. It is for this 
reason that H am let’s unpregnant pause offers such a subtle and potentially fertile 
delineation of the individual’s relationship with abstract ideals in conditions of 
uncertain moral verities, where no authoritative common means of coalescing internal 
moral perspectives with an external convention seem available.20
“Are you honest?”, becomes Ham let’s insistent subtext, while he remains unable 
to answer for himself. Is he worthy of his father’s faith? Is Claudius a king by right or 
might? Is Laertes a good son or a fool too readily played upon? Hamlet becomes a 
rogue element, out of joint with the habitual explanations and relationships of the court. 
In his desire to penetrate beneath the dissembling which he suddenly detects all around 
him, he is denied the posture of questioning spirit by the apparent necessity of deliberate 
action; this obligation, though, sits as affectation on the unpregnant prince. In C lough’s 
poem “The human spirits saw I on a day”,21 the “sceptic melancholy” (ln.49) o f the 
malcontent, free of troubling obligations to compel decisive action, is unleashed on 
contented ignorance:
Dost thou not know that these things only seem? -
I know not, let me dream my dream.
Are dust and ashes fit to make a treasure? -
18 Hamlet, 2.2.299-303.
19 Hamlet, 1.5.188-89.
20 Hamlet, through feeling himself bound to a role which he seems to find himself unconvinced by, 
unconvincing in, or otherwise unsuited to, experiences a psychological discomfort which nurtures the 
implicit desire (which subtly alienates him from reality) that his personal inclinations and public, social or 
political responsibilities should exist in lucid harmony. A similar desire can be seen to motivate Faust’s 
ideological disavowal of the legitimacy of any dissenting whispers that might otherwise trouble him also 
with the merely subjective authority of his mandates and convictions. When Faust is blinded by Care he 
is being reproached for the brutal censorship through which he has facilitated his own passionate 
conviction of the objective legitimacy of his absolute authority.
21 Clough, “The human spirits saw I on a day”, Clough Selected Poems, ed. J.P. Phelan (London and New 
York: Longman, 1995) 32-33.
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I know not, let me take my pleasure.
(In. 12-15)
The personified “questioning spirit” (In.38) in Clough’s poem affirms a background in 
which uncertainty and ignorance are virtues far more valuable than the semblance of 
certainty sustained through negligence. Against this background the semblance of 
certainty does not sanctify but rather jeopardises action. This will be discussed at 
greater length with regard to the faustian compromise and Clough’s longer poems, 
Amours and Dipsychus.
Clough’s “questioning spirit” concludes:
I also know not, and I need not know,
Only with questionings pass I to and fro,
Perplexing those that sleep, and in their folly 
Inbreeding doubt and sceptic melancholy.
(ln.46-49)
The notable presence of men of thought, critics, authors and malcontents in literary 
depictions of abstract uncertainty, reflects their characteristic possession of a set of 
habits, concerns and attitudes which sustain a certain type of interrogation of 
conventional reality. Their involvement in this “interrogation” renders them fertile 
conduits for depictions of the ramifications of these uncertainties, both in their abstract 
engagement and in their relationships with reality which proceed in counterpoint to this 
engagement.
In Marston’s The Malcontent (1604), the disinterested voice of the Epilogue 
suggests that ignorance itself is no crime, “Troth, to err is fit”; ~ however, the strategy 
of promoting one’s ignorant self under claims of expertise or certainty, is. The honesty 
that, in Elizabethan times, reflects a regard for a higher moral order and a rigorous 
rejection of false paths to worldly advancement exists for Clough’s malcontents as a 
merely cautionary insight into the limited scope of knowledge. For Clough’s questors 
there is no ideological revelation or transcendence to be attained through knowledge. 
However, in the relationship to traditional forms of certainty or conviction which this 
deprivation encourages, the “sceptic melancholy”, recognising the legitimate 
obsolescence of absolutist idealism, potentially discovers a truly fertile penetration into 
the function of idealism. It offers, therein, the substantial wisdom, lauded beyond all
22 John Marston, The Malcontent, The Malcontent and Other Plays (Oxford & New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 117-76, Epilogue, In. 11.
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else (when all alternatives have been discredited), of knowing one is dreaming (ideals, 
semblances etc.) and consenting to carry on.23
Hamlet’s suspicion of the prompts of “heaven and hell”, suggests a challenge to the 
unity or jurisdiction of conventionally accepted moral directives. Goethe’s Faust goes 
much further: “No scruples to plague me, no irksome doubt, / No hell-fire or devil to 
worry about” .24 This posture is one of Goethe’s first tools in characterising Faust’s 
disaffection. The credibility of moral guidelines based on eternal judgement is one of 
the problems which God’s ‘death’ in the nineteenth century forces to the fore of all 
attempts to establish new certainties around which the dimensions of a good, noble and 
dignified life could be resolved. It does remain, though, a contention, rather than 
forming the substance of a conviction such as Faust confesses to (“no irksome doubt”). 
Faust’s conviction is of dubious value in the context of Goethe’s work, given that the 
crowning glory of his totalitarian tramplings on reality is divine absolution and a trip to 
heaven.25 Dmitry Karamazov’s notion that without God “all is permitted” is one
23 This resembles Nietzsche’s recommendation for a wise freedom from the mendaciousness of ideology:
I suddenly woke up in the midst of this dream, but only to the consciousness that I 
am dreaming and that I must go on dreaming lest I perish ... among all these 
dreamers, I, too, who “know,” am dancing my dance; that the knower is a means for 
prolonging the earthly dance and thus belongs to the masters of ceremony of 
existence; and the sublime consistency and inter-relatedness of all knowledge 
perhaps is and will be the highest means to preserve the universality of dreaming 
and the mutual comprehension of all dreamers and thus also the continuation of the 
dream.
The Gay Science, aph. 54, 116.
24 Johan Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust - Part One, trans. David Luke; 1987 (Oxford & New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998 (1987)), ln.368-69.
25 In Myths o f Modem Individualism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Ian Watt compares 
the anti-individualist implications of Christopher Marlowe’s The Tragical History o f Doctor Faustus, in 
particular Faustus’ ultimate damnation, with Goethe’s last-minute abrogation of Faust’s debt to the devil 
(not to mention Faust’s culpability for making this deal to begin with). The ambition of Goethe’s Faust is 
sanctified as a noble impulse of human advancement and his follies excused as natural human flaw. In 
spite of his contract with Mephistopheles, at the last minute angels intercede and Faust, regardless of his 
sins, failings and complicity in the Devil’s chores, is favoured with grace and borne away from hell so 
that he might strive his way to heaven. In Goethe’s romantic incarnation, one might concede that Faust’s 
escape from the condemnation suffered by his precursors is perhaps justified by the simple fact that his 
striving reflects an attempt to make the secular and morally disparate world cohere to a binding principle. 
Faust’s crimes, that is, are individualist but also in the spirit of the age.
“He who strives on and lives to strive/ Can earn redemption still“ (ln. 11936-37). Faust’s constant 
striving seems to be offered as a tendency which somehow mitigates the extent of his personal culpability 
for the trail of destruction that builds up in his wake. This exoneration, though, seems fatuous in the 
context of Mephistopheles’ asides, in which Faust’s goals, no matter how altruistic, are routinely mocked 
and dismissed as petty fancies. While Faust is at pains to stress the commitment to philanthropic reform 
that lies at the heart of the schemes he strives to realise, the damage he does is no less real; while his 
schemes bear the mark of transient despotism, the follies and cruelties they oversee do not fade. To 
forgive him for wreaking such havoc on the strength of convictions which the play tells us are empty, 
seems to side entirely with Faust’s deluded perspective of himself. Faust’s absolution then stands as a 
wilful anomaly in a divine trumping of the devil; it is to the credit of God’s infinite power and 
compassion and to the angels who beat back devils to win Faust’s soul as a prize, rather than suggesting
45
response to this loss of a moral horizon. Dmitry’s proposition is essentially a question, 
or challenge: if God was the reason for the delineation of good and evil before, what is 
it that will convince or demonstrate to people that all is not permitted in God’s absence?
The malcontent’s sceptical (and distempered) palate registers the discrepancy 
between public conventions of honourable action and the dubious moral essence that 
underlies them. Due to the need to approve a clear moral mandate in order to act with 
the sanction of conviction, malcontents often feel themselves restricted to a choice 
between hypocritical participation or uncommitted scepticism. In each case they are 
vulnerable to feelings of inadequacy relating to notions of conventional duty and to 
critical rigour, and each challenge is felt sincerely.
Between the figure of Hamlet in Shakespeare’s play and the emblematic uses to 
which the character is put, there are of course considerable and revealing discrepancies. 
While feeling that Hamlet’s circumstances offer an analogy for their feelings of 
disenchantment and uncertain commitment, these characters are not struggling with the 
real problems posed by the suspicion that one’s father, a head of state, has been 
assassinated by the man newly married to one’s mother, and with the plethora of checks 
and balances that must be aligned to reconcile a proposed act of both personal 
vengeance and social policing. The persistence of this identification in spite of such 
differences, goes to reiterate some of the indulgences it provides. It allows, for 
example, the self-aggrandising identification with a genuinely epic fate (a habit at once 
elitist (grandeur is good) and democratic (implying everyone can be grand of soul) in its 
allegiances), while also providing particular symbols and dilemmas which offer 
immediate form and a tradition to an essentially nebulous angst of metaphysical 
disinheritance and disorientation, and of the uncertainty of moral responsibilities this 
generates. The type of liberties taken in the course of such indulgent, and often self- 
solacing, or in some way mitigatory, identifications are paralleled in the appropriation 
of other figures, such as Don Quixote and Faust, by individuals, and groups, selectively 
seeking out characteristics which seem to aggrandise or iconicise traits they already
any kind of moral exoneration of Faust. The angels concede that Faust is “An earthbound, immature / 
And fragmentary, / Fireproof yet still impure / Burden” (11954-57), his rescue from Mephistopheles’ 
demons is in anticipation of the exoneration he will undergo in the presence of God’s love, rather than a 
recognition that his sins were justified or had been in some way already absolved. His striving does not 
absolve him, it blinds him and destroys others.
One of the only justifications I can think of for “saving” Faust from the Hell he sold himself to, is 
the notion that his final approval of the world, which is implicit in his desire that the moment should 
linger, sets him free from the pride of individualism and reflects a moral graduation to selfless 
cooperation with reality. This explanation, though, is unsatisfying (as are others like it) given that Faust’s 
consent to linger, his contentment with his lot, is based on his belief that the reality he will be lingering in 
is that which he has just wrought for himself through a defiant travesty of the natural world.
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esteem and with which they already identify themselves, but which have an otherwise 
dubious or simply vague standing (both in reality and often within the works from 
which these emblematic characters are lifted). These figures offer compelling icons 
which allow those who resort to them to deem their particular habits estimable.
In the image of Hamlet’s unpregnant detachment, the fathers and children of the 
nineteenth century recognised their own resented obligations and struggle to avoid or 
dignify (as conviction, compulsion or entitlement, for instance, rather than choice) the 
necessary disavowals required by worldly participation.26 The scenario manifests in 
attitudes and ideals, among other things, as a contesting of the grounds of 
communication and the qualities on which each generation seeks to found the desired 
order of their world.
The failure to accept or adopt any first principle or cause on which to act, coupled with 
a persisting conviction that such absolute validations do exist, consign Raskolnikov, 
Faust, and Hamlet, in varying ways, to flurries of violence in reaction against the-world- 
as-it-is. Though Raskolnikov, in particular, seems to act decisively and from 
conviction, it becomes apparent, as I shall show later, that his ideological crime is 
compelled by a desire to precipitate certainty from confusion by acting as if with 
conviction. Rather than decisive, though, this type of precipitated activity typically 
seems despairing, abandoned and instinctive; a flight from equivocated moral 
judgements. This kind of denouement expresses both the abnormality of spontaneous 
gratification and its unsustainability within the field of everyday moral interaction. 
Raskolnikov’s act of murder, which he later pronounces a self-destruction, is motivated 
by a similar sense of being bound by an indecipherable equation. Fancies in which wish 
fulfilments are realised suggest imagination’s passive cure for the prodigious desires it 
nurtures, the Underground Man, for example, sits in his chair enjoying the possibility 
and fancied reality of his election as Pope. These fancies construct frames of apparently 
credible activity and fulfilment. But such frames, like the external accord desired by the 
monologic individual, when acted out provoke scenarios in which the impropriety of 
such solipsistic projections becomes plain. As a literary trope, the fulfilment of a 
character’s ideal can, and often does, serve as a trope in which individuals’ desires to
26 The calls to action that begin to hatch, partly out of frustrated indignity, from the little-Hamlets’ 
brooding abstraction of doubt are often initially offered and affirmed as a necessary progression from 
intellectual conviction. In Turgenev’s Fathers and Children, Bazarov’s commitment is fierce in its own 
disgruntled unpregnantness with the servitude to a population he has only philosophical regard for; it is 
merely the circumstantial focus of what he feels to be his duty to purvey scientific reforms.
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see their subjectively idealised worldviews reified appears as a kind of inherently 
corrupting enchantment.27
The Tyrants’ Way
When Faust learns, from a distance, that Gretchen has been jailed for her association 
with him, he blames Mephistopheles both for keeping it from him (Faust’s negligence) 
and for letting it happen (Faust’s guilt). Mephistopheles responds: “Are you snatching 
for the thunder? A good thing it was not given to you wretched mortals, to blast your 
adversary when he makes an innocent reply! That’s the way of tyrants, venting their 
spleen when they’re in an embarrassing pass”. The detachment from intimate moral 
engagement facilitated by Mephistopheles’ supernatural services indulges and 
reinforces Faust’s overwhelming self-love. The episode involving Philemon and 
Baucis, in Faust II, depicts a similarly blind and culpably callous egocentrism. Faust’s 
predatory seduction of Margareta (Gretchen) and his subsequent inability to attend to 
her with anything but hollow lip-service to his idea of love, or feel in her fate more than
OQa personal affront to his management of the affair,' reveals an incapacity to register (or 
an aversion to) the mutual responsibilities of intimacy.30 In the second part of Faust 
this inability has graduated to a grander scale in Faust’s latent, but potent, campaign to 
eradicate any lifestyle or tradition which, nurturing values alternative to his own, 
contests the validity of his authoritative ideal vision. In this colossal context it becomes 
more apparent that Faust’s inhumanity reflects an internal compromise (a necessarily 
selective approach to truth) which is fundamental to his feeling that he is entitled to
27 The fate of the false authorities which individuals often conjure to expedite their faustian compromises, 
provides a platform for moral fables portraying the corrosive unreality of wish fulfilments that offer 
ideologically justified and essentially innocent alterations of what an individuals considers a hitherto 
unsatisfactory reality.
28 Goethe, Faust -  Part One, “A Gloomy Day. Open Country”, <48-52>. (These reset line numbers 
designate a scene inserted between In. 4398 and ln.4399).
29 Faust considers this affront will be allayed by the alleviation of merely its punitive consequence: to free 
Gretchen is, for Faust, a means of dismissing the charges against him which are implicit in Gretchen’s 
social ruin.
30 Faust’s attraction to Margareta seems intensified by her personal virtuousness and her devout faith. 
Faust does not consciously set out to indulge in the perverse or cynical pleasure of defiling something 
pure, but rather seems obliviously caught between this negating desire and an intuitive attempt to prove to 
himself his capacity for goodness by showing himself a suitable match for Margareta. In his enthusiasm 
for his lady, from distance, and in his limp outrage with Mephistopheles after learning of Gretchen’s 
unhappy situation, Faust can be seen carrying off the role of a passionate lover with unwitting affectation.
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order the universe around him, and to his “deduction” that he is entirely justified in
o  1
acting on this feeling.
In the faustian compromise, the “compromise” is not simply another name for the 
traditional idea of a Faustian bargain or compact; rather, “compromise” is intended to 
accentuate the full range of reality which is strategically compromised by the selective 
approvals of “objective truth” which authorise an individualist’s absolute commitment 
to his or her ideal. This act of compromise, is implicit also in the faustian activist’s 
willingness to overlook or simplify the multiplicity by which, for example, Hamlet’s 
coward-making conscience seems paralysed.
Faust has been driven into a cynical state of destructive abandon by his dawning 
conviction that what had been his guiding idea, a positivistic devotion to the unravelling 
powers of knowledge, was a delusion. His initial ‘idealistic’ dissent is bom, then, out of 
egotistical frustration and disgust with a world that suddenly seemed to mock him with 
its emptiness and ambivalence to his previous devotions. Having cursed his prior 
affinity, along with the desires, values and goals with which it had been intertwined,33 a 
choms of spirits inform Faust that his curse has “destroyed / the beautiful world” 
(In. 1609-10). The spirits then call upon Faust (a world-wrecking “demigod”), to build 
anew and with a clear mind a replacement for what he has cleared away. The spirits’ 
encouragement (or subtle entrapment) wins Faust; his demands from Mephistopheles 
quickly show the influence of their insinuated counsel, ’’Smash this [world] first, then 
let the next be bom!”.34 And Faust is furnished forthwith with a maxim that equates
35anarchic liberty, and the dismissal of inhibitive traditions, with benevolent revolution. 
Faust later proves himself a willing recipient of the mantle of world builder which, 
rather than representing a secondary obligation of the world wrecker, reflects a vocation
31 With regard to the serial nature of Faust’s sins and the extreme damage wrought by them, it seems 
strange that Goethe should rescue his Faust from the hell which traditionally had been his ultimate fate. 
Though Goethe’s Faust does in the end learn that he had lived a blind and barren life, Goethe’s approval 
of Faust’s reprieve seems somewhat cursory.
32 In relation to the ideological non-commitment of Axel Heyst, the narrator of Conrad’s Victory (1915) 
observes a similar correlation between action and incomplete vision: “It is not the clear-sighted who lead 
the world. Great achievements are accomplished in a blessed, warm mental fog, which the pitiless cold 
blasts of the father’s analysis had blown away from the son” (Victory (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 
Penguin, 1963), 87). The warm fog of conviction anaesthetises, the passage suggests, the compulsion or 
ability to reflect (“a destructive process”) and to reckon the costs of worldly activity. Alternatively, as 
W.B. Yeats famously put it in “The Second Coming”, when the centre will not hold, “The best lack all 
conviction, while the worst / Are full of passionate intensity”.
33 Goethe, F aust- Part One, In.1587-1606.
34 Faust -  Part One, In. 1662.
35 In Faust -  Part Two, as Faust ponders Mephistopheles calls Faust a colonial power
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that is inseparable, perhaps, from the wrecker’s critical endeavour. Those who pull 
down ‘old’ forms usually strive to replace what their perceptions have discredited, but 
would they have acted in the first place without this sense of an alternative? The 
intellectual atmosphere bequeathed to the nineteenth century ‘little-fausts’ is such that, 
on an individual scale, they stand at this point necessarily to begin with and must each 
undertake this process in kind, attempting with a clear mind (not necessarily a tabula 
rasa but, rather, without illusions) to establish worthy foundations. Their critical 
activity is undertaken as the ground-laying of a new truth, and is tainted therefore with a 
predisposition to discern order. What becomes apparent in the unpregnant pause, as it 
appears in Clough’s work, is that this predisposition is itself a prejudice, and perhaps an 
anachronism.
Faust’s creed of action aims at individual refinement or illumination through loss, gain, 
woe and pain; he wants, in short, to experience everything, and without preliminary 
moral criteria imposing guidelines as to what these experiences ought to provoke as 
normative moral responses. What differentiates this from an essentially anarchic 
posture is Faust’s alleged willingness to accept a “moral” form as it gradually suggests 
itself (a situation which requires a necessary indulgence of individuals’ nascent 
responsibility, similar to that which is implicit in legal flexibility as to the responsibility 
of minors). But what would really emerge from this free-style experience? It requires 
perhaps a certain type of discrimination to begin with (the individual must bring a 
faculty of judgement, their reactions must be justified, or qualified, if they are to be of 
other than a purely subjective significance) or the abandonment of individual desires 
and prejudices.36 But Faust’s liberation is not like this, he rebels from a point of 
disaffection, and identifies as much with the dismissal of convention as with laying 
himself indiscriminately open to all ranges of experience which this facilitates.
Similarly, Faust’s reluctance to emulate his father, whose medical equipment 
strikes him as a mocking and accusing inheritance,37 also allows him a pretence of 
expiating the guilt bequeathed to him through the dubious ministrations and motives of 
his father. Through this posture, ostensibly adopted on behalf of the peasants his father 
callously patronised and exploited, he conscientiously objects to and discredits the 
precedent of benevolent public service which Wagner, for example, saw in him. Here
36 Such abandonment, a necessity of moving beyond the influence of obsolete beliefs and practices, is 
approvingly described by Nietzsche as one of the essential qualities of his men of tomorrow, the critical 
and disinterested “scholars”, in Beyond Good and Evil.
37 See Faust -  Part One, In. 668-69.
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the folk are a mere convenience for Faust’s desire to liberate himself from a particular 
obligation; he is as little concerned with their exploitation as his father. The perfect 
modem world Faust ultimately plans is free from superstitious ignorance and free also 
from the inhibitive guilt of privilege, because the folk, in dealings with whom Faust has 
been forced to confront such complications, have been excluded. It is a utopia of 
complete accord between aspiration and reality guaranteed by the systematic eradication 
or silencing of circumstance’s challenges and obligations. Faust’s aspirations, though, 
are formed merely in the image of the particular provocation and dissatisfactions he has 
experienced.
In Faust’s eventual ‘triumph’ over nature, Berman suggests “he has finally 
achieved a synthesis of thought and action, he had used his mind to transform the world. 
He has helped mankind assert its rights over the anarchic elements” .38 But mankind has 
no such rights: Faust’s triumph results from his wilful opposition to natural forces. It is 
a triumph dependent on a problematic relationship, the stasis of the unpregnant pause, 
being polarised into conflict.
The romantic quest for self-development, which has carried Faust so far, is 
working itself out through a new form of romance, through the titanic work of 
economic development. Faust is transforming himself into a new kind of man, to 
suit himself to a new occupation. In his new work, he will work out some of the 
most creative and some of the most destructive potentialities of modem life; he will 
be the consummate wrecker and creator, the dark and deeply ambiguous figure that 
our age has come to call “the developer.” 39
This figure, though, is still driven by the need to acquire a secure future, in which 
stability and rest are possible. In this suggested combination of the acting and 
contemplating person, Berman optimistically offers a solution for the troublesome 
dichotomy of men of action and men of reflection.40 However, while Faust’s plan is a 
facet of thought, his execution of it rather involves an internal compromise in which the 
legitimate obstacles are discredited and silenced. Faust’s capacity to act is achieved 
through the repression of certain dimensions of thought as a means of allowing his plan 
to attain the semblance of authority 41
38 Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air, 65.
39 All That Is Solid Melts Into Air, 62-63.
40 This distinction serves the men of reflection (as opposed to the men of action, predominantly though 
not exclusively), from Dostoevsky’s Underground Man to Matthew Arnold in Culture and Anarchy, as a 
means both of chastising and lauding their greater affiliation with abstractions than with reality.
41 As well as neglecting the aesthetic and subjective, or humanistic, aspects of the sensibilities of the 
individuals who would form Russia’s radical intelligentsia of the 1860s, the scientific and technological 
focus of their education emphasised an obligation, bom out of the privilege of expertise, to apply their
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Hamlet’s suggestion that prescient reckoning and decisive action might be 
incompatible is frequently echoed in many parallel attempts to explain or denounce the 
unfruitful burden of thought, but such insights frequently serve also as prods to provoke 
conscientiously uncommitted individuals into action.42 Berman sees Faust’s 
developments as an example of this synthesis of thought and action. But while it might 
be argued that Faust does reify what appear to be rational, purely intellectual reforms 
into direct action, this is a crystallisation in which the limited capacities of deliberate 
thought, and the influence of a limited self-knowledge, are made manifest. In the 
presence of echoes from the past, conjured by Philemon’s and Baucis’ church-bell, 
Faust is still prone to the “sharpest torment” the “rich man” can feel, the taunting 
remoteness of what “he has not got” (peace of mind, for instance, as well as the old 
couple’s linden grove) .43 The deliberate reification of his desired ideal is not inherently 
satisfying because though he can efface all traces of the heritage he has betrayed he has 
not actually made peace with it, he has achieved no inner change.
The faustian compromise generates a fanaticism which is inevitably isolating. 
Fanaticism is intrinsically censorious and survives on the denial of opposing 
information. In the fanaticism of the faustian compromise, through which individuals 
attempt to actively align reality with their idealism, denial and assertion go hand in hand 
to mould an individual psychology displaced from communal modes of discourse and 
agreement. Outside the confines of their fanaticism, the faustians become incapable of 
verifying their desired self-image and idealised orientation to reality.
knowledge to developing practical reforms and advances that would strengthen the state. However: 
“Encouraged by their training as well as by the state to employ their expertise to solve society’s problems, 
members of these elites used their knowledge of Western European institutions, conditions, and ideas to 
decry both the injustices, oppressiveness and backwardness of Russian society” (Katz & Wagner 1989, 
3). The type of conviction generated by the nature of this generations’ particular expertise and mindset, 
such as their faith in the apparently authoritative objectivity and utilitarian transparency of their rational 
methods, provided the 1860’s radicals with the kinds of pseudo-logical “justifications” for decisive 
activity and activism which their predecessors had lacked. This generation exhibited a greater confidence 
(or through their sophistry and ideological assertions and omissions they stifle their anxiety) in their right 
to act on the ubiquitous obligation felt by such minorities to form their world anew in the image of their 
enlightened and progressive certainty. This confidence, though, and the actions it facilitates is attained 
through the kind of disregard for alternatives, which they refuse to or are unable to recognise as credible 
arguments for tempering their own convictions. This is the kind of confidence sought in and granted by 
the faustian compromise, it reflects the simple and permissive feeling of righteousness attained in the 
belief that one is acting on behalf of an unequivocal authority. It is against this alloy of ideological duty 
and rational utilitarian mandate to act that Dostoevsky reacts. The anti-positivistic recoil against such 
principles in his novels condemns their fundamental misappropriation of a limited ideology and the 
limited vision with which they justify a kind of self-serving annihilation of contentions under the proviso 
that they are sick or retrograde.
421 have quoted Hamlet’s “suggestion”, previously; in his own words, it is that “conscience does make 
cowards of us all” (3.1.83).
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Faust’s reaction against the world of tradition and conformity forms the background to 
his initial bargain. When he agrees to plunge “into the rush of things / Of time and all 
its happenings” 44 he surrenders himself to circumstantial, contingent and unreflective 
action as a replacement for his scholarly devotion to learning and the “thread of 
thought” 43 which had preciously sustained him. Faust’s recent and bitter disillusion 
contextualises his first rebellion, and the newly formed ambitions it produces, as the 
fruit of disappointment, it is a reactionary and spiteful betrayal of an ethic deemed 
inadequate to the expectations it had encouraged.
Faust’s project to remake the world in keeping with his desires bears an analogy 
to the affronted aspirations of both Dostoevsky’s Golyadkin and Gogol’s madman 
Poprishchin, who each redefine their conception of the world to allow their desired self- 
image its rightful place in what they designate as reality. Weither and Wilhelm Meister, 
two more middle-class aspirants, also react similarly to the recalcitrance of reality. In 
the supernatural services provided by Mephistopheles, though, this solipsistic habit of 
individualism is given a means to make wishful ideals a reality. Submitting to this 
seduction, Faust invites the full impact of the unexpected isolation which so often 
accompanies the granting of wishful ideals. That the actual world is Faust’s proper 
home is felt initially by him only as something to be repudiated or denied. In Amours, 
Claude makes a similar grudging concession to the necessity that he eat at the World’s 
table, but remains openly contemptuous of its petty particular nature. Claude considers 
himself the victim of impersonal appetites, which are not bom of personal desire but run 
contrary to it, and which grate against his natural inclination to abstract realms.46
4j Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust -  Part Two, trans. David Luke; 1994 (Oxford & New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), In.11251-52.
44 Faust -  Part One, In. 1754-55.
45 Faust -  Part One, In. 1748-49.
46 I shall discuss this tendency to perceive reality as the travesty of an ideal at greater length in my 
discussion of Dipsychus and The Spirit (and again in relation to Dostoevsky’s portrayals of human or 
secular idealism). For now, though, here is an example of Claude’s disdainful acceptance of worldly 
activity:
Yet we must eat and drink, as you say. And as limited 
beings
Scarcely can hope to attain upon earth to an Actual 
Abstract,
Leaving to God contemplation, to His hands knowledge 
confiding,
Sure that in us if it perish, in Him it abideth and dies not,
Let us in His sight accomplish our petty particular 
doings, -




With the supernatural backing of Mephistopheles, Faust is able, in Goethe’s 
Faust - Part Two, to indulge the impulses of his self-esteem and idealism in a manner 
that more overtly demonstrates the deluded rationale of his modernist compromise. “A 
great thought has inspired me: guess / It if you can” .47 Mephistopheles guesses first that 
Faust has decided to take “some mighty city” for his “Capital”, with “wide avenues and 
squares” and the sprawl of “long suburbs”, “traffic, loud and fast”, with a “scuttling 
slither” of a populace of “swarming ants”, a horde of reverential subordinates.48 In 
Mephistopheles’ celebration of the “fun” of this generic capital, he emphasises (true to 
his personal taste for disorder perhaps) the “nookshotten”, the “poky” and the “fly- 
infested”, and the chaotic busyness and stinking ferment nurtured within the 
unregulated expanse of a modem city. Mephistopheles’ city is a distasteful and 
shambolic chaos, it almost seems calculated to repel, and provoke, Faust’s aesthetic 
desire for order. Faust’s laconic response: “All that, I fear, would fail to cheer me”, is 
linked to a fear of civil strife and disobedience.49 Prudently planning his role as the 
ruler of his ideal world, Faust is suspicious of the latent energies and discontents of a 
populace gathering in cities shaped by circumstantial necessity and prosperity rather 
than by the dictates of rational prescience: “they’re all rebels in the making” .50
In noting that his “great thought” involves neither pleasure-palace nor city, 
Faust’s aversions suggest the fundamentals of his idyll: it will neither be dangerously 
engaged with, nor segregated from, reality. In his positive expression of these 
imperatives Faust envisages the best of both worlds, he plans to remodel external reality 
to provide the implicit gratification of uninterrupted solipsistic indulgence: “I want to 
rule and to possess” .51
Faust’s “great thought” involves reclaiming land from the sea, he seeks to 
oppose nature’s tides and the emblematic expanse of ambiguous land which the ocean 
cyclically claims and surrenders through the “useless elemental energy” of tides and 
breakers. Faust is tormented by the kind of symbolic fluidity which Claude comes to 
accept as the natural element of human endeavour towards truth and meaning. Whereas
Claude at least does not consider his appetites sinful, they are simply humiliating manifestations of 
human creatureliness which will not be stifled. In this short passage, Claude actually seems quite content 
with the nature of this compromise, but it follows on from his explanation of the sanctuary he has made 
out of the idea of his unperturbed interior self; in which he has already discredited, to his satisfaction, the 
necessity of abiding by worldly circumstance. We might notice also that it is particularly with God in 
mind, not the victuals themselves, that Claude can allow himself this expression of commitment.
47 Goethe, F a u st-P a rt Two, In. 10134-35.
48 Faust -  Part Two, In. 10135-54.
49 Faust -  Part Two, In. 10155.
50 Faust -  Part Two, In. 10159.
51 Faust -  Part Two, In. 10187.
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Claude envisages the changed circumstances of secular isolation from the solid ground 
of faith as a cormorant existence bobbing over crest and trough, Faust seeks to conquer 
the fluid element by reclaiming the contested ground which it renders uninhabitable. 
Claude’s vision accepts uncertainty while Faust seeks to forcibly approve those 
elements which appear to him to offer stability. Later he is again tormented by the 
unsolid swampland; he sets about draining it to provide the foundations for his new city.
Faust is compelled by his phobia of ambiguity to work against nature; he must 
forcibly correct the prodigality of nature’s ambivalence. He relies on exploitative 
methods which mingle despotism with the occult, as Baucis reflects:
Slaves toiled vainly: blow by blow,
Pick and shovel made no way.
Then we saw the night flames glow -  
And a dam stood there next day.
They used human sacrifice:
Fire ran down, like rivers burning.
All night long we heard the cries -  
A canal was built by morning.52
Philemon’s and Baucis’ assessment of Faust’s progressive scheme, reclaiming land 
from the sea, goes no further than to note the dubiousness of its unnatural foundations. 
It is a speculation built on a contentious first principle, which holds no attraction for the 
couple who, now as always, feel themselves safely and soundly rooted in the old ways. 
In the couple’s contentment, however, Faust experiences an implied dissent against his 
totalitarian program.
Damned bell! A treacherous wound that flies 
As from a sniper’s shot behind me!
Out there my endless kingdom lies,
But this vexation at my back,
These teasing envious sounds remind me 
My great estate’s not pure! That line 
Of linden-trees, that little shack,
That crumbling chapel, are not mine.
On that green place I may not tread 
Another’s shadow falls like dread;
It irks my feet, my eyes, my ear -  
How can I get away from here!53
52 Faust -  Part Two, ln. 11123-30.
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The oppression Faust experiences in the shade of past beliefs and traditional lifestyles, 
manifests in his vision of liberty.
Yes! to this vision I am wedded still,
And this as wisdom’s final word I teach:
Only that man earns freedom, merits life,
Who must reconquer both in constant daily strife.
In such a place, by danger still surrounded,
Youth, manhood, age, their brave new world have
founded.
I long to see that multitude and stand 
With a free people on free land!54
Faust once more envisages his project as philanthropic; his vision, though, is entirely 
egocentric, and his blinkered commitment to its realisation is simple tyranny. “Until the 
edifice of this achievement stands, / One mind shall move a thousand hands” ;55 one 
mind with no acknowledgment of unsympathetic others: “the creeping power of Care be 
great, / This power I will never recognize!” .56
Faust aims to create a habitat for a new breed of person: modem individuals like 
himself who feel suffocated and disenfranchised by traditional conventions. Drawn to 
his new world by their shared need to be tätig frei (free to act, not bound by tradition), a 
modem population does begin to emerge in the wake of his reforms. It becomes 
apparent, though, that the sanctity of this habitat can only be assured through the 
displacement of those who are not actively aligned with his ideals. These incompatible 
individuals constitute a population whose marginalised voices are still potent sources of 
dissent, and capable of insinuating the obtuseness of Faust’s ideologically based reform.
As potent emblems of a conventional notion of “home”, the traditional comforts 
of Philemon and Baucis (“sweet folk”) challenge Faust’s commitment to modernisation. 
“My will, my sovereign command / Is broken on that pile of sand!” ;57 the lamentations 
and declamatory agony that surround Faust’s declaration, “The old couple must give 
way!” ,58 suggest dramatic formalities of self-justification as he shows himself he “must 
/ Grow weary now of being just”.59 The edenic garden, old fashioned church, and 
Linden trees which recall his childhood, conjure emotional bonds which he must
53 Faust -  Part Two, ln. 11151-62.
54 Faust -  Part Two, ln. 11573-80.
55 Faust -  Part Two, In. 11509-10.
56 Faust -  Part Two, ln. 11493-94.
57 Faust -  Part Two, In. 11255-56.
58 Faust -  Part Two, ln. 11239.
59 Faust -  Part Two, ln. 11271-72.
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desecrate to affirm the unimpeachable authority of his new vision. Mephistopheles’ 
subtle incitement of Faust’s aggressive dismissal of such emblems suggests a precursor 
to Raskolnikov’s policy of stepping over and also Nietzsche’s assertions that genius 
does not, and should not be required to, recognise ordinary limitations. This 
resemblance and its position in the Faustian compromise suggests interesting 
ramifications for Nietzsche’s modem nobility: in Nietzsche’s own reflections on the fate 
of such figures, the probability of paranoia and distortion is plain within their 
celebration of their ascendancy over convention. The snarling superiority Nietzsche 
attributes to the Übermenschen - who, if they are not in a position to lead, go it alone 
and snarl at the common reality that ignores or rejects their inspired edicts - is as 
compromised in its posture and expressions as Raskolnikov’s sense of his own greater 
worth. This sense is most active in Raskolnikov’s determination not to concede his 
feeling of utter diminution in relation to those who embody the laws and obligations he 
sought to escape.
The old couple are relics from classical literature; they seem to serve as symbolic 
idealisations of perennial parental nurture and uncomplaining selflessness. They are 
caring and good, but their satisfaction seems intrinsically conservative: they have every 
reason to question change and no reason to desire it, and hence resist the idea of 
palingenesis, so often proffered as the initial act of liberated modernization.60 The old 
couple, therefore, are deemed (mistakenly as it turns out) to be a further element of 
tradition and emotional heritage which is superfluous to the developing age or 
consciousness. That this couple are not superfluous is made plain through the 
recollections of their visitor. They are rescuers, offering shelter and a mooring point in
60 Marshall Berman suggests, in All That is Solid Melts Into Air, that Faust’s world-shaping modernism 
can only proceed after he has cathartically cast-off psychological dampeners which maintain an emotional 
bond to a childhood idyll of innocence and irrational enchantment, and which keep him from 
synchronising thought and action. In the Nineteenth-century Thomas Carlyle was a strong advocate of 
palingenesis as the one thing necessary to successfully reinvigorate the Christian spiritual tradition under 
threat of falling into complete discredit due to the erosion of the credibility of external authority. The 
idea of cultural death leading to rebirth was borrowed in part from the German romantics and in part by 
eastern mythology and religion, particularly by an Indian god who destroys the world with one hand 
while simultaneously recreating it with another. The decline of traditional religious faith in the West, 
throughout the nineteenth century and to the present, has often prompted individuals to seek and to 
borrow spiritual emblems and postures from the rest of the world, and from history (Buddhism, 
Confucianism, Hellenism, for example, even the trend towards Catholicism was based in what for many 
English ecclesiastics amounted to a relieving flight into mystical exoticism). These appropriated forms 
often seemed, in their exoticism (at once apparently simple or naive and ornately authentic), to retain a 
facet of the mystical spiritual potency lost to the more thoroughly (and critically) understood and familiar 
ready-made traditions which had begun to solidify into quotidian history. In addition, social movements 
like socialism and Marxism, offered similar systematic bodies of law and conduct, new moral codes, 
while at the same time eschewing the contentious desire to maintain the role of external spiritual 
authority, and emphasising instead the humanistic potential for benevolent secular, rational and 
intellectual approval of just means of social organization and how to crystallise them.
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a storm; in their ministrations to the shipwrecked traveller they provide a succour in 
distinct contrast to the kind Faust has resorted to in order to allay his own experience of 
intellectual strife and confusion. It is interesting to note, though, that the traveller, who 
returns and re-establishes an esteem for the traditional qualities Philemon and Baucis 
represent, is slaughtered along with the old couple by Faust’s over-zealous allies. 
Mephistopheles recognises this expedient as an unspoken requirement in Faust’s need to 
impose his vision with the semblance of a free hand; the need underlies Faust’s order 
for the displacement of the old couple, but he baulks at admitting the lengths that 
answering this need might require. Mephistopheles perhaps recognises the power of 
tradition and contentment which the old couple embody. With such moorings dismissed 
from the world, Faust is doomed to rootless isolation and the insatiable need for change 
which keeps him in Mephisto’s thrall. When Faust no longer seeks to impose or 
experience change, and consents to linger, he surrenders life and soul, but also brings to 
an end the devil’s work he has unwittingly been perpetrating in the neurotic momentum 
of his compulsive attempts to fit the world to his desires. Philemon and Baucis have the 
legitimate ability to baulk progress, their contentment strikes Faust as a mocking 
whisper. Faust can conquer the sea but not the old couple; he has no hold over them, 
their inertia defies the absolute authority of his values. For Faust, their presence 
maintains a proven alternative capable of disrupting the utter contentment his new 
world proposes.
At issue here is not the relative validity of modernisation or tradition but rather the 
necessary delusions generated by ideological reformers whose reverence for, and 
reliance on, the clear conscience of acting in subservient allegiance to ostensibly 
transcendent ideals (as opposed, for example, to accepting a responsibility to 
implement, and remain accountable for, pragmatic and partial checks on uncertainty) 
requires that they perceive a clear moral mandate for their cause. What Faust overlooks 
in willing the destruction of Philemon and Baucis, the narrator of Dostoevsky’s “The 
Meek Girl” 61 overlooks also under compulsion to manipulate his captive wife’s 
perspective of him (I shall return to this later). When Faust has been blinded by Care, 
“the clash of spades” delights him, but what he supposes to be the sound of work to 
reify his vision is a group of Mephistopheles’ goblins digging him a grave.62 He has 
been blind throughout to the ramifications of his vision on others and now he is blind to
61 Dostoevsky, “The Meek Girl” (1876), Uncles Dream and Other Stories, trans. David McDuff 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1989), 253-95. “The Meek Girl” has also been translated 
under the titles “A Gentle Creature” and “The Meek One: A Fantastic Story”; it was first published in 
1876 as the November edition of Dostoevsky’s A Writer’s Diary.
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the intrinsic rottenness of his unnatural insistence that the natural world should requite 
his personal desire for stable certainty.
The stifling awareness of justified alternatives both of action and inaction, like 
Hamlet’s coward-making conscience, necessitates a compromise whereby subtleties of 
vision, and often sympathy for others are repressed to facilitate the semblance of 
certainty. This repression, though, is rarely recognised by the newly certain character as 
the act of will that it is, but regarded as the inspired and enlightened acceptance of a 
particular code of conduct; an act, therefore, which is externally sanctioned. The subtly 
mitigating self-mesmerism which this kind of false attribution facilitates is emblematic 
of the monologue’s capacity to effectively dissolve bonds of community while 
purporting to uphold essential abstract moral concerns. Those deemed external to the 
monologist’s cause are dehumanised, discredited or simply overlooked, in order to 
subordinate their concerns as inferior in a hierarchical moral context. Treating alien 
concerns as inferior or unreal, then, is often condoned when precedence is given to 
resuscitation of traditional or merely personally desired assurances as functions of 
monologic authority.
In the deportment of little-fausts and of dreamers, absolutist infatuation has, 
respectively, its fanaticism and its quietism. The unpregnant pause, however, reflects a 
state somewhere in-between the two, in which individuals neither sink into isolated 
fancy nor precipitously act out their desire for an authoritative conviction. In the 
unpregnant pause individuals consciously endure uncertainty, and though it is typically 
endured as a burden, this endurance contains the possibility of recognising that it is 
ambiguity, not some hidden ideal, which is the fundamental context which gives 
proportion and meaning to any human notion of absolute truth or certainty.
Emotivism and Monologues
I shall use the term “emotivism” in accordance with Alasdair MacIntyre’s suggestion in 
After Virtue63 that the failure of the direct meaning of the moral theory put forth by 
Moore, Stevenson, Duncan and Ramsey provided an indirect insight into the nature of 
secular moral discourse.
62 Goethe, F aust- Part Two, ln. 11539.
63 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1981).
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MacIntyre adapts emotivism as a term which indicates the attempt implicit in the 
overt project of Moore et al. of distinguishing between a language of verifiable moral 
absolutes and the merely emotive statements which often masquerade as moral 
absolutes. This attempt provides, MacIntyre suggests, a perfect example of what it 
seeks to eradicate from the category of moral utterance: it is essentially an attempt to 
salvage the notion of moral absolutes as a privileged and actual fund of pure concepts or 
information properly suited to a kind of moral philosophy which is founded in 
something more stable and more empirical than simply finite human interaction, choices 
and agreements.
In MacIntyre’s realignment, emotivism implies the imposition or presumption of 
absolute discriminations in order to justify the utilisation of authoritative moral 
language to further the credibility of particular explanations of merely personal 
preferences, beliefs and actions. This imposition is variously wilful, wishful, 
unconscious and unsure, it reflects anxiety and a frustration with ambiguity, and esteem 
for authority both as an instinctive creative response and a reactionary longing. It 
reflects a condition of confusion about the status of moral and abstract distinctions.64 
Emotivist convictions, therefore, refer to convictions upheld or relied upon as if they 
represented an external absolute when in fact they have been unwittingly invested with 
the semblance of rational credibility and external authority to cater to individuals’ 
dependence on the functions provided by an absolute certainty.
Emotivism, according to MacIntyre, inadvertently provides “a preliminary 
sketch of an empirical thesis, presumably to be filled out later by psychological and
64 While Stevenson et al. provide a provocative example of an abstract system authorised by emotivism, 
in Nietzsche’s work MacIntyre demonstrates a register of protest against persisting habits of objectively 
distinguishing unimpeachable moral guides (such as God had appeared to offer). Nietzsche attacked all 
conventional forms of certainty, MacIntyre explains, prompted by his own conviction that “what 
purported to be appeals to objectivity were in fact expressions of subjective will” (After Virtue, 113). 
While it is in Nietzsche’s writings that this idea is perhaps most stridently, and sometimes most 
compellingly, asserted, traces of a similar awareness are apparent in the thought of both David Hume and 
John Stuart Mill.
A similar hostility to the superficially objective credibility which convention and necessity often 
afforded to conduct supported also by hollow rationales and bad faith was also a guiding intuition of the 
radical nihilist program of dismissing “principles”. Radical nihilists react to a recognition of the inability 
to rationally discriminate sound and vital concepts from persuasive conventions which survive on merely 
emotional or contingent grounds by calling for the dismissal of all received ideas so that what is credible 
can thereafter re-establish itself unhindered. By contrast, therapeutic nihilism claims that, given the 
indecipherable mass of plausible but not unimpeachable beliefs, ethics and moral positions, no single path 
can be legitimately chosen without the prospect of choosing wrongly (under the influence of convention, 
emotion or simple ignorance) and therein, actively making things worse. One must, therefore, choose not 
to engage in attempts to solve what cannot be fully understood. In the early twentieth-century, members 
of the Vienna Circle began to extend this kind of abstract rigour to the use of language, arguing that 
abstract philosophical and conceptual discourse should limit itself to statements that are entirely clear and 
empirically verifiable to avoid the kind of vagueness which sustains deluded and improper convictions.
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sociological and historical observations, about those who continue to use moral and 
other evaluative expressions, as if they were governed by objective and impersonal 
criteria, when all grasp of any such criterion has been lost” .65
The conditions for the prevalence of emotivism are those involving “a general 
implicit recognition in practice, though not in explicit theory, that claims to objectivity 
and impersonality cannot be made good” .66 As such, in the absence of a common 
authoritative body of moral terms, the everyday moral agreements made by people in 
relation to practical circumstances rely on the devices of emotive moral discourse to 
claim the privileges of apparent authority.
Where no commonly accepted virtues or moral codes exist, the guiding roles of a clear 
moral doctrine are taken up by the contingent appeals of strategies of eloquent 
persuasion. As a result, though, individuals tend to become isolated within the inwardly 
compelling but outwardly contestable authenticity of their abstract convictions (caught 
up in the particular symbols that assuage their particular anxieties and uncertainties) as 
they have no common standard with which to communicate their meaning. They do, 
however, have the capacity to attempt to communicate the circumstance and nature of 
the anxiety their symbols console, and therein to justify the credibility of their emotive 
standards. The desire to make sense to others remains. With the structure of morality 
fractured and lacking compelling common terms, the consoling work or assurance must 
rely on the persuasive presentation of its own implied “moral” code. Where esteem for 
authoritative moral conviction remains, though, the need to approve not merely the 
credibility but the authority of the emotive code tends to smother any willingness to 
make sense in agreement with others. This is the condition to which individuals who 
have committed themselves to the faustian compromise are condemned.
The sense of deprivation that typically weighs unacknowledged on emotivist 
moralities suggests the inability of finite beings to construct or discover authoritative 
assurance which can survive a clear awareness of the complex and ambivalent world. 
Such an assurance, nevertheless, remains the desired ideal and benchmark of emotivist 
moralities, encouraging individuals to discover in their emotional motivations the 
unimpeachable causality of an absolute authority. Subsequently the meaningfulness of 
these clusters of ethic, assurance and explicit causality (that is, a sense that “good”
This commitment resulted in the conscientiously ethical, and typically short-lived, “silence” (on matters 
where nothing ‘certain’ could be said) of some philosophers and artists.
65 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 18.
66 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 19.
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actions can be relied on to produce consequences which can be deemed good) depends 
upon a type of conviction which appears implicitly confined to the individual whose 
emotions recognise their authority. While each individual celebrates their conviction’s 
approximation of the shape of past Authority, the unimpeachable assurance they seek in 
these “clusters” can never exist, in its own terms, as more than a solipsistic pleasure.
This does not make these emotivist positions worthless as moral statements, but 
rather highlights, particularly in the celebratory devotion of those who approve them, 
the root of the problems caused by the incapacity of such convictions to provide the 
authoritative support emotivists expect from them. The problems emotivist idealism 
can engender stem from the friction between external objective fact and the untenable 
expectations that the emotivist accepts, with a kind of wilful credulity, as dispensations 
of an authoritative higher order.
Emotivism runs through the ostensibly abstract ideologies of the characters I shall 
focus on, generating and supporting their capacity to put faith in them and depend on 
the certainty they provide. This emotivist idealism is characterised by the modes of 
discourse and by the euphemistic circumstantial expressions of desire and protest, 
which absolutist requirements demand of secular idealism.
The idealists I shall focus on effectively use these terms as MacIntyre suggests, to 
express particular intuitions as if they were general abstract principles. The problems 
then arise when these individuals expect the general terms emotivists invest with their 
particular assurances to find accord in reality. As such, this thesis perhaps provides 
something of the historical, social and psychological exploration of the circumstances 
behind, and consequences of, these individuals’ attempts (whether successful or not) “to 
use moral and other evaluative expressions, as if they were governed by objective and 
impersonal criteria” .67 I shall focus also on the way in which this expectation stores up 
for them a sense of betrayal by the world and by the ideals they cherish, and therein 
provokes them to distort or resent their relationship with reality, and to separate it from 
their relationship with their ideals.
By emotivist discourse I mean to imply the kind of rhetorical (or pseudo-logical) and 
attitudinal posture necessitated by individuals’ compulsion to support convictions they 
have generated through the generalisation of their subjective and particular reactions to 
and approval of an assurance, or systems of assurance. These “Systems” tend to 
masquerade in pseudo-rational terms, and relationships of terms, which hide the fact
67 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 18.
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that the assurances they provide depend on a selective over-simplification of the 
ambiguity and uncertainty of truth, purpose and conviction in the secular world.
The factitiousness of idealism, apparent in its inadequacy in the role intended for 
it in these characters’ recourse to abstraction (as the blueprint of an absolute moral code 
or a perfect world), does not simply discredit it as solipsistic gibberish and a failure on 
its own terms, but suggests a different interpretative approach. As expressions which 
attempt to order, but in truth express uncertainty, idealisms ask to be read in 
relationship to the individuals who employ them, and the particular ends which, 
consciously or unconsciously, they have in mind. What emerges is a set of attitudes 
which, rather than re-establishing a common framework of moral verities, provides a 
recognisable pattem in which the experience of this absence, the implicit expression of 
being unable to effect this cohesion, is given an embryonic tradition and a role.
In both the unpregnant pause and the faustian compromise, rationalisations are 
revealed as fundamental to the construction of any transcendent secular certainty. This 
awareness is implicit in the terms of the unpregnant pause, a state in which externally 
authorised commitment seems unjustifiable and any pretence of absolute conviction 
therefore seems suspect of either ignorance or ignobility. While in the faustian 
compromise, it is apparent that idealistic activism is often facilitated through the 
rationalisation - effectively the denial - of facts, and their implications, which oppose 
the foundations of a favoured, ostensibly transcendent code. When depicted alongside 
or “in” the reality they aim to render, these rationalisations reveal motives and 
intentions which distort common meanings in order to artificially guarantee the survival 
of obsolete, though emotionally favoured, orientations to absolute truths.
Monologue sustains the faustian compromise, it is active also in the isolated 
solipsism which sustains dreamers in their unreality.
In articulating this notion of the monologue I shall be focusing on the way in 
which these characters’ recourse to abstraction, and the psychological basis for the kind 
of “convictions” they depend on, reveal the self-isolating implications of seeking to 
resuscitate order and authority in the image of their desires and memories.
Monologic, as I shall use it, is a term which requires some explanation. A literal
monologue is a relatively uncomplicated notion, the uninterrupted discourse of a single
68voice. I am using “monologue” as a metaphorical term for a psychological or
68 This simple root serves as the basis for Mikhail Bakhtin’s differentiation between monologic and 
dialogic frames of meaning. At the heart of this distinction is the transition of abstract authority from
63
attitudinal state; while this state is often depicted through characters’ literal 
monologues, my usage of the term embraces the initial condition of which these are 
particular symptoms. The disquiet of monologic habits reflects the inevitable burden 
experienced by individuals who, in an ambivalent reality, desire the kind of certain 
moral framework provided by faith in an external authority. The certainty the 
monologic individual constructs for themselves is fraught with its incompatibility with a 
world capable only of supporting flexible and relative gradations of moral choice.
An individual’s monologue protects and perpetuates their purportedly objective or 
rational understanding of themselves and the world which has been formed around their 
needs and particular preferences, and around their desire or intellectual esteem for 
absolute certainty. The internally compelling incantation through which individuals 
make sense of the world on behalf of their authority reveals itself to the listener through 
its tone and omissions. In the monologue, the manifestation of a hostility to reality 
which is merely latent in solipsism, is necessitated by the monologic individual’s need 
to enact their solipsistic convictions in some semblance of the actual world.
In the light of Mikhail Bakhtin’s influential notion that Dostoevsky’s novels promote or 
champion a move towards the disclosure of a dialogic scene it might be suggested that a 
focus on monologic tendencies perversely takes the perspectives of morbid, dislocated 
individuals as a source of clarity.69 But the problem of individualistic isolation and 
inhibited empathy exists in its clearest form precisely at these extremes of disruption 
and over-compensation. The morbid extremes at which these characters exist reflect the 
crystallisation of corruptions which are incipient in, though denied by, convention.70
what Bakhtin identifies as a “monoglotic” to a “polyglotic” state. In cultures dominated by a strict focal 
point of abstract moral and practical Authority, such as is embodied in the idea of an omnipotent God, 
there is effectively a single unchallenged source of the living Truth of that culture, a monoglotic 
foundation. Where many authorities, with equally contestable foundations and appeal, vie for 
recognition, approval or devotion, as in secular cultures, truth or authority is based on a polyglotic 
foundation. This differentiation is explained more extensively throughout “Epic and Novel” (The 
Dialogic Imagination, trans. Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist (Austin and London: University of 
Texas Press, 1981), 3-40)). For example: “In this actively polyglot world, completely new relationships 
are established between language and its object (that is, the real world) - and this is fraught with 
enormous consequences for all the already completed genres that had been formed during eras of closed 
and deaf monoglossia” (“Epic and Novel”, 12).
69 Bakhtin’s influential discussion of Dostoevsky’s “polyphonic” novels is contained primarily in 
Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, trans. Caryl Emerson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984). Bakhtin’s original work first appeared in 1929.
70 In Dostoevsky’s Underground Man in Russian Literature (The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton & Co. 
Publishers, 1958), Robert Louis Jackson notes how the Underground Man’s interaction with Liza brings 
into relief “[t]he tragedy of the sentimental-romantic “dreamer”, the tragic impact on others of the 
psychological experiment, the terrible havoc wrought by humiliated consciousness in its egotism of 
suffering” (37). What we see throughout Dostoevsky’s later work is that these are not merely a 
phenomenon of the underground, and that Dostoevsky wished to show the tragic impact and the havoc
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“Contemporary man. He avenges all the injuries which no one did him, nor 
thinks o f doing him”.71
For Dostoevsky, nervousness, and a neurotically distempered perspective of the world, 
is the natural disposition of secular individualism. In the contemporary individualist he 
perceives a growing numbness to communal moral and spiritual interaction, just as he 
saw the broader social fragmentation and corrosion of a secularising, industrialising and 
Westernising society, embodied in the isolation en masse of urban populations.
Bakhtin’s dialogic viewpoint keeps him from fully registering the inertia which runs 
through individuals’ relationship to their monologues as devices of contingent 
compromise between reality and a desired self-image. The desirable shape of dialogic 
openness in Dostoevsky’s novels is revealed by the failings of the monologic self- 
image. It is through the consequences of this appetite for monologic self-assurance 
rather than through their instinctive resistance to external finalisation that Dostoevsky’s 
heroes appear ultimately to oppose the challenge implicit in the monologic visions of 
others.
In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Bakhtin suggests that Dostoevsky’s heroes 
always resist the roles, or “other people’s words”, which, from their alien perspectives, 
others seek to impose.72 This makes of this resistance a far too specialised distinction. 
Not only the “heroes” (distinguished by their unorthodox relation to convention and the 
status quo), but the most parodically drawn minor buffoons are dominated by an 
impulse that resembles this intention. That it is frequently the source of such caricature 
does not, however, dismiss the significance of these exertions; their primary concern is 
not resistance but assertion. The “heroes” to whom Bakhtin refers are doing little more, 
in resisting the roles foisted on them, than exerting a preference for the authoritative 
status of their own ideals and self-conceptions; the “words” with which they give reality 
the semblance of a particular desired order.
they wreak to be incipient in any society based on the principles of secular individualism. What had 
reflected the habitual experiments of a particular type of individual, become the common recourse for the 
wider population who are forced to sacrifice themselves in service of something they cannot legitimately 
idealise. The urge to idealise, however, remains, reflecting the potency of idealisation as an instinctive 
recourse for dignifying existence with transcendent life-goals and meaning.
71 Dostoevsky, The Unpublished Dostoevsky: Diaries and Notebooks 1860-81, volume 111, trans. Arline 
Boyer & Carl Proffer (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1975), 133.
72 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 59.
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For Bakhtin, the resistance to other people’s words suggests an intuition of the 
inadequacy of the ready-made truths which received roles impose. But in Dostoevsky’s 
work it is commonly individuals’ ambitions to self-determination, their preference for 
their own version of the world in exclusion of all others, that lead them to construe and 
experience these multiple perspectives in terms of challenge and potential sabotage. 
This is not the intuition of dialogue, it is the reflexive censorship on which the 
individual’s authoritative monologue is founded. In After Virtue Alasdair MacIntyre 
observes that the interactions superintended by the sense of emotive justification, rather 
than explanation, of moral preferences are characteristically “shrill”; the monologue’s 
arrogated burden of Authority turns other voices into challenges, and meets them as 
such. Dialogue is not characterised by resistance; the loss of illusions that is the 
standard outcome of experience in the novelistic scene results from the acceptance that 
every “voice” or truth is legitimately qualified by the multifacetedness it vies with.
Raskolnikov resists the dialogue that continues around him until it is no longer a 
threat to the vital foundations of his self-esteem. As the aspirations directed by his 
desired self-image shift gradually away from the criminal self, Raskolnikov’s combative 
urge fades until the skin he must shed is sufficiently drained of meaning. For as long as 
they challenge his aspiration, Raskolnikov resists the words of Svidrigailov, Porfiry 
Petrovich, Dunya and Sonya. His own words are formed around a cliche, but as long as 
he identifies with it he fights for the cause (himself) which the cliche supports. 
Raskolnikov is redeemed only when he accepts these other versions into himself and 
affirms the dignity of an obligation to hear what others say.
In “Poor Folk” (1846) Makar Devushkin resists the version of himself which he 
finds in Gogol’s “The Overcoat” and is both right and wrong to do so. Gogol’s copyist, 
Akaky Akakievich, is revisited in Makar’s characteristically unfulfilled existence, but 
Makar’s aversion to this analogy reflects a tenacious resistance to its implication that he 
is helplessly determined by his circumstance, and that, as is the case for Akaky, no 
avenue of protest, control or free-will is available to him. Makar’s aversion, then, 
reflects his compulsion to reject the veracity of a highly disturbing image of himself, in 
which the consolations he has managed to draw from his existence are designated, he 
feels, as merely further generic facets of an existence determined by his material
73 This distinction between justification and explanation clarifies the difference between an awareness of 
the emotive particularities of individual moral preferences and relativism. The inter-relationship between 
any individual and their moral code does not exclude judgement, it merely requires that this relationship 
be interrogated and taken into account along with the judgements implicit in the responses of community 
and circumstance. By depicting or dramatising the nature of emotive techniques of self-representation,
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circumstance. Makar’s letters, his epistolary romance, and his entire inner-life are 
perhaps just the kind of meaningless copy-work with which Akaky also solaces himself. 
However, to see Makar’s resistance to this external measure as entirely justified 
(accepting, therefore, that the implications of the analogy it imposes on him are entirely 
unwarranted), would dismiss much of the ambiguity which generates the interest in 
Makar’s uncertainty of his own individualism and his uncertain commitment to it.
The brief mention of these deviations from Bakhtin’s assertion reflects a common 
tension (which I shall return to in more detail in Chapter 7) between monologic 
inclinations and the recalcitrant influence of ambivalent facts (including the discrepant 
perceptions of others). Dostoevsky’s novels are populated by a considerable number of 
minor characters who resist the roles assigned to them by the dialogic scene (in 
Bakhtin’s sense). This population reflects Dostoevsky’s commitment to depicting the 
spread of individualism and the way in which it encouraged people to act on the 
promptings of merely personal inclination or vanity. As well as the grandiose themes 
on which the novels urgently focus, the pervasive consequences of individualism’s 
validation of self-interest warn against its highly disruptive influence on the mundane 
aspects of ordinary relationships and common domestic existences.
“White Nights” (1846), “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man” (1877), “The Meek 
Girl” (1876) and An Accidental Family (1875) all contain overt pleas for open 
communication, a concern which remains a constant undertone throughout 
Dostoevsky’s work. “Why”, asks the dreamer in “White Nights”,
... do even the finest people always seem to be hiding something from others 
and keeping quiet about it? Why should one not speak out directly, without delay, 
whatever is in one’s heart, if one knows one isn’t talking idly? The way things are 
at present, people look more stem than they really are, as though they were all afraid 
they might spoil the authenticity of their feelings if they were to display them too 
readily...”.74
This stem suppression of what they really feel (and Dostoevsky’s “target” in depicting 
its consequences) originates in individuals’ intuitions of the environment of social 
interaction: the shared arena of emotivist resistance and challenge requires that the 
simulated authority of monologue (and the fragile confidence it provides) need always 
be on guard against subjection to alternative truths or perspectives.
the author brings together motivations and consequences with the versions of morality they generate and 
reflect.
74 Dostoevsky, “White Nights”, Uncle’s Dream and Other Stories, transl. David McDuff 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1989), 71-121, 109.
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In Winter Notes on Summer Impressions (1863),75 - a polemic full of satirical 
deflations and apocalyptic extrapolations of the individualism from which Dostoevsky 
considered the merely contingent moralities and superficial ideals of bourgeois Europe 
had stemmed - Dostoevsky began to clarify his conception that individualism 
necessarily involves and encourages an insensibility to the “information” about oneself 
which is latent in interaction with others.76
The disruptions which emotivist authorities (such as Myshkin’s abstract ethic of 
compassion and beauty or Don Quixote’s belief in the rightness of a world ordered by 
chivalric conventions) inevitably suffer and contend with in ambivalent reality, do not 
suggest that the intentions that formed them are irrelevant, but simply that they can no 
longer call on metaphysical orientation as their bedrock of justification. They become a 
strange form of poetic or lyrical expression of an individual’s orientation to an 
ambivalent world, rather than an objective means of discovering and committing to its 
essential system.
Though disrupting monologic allegiances to these individualistic constructions 
of absolutes, the reality of the natural world offers no particular revelation (such as a 
recommendation of polyphony, dialogic existence, or an order implicit in chaos). It 
simply provides, inherent in its ambivalent workings, the no less precious possibility of 
recognising the distortions, negligence and isolating selectivity which sustain 
monologic attitudes.
My interpretation of the tension which manifests between a character’s monologic 
intention and the ambivalent world differs from Bakhtin’s in the sense that his dialogic 
world (against which he judges monologues as if they were clouds blotting out the sun) 
suggests an inhuman place, or a utopian vision, but not a pertinent reality. Monologues 
express a desire for authority which can be read not as the obstacle to dialogic 
awareness, but ultimately as an inherently confused act of personal orientation to the 
uncertainty which this relativistic, supposedly pregnant with “dialogic” awareness, 
scenario is actually experienced as. This is particularly apparent in Clough’s depictions 
of the unravelling of his characters’ unwittingly received habits of subjectively 
approving desired authority under the guise of seeking (and finding) it externally. That 
the results of such personal protests against uncertainty are sometimes treated as 
transcendent authorities, reflects a particular dimension of the type of protest which 
forms them: these particular protests are founded on an ideological bedrock of
7i Dostoevsky, Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, trans. David Patterson (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1997).
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absolutism, a foundation from which individuals seem able to consider transcendent 
moral imperatives only as rigid general rules, abstracted from (and blissfully 
unconcerned with) human particularity and circumstantial contingencies.
Subsequent to the loss of such a commonly accepted fund of external authority (such as 
the death of God), individuals’ attempts to sustain the assurances associated, perhaps 
somewhat nostalgically, with an accepted absolute framework of purpose and virtue 
necessarily involve them in strategic and selective relationships with ambivalent reality 
and others. By selectively approving aspects of reality which support or privilege an 
individuals’ subjectively idealised ‘authorities’ over rival systems and recalcitrant fact, 
monologues enable individuals to believe in the absolute authority of their moral 
frameworks. Monologues facilitate worldviews in which individuals’ preferential truths 
appear, to them, rather as the dictates of an external authority. Simultaneously, though, 
monologues require that discrepant elements of reality be repudiated or simply denied, a 
requirement that results in a kind of unwitting conceptual incarceration within the 
particulars and the false absolutism of the desired ideal.
And yet, while the plausibility of a shared monologic ordering of the common 
world has dissipated, the propensities which sustained it so readily, and which were in 
turn perhaps nourished and reinforced by it, persist in the absolutist conceptual 
deportment of individuals in the ambiguous finite world. And for similar reasons, 
habits of monologic reassurance persist also in the form of the affirmations by which 
dialogic awareness is frequently sanctified. This is perhaps because at a fundamental 
level, individuals who seek or are compelled to understand and express (even if just for 
himself or herself) moral codes and life-goals that might transcend merely 
circumstantial considerations, continue to experience anxieties which render them 
susceptible to the assurances and support they associate with patterns of absolute 
authority, even though the value of these patterns has become highly dubious.
76 See in particular “An Essay Concerning the Bourgeois”, Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, 43-52.
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CHAPTER 3 -  Some Consequences of Moral Confusion
Whose Sound Centre?
Masao Miyoshi, in The Divided Self, attributes to Clough and Arnold the role of 
revealing the inefficacy of the “Victorian conversion” which had sought to heal the 
divided self and resolve Romantic indeterminacy with “a moral view of art as of life” . 1 2
In the works o: Clough particularly, the significant problem of what one ought to do is 
considered anc depicted, free of any special pleading, in relation to the ambiguities, 
dismptions and desires spawned by a moral scene which seemed suddenly to lack any 
governing authority. Though many poets and novelists in the period wrestled with 
metaphysical uncertainties in their work, in Clough’s writing uncertainty seems least 
tampered with: attempts factitiously to resolve ambiguities are relentlessly disrupted; 
uncertainty is given its head where others often make a show of taming it.
Conductors of monologues create and sometimes purvey versions of themselves, 
and their frequent awareness of this fact introduces the dimension of implicit dialogue
1 Masao Miyoshi, The Divided Self: A perspective on the Literature o f the Victorians (New York: New 
York University Press; London: University of London Press, 1969), 107.
2 The endeavour of Browning’s and Tennyson’s early works requires an order or meaning, the revelation 
of which is the impulse of the work. In Tennyson’s work in particular this desire to reveal involves a kind 
of faux ambiguity being ritually trounced on cue by a revivified faith. Browning and Tennyson appear 
unable, for aesthetic and ideological reasons, to admit an ambiguous collection of possibilities as a 
suitable creative platform. In “The Two Voices” (published 1842, written 1833), for instance, 
Tennyson’s stage-managing presence disrupts the surface of the poem’s Socratic procedure. Tennyson’s 
guiding hand and subjective interest can be seen forging the poems’ contentions into a capricious 
synthesis, and the two voices to be involved in the assertion of dialogue and resolution, rather than the 
representation of conflicting reactions to an ambiguity. In the spirit of the Victorian conversion, 
Tennyson’s genuine experience of ambiguity, doubt, or loss of consensus, leads to impatience and a 
determined siding with his moral self (which has been sanctified on utilitarian and didactic principles). 
Tennyson’s dialogues of the mind with itself are consequently unconvincing; they are not genuine 
representations of multiplicity but rhetorical concessions to an atmosphere hostile to the moral certainty 
he wishes to generate. Browning’s awareness of a similar constriction, Miyoshi suggests, is responsible 
for the stilted and unmanageable relationship between aesthetic form and psychological veracity in his 
earlier works. Browning’s early poetry could not gracefully or even adequately contain the intellectual 
necessities required to overcome the infinitely receding and therefore inherently elusive character of the 
first-person expression of a point of authority. However, with the dramatic monologue, suggests Masao 
Miyoshi, Browning “finally caught on to his true form”, one that would enable him to write free from a 
poetically disruptive fidelity to the fluctuations of multi-faceted truth (The Divided Self 203). Browning 
found his way around this quagmire of genuine confusion without resorting to factitious “solutions” or 
false confidence by representing, in his “dramatic monologues”, the fragmented subjectivity of secular 
inspirations and convictions within their own self-constructed frames of independent explanation and 
meaning. “With so many masks to put on the poet is not personally involved with any one of them. He is 
released from the struggle with doubt and belief, and can concentrate on form” (203). It seems necessary 
to note, in clarification of Miyoshi’s suggestion, that any release from personal involvement which the 
dramatic monologue provides, is partial; the distance it asserts between author and the voice in the poem 
is a technique which is available to complement other elements of characterisation or the dramatisation of 
concepts in the poem. It seems unwise to discount the poet’s personal involvement in any work, 
regardless of whether or not his or her words are attributed to another.
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between the self creating and the self created.3 Of the two people present in “Bishop 
Blougram’s Apology”, only one participant speaks: Gigadibs, Blougram’s interlocutor, 
“played with spoons, explored his plate’s design/ And ranged the olive-stones about its 
edge”. He seems to sense that his importance to the monologue has little to do with any 
actual input he might muster. At the end of his address Bishop Blougram is in a self- 
congratulatory mood: ‘On the whole,’ he thought, ‘I justify myself / On every point 
where cavillers like this/ Oppugn my life’. In partial agreement with this sentiment, a 
narrative voice reflects that “the great bishop rolled him out a mind/ Long crumpled, till 
creased consciousness lay smooth.”. Blougram does justify himself, but only to 
himself; his monologue takes issue only with his own interpretation of Gigadibs’ 
position. So Blougram’s address attempts to effect the exclusive triumph of 
monologue. The internal dialogue which it expresses mistakenly experiences its own 
sense of the conflict of other voices as legitimate dialogue. Answering the challenges 
he seems to expect from Gigadibs, Blougram acknowledges, absorbs and defuses 
potentially disruptive contentions and thereby revivifies his convictions. That 
Blougram is compelled to absolve himself in this fashion reflects the profoundly 
insecure character of his monologic authority. Such monologues are not the 
impervious, self-assuredly proffered essences of subjective beings; they are individuals’ 
attempts to validate the sense they make to themselves as being worthy of external 
approval. Within their subjectivity they register the challenge of a multiplicity of 
alternative propositions. Bishop Blougram, for instance, conducts the argument both 
for and against his conduct; Gigadibs, while not a double, is a source of opposition 
against which Blougram needs to justify himself. In spite of Blougram’s protestations 
as to the effortlessness of his position and his easy conscience, it is definitely his own 
needs that motivate him.
In Culture and Anarchy (1868) Matthew Arnold observes:
... not only do we get no suggestions of right reason, and no rebukes of our 
ordinary self, from our governors, but a kind of philosophical theory is widely
3 Prior to the plainly deluded manifestation of Don Quixote’s enthusiasm for chivalric conduct, his 
interest reflects a fixation with a style of being he feels is more suited to the being he feels himself to be. 
His devotion transcends material concerns - “[Don Quixote] sold many acres of corn-land to buy these 
books of chivalry to read” {Don Quixote, trans. J.M.Cohen (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 
1950), 31) - but this devotion is to what? “ ‘I know who I am,’ replied Don Quixote, ‘and I know, too, 
that I am capable of being not only the characters I have named, but all the Twelve Peers of France and 
all the Nine Worthies as well, for my exploits are far greater than all the deeds they have done, all 
together and each by him self” (54). I know who I am, which seems to say, “I know my value”, and it is 
equal to the value he places on the “authentic history” of chivalric romance. His delusions are the 
assertion of an inner logic conflating self-esteem and desire into a belief in an entitlement which, like 
Madame Bovary’s world-shrinking ambition, chafes against the contingency of circumstance.
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spread among us to the effect that there is no such thing at all as a best self and a 
right reason having claim to paramount authority, or, at any rate, no such thing 
ascertainable and capable of being made use of; and that there is nothing but an 
infinite number of ideas and works of our ordinary selves, and suggestions of our 
natural taste for the bathos, pretty nearly equal in value, which are doomed either to 
an irreconcilable conflict, or else to perpetual give and take.4
This is the state of social interaction to which Arnold attributes the necessary project of 
establishing “a sound centre of authority” .5 The “infinite number of ideas” which are 
“pretty nearly equal in value”, given that they all issue from “ordinary selves”, are 
ideally to be governed by right reason and the superior intuitions of the best self. Right 
reason and the best self are to be attained through the enlightenment of culture; they 
constitute Arnold’s attempt to resuscitate an absolute authority capable of overcoming 
the stagnation implied by the equality and mere adequacy of ordinary selves.
Arnold suggests that the path of wisdom is to accept the “give and take” of a 
compromise with what is; the path of uncompromising individualism, however, leads to 
conflict.6 Compromise is precisely what monologue cannot attain; its recourse then is 
shrill assertiveness or silence. Gigadibs’ silence and subsequent decampment for a new 
world reacts against the exclusive and stagnant essence of Blougram’s policy. 
Gigadibs’ emigration also suggests a reactionary variation on Blougram’s domineering 
authority, Gigadibs evades the unpleasant implications of an argument which he is 
unable authoritatively to refute. In reporting Gigadibs’ indirect rejoinder, Browning 
nevertheless subjects the intent of Blougram’s internal self-manipulation to the 
contestable nature of its effect, insinuating the isolating divisiveness of the authority it 
asserts. A suggestive project is thereby included in Browning’s poem beyond the 
revelation of Blougram’s self-distorting special pleading on behalf of an entrenched but 
unsatisfactory ideal. The project is implied by our own sense of the desirability of a 
genuine dialogue as opposed to the characteristically shrill discourse which MacIntyre 
(in After Virtue) identifies as the standard interchange of emotivist self-justification. 
Blougram is smug rather than shrill, his position allows him the comfort of a benevolent 
disdain for the “ideologies” which might otherwise challenge and prompt him to 
aggressive proselytising.
4 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 119-20.
5 Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, 119.
6 Nevertheless, it is perhaps the latter path which leads Arnold to his faith in right reason and the best self; 
his own inspirations stem from a form of idealistic conflict with a reality which he deems essentially 
delinquent in its deviation from what he considers an Ideal.
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In The Historical Novel? Georg Lukäcs suggests that the “inclusion of the dramatic 
element in the novel, the concentration of events, the greater significance of dialogue, 
i.e. the direct coming-to-grips of colliding opposites in conversation, these are 
intimately linked with the attempt to portray historical reality as it actually was, so that 
it could be both humanly authentic and yet be re-livable by the reader of a later age” .7 8 9
The humanly authentic and re-livable representation achieved in dialogue succeeds on 
two levels: firstly, through the insistence on the importance of registering the influential 
role of individuals experiencing and registering specific situations from a position of 
spontaneous uncertainty; and secondly, in the procedural form, which offers a form 
accessible to the reader’s re-living, involving them similarly in the ambiguous 
procedure of coming-to-grips with the particular circumstances. But this success is a 
persuasive or aesthetic effect; it depends on the plausibility of its representations, some 
persuasive induction of empathy, not on their essential accuracy.
The “dialogue” to which Lukäcs refers conceivably includes letter writing, 
journals, diaries, notes and even monologues of a certain kind, and contains and 
conveys both the separate activities and the conflict between acknowledged and 
unrecognised, or denied, influences which affect individuals attempts and desires to 
discover a satisfying order in the world.*
The individual delivering a monologue frequently plays a further considerable 
role as audience, present behind the overt pleas which their monologue privileges. By 
the mere fact of the speaker’s consciousness, monologues unavoidably register the 
presence of other voices. It is in regard to its treatment of these voices (present in the 
manner and fact of the address) that a monologue can be considered actively exclusive 
(triumphant so to speak) or otherwise. Similarly, where monologue stands for a type of 
relationship to reality, the individual who depends on this relationship is simultaneously 
tending it. In order to maintain a selective vision in a multifaceted world the 
individual’s attributions, perceptions and understanding must be plastic and dynamic.
7 Georg Lukäcs, The Historical Novel, transl. Hannah & Stanley Mitchell (Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1983).
8 Lukäcs, The Historical Novel, 40.
9 In The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 
1983), Jerome McGann suggests an analogous pattern of fertile tension between the inaccessible 
particularities of past historical moments or epochs and the contemporary perspective which addresses 
them. This tension is a potential source of a ‘coming to grips’ with the respective illusions and prejudices 
which underlie any subjective interpretation of history, as of transcendent truths. A mutually clarifying 
comparison of discrepant historical moments allows the idiosyncratic blindspots (determined by culture, 
nationality, etc.) both of the historical ‘eye-witness’ perspectives and of the individuals attempting to 
analyse them in the present to appear in mutual relief as otherwise inexplicable discontinuities in a shared 
historical sequence. Precisely in the discrepancies and discords of the respective cultural illusions
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The underground man, for instance, registers the contribution of other voices in order to 
retune them to his own leading string; it is as a matter of strategic stylisation of reality 
that he allows this contact. The dialogue (as a metaphor for moral agreement), and 
equally the dialogue of the mind with itself, avoids such selectivity and the necessary 
distortions it induces by remaining open to the variety and complexity of ambivalent 
reality.
Tennyson’s apparently dialogic poems, for example, often belie their 
determination to forge and affirm the unified conviction of a monologue; they attempt 
to conquer doubts and ambiguities by allowing them to speak in order to ritually dismiss 
them. However, in the instances where this striving meets with failure, the strategy 
becomes apparent and the dialogic relationship re-emerges, encompassing Tennyson, 
his depictions, and the rhetorical effect that he aims to evoke.
It is hard to avoid the feeling that Tennyson’s depictions of doubt or duality are 
underpinned by a certainty such as that which sustains the outcast of “Locksley Hall” 
(1842) - “Yet I doubt not through the ages one increasing purpose runs”.10 Many of 
Tennyson’s dialogues and poems of doubt lack the unfixed capacity, exemplified in 
Clough’s best works, to convincingly register ambiguity rather than record the traces of 
its resolution, From within the solipsism of Dipsychus and Claude, Clough records the 
fluid coming to grips that takes place in the open-ended dialogue of the mind with itself, 
and clearly instates uncertainty as the tme first principle and essence of any attempt to 
dismiss it.
Of course Tennyson is certainly not alone in utilising this rhetorical uncertainty. 
The path from doubt to conviction is a necessarily emotive one and requires, therefore, 
an evocation of the problematic ambiguities which demand equivocation.* 11
Nevertheless, where certainty takes unconscious or emotional priority over 
precision, special pleading is allowed to proceed as objective fact. Whether deliberately 
or otherwise such a preferential vision suggests (accurately) an affiliation to the wishful
something of the underlying nature of both is made more evident. McGann links his theory to the 
inspiration and influence of the Nineteenth-Century German critic, Heinrich Heine.
10 Alfred Tennyson, “Locksley Hall”, The Poems of Tennyson in three volumes, Volume Two, ed. 
Christopher Ricks (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1987), 118-30, ln.137. While published in 1842, the poem 
was written during 1837 and 1838.
11 Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus effects a similar rise from the depths, with the chaos, doubt and sorrows that 
culminate in “The Everlasting No” ultimately becoming the emotional context for “The Everlasting Yea”. 
“I too could now say to m yself’, writes Diogenes Teufelsdröckh, “Be not a Chaos, but a World, or even 
Worldkin. Produce! Produce!” (Sartor Resartus and On Heroes and Hero Worship, (London: Dent, 
1908), 148). Similarly, in Flaubert’s The Temptation o f St. Anthony, a vivid, thorough and convincing 
depiction of the symbolic forces of doubt is put into service by Anthony’s heedless affirmation as a 
measure of the strength and nature of his faith. “Temptation” is the device through which the eventual 
affirmation is provided with emotive roots and a background of critical awareness.
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manipulations evident, for instance, in overtly escapist or ideological art. This 
rhetorical ploy achieves its end by controlling alternative or challenging perspectives 
and redeploying them to the individual’s (whether a character or an author) preferences.
Etiquette
The heroism of unbelief appealed to many Victorians as the characteristic posture of 
their mature independence from a paternalistic religion. 12 Often, this heroism amounted 
to little more than the sanctification of the social crystallisations of Christian morality 
which persisted in the practical organisation of ordinary life. The lost assurance of a 
divine parent is compensated for by the notion of having gained a mature independence; 
humanity, it implies, has simply outgrown faith rather than deprived of it. Interestingly, 
in resorting to an over-scrupulous idealism (which celebrates the character of a lost 
authority as well as the individual’s prior allegiance to it by refusing to compromise in 
its absence), the heroism of unbelief can be seen to be erecting its own emotional stays. 
A situation ensues whereby alternatives must measure up to the exacting reverence of 
and nostalgic devotion to a once grand idea. The need for divine assurances was 
assuaged for some by seeing the progress afforded by human reason and science, and 
the growing control of human technology over the uncertainties and threats implicit in 
the natural world, as indisputable evidence of the moral health of the social conventions 
which facilitated these improvements. Those who doubted the moral mandate of 
progress, such as Arnold, revived the standard goal of idealism which the efficacy-based 
propriety of laissez-faire politics could leave unstated. Arnold’s response to Clough’s 
persistent refusal to settle his conscience on a fixed idea and commit to it gives an 
example of the essentially emotional relationship between individual and ideology.
12 In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche discusses this tendency: the English, he suggests, having gotten “rid 
of the Christian God”, subsequently felt “obliged to cling all the more firmly to Christian morality ... . In 
England, in response to every little emancipation from theology one has to reassert one’s position in a 
fear inspiring manner as a moral fanatic” (Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ (Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex: Penguin, 1990), 80). In Sources of the Self Charles Taylor associates the heroism of unbelief 
with “the deep spiritual satisfaction of knowing that one has confronted the truth of things, however bleak 
and unconsoling” (404). Taylor lists Samuel Putnam’s protest against the “cry of the child against the 
night” and the “coward’s sentimentality”, Charles Eliot Norton’s caution against the sin of “insincere 
profession”, and Thomas Huxley’s condemnation of superficial religious conformity for the sake of 
personal advantage (404-05). Behind these kinds of warning are underpinned by a common feeling that 
fidelity to a supernatural God had become a childish superstition which, having become inhibitive even 
undignified, must be put aside. The Spirit taunts Dipsychus with a challenge along similar lines, where 
the pleasures and comforts of being God’s children are implicitly disparaged in relation to the virtue and 
dignity of consenting to make-do with the harsher more naked truth of humanity’s spiritual isolation:
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From the same spiritual and social milieu Arnold and Clough perceive the same 
implications. But in order to believe that the moral equality of all ordinary selves (as 
opposed to selves that have become aligned with the standards of right reason) reflects a 
fall for which atonement can be made, Arnold needs to believe that human ideals can 
serve as higher authorities. For Clough, though, no single governor or guide warrants 
absolute approval; the possibility of a prescriptive path towards unilateral moral 
enlightenment is not, therefore, something he can approve. The characters in Clough’s 
narrative poems, however, find themselves precariously balanced between a comforting 
allegiance to the promised sequence which idealisms traditionally provide, and a 
dawning awareness of the inability of these assurances to counter the challenges, 
implicit in secular and worldly reality, that what they consider the legitimate lineage of 
their aspirations is merely the inflation of “ancient real facts to modem unreal 
dreams” . 14 Nietzsche’s commitment to philosophy with a hammer, and his rhetorical 
barrages against the general tendencies of idealistic individuals’ distorting appetite for 
absolute conviction, offer a dramatic crystallisation of currents which, in both Clough’s 
and Dostoevsky’s work, remain subtly intertwined with a persisting reluctance or 
inability to smash these philosophically obsolete traditions, conventions and attitudes.
“Maturer optics don’t delight / In childish dim religious light: / In evanescent vague effects / That shirk 
not face one’s intellects” (1.5.104-07).
13 Religion, suggests Arnold in “The Study of Poetry” (Essays in Criticism (London: Macmillan; New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1938, 1-33), has become a matter of proof, “it has attached its emotion to the 
fact”; it has sought to defend its authority by claiming its privileged grasp of the facts of divine order (1). 
In so doing, he implies, religion has marginalised the essential role of its poetic appeal, and with its 
factual authority failing, its authority has begun to flounder. Arnold claims that what had been the special 
potency of religion, the comforts of mystery and spiritual profundity, will persist in secular poetry to 
“interpret life for us”, “console us”, and “sustain us” (2), even without the overtly binding purpose 
implied in the recognition of serving an authority. “The day will come when we shall wonder at 
ourselves for having trusted to them, for having taken [religion and philosophy] seriously; and the more 
we perceive their hollowness, the more we shall prize “the breath and finer spirit of knowledge” offered 
to us by poetry” (2). Philosophy and religion become dimensions of poetry and poetry takes on the duties 
previously fulfilled by the philosopher and the priest. In Culture and Anarchy Arnold makes the 
extension of his claims, from “poetry” to culture, clear. In this extension, cultural activity becomes 
somehow detached from the individual human minds that pursue it and offers them something otherwise 
unavailable. Arnold appears to effect a repositioning of the external wisdom of religion into the finite 
cultural product of secular communities; therein he gives little heed, though, to the problems, ambiguities, 
and profound disquiet which cultural artefacts frequently evade or factitiously resolve or pacify. His own 
earlier poems which reflected such problematic conditions were disowned as un-needful; Arnold’s 
exclusion of “Empedocles on Etna” from the collected poems of 1853 is a spectacle of the kind of 
distorting commitment to self-consciously purposive literature, which its role as part of a secular scripture 
potentially induces. It is this kind of earnestly prescriptive attitude towards the role of culture and 
literature in a world without given external values that prompted Arnold’s promotion of the study of 
contemporary literature at University level. With culture serving as the secular fund of moral edification 
the Universities become institutions fitted, among other things, to the exploration of the secular spiritual 
life it expresses.
14 Clough, Dipsychus and The Spirit, 2.4.115.
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Recalling, in Sources of the Self15 the declaration of Nietzsche’s fool that “God is 
dead”, and its evocative dissipation of the landmarks of human orientation to a divine 
authority, “who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon”16, Charles Taylor 
suggests that the primarily intellectual timbre of this recognition of having lost a 
horizon of meaningful existence “undoubtedly corresponds to something very widely 
felt in our culture”.17 The correspondence to which Taylor alludes is “the sense that no 
framework is shared by everyone”, and, therefore, that no framework can “sink to the 
phenomenological status of unquestioned fact”. Sources of the Se//essentially traces
the development of this correspondence. Taylor’s observation that it is a 
“commonplace about the modem world” that traditional frameworks have become 
“highly contested” and effectively “discredited or downgraded to the status of personal 
predilection”, and his characterisation of moral seekers who “develop their own 
versions” of frameworks,19 imply a similarly common, though less commonplace, 
problem for the moral questor in relation to the involvement of other people (potentially 
each with a divergent vision of “moral” activity) in their idiosyncratic version of “the 
good”.
When moral seekers go “beyond the gamut of traditionally available 
frameworks”, they devise frameworks through “idiosyncratic combinations of or 
borrowings from or semi-inventions within” the postures suggested by tradition. In 
1876 Dostoevsky wrote: “Indeed, I keep thinking that we have begun the epoch of 
universal “dissociation.” All are dissociating themselves, isolating themselves from 
everyone else”.21 The consequence, as “everybody sets aside all those things that used 
to be common to our thoughts and feelings”, is that “there is scarcely anything about
9 0
which we can agree morally”. The dispersal of abstract moral discussion from a
15 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making o f the M odem Identity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1989).
16 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 
sect. 125, 181. Nietzsche’s lantern-bearing madman goes on to express the uncertainties which define 
existence in this horizon-less universe, “Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not 
plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are 
we not straying as through an infinite nothing?” (The Gay Science, sect. 125, 181).
17 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 17.
18 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 17.
19 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 16.
20 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 17.
21 Dostoevsky, “Dissociation”, A Writer’s Diary - Volume I, 1873-1876, trans. Kenneth Lantz (London: 
Quartet, 1994), 394. The symptoms Dostoevsky associates with this phenomena of modern individualism 
resemble the symptoms -  ie. isolation, separation, false confidence in individual convictions, and mutual 





common core, such as divine authority, engenders highly contestable individual moral 
predilections which both Taylor and MacIntyre represent as a particular problem of 
modem moral discourse. In announcing what appeared to them the inception of this 
dissociation, both Dostoevsky and Nietzsche crystallise a moral dilemma which remains 
pertinent (as it had been sporadically in the preceding centuries24).
In Clough’s and Dostoevsky’s depictions of disoriented moral seekers, the capacity of 
individuals to take charge of, and responsibility for, their actions is often fraught by an 
awareness of the unavoidable and improper influence of self-interest, and by habitual 
emotional needs for channels into which to deflect or disperse enough of their ultimate 
accountability to enable them to commit to inherently dubious positions of belief or 
conviction (as all such positions must be without an authoritative external directives).
In its compelling reflections of the finite and flawed, but also flexible, reality of 
moral interaction, Dostoevsky’s work contextualises the repercussions of this 
persistence and involves them in the concrete drama of individual existences. The loss 
of biblical authority and divine credibility frequently prompts recourse to the external 
signs available in literature, nature, statistics, science and, occasionally, numerology. 
Where Augustine had randomly opened his Bible for “guidance”, nineteenth century 
intellectuals look to Pushkin, Shakespeare, an Eagle in the sky or Masonic soothsaying. 
This availability is activated by need; it suggests an instinctive diffusion of the kind of 
problematic personal responsibility which, conscientiously weighing up choices and 
consequences, engenders the objectively unresolvable uncertainty of the unpregnant 
pause. The decisions these signs validate are inevitably pre-chosen or, at their most 
obscure, unconsciously desired. This diffusion rarely stands up to the consequences of 
the action it facilitates, it seems a ritual of permission and an inoculation against over- 
scrupulous equivocation. Rather than the standardised devotions advocated by Matthew 
Arnold’s religion of culture, these reflect a superficial recourse to individually approved
24 Similar patterns of sceptical disillusion relating to prevailing conventions of moral activity and the 
social order they underwrite are clearly apparent in, for instance, many of Shakespeare’s plays 
(particularly his later works), as well as in those of his Elizabethan and Jacobean peers (the role of the 
malcontent in relation to contemporary moral habits, conveys many analogous problems of the relativity 
of truth, convention, selfless moral good and ambitious self-serving). The contentious nature o f truth, 
belief and worldly convention were also prevailing concerns of the English Augustans and also some of 
their French contemporaries, such as Voltaire and Diderot. In many nineteenth century depictions of 
atheists by conscience, Voltaire is commonly gestured to as a potential origin of intellectual influence. 
Voltaire and Diderot stand at the start of a discernible sequence of increasingly sceptical approaches to 
the notion of humanity’s subordination to a divine authority, which can be seen to have reached a kind of 
critical mass in Nietzsche’s declaration of God’s death. The sceptical approach of the English Augustans 
to conventions of belief and morality, is exacerbated by a suspicion, particularly apparent in writers like
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touchstones conveying the impression of a recognisable external moral structure. The 
impression of objectivity is the most important function of this subjectivist appeal. This 
determinism is readily shed or sacrificed when unexpected consequences arise. It is 
Raskolnikov’s attempt to validate the “external” justifications for his crime which 
becomes the fundamental contention in his ultimately unsuccessful disavowal of moral 
culpability.
The path from god’s death to the proposition that “all is permitted” is absurd, but 
this absurdity merely reflects the desolation experienced as the extreme validations of a 
meaningful and dignifying subjection are dissolved. The proposition does not reflect a 
disinterested response; it expresses a feeling (underpinned sometimes with bitter 
resentment, and sometimes with devilish glee) of having been abandoned or betrayed to 
the wild lawlessness of an unjust, chaotic and meaningless world.
Similarly, Alyosha’s reaction to the stench that emerges from the Elder Zosima’s 
decaying corpse exemplifies how such sudden despair, of experiencing the indifference 
or remoteness of a supposedly just and merciful God, exists in a delicate balance with 
the great expectations nurtured by extreme faith. Alyosha’s disillusion suggests the 
following feeling: if an individual who has been so widely acknowledged and revered as 
pre-eminently holy can be allowed to enter the afterlife without his virtues marked or 
verified by any sign of God’s approval, and marked only, furthermore, as simply a 
material body, subject to the ambivalent laws of nature, how can we ever know whether 
the values we idealise are worthy of more than worldly esteem. How that is, can we 
ever receive any verification that what appear transcendent ideals to us are also pleasing 
to their supposed source; he is deflated, rather than really disillusioned, by the 
realisation that no signs or responses will be forthcoming.
In the second stanza of “Hymnos ahymnos” (1851),25 Clough implies that the 
language available as the currency of prayer implicates and perpetuates a status, and 
therefore a type, of address.
0  thou that in our bosoms’ shrine 
Dost dwell because unknown divine
1 thought to speak, I thought to say 
‘The light is here,’ ‘behold the way’
‘The voice was thus’ and ‘thus the word,[’]
And ‘thus I saw’ and ‘that I heard,’
Swift and Johnson, of the corrupting influences of populism; this suspicion adds to the urgency apparent 
in their desires to protect or reassert salient and vital, rather than passively received, moral standards.
25 Clough, “Hymnos ahymnos”, Clough: Selected Poems, ed. J.P. Phelan (Harlow, Essex: Longman 
Group, 1995), 272-73.
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But from the lips but half essayed 
The imperfect utterance fell unmade.
(In.9-16).
The received rhetorical postures, with their inherent orientation to a particular 
devotional purpose, impose limitations on the nature of religious expression. These 
limitations, sustained by precedent rather than persisting relevance, reinforce a lasting 
affinity for an obsolete and unrequitable subordination to spiritual authority. The 
address is futile - “I will not prate with ‘thus’ and ‘so’/ And be profane with ‘yes’ and 
‘no’ The reason for this refusal is conveyed in the first stanza
O thou whose image in the shrine 
Of human spirits dwells divine 
Which from that precinct once conveyed 
To be to outer day displayed 
Doth vanish, part, and leave behind 
Mere blank and void of empty mind 
Which wilful fancy seeks in vain 
With casual shapes to fill again -
(In. 1-8).
The dissatisfaction implicit in this stanza reflects a state of change, it is contextualised 
by its relationship (ie. its difference) to a prior, more assured and less isolating 
relationship between individuals and rituals of devotion to some spiritual authority or 
transcendent ideal. This comparative approach foregrounds the importance of the 
individual perspectives - incorporating their expectations, preferences and habits which 
are confronted by a necessity of change. The problems of generating terms of devotion 
to transcendent ideals or spiritual authority which are individually satisfactory, but more 
than solipsistically meaningful and not simply repetitions of redundant patterns of 
devotion reflect the obsolescence of previously authoritative patterns of individual 
deference to a common framework of morality and life-goals. This obsolescence also 
determines a shift of expressions of ‘truth’, ‘good’ or conviction from terms or attitudes 
which relate to commonly accepted and authoritative practices, to terms through which 
individuals, and groups of individuals, attempt to discover ideals capable of providing 
and supporting valid morals and life-goals. “Hymnos ahymnos” approves a kind of 
abstinence from moral postures, or ideological self-assertions, both in conscientious 
objection to hollow and essentially redundant rituals of conviction, and in resistance to 
the mere “casual shapes” that threaten to fill the void left by divine authority.
80
“Hymnos ahymnos”, like “Easter Day, Naples, 1849”, expresses a sense of 
dissatisfied isolation in response to the sudden loss of external validation (whether by a 
god who hears, or a community who share common ideals) that had seemed assured in 
the common language of prayer or devotion.
The desire for a communal ideal remains the undercurrent of almost every ‘new 
certainty’ from utilitarianism to nihilism. With the symbolic language of the 
community of man under God discredited, the idealistic individual’s persisting desire 
and approval of “community” seems unable to recognise in itself its own justification, 
and struggles to find means of expression in valid common terms.
Where an authoritative and common moral frame no longer exists, attaining a 
feeling of ‘communion’ or of being understood (a feeling which is vital for individuals 
who are compelled to experience their subjective moral instincts as externally 
authoritative) requires the petitioning of problematically autonomous others. To control 
and qualify the results of such dangerously random supplication, though, the suitability 
of these others can be ‘judged’ by the individual. Where individuals believe that their 
own worldview reflects an authoritative truth, their pseudo-objective judgements of the 
suitability of others’ responses to this worldview often serve merely to validate approval 
or dismiss opposition. As in “The Meek Girl”, in which Dostoevsky’s pawnbroker 
seeks to synthesise the absolute legitimacy of the “casual shapes” of his own “wilful 
fancy” out of the essentially ambivalent and amorphous reality which confronts him, a 
kind of stand-off ensues. He cannot accept reality, and reality cannot approve his 
criticisms and protests against its ambivalence.
“Benevolent silence, of course...” -  Some motives, habits and effects of 
individualistic monologue.
“The Meek Girl” (1876) is introduced as the private counsel of a husband whose wife 
has “committed suicide a few hours earlier”, and, “is now lying on the table”. 
Dostoevsky explains to the reader, “this is neither a story nor a set of diary notes”. 
The husband is confused, he is the kind of man who talks to himself. The narrative, 
neither story nor diary, is his interior monologue, undertaken in the presence of his 
wife’s dead body, through which he is “trying to make sense” of what has happened, 
and to this end also how and why.
26 Dostoevsky, “The Meek Girl”, 253.
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The strict focus of the pawnbroker’s narrative allows the cause, methods and 
effects of an individual’s devotion to their own monologue to manifest in vivid 
extremes. The particulars of his history suggest conditions more commonly diluted but 
no less present in the motivations and methods of individualistic ideological interaction 
with ambivalent reality (as exemplified by the rationales of Raskolnikov’s ideological 
crime27).
The Pawnbroker explains: “I had arrived as it were from a higher world: I was, at 
any rate, a retired second-grade captain from a distinguished regiment, a gentleman by 
birth, independent, etcetera” .28 His esteemed place has been denied him, but he prefers 
to walk the streets than to work as a civilian. This wilful disassociation from his former 
sphere is an act of profound reverence for the hierarchy that has dismissed him. 
Because he accepts its authority, but can’t accept its judgement of him, his necessary 
rejoinder is to segregate himself from what he considers his proper place, and then 
through the meek girl, to forge a new standard against which he can verify (and exult in) 
his feelings of innocent persecution. The pawnbroker has fallen from his ideal, but is 
unwilling to acknowledge his ‘fall’ either as pertaining essentially to him or as having 
stemmed from his own actions.
Subsequent to any insult to their ideal the individualistic idealist is required to 
take up arms (rhetoric and rationalisations) and defend their right to the core 
presumptions and tenets which affirm their self worth (ie. as an idealist). What follows 
is a greater conviction of the need to assert one’s rights and champion the legitimacy of 
one’s subjective idealisations against a reality deemed intrinsically immoral, unfair and 
even “false” for its recalcitrant disruption of expected assurances.
The “sense” the pawnbroker is trying to make is clearly founded on rhetorical 
rather than absolute conviction. Rather than objective clear sightedness into previously 
ambiguous causes, the pawnbroker’s “sense” is more akin to a subtle self-justifying 
casuistry, which aims ultimately at attaining the feeling of certainty by effectively 
denying its strategies to itself.
Similarly, the significance of the desire to make sense should not be forgotten in 
the face of the objective validity which the conclusion, with its tone of apocalyptic 
revelation, claims for itself. The pawnbroker’s final posture is nourished by the same 
sense of noble distinction that drove his initial posture of martyred virtue to begin with. 
The terms have changed from those imposed by the intentions of the initial version: his
27 I shall explore Raskolnikov’s compromised relationship with the ambiguities of ambivalent reality in 
later chapters dealing specifically with Crime and Punishment.
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necessary and ‘benevolent’ silence is ended, but (as noted above) rationalisation 
dominates his ‘confession’.
As the pawnbroker’s hidden motivations come to light, his confession ostensibly 
reveals a quest for meaning or sense which, believing itself committed to truth, is 
thoroughly distorted by its inability to transcend its need to authorise a personal 
predilection. In the absence of common moral terms, a particular type of moral self- 
expression manifests: influenced by a desire for authoritative assurances, moral quests 
readily mistake rationalised preferences, those which seem natural and logical to an 
individual or group, for abstract “good”.
The intensity of the pawnbroker’s dependence on his fagade of morality to support 
the sense of himself he cherishes so strongly (the ‘real me’ which only he understands), 
is matched by his intuition that this cherished self-image is highly contestable. His 
awareness of this challenge to his monologue’s ability to enact what he feels to be its 
rightful authority engenders a particular mode of interaction with ambivalent reality 
which is typical of monologues’ parasitically self-solacing tendencies. The pawnbroker 
apparently fears loneliness, but genuine communication is necessarily anathema to 
him.
In the hope of leaving his humiliation behind, the pawnbroker dissociates himself 
from the social environment in which it took place. He nevertheless feels the isolation 
from grounds of common approval, to which this dissociation is necessarily condemned, 
and which it thrives upon.
Through the pawnbroker’s narrative Dostoevsky constructs a rhetorical question 
similar, both in subject and in the ambiguous “direction”, to the inverted 
recommendation of faith which is apparent in Notes from Underground. In both these 
works a mode of self-expression and existence among others is presented in accordance 
with and extension of the prevailing principles of modem individualism. Both the 
pawnbroker and the Underground Man are, by necessity, devoted to themselves as if to 
a great cause. In “The Meek Girl” the sacrifice involved in realising one’s solipsistic 
ideal emerges with the psychological profile of Faust’s world-forming zeal (his final 
vocation in Goethe’s Faust II). The scale is shrunken and the ideal shrinks too (from
28 Dostoevsky, “The Meek Girl”, 260.
29 Reviewing critical reactions to The Underground Man’s predicament, in Dostoevsky’s “Notes from 
Underground” (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1993), Richard Peace notes that the implicitly self- 
condemning rendition of his spitefully stagnant cynicism and his irredeemably unhappy conscience, have 
appeared, to some critics, to affirm both Marxist and Christian notions that “the inadequacies of ‘man’ ... 
are merely an argument for surrender to a higher morality, and an unimpeachable authority” (102).
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providing a new world for modem humanity, to the overt posture of apres moi le deluge 
individualism), but the reprimand of an excluded Care remains.30 In pursuing his 
project the pawnbroker has been blind to the needs of the meek girl; simply oblivious. 
The world he is striving to cultivate through her, like Faust’s modem and enlightened 
nation, has no place for Care, and is isolated from happiness. And yet, even when, in 
tme epiphanic style, the scales fall from his eyes and it seems that the pawnbroker 
understands the nature and extremity of his negligence, he is unable to harmonise his 
actions with his “insight”. The pawnbroker’s epiphany exists in the same framework of 
isolated certainty as did his initial fiction of a magnanimous man wrongly ostracised. 
Regardless of the source of his epiphany, the pawnbroker’s faith in it, or the positive 
potential it holds, the change does not transcend its bond to the purely human and 
particular voice that announces it.
Even having apparently repented of the stem pride that enforced the couple’s 
silence - “ ‘Let’s talk ... you know ... why don’t you say something?’ I suddenly 
babbled, stupidly - oh, what did I care about being sensible?” 31 - the pawnbroker’s 
habitual negligence remains: having been in such “a hurry ... to confess to her”, he 
“didn’t pay any attention to her fear” .32 Apparent in this haste to confess, is the 
pawnbroker’s compulsion to consummate the absolution he experiences in his 
“epiphanic” self-knowledge by testifying to it. His enthusiasm for his new clearer 
vision leaves him once again careless of others.
The pawnbroker’s prime concern, now as before, is that someone else should 
know in what manner he makes sense to himself and approve the aptness of his 
understanding. The urge to testify, to be acknowledged, seeks a different audience, but 
depends still on habits of delusion and strategic revelations. Without a God who hears, 
the silent interior self borders on non-existence except as an authority or site of devotion 
for the public self. Sensing its own irrelevance and aware of the perils of disenchanting 
exposure, implicit in testifying in one’s own terms, the internal monologue seeks to 
ensure a sympathetic reception by defusing, one way or another, the possible terms 
which could challenge it.
30 In Faust II, the figure commonly translated into English as ‘Care’, is called 1 Sorge' in the German text. 
‘Sorge’ translates literally to care, or concern; it is the root of the word for careless and can be taken to 
imply something like empathy or sympathy for the fate of others. In Faust’s case such empathy is 
lacking, his commitment to reifying his ideal makes him necessarily careless of the damage he wreaks.
31 Dostoevsky, “The Meek Girl”, 285.
32 “The Meek Girl”, 288.
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And the main thing is that at that time I already looked upon her as my own, and was 
in no doubt as to the power I had over her.33
In cultivating the meek girl, the pawnbroker seeks to implant his self-vindication in the 
mouth of another, thereby providing it with the external authority capable of absolving 
him of his public humiliation. The meek girl is to be moulded into a quantity that 
approves the authority of his monologue and acquits it of the negligence of solipsism. 
“But in taking her into my household, I thought I was taking a friend; I was so badly in 
need of a friend. I had a clear perception, however, that the friend would have to be 
trained, given a finishing, conquered, even” .34 Which is to say, the term “friend” is 
understood by the pawnbroker to mean someone who has conceded to his terms and 
acknowledged his self-image as valid.35 Conversely, this understanding carries the 
implication that those who are not in harmony with this image are foes.
What was more, I knew with all the strength of my being that between us, at that 
very moment, a struggle was taking place, a terrible duel to the death, the duel that 
ought to have been fought long ago by that coward of yesterday who had been 
drummed out of the regiment by his friends for cowardice.36
On behalf of his audience the pawnbroker asks: “why didn’t I rescue her from her evil 
doing”, why subject her to that “terrible duel” ? 37 His answer is evident in his initial 
linking of this “duel” with the girl to the abortive duel that had disgraced him, and in his
Q O
sense of triumph in the present victory, “she had been vanquished for ever”. The 
meek girl is a conduit for the resuscitation of his tarnished “name” and social position; 
until he has vanquished her in accordance with his initial plan (which acknowledges that 
the much needed “friend” “would have to be trained, given a finish, conquered, even”39) 
he is compelled to exacerbate rather than rescue her from any damaging awareness of 
her predicament. After she is vanquished, however, the meek girl is worth something:
33 “The Meek Girl”, 260.
34 “The Meek Girl”, 281.
35 In Crime and Punishment Dunya’s suitor Luzhin had planned to play Providence to the Raskolnikov 
family, effectively holding them to ransom for their approval of his self-esteem. The plan fails, the 
family is repulsed by his strategies, and Luzhin reflects, “Devil take it, why did I turn into such a jew? 
There wasn’t even any calculation in it! I thought I’d keep them on a short tether for a bit, and get them 
to see me as their Providence, and now look! ... Pah!” (362). The absence of calculation merely confirms 
the dependence on material accounting of loss and gain in Luzhin’s social relationships.
36 Dostoevsky, “The Meek Girl”, 277.
37 “The Meek Girl”, 277.
38 “The Meek Girl”, 277.
39 “The Meek Girl”, 281.
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Having withstood the revolver, I had avenged the whole of my gloomy past. And 
although no one knew about it, she did, and to me that was everything, because she 
herself was everything to me, all the hope for my future that lived in my dreams!
She was the only person I was going to make ready for myself. I had no need of 
anyone else - and now she had learnt everything - she had learnt, at least, that she 
had been unjust in hurrying to join the ranks of my enemies. This thought had 
delighted me. In her eyes I could no longer be a villain[.]40
Typically, the actual thoughts of the meek girl are unimportant, and the “villain” she 
could no longer take him for is based solely on his own tormented sense of the “villain” 
which his refusal to fight a duel had made him out to be. The meek girl had “learnt 
everything”, everything that mattered at least for her future as a mirror of the 
pawnbroker’s egotistical pride.
As the meek girl’s natural character nurtures prejudices hostile to his “dream”, the 
pawnbroker’s “system” instinctively seeks to mute its expression. “That was the bad 
thing - that I’m a dreamer: I had enough material, and what I thought about her was that 
she could wait” .41 Through the report of this particular dreamer Dostoevsky implies a 
general incapacity of the type to accustom themselves to engagement with others in any 
terms but their own. Intending to reify his dreams through the token external authority 
of the meek girl the pawnbroker is necessarily required to graft, nurture and quash 
elements of her personality. The pawnbroker’s synthesising efforts to alter the meek 
girl’s sensibilities proceed with a complementary disregard for the meek girl as a being 
with her own rights, desires and terms of understanding. This disregard facilitates the 
oblivious acts of hostility which the monologue demands.
In Dostoyevsky and the Novel, Michael Holquist observes that the pawnbroker’s 
monologue is attended and advanced by a self-serving objectification of others: “they 
are, simply that they may become parts of the whole he is driven to constitute”. 42 The 
self-aggrandisement which accompanies the reduction of other individuals to tools in a 
master-plan, plot or scheme brings into clear relief the thwarted hubris in which 
monologue is rooted. As an extension of the effects of monologic self-assertion on an 
individual’s relation with others, the objectification perpetrated by the pawnbroker is 
extreme; the pattern, though, is a common one throughout the literature of bourgeois 
modernity. The concentrated focus of Dostoevsky’s depiction of this pattern, along
40 “The Meek Girl”, 281.
41 “The Meek Girl”, 281.
42 Michael Holquist, Dostoyevsky and the Novel (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1977), 151.
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with his anxiety for the implications of its individualist roots, magnifies its features into 
the exaggerated clarity of the grotesque.
Holquisfs assertion seems to place too much emphasis on the pawnbroker’s 
prescient control of the role of other people in his monologue. It is a minor difference 
but it seems fairer to say that because other people exist, he is driven to subordinate 
them through his monologue, that is, in “the whole he is driven to constitute”. 
Holquisfs emphasis on the existence of others “simply that they may become parts” of 
this whole certainly reflects their significance within the pawnbroker’s monologue but 
misrepresents how they come to be implicated in it. The otherwise independent meek 
girl, representing the external world, is conscripted to serve the pawnbroker’s 
manipulative attempts to construct, and then experience, an external manifestation of 
the solipsistic narrative which sustains his ideal self-conception. This act of 
conscription is necessitated by the pawnbroker’s compulsion to justify his persisting 
self-esteem (troublingly at odds with the reality the reader can recognise beneath his 
narrative) as reflecting something more than merely a cloistered and subjective self­
opinion. A recalcitrant reality, pregnant with unsatisfactory and galling reflections of 
his character and actions, demands this reaction. The pawnbroker’s distorting and 
parasitic relationship to external truth gradually communicates the persistence and 
veracity of the latent truth he seeks to drown out. But it is in the effect on his capacity 
for intimacy and self-awareness which results from the problematic conjunction of the 
two, the truth he seeks to reify and that which he seeks to annul, that the ominous 
general implications of his isolation are apparent.43
The pawnbroker’s ultimate inability to listen to more than his own requirements, 
returns the insult of a world that will not approve his idealised self-conception. The 
meek girl’s death deprives the pawnbroker of the symbol of rebirth and communal
43 In many of his novels, but particularly in Hard Times, Charles Dickens exposes a parasitic tendency in 
individuals’ fixations with and assertions of their theoretical equality and' abstract “rights”, with a comic 
fervour in keeping with his greater optimism in the prospect of humanity’s capacity for ennobling 
selflessness.
You are a man of family. Don’t deceive yourself for a moment that I am a man of 
family. I am a bit of dirty riff-raff, and a genuine scrap of tag, rag, and bobtail.’
... ‘So now,’ said Bounderby, ‘we may shake hands on equal terms. I say, equal 
terms, because although I know what I am, and the exact depth of the gutter I have 
lifted myself out of, better than any man does, I am proud as you are. I am just as 
proud as you are. Having now asserted my independence in a proper manner, I may 
come to how do you find yourself, and I hope you’re pretty well.
Hard Times (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1969), 160.
Dostoevsky’s pawnbroker destroys the meek girl (as Bounderby had almost destroyed Louisa) in the 
process of asserting the independence in which he feels comfortable enough to come to “how do you find 
yourself’.
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acceptance into which he had moulded her. Without this symbol he conceives of 
himself as disinherited and condemned to stifled silence. When the pawnbroker asks, 
“Why has a dismal inertia destroyed what was dearest to me?”, he does not mourn the 
girl, per se, but the mirror he had finally managed to make of her.44 The pawnbroker 
goes so far as to wonder whether he might simply keep the girl’s corpse, her death 
seems only an obstacle to the practicalities of his investment of her presence with his 
own required meanings. To accept her extinction, though, is to surrender the vessel 
through which he had claimed his redemption, and to lose his carefully wrought 
consolation (the dream hopes realised) for his necessary dissociation from the privileged 
sphere of his ideal self-conception.
Ultimately the victims of the pawnbroker’s parasitic self-interest are the girl and 
himself. The state which compelled the pawnbroker to take a friend is also the fate to 
which his method of forging a friendship condemns him: “now it’s back to empty rooms 
again, and once again I’m on my own. There’s the pendulum ticking away, it’s not 
interested, it’s not sorry about anything. Now there’s no-one - that’s the terrible 
thing!” .45
“ Ts there anyone alive upon the plain?’ shouts the Russian epic hero. I too am 
shouting, but I am no epic hero, and no one replies” .46 A philosophical, religious, or 
political discourse applies to an external authority; it addresses itself to an authority (the 
ideological dimensions of such discourses inevitably reflect this sense of sanction) in 
relation to which human interruptions or considerations have limited jurisdiction. When 
these “disciplines” lose their extra-human authority (whether it had related to divinity, 
or something akin to a Platonic Ideal) and are recognised as contingent expressions or 
constructions of human ‘voices’ ,47 then the epic hero’s expectation of deus ex machina 
type resolution or affirmation becomes manifestly futile. “Only people are alive, and
48around them is silence”.
The pawnbroker’s dramatic assertion that we are alone on the plain alludes to an 
ideological scene in which sceptical particularisation must be acknowledged and 
accepted as the real foundation of every indulgence in enthusiastic expression. 
Clough’s “brood of the wind”, who “nest on the wave” and “bed on the crested
44 Dostoevsky, “The Meek Girl”, 294.
45 “The Meek Girl”, 293.
46 “The Meek Girl”, 295.
47 As Bakhtin observes in “Epic and Novel” (The Dialogic Imagination, trans. Caryl Emerson & Michael 
Holquist (Austin & London: University of Texas Press, 1981), 3-40).
48 Dostoevsky, “The Meek Girl”, 295.
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billow”,49 offers an evocative analogy for a similarly abandoned (or liberated) existence 
from which only human voices sound. Clough’s work implies furthermore what a 
suspect anomaly absolute certainty must be when no external authority exists to grant it.
Care
While events, changes, and simple variety of experience continually stimulate new 
perspectives and suggest new means of organising the self and its relation to other 
selves, in a state of moral uncertainty, residual frameworks of belief, moral conduct and 
consolation fade but never go out: there is no justification absolute enough to extinguish 
them. In the emotivist world, moral orders all stem from isolated justifications; they 
can convince and impress but the allegiance to one such moral order does not offer the 
stability of a rational refutation of others.
In Faust -  Part One, directing Margareta’s attention to the “eternal mystery” all 
around, and to the bliss it inspires, Faust declares: “Of such a feeling, call it what you 
like! / Call it joy, or your heart, or love or God! / 1 have no name for it. The feeling’s all 
there is: / The name’s mere noise and smoke”.j0 Margareta concedes that Faust makes 
sense and that his explanation sounds something like the priest’s, it is “just in the 
wording there’s a difference”.51 Faust assures her, “It is what all men say, / All human 
hearts under the blessed day / Speak the same message, each / In its own speech: / May 
I not speak in mine?”. Faust essentially dismisses the particular significances of these 
subjective individual expressions by asserting that they all express the same disposition, 
call it divine faith, call it awe, call it moral independence. In his desire to reassure 
Margareta that his non-conformity is not morally suspect he waves away the need for 
any deeper understanding among relative positions and consents to the loss of common 
terms capable of serving as a vehicle of communal interaction and compromised 
agreement.
It is typically ‘care’, in some form, which is the obstacle idealists encounter in trying to 
sustain the applicability of their vision to the world. In Goethe’s Faust //, Faust’s 
visitation by a ghostly figure called Care reifies the implication that his remoulding of
49 Clough, Amours de Voyage, III.iv.93-94.
50 Goethe, Faust - Part One, In. 3453-56.
51 Faust - Part One, In. 3460.
52 Faust - Part One, In. 3461-65.
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the world in the image of his ideological vision had been an act of capricious hostility. 
While Faust’s fortress is proof against the material claims of Want, Debt and Need, 
their sister Care is able to infiltrate and to try him. Faust rejects her right to do so: 
“though the creeping power of Care be great, / This power I will never recognize!” .53 
Care appears to represent the power of something similar to Hamlet’s coward-making 
conscience, it imposes inhibitions which distract the individual from their desires, 
spontaneous resolves and convictions with concerns for the anxieties and uncertainties 
and wider complexities these decisive “inspirations” often deny or neglect. Care’s 
physical blinding of Faust reifies unequivocally the blindness which is implicit in the 
way Faust effaces the credibility of human needs which challenge his own. The denial 
of ambivalent and multifaceted reality which is latent in the active fulfilment of 
ideological protests, firstly reflects a dominance of self-interest (evident in the 
precedence given to fulfilling one’s personal duty to one’s ideal) over concern for 
others. Thereafter, continued fidelity to such active fulfilments necessitates the 
oppression of any tendency to entertain the kind of negative capability which would 
expose the capriciousness of the denial in which they are founded. In spite of being 
necessitated by involvement with others, the faustian compromise corrodes the basis of 
interpersonal intimacy and isolates the individual, who ends up imprisoned within their 
dependence on the consolations the compromise provides.
The Faustian compromise, with its consequent subordination of a capacity to care 
for others to individuals’ infatuated convictions, affects both large scale notions 
(supematurally reified in Faust’s development of a new world) and the simplest of 
personal relationships. What Dostoevsky, in “The Meek Girl”, translates into a 
particular image of a distorted marriage, is the extreme of a disrupting infatuation with 
individual quests (for knowledge, wealth, place, in short: fulfilment in a particular 
individually approved “virtue”) that is a major presence particularly in nineteenth 
century realism, and more generally in secular culture.54 In The Meek Girl
53 Faust - Part One, In. 11493-94.
54 Seen as the travesty of a marriage (in which there are resonances of the ultimately stale and self- 
interested ideological partnership of Chernyshevsky’s Lopukhov and Vera Pavlovna in What Is to Be 
Done?), Dostoevsky’s story addresses the influence of individualistic pride and strategising on what, 
ideally, is the most collaborative and selfless of interpersonal relationships. Idealistic motives similar to 
those of Chernyshevsky’s Lopukhov - who liberates Vera Pavlovna, who is unhappily oppressed by 
traditions of female subservience and arranged marriage, by marrying her on a basis o f rational equality 
and comradeship - play a token role in the pawnbroker’s early account of his interest in the meek girl’s 
domestic circumstances. “Under the pitiless burden of her daily toil” the meek girl has maintained her 
innocence and dignity, in keeping with “a striving for the lofty and the noble on her part!” (“The Meek 
Girl”, 260). The “filthy details”, which the pawnbroker admits he had learned later, are gathered 
anachronistically together to gild his proposal with a philanthropic awareness: “After all, why do you 
think I wanted to marry her” (260); to rescue her of course.
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Dostoevsky’s pessimism for a future community of individuals whose highest and 
strongest intuition is the realisation of their cherished self-image insinuates itself into 
the bonds of marriage (the epicentre of the family unit) and inter-personal relationships. 
The pawnbroker is branded with the satanic pride of individualism, a modem malaise 
which, in Dostoevsky’s work, links criminals, fools, the immature and the educated 
(with varying results). Inspired, and to some extent induced, by the apparent dissolution 
of traditional grounds of moral conduct, and by the loosening of social restrictions, 
which had previously determined, respectively, the theoretical and practical 
acceptability of commitment to individualistic ambition, self-righteously individualistic 
characters proliferate throughout the fiction of the epoch. Such figures, littered 
throughout the works of Pushkin, Turgenev and Dostoevsky, are repeatedly condemned 
by Dickens and anatomised and accepted by Stendhal and Balzac, Henry James and 
Herman Melville. Balzac’s Philippe Bridau (in The Black Sheep (1840-42)); Dickens’ 
Josiah Bounderby, and even Pip before he renounces his expectations; Hermann in 
Pushkin’s The Queen of Spades, and Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment along with 
Stepan Verkhovensky’s representative culpability for a brood of spiritually fatherless 
demons, the progeny of the negligent self indulgence of his generations’ romantic 
individualism; all exemplify a tendency towards conceptually isolated monomania, that 
necessarily accompanies the certainties and entitlements defended within the 
implications of individualism.
In contrast, merely circumstantial and particular acts of selflessness are allowed to 
reflect a tmly compelling, even enchanting, call to duty. In Demons, a fine example of 
this is precipitated by the birth of Marya Shatov’s baby: the baby becomes the epicentre 
of a mood of renewal which is made more fragile, precious and compelling by the 
subsequent murder of the child’s would-be surrogate father. Shatov’s humble 
affirmation of the essential propriety of familial and parental responsibility (it is not his 
baby, but a baby nonetheless, in need of a father) suggests a potent triumph over pride 
and personality. Through the bonds which Shatov responds to so wholeheartedly, and 
with so many apparent reasons not to, in contrast to the bonds Pyotr Stepanovich aims 
to forge through murder, Dostoevsky achieves an amplification of the relative moral 
values he seeks to convey in each. Shatov’s rebirth from ideological ‘possession’ 
originates in his response to a very particular situation with profound and admirable 
humility and selflessness. This potential for rebirth is catalysed by the kind of local and 
finite imperatives which, for example. Myshkin’s disastrous commitment, in The Idiot,
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to promote and serve the abstract idea of selflessness as a secular absolute seems unable 
to acknowledge or accept.
The lack of care for others which attends individualists’ absorption in their 
internal image of the world leaves an ultimately impoverished self-reliance as the 
necessary mode of human interaction. Family responsibilities and nurturing 
relationships of all varieties cave in to individuals’ perceptions of their rights and 
responsibilities to their solipsistic worldview.
In the economic principles of universal competition, in which the invisible hand 
of the market stands in as the moral mandate of proper conduct, Clough saw a similar 
encouragement of the most primitive of instincts and a threat to the potentially civilising 
intimacy of unselfish relationships.
Each for h im self is still the rule,
W e leam  it when w e go to school,
The devil take the hindmost, O.
Husband for husband w ife for w ife  
.Axe careful that in married life
The devil take the hindmost, O.55
The pawnbroker’s protest that he was in no position to rescue the meek girl holds for all 
these characters. Monologue becomes the sign of a strategic relationship with others, it 
thrives on and perpetuates hierarchy and inequality. Just as Golyadkin is unwittingly 
condemning himself to the experience of exclusion, and the Underground Man feels he 
doesn’t get a chance to, and therefore “can’t be ... good!”, the emotional immaturity of 
the emblematic individualists previously mentioned, is a circumstance with which they 
are obscurely but willingly complicit.56 They have been seduced into a self- 
perpetuating compromise, either in their evasive self-denial or passive escapism, or in 
the perverse consolation of spiteful self-loathing. To acknowledge that, at extremes, 
these characters are unable to observe the interests of others does nothing to exonerate 
this inability. It is clear, after all, that there are things they could do, sacrifices they
55 Clough, “In Stratis Viarum -  I ”, Clough - Selected Poems, ed. J.P. Phelan (London and New York: 
Longman, 1995), 270, In. 1-12.
56 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, 123.
57 The individualist’s self-reliant and sometimes perversely independent mind-set moulds a combatively 
strategic means of relating to others which incidentally, but no less starkly, opposes family harmony. 
Phillippe Bridau (in Balzac’s The Black Sheep), cannot acknowledge such a woman as his mother is 
(unrefined and middle-class) to be his mother and continue to be what he aspires to be. Nurturing his 
ambitious self-image, he closes himself off from the possibility of compromising associations. Phillippe 
grew up amid the “speculative individualism” of America, he has been reared by a sort of mercantile self-
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could make, and truths they could acknowledge; their guilt lies in the self-approved 
system which renders these avenues invisible, unthinkable or unattainable.
Guarded Conviction and the Virtues of Disruption
Subsequent to the disruption of commonly accepted sources of external authority (such 
as God), individuals who require the monologic assurances of an absolute authority are 
forced to generate their own. Consequently, material interests and emotional 
preferences become clothed in abstract justifications to deflect the implicit contestability 
of any subjective desire or opinion. Monologue becomes prolific as a mutual 
disorientation allows and encourages individuals to persuade themselves and others that 
their subjective ideals and moral codes reflect authoritative general truths. Hence 
individualistic monologues become the absolute idealist’s most satisfying mode of 
expression. The affirmation of self-worth becomes attached to this mirage of authority. 
This emotional affirmation is monologue’s most enduring claim on the individual, the 
emotional reassurance of making sense in accordance with their particular perception of 
the nature and virtue of rational affirmation. For idealists’ typically anxious feelings of 
displacement or deprivation, this seductive reassurance as to the credibility of their self­
perception provides the potential to at least feel secure within their own being. In “The 
Meek Girl”, the pawnbroker’s isolation within his own understanding of his rightful 
self-image, reflects the consequence of maintaining such a safe haven. Discrediting and 
excluding a displeasing reality offers the solipsist security, but perpetuates the necessity 
of a perennially tenuous isolation, maintaining a tmth they can never attempt to verify 
without jeopardising their relationship to it.
Unlike soliloquy, where a character’s “peers” are not present, monologue is an 
indirect appeal to an implicit group which exists in the same state of decentred 
authority, relying on finite and subjective inclinations and intuitions, rather than the 
directives of a shared external authority (Bakhtin’s “novelistic” frame, for instance, in 
which author, characters and reader all stand on level ground). This is the source of the 
revealing friction between conviction, uncertainty, assertiveness and supplication in 
which the resistance to the credibility of alternative perspectives is evident. In a sense
commodification in which he is both his product and promoter. The family proposes bonds that do not 
comply with the demands of this code of individualism, hence the tension of the modern 
speculating/ambitious child and the aggression towards family bonds. It is an aggression which seems
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the monologue strives to experience the apparently passive complicity of a soliloquist’s 
audience. In such a condition, comfortable responses to the actual contentions and 
interruptions that occur are implicitly contained already in the profile of the individual’s 
authoritative version of the world. Dreamers and idealists experience rational 
objections as trials of faith, challenges provide binding opportunities for the affirmation 
of the clarity of their unique vision. They become necessarily more certain and more 
isolated in the beliefs and habits supported by their monologue.
The addictive satisfaction experienced by dreamers is the absolute certainty of the 
individual’s personal significance which, in isolation, the dream enacts for them. As the 
dreamer in Dostoevsky’s “White Nights” observes, dreams furnish a world in which 
“the most important figure is, of course, our dreamer himself, in prized and precious 
person”. Monologue attempts to place this dream-like satisfaction into the mouth of 
the world, or the mouth of another.59
Comparing the characterisations attained through dramatic monologue to those 
attainable in the novel, Dorothy Mermin, in The Audience in the Poem, suggests that 
“the incidents that monologues enact are not formative or educative: they can reveal the 
speaker’s character but they do not alter it”.6u This is in fact the condition to which 
those who cocoon themselves in monologue essentially aspire; monologue aims 
assertively to impose stability by excluding or sabotaging real opposition. But essential 
aspirations aside, the actual fact of monologic utterances and the behaviour they defend 
involves a tension and anxiety which is susceptible to alteration. This confused 
intermingling of assertiveness and uncertainty is the natural state of attempts to sustain 
individual authority after the loss of external Absolutes. In its necessarily selective 
relationship with concrete fact monologic individualism is pregnant with its own 
repudiation.
In conveying the tendency of monologic order’s tendency to isolate itself from the 
outside world, interruptions, literal and figurative, are crucial. As reflections of the 
author’s awareness of the undesirable nature of their characters’ predicament,
based, not in the obsolescence of these bonds, but rather in their persisting reality, and for their 
formidable challenge as an “opponent” to individualistic programs of self promotion.
58 Dostoevsky, “White Nights”, 89.
59 Placing one’s subjectively approved and self-assuring worldview into the mouth of another stands as an 
example of the kind of external approval absolutists often require in spite of their apparent “conviction”. 
The most common type of monologic tyranny exists in the manner of the relationships such individuals 
cultivate with others. I shall discuss this tyranny further in relation to Dostoevsky’s depictions of the 
insidious separateness of individualism, particularly in the short story “The Meek Girl”.
60 Dorothy Mermin, The Audience in the Poem: Five Victorian Poets, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Rutgers University Press, 1983), 11.
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interruptions are rarely unappealing. In “White Nights”, Nastenka’s interruption of the 
dreamer’s life-story, and of his habitual dreaming, allows him to glimpse his existence 
in relation to his dreams rather than from within their distortions. The shock 
experienced in the intrusion of external disruptions reflects infatuation’s typical hostility 
to concession or compromise.
When cultivators of a monologue come to recognise that it hangs together by way 
of their position at its core, their monologue’s allegedly objective credibility collapses 
and their justification for disregarding other voices fails. Where this justification is not 
refurbished, this failure can result in the revelatory, sometimes epiphanic, awareness of 
having emerged from a selective reality.
The expert manipulator of the seductive assurance of monologic certainty comes 
to require acuity, though not self-knowledge, and an analytical ruthlessness which 
singles out the tones and terms of others’ vanity. Becky Sharp, Thackeray’s speculator 
in the snobbery of others, offers one example of such expertise: Becky’s successes last 
for as long as she can make herself a significant and affirming clause in the plausibility 
of others’ self-images. The disenfranchised confidence of an increasingly sceptical and 
individualistic population, along with their desire to believe in something, even if just 
their own judgement, is preyed upon in a similar fashion by Melville’s confidence 
trickster, in The Confidence Man. Melville’s novel suggests that without the grounding 
of common external standards of conviction or faith, individuals are unavoidably 
subject to influences which merely play upon their vanity or desire for certainty.
As a means of “listening” to works of literature, a sceptical readiness to “hear” the 
anomalies that betray hidden motives and attempts to fabricate conviction can also be 
invited or stimulated by the author, as it is by Clough and by Dostoevsky. This 
invitation is a fundamental expression of the aesthetic intuitions of Clough’s poetry. It 
determines the character not only of his major discursive works but interlaces the voices 
of his shorter poems in an assertion of the multiple and flexible convictions that can be 
generated in response to what is objectively the same stimulus. The particular 
circumstance and tone -  and therein the use to which any expression is implicitly linked 
- emerge as a crucial directive in linking utterance to utterer (maintaining the dignity of 
the individual utterer without the recourse to absolute meaning residing in the utterance 
itself).
An existence dependent on the seemingly absolute assurances of monologic certainty 
cannot effectively hide its secret motivations. The monologue’s tones of false authority
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surrender up the same meaning to the sceptical ear as utterances willing to concede any 
claim to authority in recognition of the ambiguity of individual conviction. Each attests 
to a limitation of human ideology, the latter directly, and the former through 
recognisable evasions of fact which its failed attempts to flaunt these limits necessitate.
The works that best convey the equipoise of multiple “truths” are not trying to 
assert this fragmentation but to experience, evoke or invoke horizons. In Dostoevsky’s 
case it is the horizon imposed by a unilateral human incapacity to effect the authority 
embodied in the idea of God. For Clough’s characters, the horizon marks the same limit 
(and therefore the human sphere of meaning has the same dimensions for both authors) 
but through their explorations into meanings beyond this horizon, Clough depicts the 
consequences of their inability to find anything they haven’t themselves participated in 
placing there (anything, that is, external to human culture). In alluding to this inability, 
Clough’s poems convey the curiously ephemeral nature of the ideas of order which the 
poems’ protagonists esteem with such anxiety and anguish; their idea of the one thing 
necessary melts away leaving not chaos, abandonment or deprivation, just the challenge 
and provocation of natural uncertainty. Dostoevsky’s monologic characters enact their 
refusal of a similar uncertainty by experiencing the world in accordance with their 
intrusive solipsisms.
In the “dreamer’s” reminiscences that make up Dostoevsky’s early tale “White Nights”, 
a dependence on imaginary fulfilments is sympathetically anatomised and 
simultaneously denounced. In language that seeks initially to evade his own 
involvement, the dreamer speaks of the “magical, animated tableau” his dreams would 
superimpose on an undesirable reality. He speaks from experience of course, and in 
acknowledging this by consenting to frame his observations around “F\ the dreamer 
begins to graduate from the evasions made available by the objective and generic style. 
This is the first sign of the progress, or recovery, recognised later and celebrated by 
Nastenka. From the stagnation of abstract thought and silence, the dreamer’s 
conversation with Nastenka unlocks the proportion which solipsism lacks, and 
engenders a momentum of engagement.
I was waiting for Nastenka, who was listening to me with her intelligent eyes wide 
open, to break into her childish, irrepressibly mirthful, laughter, and was already 
kicking myself for having gone too far, for having blurted out everything that had 
long been seething within my heart, and about which I was able to talk as if I were 
reading from a written text, because I had long ago prepared my own verdict on
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myself, and could not now keep myself from reading it out, from making my 
confession, without any expectation that I would be understoodf.]61
The dreamer’s impulse to speak is coupled with the awareness of an inadequacy in what 
will be said. The awareness is not of the inadequacy of words as tools of representation 
but, rather, of their incapacity to dominate ambivalent reality merely through the 
subjective conviction that underlies their straightforward formulation (except in relation 
to the remodelled nature of reality, within the dreamer’s “dream”). The interpretations 
cannot be controlled. The pawnbroker’s interference with the meek girl’s terms, and the 
characteristic clauses on clauses that dominate the confessions of underground 
dreamers, suggest desperate attempts to speak (offer) and simultaneously impose their 
own frame or terms of interpretation.62 This is not confined to the underground 
confession; it is evident to greater or lesser extent in any confession that has as its 
primary intention the approval of the confessor’s version of events. This desire for the 
reification of an individual’s sense of himself or herself, the striving to be understood in 
one’s own terms, carries as a complement the intention of silencing, or otherwise 
subordinating, the terms of others, an intention which limits its own possibilities for 
understanding.
The formulation of the “written text” (to which the narrator refers in the passage 
above), with its precision and rehearsed control, testifies to the dreamer’s determination, 
exacerbated by his insecurity, to be understood in his own terms. “The life of which I 
speak is a blend of the purely fantastic and the fervently ideal with (alas, Nastenka) the 
dingily prosaic and ordinary, not to say the unbelievably vulgar” .63 While the dreamer’s 
interior ideal self is cherished as “the real me”, this tender favour and protection reflect 
an intuition of its tenuous potency in its own right. In expressing his self-knowledge he 
hopes to make it something independent of himself but also to identify himself with it. 
The dreamer gets his first hint that his bookish “written text” is an inappropriate means 
of communication from Nastenka’s immediate interjection: “Ugh! Good Lord, what a 
preamble! I’m not sure I want to hear this!” .64
Though not actually written down, the dreamer’s “story” in “White Nights” exists 
as a self controlling text. Such resorts to a semblance of objectivity or disinterest
61 Dostoevsky, “White Nights”, 91.
62 The pre-emptive explanations which seek to disrupt alternative interpretations feature similarly in some 
of Robert Browning’s dramatic monologues. In such instances they also serve a dual purpose: the 
character’s exertions strive to quash dialogue while the disturbance created by these exertions alerts the 
reader to the implied shape of a phantom adversary.
63 Dostoevsky, “White Nights”, 84.
64 “White Nights”, 84.
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(apparent also, for example, in Raskolnikov’s justifications of his moral rebellion and in 
the pawnbroker’s justifications of his exploitation of the meek girl) suggest individuals’ 
intuitive attempts to efface any traces of special pleading or self-interested casuistry and 
to disguise from themselves and from others the reliance of their convictions on tenuous 
extrapolations of idiosyncratic responses to reality. The special pleading with which 
solipsistic individuals tend to protect the authority of their worldview from the 
interruptions latent in ambivalent fact is inevitably transformed, in their own 
understanding, into an act of recognition and affirmation of the compelling credibility of 
their ideal, through which they correct and, in effect, chastise a recalcitrant and inferior 
reality. In so doing, these individuals ensure that their self-image always remains 
innocent: in presenting their emotivist moral orientations as acts of recognition and 
submission to higher authorities, they allow themselves to believe that the principles 
these authorities sanction, the consequences they produce, as well as the authority’s 
potential failure, relate solely to the moral status of the abstraction they ostensibly serve. 
They exempt themselves, that is, from any obligation to accept fundamental 
accountability for their idealistic activities or the unsuspected consequences thereof. If 
the consequences of their devotions are challenged, therefore, their own accountability 
remains limited to the credulous sincerity with which they mistakenly approved a false 
idol. In such circumstances, the status of follower or devotee becomes a convenient 
alibi, allowing previously committed individuals to reproach themselves with ignorance, 
gullibility, hope, but to avoid accountability for any misdeeds which they might have 
idealistically committed.
Similarly, in Dipsychus, the proposed subordination of self-interest to an idea of a 
more noble code of conduct, abstracted from contingent and personal compromise, 
provides fundamental support for Dipsychus’ posture of idealistic detachment from a 
debased world. In Amours, Claude’s attempts to practice a kind of dutiful, and therefore 
dignifying, objectivity also mark his reflections, whether on the history of Religion, 
Mazzini’s Roman Republic or his attachment to Mary Trevellyn, with a sober 
equanimity similar in intention (though not intensity) to Stavrogin’s attempt, through 
what Bakhtin deems the deliberately “wooden” second-guessing of his confession, to 
control a moral background to his confession which is fraught with alternative and 
accusatory implications.65 In placing himself and his reflections in the crucible of self 
scrutiny, Claude subjects his existence to the mediation of whichever tropes or
65 The deliberately self-effacing devices within Stavrogin’s confession are discussed in Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics, particularly pages 244-45.
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conventions, out of those that furnish him with possibilities of clear expression, remain 
entirely apt reflections of his intellectual and emotional state. Nevertheless, these apt 
conventions (typically tropes of confusion or disorientation, ie. spiritual orphanhood, 
the battle by night) still generate feelings of dissatisfaction and his own inadequacy, 
which reflect a continuing antagonism between Claude’s varyingly sober and playful 
consent to compromise for the sake of participating and communicating with others, and 
his persisting disdain for the factitious commitments to which, in his mind, this 
compromise necessarily consigns him. Claude’s epistolary reports and Stavrogin’s 
confession seek control over problematic disruptions to their desired self image. 
Claude’s sceptical scrutiny and exacting explications reflect the rigour of his asymptotic 
approach to certainty; evincing an underlying doubt of the seifs jurisdiction to judge 
anything, including itself.
Writing on Clough’s “agnostic imagination” in The Lucid Veil,66 W. David Shaw 
refers to heightened consciousness and uncertainty as enemies of closure (having 
‘become’, as opposed to becoming). This perpetuation of uncertainty is, however, the 
consequence of the most rigorous and uncompromising compulsion to establish grounds 
for adamant conviction. The ripples of causation, extending ad infinitum, proliferate 
through a desperate yet highly disciplined grasping after foundations; everything is 
searched through, every angle, every clause. The natural consequence of this is the 
discovery of more contradictions and further uncertainty (for every vacuum there is a 
plenuum) .67 To speak of or to perceive uncertainty primarily in negative terms (as a
66 W. David Shaw, The Lucid Veil: Poetic Truth in the Victorian Age, (London: The Athlone Press, 
1987), particularly the chapter: “Clough’s Agnostic Imagination: The Uses of Uncertainty” (136-41).
67 Attention to these perpetual ripples creates a thought pattern always seeking out causes of causes, 
projecting sequences and following them backwards. This habit extends also to wranglings with the 
future: stimulated by the merest circumstance, self-narrating individuals can live out a possible life-time 
in their minds. Though this ersatz reality carries the semblance of actual experience, and though these 
individuals often treat these experiences as real (more real in fact than their reality), it merely sets up 
further solipsistic self-dependence in place of objective fact.
By “self-narrating” I do not mean, for example, the Underground Man’s sessions of imaginary 
wish-fulfilment, or the tendency of these fulfilments to dissipate his inclination to pursue his aspirations 
in reality. I mean, rather, the tendency to mentally extrapolate from an inclination, a choice, a chance 
event or possibility for action, a “lateral” procession of consequences, and, treating this procession as 
inevitable and real in spite of it being merely imaginary, refusing to actually engage in the first step. It is 
a tendency which is often intertwined with a fastidious dictating to circumstance and the circumscription 
of its possible consequences within the bounds of purportedly transparent inevitabilities. This tendency, 
typically timorous, is well exemplified by Dipsychus’ projection, in Dipsychus and The Spirit, of the fate 
of any young woman who might join him (or any other man) in sexual experimentation: “The swallowed 
dram entails the drunkard’s curse / . . . and the coy girl / Turns to the flagrant woman of the street / 
Ogling for hirers, horrible to see” (1.3.93-96). Dipsychus cannot accept any complicity with such a fate, 
merely for his “poor pleasure’s sake” (1.3.158), and therefore must abstain. This particular example has 
an element of a personally ritualised (or taught) invocation of precautionary consequences -  it does not 
just forestall consequences it is used to forestall consequences - but this particular ritual further 
exemplifies the ease with which any uncertain appetite or inclination can be dissipated or rendered 
undesirable by such anxious imaginary extrapolations. In Amours de Voyage, Claude, pondering the
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function, that is, of the closure it forestalls) is perhaps appropriate to the essential 
intentions of the rigorously self-qualifying hunt for first principles, but the authority of 
these intentions depends on a problematic and essentially capricious insistence on the 
actual attainability of their goal (absolute certainty, or convincing first principles). The 
awkwardly over-qualified statements which are often employed by characters who need 
to feel or show themselves to be more certain than they really are reflect conflicted 
attempts to prop up or ‘fix’ utterances which are in fact sound reflections of the inability 
of their moral environment to support the kind of absolute certainty, whether in self- 
knowledge or of external first principles, which they desire. Their respective reliance
notion that “Action will furnish belief ”, suggests that, if this is true, then “what one wants”, is “to 
predetermine the action” so that the belief will not be dictated by chance, but will reaffirm some pre­
approved truth (V.ii.20-23). This is a problematically circular desire, and it highlights a reluctance to 
accept ambiguous or partial inspirations or desires as valid grounds for action. This reluctance bears a 
good deal of responsibility for the distempered palate which, predominantly, leads Claude habitually (and 
not always honestly) to find notions of worldly interaction unappealing, uninspiring and easily 
disparaged.
68 As Tikhon observes, in Demons, Stavrogin’s facade of cold-blooded indifference in his confession - 
which Bakhtin identifies as a “woodenness”, through which Stavrogin “arranges every sentence so that 
his personal tone does not slip through” (Problems o f Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 245) - is intended to provoke 
those who will read it to more adamant condemnations. To such predictable condemnation Stavrogin 
would be able to respond with contemptuous superiority, thus evading the shame and guilt which an 
audience’s pity or forgiveness might force him to admit and respond to. Just before offering his 
unsolicited confession, Stavrogin protests, ’’Listen I don’t like spies and psychologists, at least those who 
try to pry into my soul. I don’t invite anyone into my soul, I don’t need anyone, I’m able to manage by 
myself’ (Demons, trans. Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky (London: Vintage, 1994), 689), while 
after, he insists again that “I am in no way inviting you to quickly start objecting to me and entreating 
me” (706). The irascibility of Stavrogin’s preliminaries and closing remarks to Tikhon betray feelings of 
anxiety, challenge, despair and spite which he hopes to juggle, balance and negate to a point of 
satisfactory certainty (one way or another, moral surrender or triumph, though he would prefer not to 
admit that his uncomely crime was the act of a hollow parasite, rather than the instinctive amoral self- 
expression of an intrinsic outsider).
Claude’s qualifying clauses seek to gradually attune outright statements to the partiality which he 
is so conscious of, and committed to admitting, and to render as nicely as possible his experience of a 
world that seems intrinsically resilient to attempts to establish any grounds for absolute certitude of belief 
or purpose. Can he be sure of the Republican revolution? Can he be sure of his feelings? Can he be sure 
of his perceptions, or of the real circumstances they seem to constitute?
So I have seen a man killed! An experience that, among 
others!
Yes, I suppose I have; although I can hardly be certain,
And in a court of justice could never declare I had seen it.
But a man was killed, I am told, in a place where I saw 
Something; a man was killed, I am told, and I saw 
something.
(Amours, Il.vii. 162-66).
This example is drawn from the instance in which Claude is perhaps most involved in something 
externally active: a catholic priest, seeking to escape the city, has been murdered, perhaps, by an angry 
mob; it is the closest Claude gets to adventure, or the external provocation of the picaresque. This actual 
happening is soon cocooned, though, in sceptical, inward-looking interrogations of his reaction to the 
disturbance, in an attempt to winnow fact from any merely habitual or conventional reactions and 
explanations. In his recount, his precision and fidelity to his uncertain impressions is striking. 
Throughout the poem similar patterns of qualifying clauses are used to a more definite effect to allude to 
the body of qualifying detail and contradictory complexities, which lies beneath any of his partial and
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on qualifying clauses shows them struggling to formulate their own authority as an 
abstract utterance which will remain viable beyond their particular emotive involvement 
with it. In their different ways, they each seek to trial their particular perceptions and 
judgements as instances of conviction which might serve as the archetype of general 
truths. These attempts to formulate a controlled persuasive objectivity, whether 
motivated by an earnest or self-serving desire to generalise personal beliefs, indirectly 
reflect the effect of a decentred field of moral agreement on individuals’ relationships 
with moral abstractions.
Artistic representations of characters’ monologic intentions and exertions 
typically present the incapacity of any subjective generalised ideal adequately to render 
or contain the ambiguity and uncertainty of ambivalent reality. The disruptions and 
dissatisfaction which this incapacity typically invites expose the folly of placing a 
subjective image of authority as the central impulse of one’s understanding and 
expectations of existence.
equivocal convictions, statements, doubts and feelings. Throughout the poem, these clauses establish a 
rigorous honesty that acknowledges the irreducible contingency and ambiguities so thoroughly that even 
in admissions of helpless confusion, Claude’s letters maintain a resilient air of expressive competence and 
clarity.
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CHAPTER 4 - Uncertain Convictions
I.
Anchored in Abstraction
In “Spiritual Authority in the Nineteenth Century”, Northrop Frye suggests: “In a sense 
the search for spiritual authority is really the search for a “governor” in the mechanical 
sense, something that distributes the rhythm of a mechanism without being involved in 
the mechanism itself’. 1 23 Frye observes that, “spiritual authority begins in the recognition 
of truth” which “has about it some quality of the objective”.
Earlier in the essay, Frye notes Mill’s observation that “the non-existence of an 
acknowledged first principle has made ethics not so much a guide as a consecration of 
men’s actual sentiments”. In such a state, ethical statements become a self-reflecting 
exercise, like political or partisan interpretations of history they can betray intentions 
beneath their explicitly objective judgements. And the quest for truth becomes a means 
of sustaining the desirable but remote notion of their possibility. The inward turn which 
this quest takes suggests, then, a covert quixoticism in which individuals seek external 
absolutes through a self-seducing internalised relationship with abstractions.4
Claude (initially) and Dipsychus hold the idea of an innermost I as an anchor, an 
authentic thing, which they drop down to fix themselves after the dissolution of 
religious certainties leaves a world of finite, man-made, and therefore contestable, 
morality and conviction. The psychological necessity of this anchor is the source of 
their initial conviction in its reality (though what it eventually comes to mean in reality 
often forces them to ponder its worth and accuracy). The dilemma between Dipsychus’
1 Northrop Frye, “Spiritual Authority in the Nineteenth Century”, Essays in English Literature from the 
Renaissance to the Victorian Age, eds. Millar MacLure & F.W. Watt (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1964); 304-319,318.
2 Frye, “Spiritual Authority in the Nineteenth Century”, 317.
3 Frye, “Spiritual Authority in the Nineteenth Century”, 314.
4 The nature and significance of such shifts are discussed in far greater detail by Charles Taylor in 
Sources of the Self Throughout Part TV, “The Voice of Nature”, Taylor explores a “strong orientation to 
inwardness in the transpositions wrought on Augustine by Descartes and Montaigne, and in the practices 
of disengaged self-remaking, and religious and moral self-exploration, which arise in the early modern 
period” (389). Taylor suggests that “[t]he modem subject is no longer defined just by the power of 
disengaged rational control but by this new power of expressive self-articulation as well” intensifying the 
focus on inner depths, and leading to “an even more radical subjectivism and an internalization of moral 
sources” (390). It is a tendency which leads into Romantic expressivism, wherein individual self­
completion and a sense of the deepest significances of existence are pursued as a common interrelated 
goal leading to a harmonious unity between the unique individual and the external world. Matthew 
Arnold, influenced by the German romantics of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (who in 
turn had taken the ancient Greeks as their exemplum), stressed the role of culture, and individuals’
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sense of a determining innermost being - “one’s humour, which is the true truth” 
(1.4.37) - and the roles reality would have him play - on “vile consideration” (1.4.42), 
“To calculate, to plot; be rough and smooth / Forward and silent, deferential and cool” 
(1.4.35-36) -  gradually exposes him to the unsettling possibility that attending to the 
higher purpose his nature has fitted him to will consign him to an uncelebrated and 
ostensibly purposeless role: “how shall I then explain it to myself / That in blank 
thought my purpose lives” (2.5.15-16). Dipsychus wonders how, in a world without 
clear, commonly accepted verities, to reconcile himself to, or to ‘objectively’ justify, the 
personal choices and sacrifices which would be necessary to his continued observance 
of ideals he has come to associate with his spontaneous, natural, uncorrupted self. The 
higher dignity or gratification he associated with fidelity both to his ideals and to what 
seems to him his true self, are troublingly debunked by a reality which is either 
oblivious or hostile to the code he favours. In Claude’s case the idea of an incorruptible 
inner reserve is placed more overtly in counterpoint to what he considers the demeaning 
necessities of worldly existence.
But for assurance within of a limitless ocean divine, o ’er
Whose great tranquil depths unconscious the wind-tost 
surface
Breaks into ripples of trouble that come and change and 
endure not, -
But that in this, of a truth, we have our being, and know 
it,
Think you we men could submit to live and move as we 
do here?
(m.vi. 125-29).
This value or esteem for the idea of a Self, via the abstract discourse it comes to 
dominate, is not a straightforwardly proud or egotistical disposition, it reflects rather the 
role of this notion of a determinate inner ‘self as an anchor on which such people are 
forced to rely, and which, consequently, they defend. Given the importance of this core 
to these characters, their defence, both to themselves and to “the world”, relies heavily 
on disguising the evidence of their special pleading. The natural torment to the self- 
made consciousness is the prospect of recognising its first principles, the capacity for 
objective self-knowledge, as factitious.
interaction with it, as a potential medium of this kind of individual exploration of inner depths as a
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Thrown back on the individual responsibility of self-scrutiny, absolute idealists 
nevertheless still feel compelled or committed to conduct metaphysical equations in 
universal terms, generalising from their individual circumstances the nature of the 
defining form they consider these circumstances exemplify. The notion of an inmost I 
offers the solacing notion that a primary and incorruptible tmth exists within; an 
inviolable internal reality which offers a constant thread to guide the feat of 
reintegration into a secular world.
Dipsychus’ and Claude’s desire to believe in the objective reality of their 
subjectively solacing notions of the potentially authoritative and guiding role of each 
individuals’ ‘innermost I’, manifests in a kind of quixotic devotion to the higher reality 
of their solipsisms. As with most instances of quixoticism, Claude’s and Dipsychus’ 
‘quests’ to realise these notions are further compelled by an undesirable circumstance; 
the “battle by night” seems to force individuals in on themselves in an attempt to 
establish a sanctuary and stable ground of unequivocal presumptions.* 5
It was a conscious ethic of Clough’s that his work should critique itself and its author. 
W. David Shaw, in The Lucid Veil, identifies Clough as “a poet of uncertainty”, who 
reminds us “that to answer questions is always to delimit arbitrarily a whole terra 
incognita of unknowables” .6 For all the movements towards reasons, origins, and
component of articulating one’s place in a wider context (see 401-10, particularly 408-09).
5 Ideas of ‘self-knowledge’ to which individuals often aspire or cling are inherently contentious, 
particularly when the individual is beholden to some form of abstract ideal or code of conduct: what 
appears to be self-knowledge often reveals itself to be a self-image moulded by the idealist’s esteem for 
the idealised code of conduct. Conrad’s Lord Jim (1900) provides a particularly explicit example of this 
kind of subtle self deception: Lord Jim’s romantic idealisation of the duty of an officer is the basis of his 
sense of intense unworthiness of the esteem or respect he longs to feel warranted in holding for himself. 
His drifting between jobs and countries after the Patna incident sees him searching for an opportunity to 
participate in action which will prove to himself and “externally” justify the association with a noble code 
of conduct which his self-esteem still maintains. The persistence of his sense of dignified distinction, of 
what he’s worth, in spite of his recognition that he has factually failed this estimate, is a dilemma he seeks 
to resolve in his favour. In a sense, Jim’s romanticism and the blindness to his own nature which it 
breeds, are necessary accomplices in his unacknowledged determination to consider himself, in spite of 
his tangible failure, worthy of a higher truth. The sort of reliance on subjective internal standards, and the 
necessary defiance of practical directives suggested by external reality, that this kind of inferiority breeds, 
participate in Conrad’s Lord Jim as the reified points of contention in a juxtaposition of romanticism and 
practical, finite proportion. This juxtaposition, as conducted by the narrator Marlowe, admits a 
fundamental uncertainty over the virtue or irresponsibility of Jim’s subservience to his “shadowy ideal of 
conduct”. Or rather, Marlowe seems certain of both the irresponsibility and nobility of Jim’s conduct, but 
is unable to resolve or coalesce the contradictory feelings into a stable perspective.
6 W. David Shaw, The Lucid Veil: Poetic Truth in the Victorian Age (London: The Athlone Press, 1987), 
141. Shaw argues that in the seeking yet evasive cycles of Amours’ “circling hexameters” Clough 
dramatises “the anxiety of someone who is conscious of more than he can allow himself to know” (141). 
The anxiety which deems this knowledge “unallowable” originates in the antagonism between scepticism
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credible statements, very little ever emerges from Claude’s letters which he is able or 
willing to recognise as a clear step forward. The rigour of Claude’s commitment to 
establishing fundamental propositions, prefixing clause upon clause, appropriately falls 
victim to an inexhaustible fund of counterpoints and credible alternatives.
Rather than asserting moral anarchy or the decreasing substantiality of the “self’ 
(as John Goode suggests in “Amours de Voyage: the Aqueous Poem”* 7), Amours 
dramatises the distemper engendered by the persistent application of a redundant 
standard of conviction, received or revealed and rigidly absolutist, to a flexible and 
interactive moral scene. In Claude, Clough depicts the disorientation of a substantial 
self which cannot assert itself in terms that give its intuitions of truth and purpose 
preference, and thereby authorise their superintendence, over the panoply of legitimate 
roles it recognises in the varying points of view that surround it in the everyday world. 
What Claude experiences as the absence of this approvable point of origin reflects 
rather his inability to approve its apparent deviation from the form he had expected it to 
assume. This inability extends from a persisting emotional esteem for the ideology 
from which these expectations originate. Claude’s misapprehension of this deviation as 
deprivation leads him to despair of an assured first principle from which to begin 
seeking truth and satisfactory duty. Consequently he seeks again and again to organise 
his experiences into something approximating a rite of passage from which he can draw 
a sense of enlightenment and qualitative change, and distil a fixing certainty.
The disquietude which results from Claude’s honest confrontation of uncertainty 
exposes his own problematic responses to the relationship he gradually discerns 
between idealistic aspirations and the reality that both stimulates and repudiates them. 
Claude is dutifully sceptical, and a dutiful absolutist; he can neither ignore the reduction 
of the idea of absolute authority to a metaphorical crutch for necessary convictions, nor 
accept the emphasis this reduction (the utter vanity of any attempt on the Absolute, 
V.v.63) places on the chosen allegiance of the individual. In Amours, Claude’s 
experience of Rome is disappointingly different from his expectations. Consequently,
and idealism in an environment where meaning is called on to conform to the provision of an
authoritative and unimpeachable narrative.
7 John Goode, “Amours de Voyage: the Aqueous Poem”, The Major Victorian Poets: Reconsiderations, 
ed. Isobel Armstrong (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 275-97
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in the ensuing suspension between his desire to be guided by tradition and his doubts 
about the actual wisdom of the past, he comes to feel abandoned and disoriented.8
The inward turn delivers an infinitely plastic realm of possible rationalisations of 
conviction and satisfying self-representations, but it further isolates the individual from 
the prospect of involvement and illumination through coercive experiences of 
unmediated and initially inexplicable aspects of reality.
Claude and Dipsychus are individuals whose palate for worldly experience has 
been distempered by their indoctrination in a framework of unrealisable certainties and 
security; this indoctrination supports not only an unrealisable idealism but an 
impractical commitment to reifying these inspirations. In cumulative contrast, 
gradually but persistently, Clough allows the multiple facets of secular reality to 
ambivalently disrupt these desired but obsolete convictions. In the works as a whole 
these disruptions come to represent a force of ambiguity which, rather than the negating 
imperviousness it sometimes seems to Claude and Dipsychus, invites new approaches to 
the role of abstract ideals (such as truth and honour).
Clough and Conviction
Through individuals’ tenacious need to test on others (real or imagined) the sense they 
make of their surroundings, the limitations of emotivist ideologies are typically 
revealed. Both on the individual level of quests for self-knowledge, and on the general
8 In this sense Claude’s discoveries of ambiguity and factitious equivocations at the root of many of the 
conventional consolations of the period (spiritual devotion, worldly duty, love, even sceptical disillusion) 
anticipates the explorations of fraught responsibilities of individual freedom and cultural inheritance 
which are a common theme of the modernist writers of the early Twentieth Century. In Modem Epic 
(London & New York: Verso, 1996), Franco Moretti suggests that “[a]t the start of the twentieth century, 
as though obeying some secret signal, Conrad and Mann, Musil and Rilke, Kafka and Joyce, all set about 
writing stories of ‘formation’ [Bildung] -  in which the Bildung does not occur: in which objective culture, 
congealed in conventions and institutions, no longer helps to construct individual subjects, but wounds 
and disintegrates them” (195). It should be noted, though, that this wounding and disintegration are 
invited or, rather, catalysed by the subjects’ received conceptions of the kinds of roles these received 
conventions and institutions should play in individuals’ development. Subsequent to the failure of these 
“conventions and institutions” to fulfil a role they seemed bound to by their implied role in some grander 
pattem, individuals who had based their expectations on the persistence of such order are often overcome 
with feelings of confusion and abandonment, and of having been arbitrarily betrayed. The hostile 
implications of this transition, to which Moretti refers - a culture that merely wounds and inhibits those 
individuals who seek to form an individual identity in collaboration with it - reflect a biased reaction 
against what is in truth a dysfunctional relationship, for which both parties (‘objective’ culture and the 
‘developing’ individual), with their incompatible (or simply unclear) demands, are responsible. It is the 
consequence not of a decisive deficiency in objective culture, but rather of the unfamiliarity and anxiety
106
level to which these naturally turn for abstract approval (idealism), inadequacies of 
traditional forms and formulae come to signify an upheaval in the orientation of 
morality from being a universal system of obligations to being one of flexible utilitarian 
calculations and a merely optional bond.
In 1853, Clough wrote to Ralph Waldo Emerson:
Here is the sort of thing I used to try and represent to you. I went out this 
morning to do civilities .... I went first to Frank Newman, with whom a certain Dr. 
Stamm, abroad on a mission to form a new Religious Union or League -  he 
delivering himself of a sort of Anima Mundi Religion; Humanism I think they call it 
-  F. Newman fraternizing from a Theistic distance -  Thence I got to old Crabb 
Robinson with liberalism and Abolitionism and -  etc. Then I went across country 
and found myself at the Brookfields -  where presently in came two ladies, one of 
whom Mrs. Brookfield’s little girl calls Miss Lord Lyttelton, being sister to Lord 
Lyttelton, I suppose -  a very fair specimen of aristocratic tradition. Thence I fell in 
my walk upon Carlyle ... However, these changes of atmosphere don’t affect me as 
they used to do: - nor do I think much of them now[.]9
Clough recounts the ideologies of his acquaintances as the symptoms which, in their 
variety from a common cause, delineate particular constitutions, preferences and 
circumstances. The various creeds which Clough turns up in his brief foray are 
gathered together not as points of rational contention (the relative evaluation is so futile 
it is not even hinted at) but as reflections of a common act of adaptation; these ideas are 
suggestively laid out as the various pelts or plumages with which the intellect both 
decorates and insulates itself (Clough’s Adam and Eve similarly explores individual 
creeds, and their varying religiosity, as idiosyncratic responses to situations of extreme 
moral anxiety and confusion).10 Clough’s depiction of the environment through which 
his civilities draw him suggests precisely the multiform nature of “truth” of which 
Claude, in Amours, becomes gradually aware. The substantial shocks to the system of 
these variously compelling “changes of atmosphere” are evident in the turbulence of
which dominates these individuals’ reactions to alterations in the roles which culture and abstract ideals 
can credibly and productively play in their conceptions of and relationships with abstract verities.
9 Frederick L. Mulhauser (ed.), The Correspondence of Arthur Hugh Clough, volume 2 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1957) letter 403, 463-64.
10 Thomas Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus concentrates much of the philosophical and religious contentions of 
the time into the half-parodic clothes-philosophy of Diogenes Teufelsdröckh. The symbols of traditional 
religion and knowledge are the ornamental garments of the Dandiacal body, a body whose time has 
passed; its comforts have been deemed obsolete in recognition of the natural nakedness of the human 
creature. Clough’s poem “Epi-Strauss-ium” (1847) - a short response to the implications of the higher 
criticism of the Bible practiced by the German David Strauss -  evokes a similar transition by juxtaposing
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ideas that persistently frustrate Claude’s desire for stability. This turbulence is also 
registered more directly in Clough’s Oxford Diaries, throughout which his personal 
attempts to make sense of a confusing array of various and independently credible 
individual creeds were further burdened with exposure to the compelling though 
incompatible pseudo-messianic teachings of Carlyle, Newman, Pusey and, from an 
early age, Dr. Arnold.* 11 The elements of plausibility and apparent truth within the 
contrasting doctrines espoused by these esteemed individuals initially troubled Clough’s 
conviction of the needfulness of a single authoritative creed (precisely what he had 
come to feel the lack of ). But as he came to see the contesting convictions of his peers 
and teachers in relation to particular individuals, rather than an abstraction of truth, the 
discord of incompatible truths came to suggest a gallery of idiosyncratic expressions, 
figuratively expressing individual interpretations of the relationship between abstract 
ideals and the concrete world.
In his diary of 1842, Clough copied down the following passage:
the multi-coloured light falling inside a church through stained-glass windows, to the clear unadulterated, 
and “more sincerely bright” white light of a faith independent of mystery, artifice and superstition.
11 Clough’s Oxford diary entries - see: Anthony Kenny (ed.), The Oxford Diaries of Arthur Hugh Clough 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) - offer a sketch of the vulnerability and insubstantiality of scepticism in 
moments when it is not interrogating a proposition.
Here I am with all my imagination truths utterly departed; and a new false growth in 
their place; so that I cannot act rationally -  my affections utterly divorced from both 
im<agination> & reason.
(March 1842 - The Oxford Diaries o f Arthur Hugh Clough, 199).
Clough’s suspicious response to the field of apparently empty promises gradually provides its 
own ballast of honest uncertainty as he becomes accustomed to accepting the veracity of feelings of 
confusion, rather than considering them flawed impressions of an actual ideal. For instance, “I seem to 
have got out of my difficulties by the worst possible way -  est<a>blishing a new [fancy], which being 
independent of other people I am not ashamed to stick to, but is wholly illegitimate all the same” 
(February 1842 -  Oxford Diaries, 192). This clarity is not a source of triumphant alleviation or even 
transient stability, but it does contain the potential for a more direct relationship with a world that exists 
beyond the intermediary prejudices he discovered to be so important to the ‘authority’ of received 
conventions of external order.
12 In the variety of responses to the erosion of the Christian church’s supernatural authority, as arrayed, 
for example, in A.N. Wilson’s God’s Funeral (London: Abacus, 2000), it is apparent that in the grip of 
uncertainty, reasons were found to approve orthodox belief, to honourably forego it, to reinterpret the 
articles of faith, or, having intellectually approved the need for some form of broad moral structure, to 
profess “faith” (either for intellectual or aesthetic reasons) without actual belief (Wilson discusses, for 
instance, Bishop Colenso’s cynical and conservatively pragmatic approval of the church’s authoritative 
role as a governor of social morality and cohesion). Among these possibilities (which I have stylised 
somewhat) there are further variations relative to individual motivation and self-awareness. These 
various responses, though, tend to bear in common traces of a reactionary response to uncertainty, in then- 
tone these responses register its unsettling presence in the background of the certainties their needs and 
desires encourage them to impute to an intrinsically ambivalent and amoral natural world.
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‘It is the trial and mystery of our position in this age and country, that a religious 
mind is continually set at variance with itself, that its defence to what is without 
contradicts suggestions from within, & that it cannot obey what is over it, without 
rebelling against what was before it’[.]13
Responding to it thus:
In this state of non adjustment, Obedience becomes conformity, conventionality... 
and shame, while Non-conformity leads us into Passion for Passion’s sake, fancy for 
fancy’s sake, that perpetual semi-consciousness of rebellion which leads into 
rebellion.14
Clough was consistently concerned with how to live properly, what is to be done with 
our lives. The “our” here is quite significant. Clough did not simply desire a path by 
which he could attain a personal assurance and mandate to act. In spite of frequent 
preoccupation with interiority and self, his work repeatedly troubles itself with the 
problematic necessity for individual comfort or triumph to be augmented or “activated” 
by a healthy adherence to a society, ideally of similarly “awake” individuals. Clough’s 
desire for a model of proper living expresses what appears a perennial need for 
conventions establishing commonly acceptable virtues and life-goals. However, it 
asserts itself as a paramount dilemma in such periods as Clough’s, in which traditional 
bodies of thought and belief which have previously provided guidelines on which these 
decisions could be made, have grown stale and lifeless. Through such avenues as 
higher criticism, natural theology, evolutionary theories, Tractarian squabbles, and 
prevalent social concerns such as Chartism and labour, the inadequacies of traditional 
assurances were being emphasised, while the challenges of science and capitalism to the 
idea of a supernatural authority become more and more trenchant. And though the 
sediment that has formed around spiritual appetites and concerns is challenged with 
redundancy, it is a challenge to forms of conceptualisation and expression, while the 
impulse that forms them seems resilient. This resilience, however, does not attest to the 
absolute value of any of the particular forms it manifests in but conveys, rather, a 
persisting need (for transcendent meaning or assurances) which generates and moulds 
these responses.
Reviewing a book on recent social theories, Clough wrote:
13 Kenny (ed.), The Oxford Diaries of Arthur Hugh Clough, October, 1842, 215.
14 Kenny (ed.), The Oxford Diaries of Arthur Hugh Clough, October, 1842, 215.
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The dream and aspiration of the ardent and generous spirits of our time is for a 
certain royal road to human happiness. Disappointed a thousand times, they still 
persist in their exalted creed that there must and will be here on earth, if not now, in 
some future and approaching time, a state of social arrangement in which the 
spontaneous action and free development of each individual constituent member will 
combine to form ‘a vast and solemn harmony,’ the ultimate perfect movement of 
collective humanity.15
To make the nature of this “royal road” clear, “beautiful thoughts will distil as the dew, 
and fair actions spring up as the green herb” . 16 Similar dreams and aspirations play a 
significant role in the absolutism which is so problematically affirmed by the self- 
privileging language of the little-Hamlets: a wishful coalescing of the goals of 
individual self-determination and a belief in the paramount virtue of disinterested 
commitment to the realisation of a common binding ideal. The universal scope of these 
terms, though, ironically determines their limited pertinence to any actual circumstance.
Nevertheless, in such a scenario the anxieties of individual freedom and 
responsibility to choose evaporate, and as they do Clough’s language, aping the tone of 
these particular wishes, balances itself between earnest rhetoric and anxious vagueness. 
Though often fanciful, abstract idealistic aspirations are not implicitly deluded and 
demeaning (as The Spirit represents them to Dipsychus). Rather, they express a 
reaction to an uncomfortable state of uncertainty.
O blessed ages of pure, spontaneous, unconscious, unthinking, unreasoning life and 
action, to you, either in the past or the future, the human heart is still fain to recur -  
still must dream .... O blessed ages indeed! But have such, since men were men, 
ever been? Or are such, while men are men, ever likely to come?17
The notion that a new order, if such is ever to emerge, could only arrive through 
something other than human application, allows Clough to act as if he doesn’t believe 
such a thing existed. He is free to register any number of possibilities. While still 
influenced, and to an extent determined, by the sediment of preceding forms, Clough’s 
depictions are nevertheless free of the panicked reflex to reinstate them. Clough is free 
to act as if the necessity of authority were something quite different, and therein, to
15 Clough, “Extracts from a Review of a work entitled ‘Considerations on Some Recent Social Theories’”, 
Prose Remains of Arthur Hugh Clough, 405-12, 407.
16 “Extracts from a Review . . .  ”, 407.
17 “Extracts from a Review . . .  ”, 408.
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engage in the contemporary flux as a thoroughly human event. Neither God, nor the 
divine species of authority God represents are present or dead in the reality to which he 
exposes his characters, merely in their psychology. It is the balance, the poise and 
retention between coexisting currents of doubt and faith, that means Clough can allow 
any number of antinomies and paradoxical contradictions to jostle within and around his 
curious and characteristically oscillating characters - engaged/disengaged, 
certain/uncertain - in response to the same stimuli. An indomitable variousness is 
always allowed to emerge and challenge the inadequacy of systematic truths, and to 
expose the compromising necessity of adopting a selective truth in order to commit to 
an ideal.
In 1849, defending the resignation of his Oxford tutorship to Provost Hawkins, Clough 
wrote:
I don’t think young men are at all inclined to part with Christianity, absolutely: but 
they have no Christian ideal, which they feel sure is really Christian, except the 
Roman Catholic. Any middle term is felt to be a sort of mixed Christianity; and 
whence that admixture comes they are not careful to enquire, nor in what quantity it 
may be admitted: - but they have a growing sense of discrepancy. ls
In Amours, as in Dipsychus, ideals assured by a history of divine involvement are 
scrutinised for their ability to support a sceptical secular order; Clough deploys
18 Clough to E. Hawkins, The Correspondence of Arthur Hugh Clough, volume 1, ed. F.L. Mulhauser 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), letter 214, 249. Elements of the advice Provost Hawkins had 
given to Clough when he was debating whether he could maintain, in good faith, his subscription to the 
39 Articles, are placed in The Spirit’s mouth, in Dipsychus, as it tries to persuade Dipsychus to submit to 
worldly compromise.
Take larger views (and quit your Germans)
From the Analogy and Sermons;
I fancied - you must doubtless know,
Butler had proved an age ago,
That in religious as profane things,
‘Twas useless trying to explain things;
(2.1.47-52).
The Spirit’s direction to consult Bishop Butler’s “Analogy” (the Analogy of Religion (1736)), for 
example, directly echoes advice Hawkins had offered Clough (see: The Correspondence of Arthur Hugh 
Clough, volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), letter 190, 225-27). In this setting Hawkins’ 
arguments are utilised to oppose a pompous, or precious, devotion to idealistic non-conformity; the 
alternative here, though, is not conservative religious orthodoxy, it is “Men’s business-wits, the only sane 
things, / These and compliance are the main things” (2.1.53-54). Clough recontextualises the arguments 
with which Hawkins had tried to convince him of the prudence of ‘pragmatic’ subscription to denounce 
the undignified casuistry and unnecessary bad faith which this argument seemed to ask of him.
I l l
characters of a particular habitual pattern of perception and expectation into a realm of 
uncertainties. They bring to this realm habits of thinking, sets of ideas and expectations 
about the nature and role of absolute truths and life-goals. In particular, they strive to 
reaffirm the certainties they associate with the previous age of faith by interrogating or 
appealing to the supposed truths of revealed religion, and the type of order which these 
sanction.
The practical and emotional implications which proceed from Claude’s and 
Dipsychus’ habitual dependence on these patterns reveal their obsolescence as feasible 
guides of conduct. Through the particulars of this revelation (the particular conceptual 
strategies which succeed or fail), the flexible, multifaceted, and nebulous nature of the 
realm of uncertainty is implied by way of what it recognisably isn’t. In this revealing 
reaction, the various forms of abstract order appear as metaphoric devices resorted to as 
real things, in attempts to impose a moral dimension over what is actually and 
ambivalently supported or dismissed by the realm of uncertainties. These generalised 
schemes attempt to dictate what should or should not occur in a “good” world, allowing 
personal dissatisfactions to be expressed in the semblance of disinterested judgements 
of a delinquent reality. They provide individuals, ultimately, with what they consider 
objective grounds on which to challenge the natural world’s ambivalence towards 
human hierarchies of meaning. In Clough’s work, though, it is apparent that this kind 
of attempt to reaffirm abstract order cannot resolve the uncertainties of the present. 
Such attempts do, however, provide these characters with metaphors to compensate for 
their loss of real convictions (metaphors which are easily and sometimes eagerly 
mistaken for the idea or ideal they evoke). Throughout Amours this metaphoric 
relationship is intimated in the actual standard of knowledge and truth which Claude 
discovers in his attempts to make himself, his beliefs, and impressions absolutely clear. 
None of Claude’s factitious postures and ephemeral inspirations are entirely false - each 
role has a kind of superficial credibility, as a reaction to a particular stress or 
circumstance, which is subsequently unravelled by Claude as he assesses their essential 
pertinence or inhibitiveness, in rendering his actual thoughts and feelings - they are 
incapable, though, of providing the coherent certainties by which he expects to 
recognise the genuine dictates of an absolute authority. It is not abstract ideals, per se, 
against which Clough’s satire is directed, but against individuals’ unwillingness or 
inability to accept that reality has no obligation to comply with them.
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Claude’s literal remoteness from habitual convention parallels his metaphysical 
disorientation. Burdened by, though hardly believing in, received attitudes and 
expectations forged under divine authority, he familiarises himself with the new terrain 
of secular responsibility as if struggling to make himself at home in a new locale: he 
begins to accept customs which, though unfamiliar to him, seem apt to his 
circumstances. In the metaphysical sense, then, Claude is like an exile from a 
convention that had sustained, even if cynically or uncritically, a presumption of the 
desirability and possibility of moral absolutes and transcendent order. Regardless of 
whether he ever believed in God, per se, and has lost his faith in this sense, confidence 
in a world ordered by a sympathetic, external and infallible authority is lost to him. The 
idea of such an authority remains with him (a spectre he repeatedly sees through, but 
whose misleading appearances he never altogether resents), as an abstract template 
against which to judge the disorderly world, but absolute faith and the aspiration to 
somehow participate in reifying any such template is not a “vocation” to which he can 
return.
Claude’s deflective wit allows him to unravel and display the defence 
mechanisms contained within the dubious expressions of certainty on which he 
nevertheless is emotionally dependent. His emotional need and intellectual rigour are 
intertwined in mutual disruption, but the willingness to acknowledge the complicity of 
honesty and absurdity allows a dignifying pathetic humour to drown out the futility 
which often, and unfairly, partners the acceptance of finite limitations in the wake of the 
great expectations absolutism encourages.
Claude’s scepticism is tinged with suspicion “I do not like being moved: for the 
will is excited; and action / Is a most dangerous thing” (II.xi.270-71); it polices his 
aversion to what he sees as the seductive and corrupting directives of worldly 
convention, its merely customary or received beliefs and convictions, and on his own 
belief that an unimpeachable authority, which cannot be unravelled in the way worldly 
convention can, exists, or will exist. So, while “Waiting, and watching, and looking” 
(II.xi.278), Claude is bolstered by his idealisation of compelling external inspiration 
which “without our knowledge or conscious effort” (II.xi.280), will show itself to be 
genuine grounds for convinced action rather than “some malpractice of the heart” 
(II.xi.272).19 Claude’s commitment to a “perfect and absolute something” (EI.vi.144)
19 Dipsychus admits to a similar policy of cautious scrutiny of the feelings and ideas prompted by the 
external world:
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tyrannises over his relationships with the events of his life. He brings a rigorous 
scepticism to bear on his unavoidably particular consolations and feelings, even when 
he is most in need of their comfort and semblance of support.20
What with trusting myself and seeking support from 
within me
Almost I could believe I had gained a religious assurance,
Found in my own poor soul a great moral basis to rest on.
Ah, but indeed I see, I feel it factitious entirely;
I refuse, reject, and put it utterly from me;
I will look straight out, see things, not try to evade them:
Fact shall be fact for me;
(V .v .95-101).
While such habits (which, though openly affirmed by Claude only at the end of the 
poem, have been apparent in his thought pattem and manner throughout) might guard 
him against factitious enthusiasms, they aiso undercut his ability to develop on any 
emotional foundation, and forestall the consequences which might follow from an 
admission that he has been moved (he need not acknowledge, for instance, that his 
feelings for Mary were real and precious regardless of the ambiguities they contained).
When Claude begins to recognise his own affinity for the Republic to be less 
disinterested and lofty than he had initially felt it to be, he becomes equally embarrassed 
both for the cause (which has failed to inspire him with self-sacrificing devotion), and 
for the naivete and eagerness of his desire to believe that some external agent of justice 
might grant the Republicans’ a triumph over their oppressors. He can no longer respond 
to the cause as if to a pure abstract ‘good’ (untainted by particular interests or moral 
ambiguities), and he is not disposed to find in it anything else (a worthwhile strategic 
protest in a political conflict, for example).
Yet I could think indeed the perfect call 
Should force the perfect answer. If the Voice 
Ought to receive its echo from the soul,
Wherefore this silence?
(2.4.63-66).
By his absolutist standards, the absence of this echo disproves the worthiness of any of the claims being 
made upon him, no voice calls with adequate authority so he feels justified in maintaining his idealistic 
inertia.
20 This tendency is succinctly prefigured in one of the epigrams to the poem “II doutait de tout, meme de 
Famour” (he doubted everything, even love).
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Though Claude recognises in the Republic’s cause a logic of propriety or justice, 
this recognition lacks any truly felt, internal significance (in short, it is not his fight). 
From the fact that Claude can intellectually affirm the republicans’ principles, but not 
involve himself without feeling himself giving way to infatuated unsubtlety, or a cynical 
indulgence of a thoroughly general approval of revolution, he is forced to admit the 
circumstantial or contingent value of their ostensibly absolute ideals. The general ideals 
of the republican fight are dependent on the particular significance which gives their 
abstract credibility a compelling emotional sanction for the rebels, and at this level 
Claude must recognise the limited emotional purchase on him of what remains a 
theoretically just cause. The great cause gives way to a local political struggle which, 
beyond its particular context, cannot support the kind of general rhetoric it employs. 
Claude is a gauge of this: his gradual indifference to the initially compelling generalised 
cause suggests an awakening to the way in which absolute terms are used by internally 
dependent groups (or individuals) to express and privilege their shared feelings of the 
general and authoritative validity of an experience which is generated within a particular 
circumstance. Rather than manifestations of objective external categories, validating 
the absolute propriety of their commitment, the convictions which Claude envies the 
republicans are expressive self-referential terms.
FAREWELL, Politics, utterly! What can I do? I cannot
Fight, you know; and to talk I am wholly ashamed. And 
although I
Gnash my teeth when I look in your French or your 
English papers,
What is the good of that? Will swearing, I wonder, mend 
matters?
Cursing and scolding repel the assailants? No, it is idle;
No, whatever befalls, I will hide, will ignore or forget it.
Let the tail shift for itself; I will bury my head. And 
what’s the
Roman Republic to me, or I to the Roman Republic?
(ffl.iii.60-67).
It is the embarrassment which Claude feels at his inability to transform his idealistic 
impulses into action which determines the exaggeratedly adamant resignation from this 
field; the disillusion which accompanies this resignation though is surprisingly good 
humoured.
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Claude makes fun of his own propensity to justify his uncommitted inertia as the 
consequence of decisions taken on rational grounds. Listing his reasons Claude seems 
amused by their hollow ring, and concludes with a rather cruelly barbed exaggeration of 
the lip-service which turns so readily, in the absence of active commitment, to 
hypocrisy. Perhaps in this sentiment one could perceive a grain of self-loathing, but 
Claude’s sarcasm is not of an acidic or destmctive nature; it is not jeering or superior. 
Nor does Claude condemn himself: predominantly, it seems, Claude would prefer to 
make of himself a clownish figure, a squeamish fop, and though he might feel 
shamefully stupid, it is with a resigned fondness rather than anguish that he considers 
his failings.
Why not fight? -  In the first place, I haven’t so much 
as a musket.
In the next, if I had, I shouldn’t know how I should use it.
In the third, just at present I’m studying ancient marbles.
In the fourth, I consider I owe my life to my country.
In the fifth, - 1 forget; but four good reasons are ample.
Meantime, pray let ‘em fight, and be killed. I delight in 
devotion.
So that I ‘list not, hurrah for the glorious army of martyrs!
(EH.iii.68-74).
Claude’s necessary explanation - like the similar appeal, “no man / Feels quite distinct 
the assurance that he of all others is called on, / Or would be justified, even, in taking 
away from the world that / Precious creature, himself’ (Il.ii.32-35) - provides a focus 
for all manner of refracted images of duty, unacknowledged responsibilities, and a 
guilty awareness of genuine disinterest. These eruptions of self-parody and half- 
embarrassed self-exoneration represent moments in which Claude relents to exploit the 
seductive but dubious control afforded by irony and satire. They emerge sporadically 
from a background of speculative ambiguity, involved argument, mawkishness and 
sentimentality and in reaction to an emotional background of confusion, need and 
naivete. That Claude cannot furnish Eustace with the fifth reason not to fight, is due 
solely to the dwindling momentum of his ad hoc flippancy. Claude becomes 
embarrassed, as he had after his critical portrait of the Trevellyns’ middle class 
pretensions, by the delimiting flourishes with which he deploys both genuine criticism 
and self-indulgent snobbery. Claude’s playful self-justification is burdened with the
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half-embarrassed recognition that it could well be construed “a weak and ignoble 
refining, / Wholly unworthy the head or the heart of Your Own Correspondent?” 
(ILiv.93-94).
The juggling of a variety of compulsions, courage of convictions, obligation to 
abstract ideas, absence of emotional involvement, inability to consummate theory, 
cowardice hiding in “reasons”, cowardice admitting itself in the flimsiness of its 
reasoning, suggests a step towards acceptance of all of these as a muddle of 
possibilities, all generated within the mind and constituting an expression of its 
competence to comprehend its incompetence.
It is the essence of Clough’s portrayal of an experience of the dissolution of 
absolutes that Claude’s attempts to utter convictions remain unresolved. Though 
Claude’s manner implies that he rarely knows what to make of his utterances, in the 
context of the poem his fidelity to this confusion allows its significance to emerge. In 
conjunction with Claude’s inherited desires and habits of critical thought the ambiguity 
he resists but cannot resolve conveys a potent signal. The combination of ostensible 
certainty, or expressed conviction, with this tone of ambivalence confronts Claude 
directly with the absurd paucity of his ontological and epistemological resources. It is 
Claude’s fidelity to “what is” that allows this absurdity to resist a diluting transposition 
into freedom or travesty. Claude is amused by the sound of his attempts to express 
convictions, but in spite of the awkwardness and absurdity that accompany the 
persisting incapacity to locate them, he is no less eager to find the right words. The 
disharmony of his individual intuitions and his universalist utterances jars in his own 
ear, and in the readers’ with extra absurdity in that Clough allows us to wonder not only 
at the inadequacy of Claude’s tools to his purpose (discovering absolutely valid 
foundations of equivocation and purpose), but the credibility of this purpose also.22
21 In The Proud Knowledge: Poetry, Insight and the Self, 1620-1920 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1977), John Holloway suggests that “[o]nce the poet as quizzical bystander turns his detachment and 
quizzicality upon himself, there has to be a multiple, an endless reiteration of the movements both of 
submission before dubiety and at the same time of rising above it through the very act of registering it” 
(141). The terms of Holloway’s delineation, “submission” and “rising above”, seem inappropriate: they 
imply the continuing project of a plausible systematisation which logically “submission” would surrender. 
The real triumph exists in perceiving, from within that act of surrender, the imposition of a false 
requirement which seduces the registering of confusion into conceiving of itself as a rising above it. This 
mistakes familiarity, the sense of awareness, for the experience of control, and though this association 
does occur, the consolatory terms of truth in which it robes itself are inherently dubious.
22 Claude’s eventual deflation of his own attempts to muster conviction reflects the happily diminished 
scale of the gamletiki and faustuli. Between Weither and Claude the pathology of suicide experiences a 
change of atmosphere, the support for an ideological act of both sacrifice and self-worship becomes a 
pompous act entirely out of scale with the significance of self-consciousness. The dramatic tragedy
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The Aqueous Age
Following his inability to engage with reality in the terms his abstract invocations 
favour, it is tme that Claude returns to their removed realm of theoretical idealism with 
an air of resignation. Nevertheless, to see Claude (as Robert Micklus does23) as a man 
“stymied by his fear of a world he cannot comprehend”, and alienated as he “blindly 
refuses to appreciate Tamour de voyage of modem life” 24 - is to accept this air of 
resignation as something like a strategic and dishonourable retreat from a worthy but 
over-taxing struggle. What Micklus sees as Claude’s complete resignation to “the 
world of abstraction” 25 is Claude’s recourse to release-valves, familiar and reliable, 
which are the last resort of his need to invoke or gesture to the idea of a clear authority. 
The affiliation with idealism and abstraction which they struggle to resuscitate are 
enchantments that the old language of absolutes and transcendent ideals, having lost its 
link to a commonly accepted authority (such as God), can only assert, rather than serve. 
While acknowledging that even in this final retreat Claude remains uncommitted, 
Micklus treats the presence of this language as a sign of convinced preference for 
abstract certainties over the dynamism of modem life 26
Werther seems compelled to impose as the shape of his existence is one more of the postures that reveal 
themselves as two-dimensional costumery in Clough’s aqueous realm. While refusing to resolve the 
ambiguity and uncertainty which prompts so much of Claude’s self-deprecating and paradoxical precision 
and disorientation Clough’s humour in Amours thrives on the resilience and reluctant wisdom provoked 
through Claude’s involvement with his own defied expectations.
23 Robert Micklus, “A Voyage of Juxtapositions: The Dynamic World of Amours de Voyage”, Victorian 
Poetry, 18 (1980), 407-414.
24 Micklus “A Voyage of Juxtapositions: The Dynamic World of Amours de Voyage”, 414.
25 Micklus “A Voyage of Juxtapositions: The Dynamic World of Amours de Voyage”, 413.
26 Micklus has a habit of keeping Claude to his words, perceiving in them a more scrutinised and 
approved conviction than seems fitting. Micklus gives little regard to the conversational setting, 
determined by currents of rhetorical effusion, evasive clutter and vigorous ephemera as much as by 
attempts at truth-telling, and Claude’s fluctuations are consequently treated as convictions rather than 
tentative reflections of changing states of mind.
Similarly, comments like John Goode’s: “I don’t know how Houghton can talk of Claude’s fear of 
sex. What he fears is the factitious rhetoric of institutionalised love; ‘let love be its own inspiration’ ” 
(Goode in Armstrong 1969, 288), can only stand unqualified if we have faith in Claude’s capacity for 
objective self-evaluation. But one of the foremost “plots” of Amours is Claude’s traumatic inability to re­
align definitive expression of internal conviction with lasting external credibility. Goode’s objection 
emphasises Claude’s conscientious objection at the expense of recognising Claude’s characteristic 
inability to affirm coherent principles and the primacy, therefore, of aversion and justifications of restraint 
in determining his reactions. “Ah, let me look, let me watch, let me wait, unhurried, unprompted! / Bid 
me not venture on aught that could alter or end what is present!” (II.xii.274-75). Exaggerating the critical 
acuity of Claude’s isolation ignores the potent stimulus afforded by his feelings of inadequacy. This 
inadequacy suggests the presence of an idealist’s disappointed scepticism rather than a self-satisfied 
triumph over enthusiasm.
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The source of this “blind refusal” is the hangover of idealism; it is not a choice, 
it is the recognition of an inability, and again the “air” of resignation, ambivalent and 
dubious, reveals a desire thwarted, as if by poor tools, and not, therefore, dispersed.
“Decisions” for Claude inevitably appear as the hopeful seed of a certainty rather 
than its fruitful representation. Claude’s attempts to prime the pump of conviction, like 
Hamlet’s self-exhortation, “from this time forth, / My thoughts be bloody, or be nothing 
worth!“, convey the uncertainty of a faltering experiment in self-authorisation.27 The 
tone of voice conveys awareness both of what is required and the speaker’s lack of it. 
Claude’s epistles become a crucible for experiment and observation of the relationship 
that binds conviction, communication and consistency together as an alchemical source 
of decisiveness.
In The Bothie, Phillip Hewson and his undergraduate friends muse on the relative 
virtues of the life of the soil and the grafted existence amidst urban modernity: “Truly I 
see a good deal in the daisy-carnation fable; / Though I should like to be clear what 
standing in the earth means” (11.269-70). Phillip is not entirely serious, he is after all 
reflecting on the allegorical desirability or otherwise of a cut carnation, a rooted 
carnation and a rooted daisy. Neither, though, is he merely joking: to understand how 
one ought to lay down roots is the first principle of growth; and it is this principle which
Goode himself acknowledges that in seeking stable roles “it is the language which is treacherous” 
(in Armstrong 1969, 286); this treachery reflects an atmosphere in which self-perceptions and preferences 
come forth under inherent suspicion of performing strategic seductions. This implicit suspicion is 
endemic following the detachment of the abstract language of idealism from an external, or “higher”, 
discourse capable of satisfactorily validating its practical credibility. In Clough’s portrayal of the 
sceptical individual’s static poise and retention the legitimacy of the various consequences of this 
detachment are apparent. As a profile of the fertile and redundant elements of both factitiousness and 
fact, the symptoms of this circumstance of apparent deprivation provide something akin to a key to the 
anatomy of idealism. But it is the anatomy of a human organ not an independent body. Clough’s 
abstraction is vital, interconnected and thoroughly dependent on the body it belongs to (be it social or 
singular).
Goode seems to give rather too much credence to certain of Claude’s utterances, seeing in them 
not the contingent orientation of the self but rather a legitimate insight or certainty of a supposedly 
insubstantial self. “Do I look like that? you think me that: then I am that” (I.iv.86), for Goode becomes “I 
am that” (Goode, 277). But are we really to understand that Claude believes he isn’t also that which he 
deems himself? A self, therefore, capable of differentiating between, though not necessarily of 
evaluating, external and internal facets of identity. This temptation to extract isolated moments of 
certainty from the lapping waves of Claude’s convictions is typical of much critical response to Amours. 
Goode, more than other critics, allows for the erosion that inevitably follows but seems, nevertheless, to 
avoid asking why Claude, at the moments he recognises the constriction of his horizons, might be making 
his implicit requests for some other sort of relationship between semblance and being aside from the one 
he experiences. Why, that is, he is dissatisfied with society’s right to perceive him in ways that challenge 
his ideal conception of himself. Claude’s intimations of the potential insubstantiality of self always exist 
in collaboration with his desire for the opposite. The momentum and the role of this desire are dismissed 
in Goode’s neglect of the implicit evasions and ellipses within the language of idealism which the 
relationships between Claude’s abstract and worldly concerns so convincingly decodes.
27 Hamlet, 4.4.65-66.
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the unrequited quests of Clough’s later characters, Claude and Dipsychus, seek to 
discover. Claude reflects:
I, who believed not in her, because I would fain believe  
nothing,
Have to believe as I may, with a w ilful, unmeaning 
acceptance.
I, who refused to enfasten the roots o f m y floating 
existence
(V .v.64-66).
Ungrounded by any consistent standard Claude finds himself unable to authoritatively 
judge the external forces that move around him, and unable to order his disparate 
reactions to them into a pattem containing a compelling whole. He is at the mercy of 
juxtaposition (circumstantial happenings), intellectual curiosity and emotion, but 
nothing lasts, nothing solidifies into a conviction, or even a necessary compromise, 
because nothing needs to: he is independent, unemployed, apparently financially secure 
and restless; because he exists in a sort of limbo, Claude is free to find his abstract 
ideals hollow without being forced into evasions or disillusion.
Attempting to discriminate between authentic and factitious elements in the 
conventions of truth and value, Claude looks for legitimate lineages: he hopes to 
discriminate healthy traditions (implying lasting prospects, and reflecting perennial 
needs, such as consolation, duty and vocation) from seductive misgrowths or mere 
convention. The potential fertility of this approach aside, though, Claude is bound to 
experience the world’s ambivalence, which has been the backdrop and prompt to these 
finite myths and talismans, as a betrayal of his desire to recognise a path of certainty, 
and an obstruction of his obligation and entitlement to serve an absolute.
Although Claude becomes aware of the aqueous nature of the moral foundations 
of his world, his desire to discern certain virtues and a certain self in relation to them, 
distempers his palate and renders fluid ambivalence a state of inadequacy and 
deprivation. Claude uses water images and evocations of rootlessness to register 
discomfort and disorientation.28
28 E. Warwick Slinn, in The Discourse o f Self in Victorian Poetry (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire 
& London: Macmillan, 1991), writes:
Claude’s story of love, then, and of his voyage on the fluid medium of his oceanic 
metaphors provides no Roijiantic model of growth and development, no movement
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‘This is nature,’ I said: ‘we are bom as it were from her 
waters,
Over her billows that buffet and beat us, her offspring 
uncared-for,
Casting one single regard of a painful victorious 
knowledge,
Into her billows that buffet and beat us we sink and are 
swallowed.’
(m.ii.51-54).
Then, with the statue of a Triton (half man, half fish) in front of him, the “simpler 
thought” follows: “Let us not talk of growth; we are still in our Aqueous Ages” 
(in.ii.58-59). This simple thought transforms Nature’s uncaring relationship with her 
offspring from the semblance of punishing deprivation to reflecting an inadequacy that 
is merely the sign of an ambivalence to human abstractions. The prospect changes from 
decay to freedom.
Claude’s acknowledgment of the “aqueous age” emerges as the disillusioned 
backwash of his Republican enthusiasms (during which he bids farewell to politics, 
“utterly!” (HI.iii.60). In compensating Claude for the lost posture of conviction, his 
declarations of the inherently fluid nature of truth and moral distinctions are channelled 
towards the same decisive manner that had marked his tentative certainty in the virtue of 
heroic sacrifice. Knowledge is mourned at this point as “the needless, unfruitful
towards personal transcendence or universal insight, no crowning realisation of 
some ultimate teleological purpose. It is closer to a dialectical model where 
opposites dissolve and are continually in a state of transition. Claude does not move 
towards a moment of fulfilment but simply to a realisation of the way in which he is 
a decentred participant in process.
The Discourse of Self in Victorian Poetry, 113.
But Claude himself does not actually ever arrive at this realization. While the momentum and 
implications of Clough’s poem point the reader in this direction (suggesting, that is, that such a realisation 
is the solution Claude’s problems invite), Claude never explicitly conceives of himself in the decentred 
terms the poem allusively promotes; that he cannot do so is as much the point of the poem as the aptness 
of doing so. Claude remains at the mercy of his desire, in spite of its unrequitable essence, for the 
“crowning realisation” of an unimpeachable teleological purpose. To confuse these origins of awareness 
is to discredit the role of Claude’s dissatisfaction within the aqueous world Clough depicts. While growth 
towards the goal of this desire is improbable, it offers at least a template against which to organise the 
fluctuations of desire, satisfaction, self-knowledge and individual proportion: a point of orientation that 
has no discriminating moral license unto itself but which offers a co-ordinate for continuous acts of 
contextualisation, achieved through the scrutiny of the discord and discrepancies which individuals’ 
fluctuating predispositions, preferences and preconceived ideas provoke and encounter in the world.
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blossom” (m.iv.84), a description which acknowledges an objective finding and 
registers Claude’s feeling that, somehow, a worthy ideal has been betrayed by reality.
Rationales of consolation and commitment interfuse throughout Clough’s work, 
but their interrelation is perhaps best represented in Claude’s image of the “wet sands”, 
cyclically crowded with transient water birds.
Ah, but ye that extm de from the ocean your helpless 
faces,
Y e over stormy seas leading long and dreary processions,
Ye, too, brood o f the wind, whose com ing is whence we 
discern not,
Making your nest on the wave, and your bed on the 
crested billow,
Skimming rough waters, and crowding wet sands that 
the tide shall return to,
Cormorants, ducks, and gulls, fill ye my imagination!
Let us not talk o f growth; we are still in our Aqueous 
Ages.
(ffl.iv .91-97).
In its immediate contrast to the ocean which it seems to delimit, the significance and 
partial stability of this half-solid ground appears, to the fatigued and longing individuals 
who huddle on it, to constitute the bedrock they desire, and which they are predisposed 
to ascribe to any assurance that seems to offer absolute certainty.29
Claude observes that the tides shall return to the wet sands again and again. The 
temporarily solid ground in this conceit suggests the common substance of the 
assurances which individuals approve as the basis of coherent systems of ideas. The 
anxiety which precedes Claude’s “simpler thought” on viewing the statue of the Triton, 
reflects his devotion to establishing the possibility of re-establishing solid ground in the 
face of what appears a wholly natural and uncontestable flux. The image of the Triton, 
and similarly the “cormorants, ducks, and gulls” that “nest on the wave”, suggest forms 
naturally suited to their environment (DI.iv.94-96). Claude can acknowledge and 
approve of their propriety but he is reluctant to disavow the charms of an authoritative
29 In similar imagery of shores and oceans, desire and fatigue, Prince Myshkin, in Dostoevsky’s The Idiot, 
notes how young Russians’, with an intense ‘thirst’ for certainty but no Christian ideal, find the solid 
shore of atheism as comforting as the antithetical religious faith that had nurtured their ‘thirst’ to begin 
with. That they might remain uncommitted, floating in a sea of ambiguities, is unconceivable both for 
Myshkin and for Dostoevsky, for whom the ‘thirst’ for an ideal to bow down to is simply a law of human 
nature.
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ethical foundation. Nevertheless, Claude does appear to accept the possibility that 
existing as a participant of flux rather than the axis around which it must form a pattem 
is the only posture which does not travesty the natural world. The Triton serves as a 
provocative embodiment of flexible hybridity, and offers Claude a striking contrast to 
his ungainliness in the new habitat of ambiguous truths and guidelines, and a template 
for possible acclimatisation.
In the wake of Claude’s political engagement, certainty becomes associated with 
the tidal fluctuations of the “wet sands”. In place of the committed self-sacrifice of the 
republican martyrs, his imagination fills with images of “cormorants, ducks, and gulls”; 
flotsam, responding to tidal movement rather than generating or controlling it.
Any implication that by the end of the poem Claude has found for himself, in 
facts, knowledge or scepticism, a solid foundation, is undercut by the comparison of a 
surface to which he must actively and consciously “cling” with ’’the rich earth” in which 
he might have taken root (V.v.67). The former, associated with “the hard, naked rock” 
(V.v.67) of abstract consolations, implies a posture requiring an unnatural and distorting 
grasp of reality.
In Clough’s work, the clear-sighted individual appears necessarily rootless and 
removed from sequence. This prompts anxiety for the idea of sequence and an inability 
to proceed without a sense of it. As the attitudes which conventional tropes of sequence 
traditionally complemented are found to be factitious, and therefore obsolete as 
foundations of further “progress”, Clough’s poems reveal the discomfort of dissociation 
to lie primarily in the persisting esteem for absolutes and for the images of certainty
o n
which they had seemed to offer.
In the clear-sightedness and openness which Claude’s confrontation with his 
own inability to resolve uncertainty ultimately achieves, the pattem of the disappointed 
idealists’ self-perpetuating cynicism is disrupted. Because the consoling conviction of 
reality’s deficiency in relation to “what-should-be” no longer has to be maintained, this 
pattem becomes unnecessary.
By echoing abstract convictions and “truths” after they have been noticeably altered by 
contingencies of expressive interaction, Clough implies that no such truth or belief is
30 Clough allows the reader to recognise that the literal or absolute authority of such platforms is only 
apparently crucial; they are gestures, imaginary scaffolding: as well as compelling Claude’s obligation to 
formulate and weigh his criticisms in general terms, his reverence for abstract ideals provides 
psychological support which sustains him in his isolating protests against the status quo.
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self-evidently credible. Absolute conviction, in this scenario, implies anxious pretence 
and evasion; in Amours, all ideas are fluid, they alter with time, situation and use. The 
essence of these ideas is inevitably revealed as idiosyncratic, rather than generally 
typical, and they frequently wither under the generalising urge of Claude’s attempts to 
express himself with conventional forms of conviction and closure. The unimpeachable 
breadth of significance he needs and therefore seeks to give them is their undoing as he 
revisits them with the expectation that the essence of the idea will have maintained the 
glow of authority bestowed by the circumstance of their conception, and the formal 
gestures into which they are habitually transposed.
Great is Fate, and is best. I believe in Providence, partly.
What is ordained is right, and all that happens is ordered.
Ah, no, that isn’t it.
(V.viii. 176-78).
Claude’s attempt to £om  some sort of creed, capable of giving order to his 
disappointment and a mooring point to his uncertainty of his own beliefs and feelings, 
gathers momentum briefly, but the certainty of the embryonic catechism is 
unacceptable. Again, as the poem closes, Claude seeks to gather his findings into 
something like an orderly cohering credo:
Faith, I think, does pass, and Love; but Knowledge 
abideth.
Let us seek Knowledge; - the rest must come and go as 
it happens.
Knowledge is hard to seek, and harder yet to adhere to.
Knowledge is painful often; and yet when we know, we 
are happy.
Seek it, and leave mere Faith and Love to come with 
the chances.
(V.x. 198-202).
In spite of the internal consistency and reasonableness of these deductions, they seem to 
offer no unified assurance or real consolation (for Claude, and for many idealists like 
him, the happiness of knowing is still diluted by disappointment and disillusion); 
Claude retreats, resignedly, to concrete fact “tomorrow I hope to be starting for Naples” 
(V.X.203).
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Claude’s multiple failures to approve a moral stance or foundation, both in 
practice and expression, attests to the inadequacy of a certain type of moral enterprise to 
the aqueous age Clough places him in. The Roman Republicans, expecting defeat, 
fought to bring attention to their cause. In contrast, Claude’s failure rebounds on the 
mode of abstractly intellectualised morality for which he stands as a quixotic bastion in 
a world that has moved beyond it. Claude’s continuing emotional attachment to the 
idea of absolute certainty motivates the kind of rigorous and problematic sceptical 
scrutiny through which he discovers ambiguity at the heart of every apparently 
authoritative posture or convention. This self-thwarting commitment to absolutism 
delivers Claude into a position in which he is disillusioned but emotionally bound to 
illusion.
In dramatising the difficulties incumbent on traditional forms of self-exploration, self- 
knowledge and self-expression when conducted on the crested billows of flexible 
secular morality, Amours affords intimations of an unacknowledged short-circuit 
between the reality and appearance of ideological discourse.
Aside from its apparently justified deflations of the variety of enthusiasms he is 
visited by, the proficiency of Claude’s scepticism gives him scant gratification (after all, 
in spite of his commitment to rational doubt, Claude longs for some inspiration or 
conviction which his scepticism cannot deflate). This inability to be satisfied by the 
proper procedure of a rational interaction with the natural world reflects the persisting 
desire for an absent form of unifying authority. Throughout Clough’s poetry, this desire 
combines with sceptical rigour to produce genuinely ambivalent reflections of the 
predicament of secular ideology. Claude is more than a disruptively critical camera 
through which the received postures of human interaction are viewed; his dissecting 
doubtfulness is simultaneously nurtured and insulted by a potent longing for an 
unimpeachable abstract truth. While often manifesting as a corrosive and negating 
force, scepticism implicitly expresses a profoundly hopeful fidelity to the possibility of 
discerning common truths.
Claude’s wit gives voice to a genuine regret in the disjunction of idealistic 
language and direct meaning, but at the same time it thrives tenaciously on bearing 
witness to the absurdities revealed through this breach. Alongside the attempt to control 
this disjunction, the inability to satisfactorily do so gives Claude’s letters, and his
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implicit manner, the nervous instability which sees him wavering between laconic 
urbanity, earnest confusion and over-strident declamation.
Claude’s real discovery is perhaps that his habits identify a natural commitment to 
uncommitted intellectual inquiry (not knowledge, but scrutiny): beyond doubt, 
uncertainty and dissatisfaction his motivation to decipher, dissect and discuss persists. 
That is, in the intellectual and emotional interaction which Claude’s letters to Eustace 
appear to sustain, Clough depicts an assuring relationship to doubt (rather than any 
assurance capable of dispelling it). In Claude’s need for this, Clough depicts a resilient, 
flexible and inherently moral appetite, which seeks re-evaluation and agreement rather 
than passively accepting received truth.
When an individual longs for conviction but is unable to approve any single 
posture as worthy of it, both the possibility of religious faith and the possibility of 
secular contentment are simultaneously disrupted by the attractions of the other. The 
humour with which Clough explores this dilemma sustains a fondness for the characters 
it ensnares, while at the same time it rigorously exposes the flaws in their ideals of 
knowledge, control and comfort. Rather than the bitterness of the turned idealist, which 
both Claude and Dipsychus flirt with, Clough’s non-ideological “waiting” can 
countenance the broken promises of idealism without a sense of personal betrayal or 
spiteful deprivation.
In Clough’s work, characters’ attempts to locate and profess abstract absolutes 
come to suggest consoling rituals in themselves, or symbolic performances which 
invoke laws that are no longer commonly accepted or credible. These performances can 
be criticised, enjoyed and appreciated, and though their credibility can be challenged, 
qualified and tempered, it cannot be either dismissed or verified (except in relation to 
their shifting claims of authority, which inevitably melt away). In this distinction the 
worth of abstract ideological utterances is clarified not eradicated. Communication and 
contention together constitute the tempering trial through which individuals can gauge 
which aspects of their ideals and ideologies are credible to others and which are merely 
credible to them.31 The “perfect and absolute something” (III.vi.144), whether as a
31 The radically “democratic account” of language which Isobel Armstrong, in Victorian Poetry, identifies 
in Clough’s work reflects his evolution: “of a radical language, not by inventing a notional ‘common’, 
universally accessible speech abstracted as a norm, nor by inventing a condescending imitation of the 
language of the poor, but by enabling language to become the object of democratic investigation” (180- 
SI). Which is to say that in Clough’s poetry the use of language inevitably reveals the particularity of its 
specific involvement with the self or group it serves; “Language thus becomes the communal, social 
possession formed by particular groups” (181). While language wanes as a fund of common meaning,
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particular promise of external reward or as the emblematic notion which encourages 
individuals’ to surrender to subjective impressions of authority, is an ultimately 
isolating grail. Even Claude’s projected triumph of his individual fidelity to an ideal, a 
revelation “Which I then for myself shall behold, and not another”, seems necessarily 
dour in its self-sufficient righteousness (IILvi.145).
II.
Dipsychus -  The Discomforts o f an Uncertain Conviction
The discrediting of a moral authority is often troubling for the disorientation it breeds 
but it is troubling also for the self-doubt it introduces into individuals confidence in 
their capacity to discriminate the real from the fanciful. What had seemed so 
compelling and so right is exposed as illusion, generating a reluctance to trust the only 
faculty remaining, individual judgement, for the re-orientation to the responsibilities 
and entitlements of abstract morality. Individuals deprived of an absolute and seeking a 
new authority to support their desire for moral certainty, seem to find themselves 
hesitant to trust their convictions to anything tainted by the subjective distortions of 
sentiment or emotion. Claude, in Amours, resorts to the protective incantation, “Fact 
shall be fact for me” (V.v.101), to guard him from the delusory certainty of such 
factitious and circumstantial convictions. If ambivalent uncertainty is intolerable, these 
disoriented absolutists find ways to resist acknowledging the presence of such factors as 
preference, comfort, and self-interest, in their justifications of conviction. The language
existing to carry the intentions of expression, it remains intertwined with the self and circumstance. This 
awareness changes the orientation of the meaning of utterances: from logical discussion, for instance, to 
strategic invention.
Armstrong emphasises the alienated state of metaphorical language due to this fractured 
particularity, and its consequent state of contention with the reality it seeks to claim power over. 
However, while the possibility that compelling general assurances will emerge from particular instances 
of metaphoric truth dissolves, the resilience of the habit offers a compelling case for a mode of evaluation 
other than its logical or literal credibility. (This credibility, though, is the implicit standard required by 
the type of rationalisations in which its devotees clothe the absolute rightness of their devotion, and, 
therefore, is implicit also in the nature of the assurance and certainty they intend these rationalised 
authorities to provide). With an awareness of the intended authority of an utterance and the circumstance 
in which this intention and the act are founded, the propriety of a different approach to the role of such 
convictions is evident. Furthermore, through this simultaneous awareness of construction and 
constructor, the profile of the intended meaning and the motivations which determine this intention often 
become apparent: an individual or circumstantial need requires support, and in the nature of the crutch the 
essential nature of the need is reflected. In the transition between secular and divine foundations for the 
role of abstract notions of truth and morality these crutches become unnecessary and cumbersome
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of abstract objectivity and pseudo-scientific ideology takes up the strain and offers the 
semblance of rational proofs of new foundations and certainties to their merely 
rationalised convictions. The inadmissible confusion is effaced superficially, but the 
meanings given to “rational” terms remain latently charged with the uncertainty they 
repress; for this reason, individuals who utilise these terms are often compelled to adopt 
more adamant postures of conviction than might be naturally appropriate were these 
terms actual givens, not merely contestable rationalisations. The overt language of 
conviction is a self-solacing code, which plays on the belief in the co-existence of two 
types of knowledge, circumstantial truths and unchanging abstract truths. This 
distinction suggests a religious hang-over and becomes a source of quixotic approaches 
to human ideology and convictions.
'Y )Responding to his nephew’s depiction of Dipsychus’ temptations (in the “Epilogue” ), 
the poet’s uncle alludes to a type of moral indoctrination, through which the generation 
represented by the poet (and Dipsychus) have been forged in disharmony with the world 
and their prospective roles in it.
. . .  as for my own nephews, they seem to me a sort of hobbadihoy cherub, too big to 
be innocent, and too simple for anything else. -  They’re full o f the notion of the 
world being so wicked, and of their taking a higher line, as they call it. I only fear 
they’ll never take any at all.” -  What is the true purpose of education? Simply to 
make plain to the young understanding the laws of the life they will have to enter.
(Epilogue, 46-52).
Through the course of their education these nephews have been put through “a course of 
confirmation and sacraments backed up with sermons and private admonitions, and 
what is much the same as auricular confession” (63-65). They emerge then with such a 
strong personal affiliation to the directives of a higher line, and such a sense of the 
transcendent dignity attained in observing it, that they seem disqualified from their 
“country’s service” in pragmatic capacities (39). Worldly duty is superfluous to their
appendages, sought out to gratify a retrograde impression as to the paramount value of an order founded 
on external absolutes.
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observation of the higher line, and they are superfluous to a community they deem 
merely circumstantial, which they nevertheless exist within. Being expatriates allows 
them, even if temporarily, to evade the scene in which intimations of their negligence 
pollute the dignity of their abstract devotions. Alternatively, where funds are needed, as 
in Dipsychus’ situation, or where protean projects seem feasible, the affiliation with the 
higher line can be played out in action which appears ideologically justified.
Where they cannot consolidate an authority to shelter them from accountability 
for their uncertain moral acts, these hobbadihoy youths feel compelled to guard their 
conscience by remaining aloof from the threat of error or corruption which is 
unavoidable in any practical employment. Both Amours and Dipsychus contain 
signposts which direct their relevance outwards from the representation of what is 
solely individual to Claude and Dipsychus (and The Spirit which is really an extension 
of the same entity) to the atmosphere from which these individuals emerged. Clough 
thereby suggests that there is something typical in both Claude and Dipsychus. They 
are not archetypes, they are not generic forms, and neither are they symbols or 
emblems, they remain individuals and like all individuals they are unique. However, 
they reflect characteristic traits of a peer group implied by the problems which confront 
them, and by the cultural tools (or lack thereof) which are available to combat these. As 
such, while existing outside convention, they are not intrinsically outsiders (neither 
sociopathic nor natural hermits), but earnest individuals unable to locate a satisfactory 
place “in” society. In his gestures to their peers, Clough implies a broader pattern of 
which Dipsychus and Claude are each, in their particular way, examples. Both have 
seemed slightly removed and aloof; through these signals of a loose community, 
though, Clough counter-acts this impression and allows its implications to maintain 
their complexity. It is an assurance, in fact, of the normality of their alienation, not as a 
mean of society but as a natural part of its leaven regardless. The characters themselves 
project a sense of their own isolation and a belief in their unique distinction in being so 
plagued, but this also relates to the exaggerated sensibility of the unworldly self.
So go forth to the world, to the good report and the evil 
Go, little book! thy tale, is it not evil and good?
Go, and if strangers revile, pass quietly by without answer.
32 In the Epilogue of the poem, the poet (who has just read out the dialogue involving Dipsychus and The 
Spirit) and his uncle (the audience) discuss some of the themes of the poem and the questions they feel it 
raises.
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Go, and if  curious friends ask o f thy rearing and age, 
Say, I am flitting around from brain unto brain of 
Feeble and restless youths bom to inglorious days,
{Amours, V .217-22).
The foundations of Clough’s sceptical equanimity, and his humour, are gradually 
developed through an anatomy of the habits of conviction. Clough’s “anatomy” accepts 
the element of truth in both Dipsychus’ and The Spirit’s arguments but questions their 
attempts (through the consequences the attempts invite) to forge these truths into 
authoritative doctrine, with an unimpeachable mandate to govern moral conventions.
In Herman Melville’s The Confidence Man (1857) a similarly ambiguous moral 
environment forms the backdrop against which an inability to admit to a lack of 
confidence, the denial of ambiguity, represents the greatest vulnerability to manipulative 
exploitation. Similarly, the negation of Dipsychus’ emotive convictions succeeds 
through his gradual acquiescence to The Spirit’s false deification of Necessity. But the 
method of this emotive conversion can't avoid “re-enacting” the shape of devotion, 
wherein “I must” becomes an ennobling act of continued deference to a higher line, 
while spelling the end for what now seems Dipsychus’ merely solipsistic indulgence in 
abstract criticism of reality.
In contrast to the higher discourse in which Dipsychus imagines his terminology 
participates, The Spirit teases out the contingencies and emotional strategies on which 
his faith maintains its semblance of external authority.
Whatever happen, donf I see you still
Living no life at all[?] Even as now
An o’ergrown baby, sucking at the dugs
Of Instinct, dry long since. Come come you are old enough
For spoon meat surely.
{Dipsychus, 2.5.177-81).
Dipsychus is a dreamer, he is a lover of abstraction and of a worldview which appears 
fancifully incompatible with actual fact. In opposition to this dreaminess The Spirit 
holds forth throughout the poem as an advocate for the propriety of “waking up”, and 
acknowledging and interacting with the actualities of the world. In “The Intellectual
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Physiognomy in Characterization”33 -  essentially a polemic on the propriety of active 
commitment as opposed to purely abstract theoretical engagement with the world (or 
rather an impression of it) -  Georg Lukacs conducts his argument under the banner of a 
quote from Heraclitus: “Awake, men have a common world, but each sleeper reverts to 
his own private world”.34 The “common world” is a strategic image advocating 
ideological commitment; the enthusiastic use of this image by proponents of 
commitment, including The Spirit, is as intolerant of the common world’s profound 
ambiguity as are the dreams of the sleeper. Here “the common world” is simply a 
stylised counterpoint to the solipsism of the dreamer. What we see so clearly in 
Clough’s work, though, is that awaking to the nature of the common world is as likely 
to stifle commitment as to expedite it. The standards against which terms of conviction 
are judged remain those inherited from absolute devotion to divine authority, and in 
relation to these the individual “awake” to the ambiguities of the secular scene finds no 
credible justification to commit, idealistically, to it.
The Spirit identifies Dipsychus as a biblical Don Quixote (1.3.135); his reality is 
informed and defined, it would seem, by Biblical formulae, “A chivalry of chasteness” 
(1.3.136), in a similar way that Don Quixote’s is informed by the chivalric formulae of 
courtly romance. The symbols which Dipsychus recognises as the appropriate tools of 
representing and discussing reality are drawn from the emotionally approved 
foundations of Biblical morality and ideology. Reality in both cases is overlaid by 
fantastic impressions, to which each character pledges their allegiance in preference to 
an inherently disappointing reality.
Don Quixote transposed a past or merely mythical code of honour onto a present 
in which he can recognise no worthy equivalent; in response to a sense of disorienting 
deprivation, Dipsychus’ quixotism enacts a similarly nostalgic stylisation of reality. 
Each characters’ leading idea, the form of their quixoticism, contains a latent protest 
against the endemic dilemmas engendered by the impotent desire to find clear patterns 
of authority in the here and now (which is always flexible and multiform regardless of 
the relative potency of the explanations that order it or otherwise).
Refusing to stand up for his “honour” against the rude challenge of a Croatian 
guard, Dipsychus acknowledges the possibility:
33 Georg Lukacs, “The Intellectual Physiognomy in Characterization”, Writer and Critic, trans. Professor 
Arthur Kahn (London: Merlin Press, 1978), 149-88.
34 Lukacs, “The Intellectual Physiognomy in Characterization”, 149.
131
that the holy doctrine of our faith 
In too exclusive fervency possessed 
My heart with feelings, with ideas my brain [.]
( 1.6.195-97).
This admission is rather whimsically incorporated into Dipsychus’ relieved justification 
of the ‘honourable’ course of Christian humility and forgiveness. Under pressure, 
Dipsychus is not above the strategic manipulation of his relationship to his authority. 
The imperative in Dipsychus’ relationship with the actual world becomes the 
organisation or manipulation of feelings and facts into patterns that allow his 
emotionally and intellectually approved ideal to seem feasible or true.
Those who depend on systems (as with Dipsychus’ quixotic relationship with the ‘facts’ 
of religion), love the system as a world not as a means of understanding the world 
(systematising its curious confusion). It is a mediating device - between the self and the 
world the system is erected - which informs desire initially, then becomes an extension 
of it. The self desires the system it has grown into, over the reality it is supposed to 
order. But this promotes a state of schism with reality that tells (madness, doubt, 
alienation) against the preference of the self and the system. The discomfort of this 
telling schism can challenge the manipulations of desire, and force the individual to 
recognise the determining force of their denials as well as their wants.
And I half yielded! O unthinking I!
O weak weak fool! O God how quietly 
Out of our better into our worst selves 
Out of a tme world which our reason knew 
Into a false world which our fancy makes 
We pass and never know - O weak weak fool.
( 1.3.4-9).
In a grand gesture to his own autonomy, Clough’s Cain (in Adam and Eve) accepts his 
destructive impulse, and the consequences of his acting on it (a radically altered world), 
as his personal responsibility. Dipsychus, by contrast, generalises; he decrees his 
temptation a common affliction, which it may well be, but his intention is rather to 
exonerate his temptation (for his own sake and to protect his ideal) than to explain the 
origins of his moral dilemma. The weakness or inadequacy revealed in this contrast
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reflects Dipsychus’ imperative need to orientate his moral angst to a framework of 
stable external categories. His need to ensure the comfortable delusion of a realisable 
template of external accountability forces an experience of uncertain moral boundaries 
and dilemma into a histrionic act of self-reprobation. The attempts of both Dipsychus 
and Claude to announce moral certainties frequently strike this awkward tone of 
compensatory overstatement. On deployment they discover their inadequacy in the 
element of uncertainty which they aim to orchestrate. Like the Underground Man, who 
worries over the laughable bookishness of any attempt to demonstrate and defend a 
point d ’honneur to an urban, modem audience, Claude’s and Dipsychus’ expostulations 
of conviction seem to strike them as anachronistic and affected.35
Dipsychus takes pride in the fact that the pleasure he feels in the presence of life 
and the world’s beauty is “sincere and unmingled” (1.5.50). He believes that the purity 
of specular detachment is propriety. The impulse to mingle with life, therefore, is 
logically decreed improper. Nevertheless, this impulse is spontaneous and potent; 
religious logic can tell Dipsychus to resist, but it cannot curtail the force he is resisting.
Better it were, thou sayest, to consent,
Feast while we may, and live ere life be spent;
Close up clear eyes, and call the unstable sure 
The unlovely lovely and the filthy pure,
In self belyings self deceivings roll 
And lose in Action, Passion, Talk the soul.
Ah better far to mark off so much air 
And call it heaven, place bliss and glory there 
Fix perfect homes in the unsubstantial sky 
And say what is not shall be by and by 
What here exists not, must exist elsewhere.
Play then not tricks upon thyself, O man;
Let fact be fact, and life the thing it can.
(1.5.63-75).
Dipsychus decries the acceptance of human limitation as a prematurely grasped at 
convenience. To consent to life, he implies, we must deceive ourselves and constrict 
what he considers our noblest desires and tendencies to an arbitrary and irresponsibly
35 The Underground Man complains that “among us to this day it is impossible to speak of a point of 
honor -  that is, not honor, but a point of honor (point d ’honneur) -  otherwise than in literary language. In 
ordinary language there is no mention of a ‘point of honor’ ” (Notes from Underground, 50). I shall 
return to this complaint later.
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flimsy conception of some future state. These, he seems to imply, are the tricks that 
people play on themselves at the behest of appetites which, in calling us to “feast while 
we may”, are robust advocates for a healthy irreverence towards the dictates of absolute 
Truth. Nevertheless, this is an irreverence which Dipsychus does not share. Dipsychus’ 
concern that fact should be recognised as fact is generated not only by his esteem for 
pure and absolute dictates. Dipsychus feels (or fears) that people who have consented 
in the manner he describes have gratuitously limited their lives; their closed up eyes 
preclude life from becoming “the thing it can”. As ever, Dipsychus lauds the nature of 
his abstract aspirations in the vaguest of terms; his intention to insulate himself against 
the compromising demands of worldly commitment is nevertheless clear. In light of 
Dipsychus’ championing of abstinence his anger with himself at having nearly “fallen” 
(throughout 1.3) might well reflect a straightforward concern for his threatened soul. In 
his immediate response, though, it is apparent that his disappointment was due not only 
to his inability firmly to hold back but also to his ultimate inability to go forward. 
Dipsychus’ policy of abstinence plays a part in a casuistic proliferation of principles and 
beliefs which reflexively validate his unworldly state (which, though effectively static, 
is fraught with counter-acting tides, ideas and impulses).
Alone on the Plain?
Solipsism suggests the formulation of or recourse to a personal, proudly subjective 
lexicon, which is obscure and misleading beyond the interior confines of its origin. 
Dipsychus defines the world to himself, as does Claude, but both do so from within a 
rootless subjectivity, generating a relationship to reality which demands external 
expression but can only hope for approval from like minds. Claude deems himself an 
Adam: he names the world, but is troubled nevertheless by the absence of a help-meet. 
He feels there is no-one to share the meaning he makes of the world, and temper or 
activate it with their understanding (no-one, that is, except Eustace, to whom Claude 
unconsciously turns for this interaction).
Here in the Garden I walk, can freely concede to the Maker 
That the works of his hand are all very good: his creatures,
Beast of the field and fowl, he brings them before me;
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I name them;
That which I name them, they are, - the bird, the beast, 
and the cattle.
But for Adam, - alas, poor critical coxcomb Adam!
But for Adam there is not found an help-meet for him.
(Amours, I.vii. 146-51).
Similarly unable to recognise any means of anchoring his ideals outside himself, 
Dipsychus grudgingly identifies his own help-meet as “th’hard naked world” (2.6.77). 
“Adam accept thy Eve” (2.6.78), he tells himself, but it is The Spirit’s camouflaged 
ideology of pragmatic materialism which he accepts, under the misapprehension of its 
disinterested veracity. In trying to remain idealistically pure and to postpone their “fall” 
into compromised worldliness, each risks sentencing himself to a lonely and anxious 
state of proud isolation and repressed longing. The self-contained understanding and 
approval of the solipsistic idealist, appear here in a telling juxtaposition with a social or 
romantic ineptitude. The unlikelihood of establishing conventional domestic ties (a 
“comfortable home”) reflects the isolating effect of solipsists’ dependence on their own 
version of their role and ideal conduct in the world.
Initially, youthful idealists like Claude have no reason or need to approve received 
ideas. Frequently, abstract idealists are defiantly, and symptomatically, independent, 
avoiding the responsibilities implicit in involvement with other people in order not to 
compromise the feelings of control and competence which their solipsisms afford 
them.36 To maintain the ideals of conduct they have enshrined at the centre of their self­
esteem, they are often forced (or feel duty-bound) to maintain this independence
Claude attempts to assure himself (or is perhaps appealing to Eustace for 
assurance) that his rationale of dutiful, not just preferential, detachment is valid. To
36 The “symptomatic” kind of independence, which often underlies overtly defiant rationalisations, is 
apparent in the failure of Claude’s courtship; it is perhaps best exemplified, though, by a revealing 
anecdote told by the narrator of Wuthering Heights. This character, a refined, solitary gentleman, 
confides that his mother, “used to say I should never have a comfortable home”, and relates an episode in 
which he considers he had “proved [him] self perfectly unworthy of one” (Wuthering Heights 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1985), 47-48). The episode in question involves the 
narrator’s infatuation with a young lady at the seaside, “a real goddess, in my eyes, as long as she took no 
notice of me” (48). The narrator never confessed his love but assures us that in his looks the “merest 
idiot” could not have failed to perceive his condition. The lady in question responds in kind, she “looks” 
her understanding. Confronted by the prospect of actual involvement beyond his original distanced 
infatuation, the narrator confesses that he “shrunk icily into [him]self, like a snail, at every glance retired 
colder and farther” (48). Confused by the narrator’s unusual procession from a successful advance to an 
unequivocal retreat, the young lady decamps with her mother. Nothing is left for the narrator but to muse 
over “this curious turn of disposition” by which he has “gained the reputation of deliberate heartlessness” 
(48). The inappropriateness of this reputation, he further confides, is a fact of which he alone is aware.
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starve for his own ideal might conceivably be construed as a noble act, but to inflict the 
deliberate unworldliness of his idealism on others, a wife or children, would force the 
self-sustaining ego-centrism of his “unauthorised” idealism into direct conflict with 
concrete worldly responsibilities. To Claude, independence and solitude come to seem 
necessities of his vocation as an idealist. His jocular but genuine salute to the “Most 
meritorious subject, the childless and bachelor uncle” (Lix. 185) reflects a wry 
recognition of the condition most amenable to his idealistic affinities. Nevertheless, this 
“amenable” condition is not an entirely chosen or desired fate; Claude’s devotion to 
abstraction is revived, for instance, as a consoling posture in the aftermath of his failed 
romance.37
In Amours, Claude’s failure to conventionally validate any explicit moral framework is 
ultimately of secondary significance to the impulse for communication or utterance out 
of which it is formed. When one imagines the poem as a diary or journal the 
importance of supplication, inherent in the epistolary form, becomes clear. Claude’s 
semi-performance of love is neither wholly factitious nor wholly true, the semi­
performance of his letters to Eustace is similarly neither thoroughly candid nor formally 
opaque. Within their tentative and self-conscious mixture of adventurous speculation 
and precise criticism, it becomes apparent that the forms of certainty which Claude most 
strongly desires or intellectually esteems, can only attain the kind of absolute credibility 
he longs for through his indulgence of expressive acts of self-persuasion. In the very 
flexibility of such acts, the indirect expression of the challenges they aim to silence 
remains constant. This is the case in Notes from Underground and The Meek Girl, and 
Turgenev’s Superfluous Man (in “The Diary of a Superfluous Man”), the instinctive 
recourse of these variously desperate individuals to the platform of secular confession 
points the way of the search for a meaningful utterance. In Three Rival Versions of
o o
Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition, Alasdair MacIntyre 
presents Nietzsche’s espousal of his philosophical and philological claims against 
language’s capacity for meaning as its own repudiation. The apparent failures of
j7 The merit Claude grants to such figures is playfully backed up with a commendation of their inherent 
accordance with Malthusian doctrine of population control (I.ix.185). Claude’s partisan approval and 
identification with and approval of the virtues of this position, invite the qualifying retort that the limited 
involvement of the childless bachelor uncle nurtures a child’s lack of responsibility and obligations while 
claiming the rights to independent self-reliance of the mature adult.
38 Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and 
Tradition (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990).
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expression in Claude’s letters exist in a similar context of supplication to flesh and 
blood, and devotion to the process of making sense.
Expression for Claude becomes a test of the possibility of relating to perception as 
knowledge. Perception is interpretative and personal while knowledge, for Claude, 
constitutes or “relates to” a fund of absolute certainties. Claude’s admissions of his fear 
of being moved, are fears rather of being moved by contingent and subjective stimuli, 
“Some malpractice of heart and illegitimate process” (II.xi.272), as opposed to being 
directed by the manifestations of an external law.
Waiting, and watching, and looking! Let love be its own 
inspiration!
Shall not a voice, if a voice there must be, from the airs 
that environ,
Yea, from the conscious heavens, without our knowledge 
or effort,
Break into audible words? And love be its own 
inspiration?
(n.xii.278-81).
Claude’s defence of his emotional scepticism, like his spiritual scepticism, is more than 
a simple cynical resistance to the ephemeral enthusiasms which the poem repeatedly 
discovers in a variety of initially plausible roles. Claude is yearning to be moved, but 
he is equally determined to keep his fingers off the scale of inspiration, and thereby 
assure himself that any movement might suggest a pure external direction. Claude’s 
suspicion of the foundations both of his own “convictions” and of social and moral 
convention allows Clough to allude to the likelihood that any unequivocal ideal or 
certainty will be based in either ignorance, delusion, or mere assertion. Claude’s 
unwillingness to accept these readymade certainties is teased and tempted by the 
urgency of his desire for the tme assurance that ostensibly they offer. And yet, 
alongside the substance of this frustration we have Claude’s letters to Eustace, in which 
the consolation of community and the consolation of bearing witness allow for the 
gentle humility and self-deprecation which dignifies rather than dismisses Claude’s 
frustration. In the isolation of his prayer-like unsent letters this dignity persists in the 
ideal of another’s sympathetic scrutiny and understanding. Claude benefits from a 
relationship to himself and his own strategies which allows for honesty and proportion 
enough to deny his weaknesses the indulgence of rationalisation and approval, without
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condemning himself for being weak. This resembles the suggestion, implicit in 
Clough’s work, of a disillusion with the hierarchies of knowledge and special 
competence implied by revelatory rites of passage. It is in deference to this “faith” that 
such rationalisations typically proceed.
The tenor of Claude’s utterances alerts the reader, and Claude equally, to breaches 
being denied, prejudices justified and malpractices of attribution and understanding 
being verified as truth. In the combination of vanity and critical pride Claude inevitably 
acknowledges these flaws. Ignorance and hypocrisy are the recognisable negative 
images of his ideal; Claude’s only real point of contact with his ideal is in defying its 
travesties and impostors in the ideal’s name, in spite of the discomfort and social 
disruption this defiance engenders.
In spite of the frustration and helplessness that begin to creep into Claude’s failing 
attempts to affirm a certainty, his persisting commitment to registering and examining 
his uncertainty begins to suggest a resilient posture of discovery and gradual re­
orientation from the midst of confusion. Though his typically abortive resolutions, and 
the profile they bolster, remain ambiguous, and Claude remains uncertain, his 
relationship to uncertainty develops a tenacity which dispels any implications of 
inadequacy or failure that his initial orientation to abstract certainty might have invited.
Claude expresses himself to Eustace in a recognisable “dialect” which appears at first 
to depend upon a set of conventions which, in a literal sense, prove unsound each time 
he tries to rest upon them. Approached as manifestations of an actual ideal of conduct, 
these conventions unravel. Of his love, for instance, he suggests: “After all perhaps 
there was something factitious about it; / I have had pain, it is true; have wept; and so 
have the actors” (V.viii. 164-65). This cautiousness reasserts, or rediscovers (given that 
in his quest for Mary he had acted, though self-consciously, as if inspired), a previously 
expressed scepticism about the limited nature of any fruitful commitment or inspiration.
39 In discussing the dialectic subtleties of Clough’s poetry, in “The Radical In Crisis: Clough”, 
particularly pages 178-88 of Victorian Poetry (London: Routledge, 1993), Isobel Armstrong makes a 
similar observation in relation to the interaction between the characters in The Bothie. In both cases the 
recognised solidarity of a particular class of discourse is typical of a recurring means of intellectual 
identification through “passwords” such as the use of Latin and Greek, or discussions at a certain level of 
abstraction. In Conrad’s The Secret Sharer a similar shared origin is revealed between the captain of the 
Sephora and Leggatt by the tone of their conversation. Their like demeanour extends to a shared mode of 
training, and their mutual recognition of the terms of a particular moral code offers Leggatt the 
opportunity to explain his crime to a peer and feel himself understood.
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Tell me, my friend, do you think that the grain would 
sprout in the furrow,
Did it not truly accept as its summum and ultimum bonum 
That mere common and may-be indifferent soil it is set 
in?
Would it have force to develop and open its young 
cotyledons,
Could it compare, and reflect, and examine one thing 
with another?
(III.ii.40-44).
When Claude scrutinises the various tropes of knowledge and growth into which his 
desire for orientation gently leads him -  the quest for self-knowledge, for love, 
ideological engagement; he even finds hints of affectation in the resignation his failed 
quests engender40 - he finds in them precisely the sort of contingent, half-habitual and 
half-affected postures from which initially, as an isolated tourist, he felt he had 
escaped.41
In spite of his difficulties in discriminating and expressing any clear and certain 
conviction, and perhaps because of these difficulties, Claude still writes, demonstrating
40 For example, in a frustrated and defeated mood Claude reflects on the ill-fatedness both of the Roman 
uprising, and his own identification with it:
Whither depart the souls of the brave that die in the 
battle,
Die in the lost, lost fight, for the cause that perishes with 
them?
Pining and haunting the grave of their by-gone hope and 
endeavour?
All declamation, alas! Though I talk, I care not for 
Rome, nor
Italy; feebly and faintly, but with the lips, can lament 
the
Wreck of the Lombard youth and the victory of the 
oppressor.
Whither depart the brave? -  God knows; I certainly do 
not.
(V.vi.118-28).
Within his impulsive elegiac gestures to the crushed revolution Claude discovers vague sentimental tropes 
which had seduced and consoled him through the lyrical mystification of defeat and the invocation of a 
notion of fertile and dignifying sacrifice. The threadbare nature of these mere declamations, also betrays 
to him the mildness and insubstantiality of his initial engagement with he Republican cause.
41 As the developing political and social circumstances around Claude begin to challenge this 
independence, he is forced again to dissect, and often deflect, elements of social obligation in order to 
disclose and avoid the potential entrapments of merely factitious conventions. “One doesn’t die for good 
manners” (II.iv.69), he observes, but the whimsicality of his objections to mere good manners (itself an 
example of the lightness or good-form he adheres to out of a kind of delicacy, a sense of proportion and a 
stoic acceptance of his disquiet), is the public face of a belligerence towards unthinking conformity.
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the tenacity of motivations analogous to those that might once have moulded these 
conventions. Even in dissolving the authority these conventions appear to claim, 
Claude’s commitment to seeking clarity, even at the cost of what seems a gratuitous 
disorientation and confusion, demonstrates the vitality of the impulse to affirm a 
binding framework of conventions, abstracted from merely particular interests, which 
had temporarily manifested in them. Claude’s sceptical persistence dissolves this 
dormant or implicit justification of observing the status quo allowing for what is a skin- 
shedding, rather than a negation, of anachronistically absolute conventions of abstract 
idealism.
Through the course of his tour, Claude’s attempts to resolve his feelings of 
intellectual isolation from familiar frameworks of value and behaviour become 
essentially the manifestation of his desire for communication and clarity. In attempting 
to right the wrong which these feelings seem to register, though, their nature and origin 
are formulated and expressed as a normative condition unto itself (not merely as a 
deprivation). Claude’s unsent letters still invoke a particular recipient but, in this 
abstraction of the idea of reception and in the prospect of sympathy which it highlights, 
discover a different sense of meaning or purposeful quest to express a cohesive idea (at 
the very least), and beyond that to be understood.42
Claude’s letters to Eustace half-consciously seek the consolation of solidarity; this 
consolation is problematic and is not openly sought or acknowledged partly out of an 
incomplete awareness of the need that prompts the seeking. This incomplete awareness 
seems due, furthermore, to an unwillingness to accept the potentially self-obscuring, 
diminishing or diffusing, implication of a dependence on an other to dispel the 
insubstantiality of the isolated consciousness (to give it clear concrete form). Claude 
seems to realise this in his somewhat compromised celebration of liberation from the 
assujetissement of being what one has been. Solidarity of expression, therefore, while 
providing the comfort of making sense to another, is also a confine. The discomfort 
Claude feels in the company of his uncle’s circle suggests the negative manifestation of 
this segregation of affirming environments. Claude’s letters to Eustace, in contrast, 
suggest the instinctive recourse to the approved and common language of a peer through
42 The epigram to Lord Jim, “ ‘It is certain my conviction gains infinitely, the moment another soul will 
believe in it.’ -  Novalis” (Lord Jim (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1989), 41), infers the 
potency of a similar desire to be understood by another in the same light as that in which he wishes to 
understand himself.
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which Claude can measure the sense he is making, as opposed to blithely vocalising a 
solipsism (or monologue).
But as men pray, 
without asking
Whether One really exist to hear or do anything for 
them, -
Simply impelled by the need of the moment to turn to 
a Being
In a conception of whom there is freedom from all 
limitation, -
So in your image I turn to an ens rationis of friendship.
Even so write in your name I know not to whom nor in 
what wise.
(V.v.71-76).
Claude’s ens rationis of friendship, wherein the affirmation of an understanding listener 
is presumed free of the potentially dismptive actuality of the friend, is likened to prayer. 
It is a particular type of prayer, though, which implies no actual article of faith (and 
therefore no controversies beyond accepted difference within a commitment to 
discussion). This non-denominational expression is not a vehicle for signalling faith or 
allegiance to something beyond it, but the effect of a resilient impulse to use moral 
language; an impulse which is both supplication and its own reward whether its subject 
be doubt, confusion, wonder, hope or engagement. To judge these expressions in terms 
of the particular ends they frequently propose for themselves is to accept their own 
exaggeration of one proposition (the true goal) out of all proportion with the others that 
give it context, and to forget the tentative preconditions from which it follows. 
Claude’s impulse towards communication (his writing) and to the ens rationis of 
friendship both propose a faith in the redeeming possibility of a human relationship 
similar to the ens rationis of divine authority in which “true faith” comports itself.
Secular Sharing
It is often the effects of the secret counsel with the secret self (necessary to maintain 
inhibiting and alienating ideals and principles in the midst of social conventions that
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“betray” the limited credibility of their ideals), which are the source of the trauma and 
dysfunction of double mindedness, rather than the double mindedness itself.
At the start of Dipsychus, Dipsychus dejectedly finds himself guilty of being a 
“poor fool / Still nesting on thyself’ (1.1.5-6). Dipsychus’ fixation on the workings of 
his own self-conception and worldview and their relationship to the common world is 
driven by his inability to reconcile his feeling of an imperative obligation to seek the 
Ideal with his experience of the obligations valued in everyday life. The rigour is self- 
imposed, it is an aspiration towards standards of propriety which Dipsychus believes are 
necessary to potential recipients of these ideal satisfactions. But these are abstract and 
conceptual values, they are metaphysical; symbolic. Dipsychus’ emotional affinity with 
the narrative in which these abstractions are more than mere symbols necessitates his 
detachment from ambivalent reality and his recourse to a solipsistic idealism.
Dipsychus’ literal isolation in Venice is mirrored in his feelings of moral isolation 
within the secular materialism he associates with the world of base fact. He is uncertain 
of his capacity to uphold the ideal standards he has set for himself and more 
significantly of the absolute propriety of doing so. The Spirit’s role in turning this 
position of anxious supplication into a willing self-abnegation can be clarified 
somewhat by considering a depiction, in Joseph Conrad’s short story “The Secret 
Sharer”, of the reinforcement of an isolated esoteric moral code.43 This parallel will 
help to draw out some of the problems engendered by the isolation of absolute idealists 
from satisfying rituals of moral support or acceptable self-checking.
Dipsychus, a “mawkish meditative stranger” (1.1.60), longs to hear himself 
echoed and approved and to feel his strangeness verified as the prestigious mark of 
enlightenment and perspicacity. Dipsychus confronts the world in a state of conflicted 
certainty and isolation, his commitment to his ideals is still a matter of preference but he 
can find no way to galvanise it into an externally credible moral position.
Both Dipsychus and the narrator of “The Secret Sharer” are struggling with their 
dawning recognitions of a personal responsibility to apply their respective idealised 
codes of conduct to the actual circumstances of their existence; to translate what have
43 Joseph Conrad, The Secret Sharer, ed. Daniel Schwarz (Boston & New York: Bedford Books, 1997). 
The Secret Sharer has given rise to an array of critical interpretations (a sample of which is provided in 
the edition I have cited). It is not my intention to dispute or qualify what Conrad’s story has been taken to 
mean, but merely to emphasise particular aspects which help to clarify an important aspect of the kind of 
moral disorientation and idealistic contest with reality depicted in Clough’s Dipsychus.
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been cloistered or theoretical affiliations into applicable templates of interaction with 
reality. Conrad’s narrator notes at the outset:
... what I felt most was my being a stranger to the ship; and if all the truth 
must be told, I was somewhat of a stranger to myself. ... I wondered how far I 
should turn out faithful to that ideal conception of one’s own personality every man 
sets up for himself secretly.44
With a common background and consequently a common commitment to the 
disinterested ideals of the officer class, the narrator and Leggatt “understand” one 
another and mutually approve Leggatt’s misadventure as an example of the kind of 
morally ambiguous consequences of his duty to the higher imperative of saving the 
ship.45 The misadventure comes under the authority of an abstract code which is 
necessary to guide and support individuals who are required to act in the role of an 
authority for others. The narrator’s sympathetic understanding provides emotional 
support and external reaffirmation for this example of the morally controversial 
decisions and actions which abstract codes of duty, such as that shared by himself and 
Leggatt, occasionally demand of their devotees.46 In its dependence on the underlying
44 The Secret Sharer, 26.
45 Leggatt has been involved in the death of a crew member during a storm and in the course of his 
attempts to, in his opinion, save the ship by hoisting a particular sail. He has escaped incarceration on his 
own ship and, resting in the water beside the narrator’s vessel, is taken on board where he explains his 
predicament. The narrator receives Leggatt in a state of longing for positive reinforcement of an ideal 
self-conception (preconceived by him as the form which self-knowledge will affirm as his essential 
character) that has come to seem somehow dubious and unsettled.
From their first exchanges, and despite its highly abnormal circumstance, the captain’s interaction 
and affinity with Leggatt proceeds as if nothing could be more normal: the two both attended the same 
Officer training ship, the Conway, and Leggatt's appeals are made “as if our experiences had been as 
identical as our clothes” (The Secret Sharer, 31). The captain’s sense of his strangeness to his crew, and 
his more complex responsibilities -  “I was willing to take the adequacy of the others for granted. They 
had simply to be equal to their tasks” (26) - expedites a further bond with Leggatt: of the second mate, for 
instance, the narrator confides to Leggatt, “I don't know much more of the fellow than you” (37). The 
captain embraces Leggatt in this kind of assertion of mutuality, an embrace that responds to an immediate 
affinity with Leggatt's ruling class language and mode of speech. “I say”, “Look here, my man”, “By 
Jove!”; his voice, furthermore, is “calm and resolute. A good voice” (30). Leggatt's self-possession 
induces a “corresponding state” in the narrator, who seems to have registered the signs of a peer and ally 
straight away. The rapport is strong enough that on learning the reason behind Leggatt's appearance, 
“I’ve killed a man” (31), the narrator's foremost concern is to proffer an excuse on Leggatt's behalf - “Fit 
of temper” (31) - and thereby declare his allegiance. Leggatt has already qualified his confession by 
suggesting that his victim was not strictly speaking a “man” anyway, certainly not a man as he and his 
new friend understand it. The narrator approves Leggatt's callous elitism reflecting silently on the “ 
‘bless my soul -  you don't say so’ type of intellect” (31) of his “absurd” mate. Leggatt then cements the 
captain's complicity, asserting a sympathy based in a well-founded presumption of shared experiences 
and opinions, “But what's the good of talking! You know well enough the sort of ill-conditioned snarling 
cur” (31).
46 It is possible that Leggatt, with his Conway trained esteem of vocational duty, represents the human 
arm of pragmatic necessities which transcend personalised moral responsibility. Leggatt fulfils a duty to
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rapport granted by their shared moral code, and sustained through their secret counsel, 
the relationship between Leggatt and the captain suggests conditions under which self­
justification and confession can seem to objectively validate subjective beliefs or moral 
conduct.47
“As long as I know that you understand,” he whispered. “But of course you do. It's 
a great satisfaction to have got somebody to understand. You seem to have been 
there on purpose.” And in the same whisper, as if we two whenever we talked had 
to say things to each other which were not fit for the world to hear, he added, “It’s 
very wonderful.”48
The shared moral code between the narrator and Leggatt (affording the kind of 
communion which Dostoevsky’s pawnbroker seeks, unsuccessfully, to manufacture by 
force in The Meek Girl), provides each with an outlet through which tendencies that 
might isolate them from, or turn them against, common reality, are contextualised as a 
particular kind of service to it. By finding someone who understands and approves his 
moral position, Leggatt is able to accept the fate (of innocent exile) imposed on him by 
the majority’s condemnation of his ambiguous position.
For Clough’s generation Latin was necessary for a professional career, it was important 
to medicine, law and the clergy. At the same time both Latin and Greek were signs of a 
privileged education, and served both as a line of cultural demarcation and a sign of 
common and complicit interest (similar to the shared training from the Officer ship The 
Conway which binds two members of a duty elite in Conrad’s “The Secret Sharer”). A 
similar function of demarcation and identification is still apparent in Virgnia Woolf s 
depiction, in Jacob ’s Room, of the abstraction from “real life” of a young educated elite 
in the early twentieth-century: “A learned man is the most venerable of all - a man like 
Huxtable of Trinity, who writes all his letters in Greek”, muses Cambridge graduate
the ship and its crew while sacrificing the crew member and, effectively, himself. The common bond 
between Leggatt and the narrator, their mutual Conway training, suggests both the isolation of an elite 
and the mutual recognition of a code of dutiful efficiency. The narrator’s minority allegiance with 
Leggatt might represent either the bias of familiarity (in the company of his crew he feels a “stranger”) or 
the enlightened moral consciousness of a privileged class exempt from popular moral confines.
47 As such this shared and affirmed “knowledge” becomes the emotional ballast which reassures him of 
the moral acceptability of his actions, in contrast to the condemnatory judgements which pursue him as a 
kind of unthinking urge for simple justice (and with an implied hint of lower class ressentiment and 
vengefulness against moral “liberties” taken by the ruling class).
48 Conrad, The Secret Sharer, 52.
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Jacob Handers in Jacob’s Room.49 “Boastful, triumphant” (63), Jacob and his friend 
walk the streets of London quoting Sophocles and Aeschylus to one another (though the 
narration implies that each listens solely to himself). “ ‘Probably,’ said Jacob, ‘we are 
the only people in the world who know what the Greeks meant’ ” (64). Isolation and 
insight are eagerly and uncritically conflated in a self-confirming insularity and elitism. 
By implication, this kind of privilege suggests grounds for discounting those who don’t 
recognise the relevant “passwords”, and defusing the obligation to give them equal 
consideration as moral beings. More importantly, in relation to Dipsychus, the loss of a 
divine authority results in the fragmentation of a community that might once have 
supported Dipsychus’ unworldly appeals against worldly commitment. Without a 
divine authority or the guidance of absolute law, individuals who devote themselves to 
abstract quests for meaning and moral conduct are liable, through their openness to 
manipulation and self-delusion, to surrender themselves to merely finite images of 
absolute authority. For it is only from representatives of these factitious authorities that 
they will receive anything like the kind of absolute reinforcement for which they long.
The Spirit disputes the terms of Dipsychus’ fidelity to an idealism based in 
Christian principles, but at the same time it encourages the habits of absolutism which 
underlie this fidelity, in order to facilitate his dutiful submission to worldly necessity. 
Dipsychus’ thwarted attempt to rediscover the authority of his Christian ideals -  The 
Spirit, he seems to presume, will be forced to fall silent once he addresses it directly, 
and his convictions will have been revivified by their triumph - engenders the ultimate 
collapse of his cherished affinities.
I have scarce spoken yet to this strange follower 
Whom I picked up, ye great gods, tell me where!
And when! for I remember such, long years 
And yet he seems new come.
(2.2.28-31).
49 Virginia Woolf, Jacob’s Room (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1992), 93. While 
something akin to an early-twentieth-century counterpart to The Bothie, Jacob ’s Room is somewhat more 
direct in its characterisation of the status of “intellectual” discourse. Mrs. Papworth, who “did for Mr. 
Bonamy in New Square ... held the plates under water and then dealt them on the pile beneath the hissing 
gas, she listened: heard Sanders speaking in a loud rather overbearing tone of voice: ‘good’ he said, and 
‘absolute’ and ‘justice’ and ‘punishment,’ and ‘the will of the majority.’ ” (Jacob’sRoom, 87-88). 
Overheard, these become alien fragments rather than words with meaning, the quotation marks suggest 
strange (and privileged) symbols; the components of a language differentiated, overtly and simplistically, 
from that of the useful parlance of domestic help. Mrs. Papworth’s eavesdropping ends with her 
intervening as the two young gentlemen conclude their abstract debate by further trying one another out
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The predictably reaffirming circuit of shared or commonly accepted terms which 
Dipsychus expects will support his beliefs and moral position, is relentlessly inverted 
and undermined by The Spirit; it takes Dipsychus’ “higher line” and annotates and 
anecdotalises it, belittling the scope and provenance of Dipsychus’ idealism.50 
Dipsychus similarly employs the imagery of productivity and dutiful service to justify 
his preference for a prolonged unworldliness as a disinterested spiritual duty.
Long before The Spirit’s voice is registered (as opposed to indirectly addressed) 
by Dipsychus, it appears plainly to the reader as an irreverent counterpoint and comic 
deflation of Dipsychus’ “higher line”. In the first scene, for example, The Spirit 
parenthetically insinuates a background of alternative responses in the context of which 
Dipsychus’ utterances are characterised from the outset as contestable. The 
persuasiveness of this challenge is extended by the interaction between The Spirit’s and 
Dipsychus’ tone. Alongside the levity of The Spirit’s polarising banter, the contrasting 
tones of Dipsychus’ utterances (betraying a melodramatic melancholy combined with 
the solipsist’s belief in a universal accord for their own insight and understanding), are 
those of exaggerated declamation. Dipsychus’ standards of evaluation remain abstract 
and general and can only render the actual world, therefore, as an inadequate and 
negative landscape. For Dipsychus, like Claude, the idealised allegiance to the realm of 
ideas effects an awkwardness in negotiations with the particular and with “normal” 
people. Dipsychus’ sense of kinship with the abstracted world of universal concepts 
reflects his esteem for what is essentially a jargon with which he can sustain a belief in 
the moral sovereignty of idealistic individualism, and in which he can also denigrate 
and dismiss any obligation to accept the “diminishment” which he equates with any 
idealisation of materialistic imperatives. The Spirit in turn forces Dipsychus to accept 
such obligations as more universally true than his jargon. The Spirit fuses the terms of
in a wrestling match. Phillip’s activism seems undertaken in a similar spirit and with a similar intended 
audience.
30 A similar ritual of disenchantment, wherein a highly romantic, Byronic posture of unique individual 
inspiration is exposed as a dubiously hollow role, is apparent in Alexander Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin. In 
Tatyana’s discovery, in Eugene’s library, of the sources from which Eugene has assembled the pastiche of 
his character, Pushkin invites the reader to see Eugene as, at best, something of a sponge (unable to 
generate any character of his own, and absorbing it from estimable sources), and, at worst, as a hollow 
phoney. In Dipsychus’ case, it is rather because he aspires to be so scrupulous about the veracity o f his 
various beliefs and affinities that the uncertainties which The Spirit fans are able to unsettle him and so 
damagingly taint the articles of his faith. While his absolutism is legitimately challenged by the 
pragmatic quibbles which The Spirit exposes it to, his own personal intellectual and emotional approval 
need not be dissolved as dutifully, to his own mind, as they are.
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allegedly exclusive terminologies, and utilises rather than disperses Dipsychus’ sense of 
opposition between the universal and particular to commit him to the latter. From the 
point at which Dipsychus first registers the Spirit’s “persecuting voice” (1.2.17) an 
overt diplomacy begins. Dipsychus’ dialogue with The Spirit throughout Part 1 
conducts an indirect contest of imagery and analogy; The Spirit moulds the close-up and 
particular to challenge Dipsychus’ habitual recourse to grand spiritual distance. 
Dipsychus utilises a scenic vision to engage with that higher line which “sternly” will 
“sweep past our vanities” (1.2.56), and therein to activate and enact a relationship with 
abstraction which resembles his expectations of divinity.
Dipsychus’ decision to “essay it now” (2.2.36) seems an instinctive gamble on a ritual 
of external approval: he lays out the equation in which his position seems both right and 
good with a desire, like Leggatt’s, the pawnbroker’s and Claude’s, that the terms be 
recognised and the equation validated. The vulnerable isolation of Dipsychus’ 
conviction involves him in this failed bid to see it affirmingly reflected back on him 
after projecting it onto The Spirit. “Come we’ll be definite, explicit, plain. / 1 can resist,
I know” (2.2. 40-41): confident in the potency of his arguments and anxious to vanquish 
The Spirit’s dissent, Dipsychus stakes his certainty and signs his compact with the devil. 
In contrast, though, to the implicit understanding between Conrad’s secret sharers, The 
Spirit acknowledges Dipsychus’ terms only in order to ground its contradiction of their 
significance in the most compelling context. The desperate bravado of Dipsychus’ 
resistance, “definite, explicit” and “ plain”, offers up his emotive authorities to a hostile 
force of particularising corrosion. Dipsychus’ inability to communicate the knowledge 
on which he has based his self-esteem betrays both his illiteracy in the terms of social 
interaction and the limitations of his ironically idiosyncratic approval of and 
commitment to abstract qualities.
But should I form, a thing to be supposed,
A wish to bargain for your merchandise,
Say what were your demands; what were your terms[?]
What should I do, what should I cease to do?
(2.2.53-56).
Presuming himself well enough furnished with arguments and conviction to engage 
with and disperse The Spirit’s temptations, Dipsychus undertakes this hypothetical
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bargain. The abstract and theoretical discussion allows Dipsychus to indulge in a half- 
mocking posture of informed opposition to worldliness. This enables The Spirit, 
though, to directly address and amend Dipsychus’ ideological stance and criticisms. It 
is a negotiation which Dipsychus enters into in what he considers a fittingly mock- 
serious tone, resorting immediately to the deliberate dry wit of an affected rakishness: 
“Religion goes, I take it” (2.2.59). By attempting to control the tone of his hypothetical 
engagement with The Spirit’s arguments, Dipsychus betrays a desire to undermine 
potentially unsettling contentions. Dipsychus temporarily conducts himself in quite a 
changed manner, maintaining the proposition that he is engaging in a transaction from 
the position of strength. While he is briefly suspicious of The Spirit’s eager 
congeniality Dipsychus’ own desire to register the superiority of his claims betrays him: 
“I doubt about it; shall I do it? -  Oh! Oh! / Shame on me, come” (2.2.49-50).
Having decided that silence signifies a weak unreadiness Dipsychus begins to assemble 
his own front of nonchalant resolve.
Scarce I know
If ever once directly I addressed him.
Let me essay it now: for I have strength.
(2.2.34-36).
His first direct address to The Spirit seeks to establish the disinterested indulgence he is 
extending to The Spirit: “Should I, my follower / Should I conceive, (not that at all I do, 
/ ‘Tis curiosity that prompts my speech)”(2.2.50-52). Dipsychus’ new enthusiasm, 
“Which is to last, ye chances, say how long?”(2.2.43), allows him to see The Spirit as 
“an eaves-dropping menial” and to address it accordingly. Dipsychus dismisses The 
Spirit at the end of the scene, is succinct and decisive throughout, and jokes with the 
Spirit’s propositions as it has joked with his. The lines of lackey and master are clearly 
drawn in Dipsychus’ mind, but these roles are founded on the fatuous superiority of 
self-assertion, the fulcrum on which manipulative minions, cunning fools and 
confidence men in general can move mountains. The seduction thrives on The Spirit’s 
expert manipulation of Dipsychus’ brief flirtation with the posture of confidence and 
competent self-mastery. Dipsychus begins to bargain with The Spirit with the tone and 
deliberate explicitness of an affected worldliness. The willingness and capacity to 
bargain constitute credentials on which one of the talismanic rituals of vulgar (for a
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conservative idealist like Dipsychus) capitalist materialism depends; a ritual which 
consecrates savoir-faire as a sublime state reflecting the virtues of pragmatic knowledge 
and appraisal.51 Dipsychus, though, is gulled by the simplest of salesman’s confidence 
tricks which he essentially plays on himself (like Goethe’s Faust, whose belief in his 
command over Mephistopheles blinds him to the reality of his role as a puppet for the 
spirit of negation).
But overall, the effect is of a series of propositions put, and a willingness to accept 
complicity unhappily established, “T is well, ill spirit. I admire your wit / As for your 
wisdom, I shall think of it” (2.2.124-5). The stealthy recognition of implied knowledge 
and the acquiescence to manipulation out of a desire for the reinforcement of internal 
desires and impulses generate the seductive partiality of secret sharing. In their role as 
tempter and manipulator the “followers” turn the perceived strength of the proud 
“superior” to their own ends.52
Faust, when expressing his supposedly ambivalent concern over the obstacle 
presented by Philemon’s and Baucis’ home (he has an interest of course, but his 
motivation is not primarily one of malevolence towards the individuals), is certain of 
Mephistopheles’ reinforcing approval. Mephistopheles’ approval, though, is merely a 
means of furthering his own ends, as the spirit of negation, by flattering Faust’s feeling 
of supreme competence.
The pimp’s spruiking in Clough’s “Easter Day II”, “Eccelenza sure must see, if 
he would choose ” (ln.4), demonstrates a similar collaborative seduction (both parties at
51 Dostoevsky’s archetype of the corrosive and self-erasing effects of individualistic materialism, Mr 
Golyadkin (in The Double), goes to great lengths to exhibit a similar kind of savoir-faire. Aside from 
driving out in a hired coach with his valet in costume livery, Golyadkin’s imitations of the virtues and 
habits associated with the prestige of material wealth include a ritual visit to markets where he repeatedly 
bargains over trivial commodities, striking a pose of a man of financial ease and sagacity, but avoids any 
actual layout (he gloats, rather, over the fatness of his wallet, a routine that empowers him and 
reinvigorates his aspirations). Golyadkin’s ritual suggests a self-solacing exercise, a kind of dry run, in 
the fundamental virtue of knowing the worth of things, and being able to bargain for whatever takes his 
fancy. It is a charade which requires other people, but which is essentially for his own benefit; Golyadkin 
is his own most avid observer, finding in his performances a pleasing image in which he finds himself a 
perfect fit in the role to which he feels his “character” entitles him. As he makes his false bargains it is as 
if he were trying out a disguise to see if anyone would spot him as a fraud and pretender. To prove to 
himself, that is, that he has the soul of an aristocrat and that his aspirations are the natural expression of a 
yearning for his proper social rank.
52 Referring, in Problems o f Dostoevsky’s Poetics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), to 
the seductive allusiveness of Ivan Karamazov’s discussion with Smerdyakov Mikhail Bakhtin describes 
the complexities implied in talking with a clever man, “who always avoids all direct words that might 
expose him, and with whom, therefore, ‘it’s always worthwhile speaking,’ because it is possible to speak 
with him by hints alone” (258).
53 Clough, “Easter Day II” (1865), Clough - Selected Poems, ed. J.P. Phelan (London and New York: 
Longman, 1995), 262-63.
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some level want the same outcome) in an everyday utilisation of affirming echoes to 
induce or activate latent desire. In addressing the narrator of “Easter Day IT’ as 
“eccelenza” the flattery and purpose of the pimp keeping step is quite blatant. The 
instability that prompts Dipsychus’ attempted ritual of empowerment -  wherein he 
speaks on behalf of the terms he has privileged and hopes to hear these terms approved 
and his uncertainties quashed by a sympathetic interlocutor - is more complex. In both, 
though, problematic desires (respectively, for sex and for absolute certainty) offer 
openings to seductive persuasions that attempt to induce the compromise of a personal 
ideal of good conduct. The Spirit’s manipulation, though, of Dipsychus’ desire to feel 
his ideals understood and approved follows a similar path of sly civility: his chivalric 
commitment to serve the highest truth (no matter how personally repellent) and his need 
for moral support are subverted by The Spirit’s rhetorical marriage of the certainty he 
desires with the otherwise abhorrent sham-virtues of convention.
The potency of auricular confession depends on a presumption of the shared 
values of confessor and confessed. Dipsychus’ self-communing registers this 
expectation; his hierarchy of terms delineates transcendent virtues and base corruptions, 
for instance, in an expectantly authoritative tone which seeks approval. Even his 
genuinely ambiguous representations of the dilemmas he is caught up in can be seen as 
invitations for an external validation of his favoured notions and, therein, the dispersal 
of the doubts that naturally attend them. To the genuine confusion which underlies 
Dipsychus’ attempts to validate conviction (particularly in Part 2) The Spirit applies a 
principle of order quite different to that which Dipsychus might have expected 
(particularly given his belief in the potency of abstract terms); nevertheless, he cannot 
resist the image and effect which The Spirit engineers in echoing particular aspects of 
his own confessional self-representation.
I commune with myself,
He speaks, I hear him, and resume to myself;
Whate’er I think, he adds his comments to;
Which yet not interrupts me.
(2.2.31-3).
To experience external approval, subjective testimonials have to find an interlocutor 
who shares or will entertain their fundamental prejudices. A satisfying secular 
confession (one in which one makes sense in the manner one had hoped to), involves a
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supplication to and dependence on attaining the complicit involvement of the listener. 
On these grounds, Leggatt’s confession (in The Secret Sharer) and the code of conduct 
it invokes are understood and approved. In contrast Dipsychus’ “confession” is 
subverted by The Spirit in a way that demonstrates the vulnerability conceded in the 
appeal for affirmation (of one’s moral conscience if not one’s actions) which motivates 
secular confession and moral supplication.54
The emotive environment is a scene ripe with comic cross-purpose. In “Clough’s 
Poems of Self-Irony” ,55 Masao Miyoshi suggests that the “intellect, wit, and irony, and 
an enormously attractive humour” which Clough had gained by the time he wrote 
Dipsychus are evident “most noticeably” in “the blood and bones of Mephisto” .56 For 
Miyoshi The Spirit’s inexhaustible capacity to make light recommends him as the 
poem’s comic source. But Dipsychus is not simply the butt of warranted ridicule, The 
Spirit’s capacity to make light is founded in a corrosive cynicism which is neither all 
encompassing nor disinterested: it strategically deflates the abstract value systems 
which support Dipsychus’ resistance to the claims, implicit in its idealisations of 
everyday necessity, of materialism and philistinism. The comedy of Dipsychus goes 
beyond the mockery of a tender-conscience’s ideals, it is not a case of illusions stripped 
away by ridicule, but rather of an atmosphere in which the gap between individuals’ 
desire for absolute certainties, and the selectivity of the terms and explanations these 
typically rest on, leaves would-be devotees eager to succumb to confidence tricks and 
unnecessary concessions. The vulnerability inherent in the determination of spiritually 
disinherited idealists to maintain a commitment to transcendent abstract values is 
apparent in Dipsychus’ ultimately self-betraying negotiations over a worthy ideal. But 
the futility and pathos which underlie Dipsychus’ gradual submission to worldliness are 
exacerbated by the cumulative implication that it is not his ideals that are obsolete but 
the relationship he demands they should fulfil.
54 The “author” of Balzac’s Lily of the Valley, for instance, is so eager to communicate his good opinion 
of himself to his lover through the account of what he considers an estimable and ennobling grand passion 
that he never considers the possibility that his account will receive anything but approval. The portrait of 
a constant and pure lover he imagines himself to be offering, is received as a vain and self-absorbed 
depiction of a man fascinated by his own feelings and too pompous to realise how this narcissism insults 
her. The author’s lover returns his self-portrait with disdain, and casts him aside with a fastidious 
revulsion at his naive egotism.
55 Masao Miyoshi, “Clough’s Poems of Self-Irony”, Studies in English Literature, V (1965), 691-704.
36 Miyoshi, “Clough’s Poems of Self-Irony”, 703.
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Reasonable Arguments
Clough’s characters share a state of confused dizziness in which their disjointed relation 
to what they perceive as the normal world is testified to by the awkward manner in 
which they interact with it.
In “On the Poetry of Wordsworth”, Clough notes a frequent complaint made 
against Wordsworth’s “mawkish” propensity for taking the simulated sentiment as the 
really real fact of the object, thereby eclipsing the objective form with the subjective 
formulation.57
Nay now, what folly’s this? Why will you fool yourself?
Why will you walk about thus with your eyes shut?
Treating for facts the self made hues that float 
On tight pressed pupils, which you know are not facts.
(Dipsrychus, 2.5.123-26).
Dipsychus’ selective vision effects a similar extravagance of artifice by avoiding the 
complications of involvement with other people as a protection against the complex 
ambiguities of emotional life. Dipsychus’ love of the far-off appears at first a sort of 
instinct towards a sublime grandeur, and perhaps it genuinely is, but through The 
Spirit's challenges this inclination comes to suggest aversion and subsequently evasion. 
Dipsychus’ fondness for Ideals is plainly stated, but its emotive significance is 
generated through the context of his confused inadequacy when exposed to the world.
In contrast to an attendance to the close-up and particular, preoccupation with the 
idealistically generalised vista suggests a prophylactic means of experiencing the world. 
Distance is perhaps the simplest means of muting the din and blurring the complexity of 
an ambivalent world. The ‘distance’ of generalisation buffers the pleasures of 
disinterested observation and transcendent envisaging from any obligation to 
acknowledge internal contradictions and complexities; it is a perspective from which 
these stylised impressions can be felt to offer mooring facts of conviction.
Aimless and hopeless in my life I seem 
To thread the winding byways of the town
57 Clough, “On the Poetry of Words worth”, Prose Remains of Arthur Hugh Clough, 305-21, 315.
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Bewildered, baffled, hurried hence and thence,
All at cross-purpose ever with myself
Unknowing from whence from whither. Then in a moment,
At a step, I crown the Campanile’s top 
And view all mapped below. Islands, lagoon,
An hundred steeples and a million roofs 
The fruitful champaign, and the cloud capt Alps 
And the broad Adriatic. Be it enough,
If I lose this how terrible. No, no 
I am contented and will not complain.
To the old paths, my soul! O be it so!
(2.4 .83-95).
Dipsychus rises, and “at a step” is at the Campanile’s top. He is above, removed and 
looking down. The town is distanced, it becomes part of the “view all mapped below”. 
From feeling himself threatened and surrounded by corruption Dipsychus at a remove 
confronts a city that is visual, diagrammatic and clear. The alternative perspective of 
clean distance and cluttered proximity produce an emotional reciprocation in the 
observer: by implication his involvement with external reality is, respectively, that of an 
all-seeing giant or piece of flotsam.
The desire to order experience as if contained within a pictorial frame suggests the 
wishful thinking of individuals frustrated and disoriented by their inability to 
satisfactorily encode fact and experience without artificially, and tellingly, omitting the 
manifest ambiguities these naturally involve. The disquiet of unrequitable desire (the 
frame is rarely as unobtrusive or fitting as it is required to be) is a further manifestation 
of the unpregnant pause, incorporating both confusion and protest. Dipsychus’ defence 
of a specular existence demonstrates its complicity with emotivist conviction; the 
controlled lack of interactive involvement preserves the preferred “order of things” from 
unruly interruptions and challenges.
Maturer optics don’t delight 
In childish dim religious light:
In evanescent vague effects 
That shirk not face one’s intellects 
They love not fancies fast betrayed 
And artful tricks of light and shade 
But pure form nakedly displayed,
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And all things absolutely made.
( 1.5.104- 11).
Dipsychus’ mode of seeing protects the “childish dim religious light” while The Spirit 
aims at making him see into the shade -  his own blind spots and evasions - which 
appear to give this trompe Voeil real substance. While Dipsychus seeks to quarantine 
the “insidious lewdness” (1.3.23) of The Spirit’s voice as the whisperings of 
wickedness, a moral distinction, The Spirit detracts from Dipsychus’ affinities in the 
name of time and growth; the most corporeal of admonishments.
In the image of the afterlife, aiming essentially to pre-emptively activate and control 
the desires and the fears of the dying, the mechanism of Christian consolation more or 
less admits its initial position of weakness. With regard to the other brutish betrayal of 
the unworldliness which God, as the biblical creator, intended for his creation, the post- 
lapsarian encryption of the animal reality of sexuality in a language of repression and 
transgression sees it similarly contextualised as a trial of obedience, in which 
individuals’ capacity to fulfil the vision of their creator is measured.
In Dipsychus’ uneasy approval of and allegiance to the ethical profile which 
Christian language bestows on sexual impulses, Clough explores a further point of 
challenge to the rhetorical provisions and strategies underlying the moral guidelines of 
conventional Christianity.
O yes, my pensive youth, abstain:
And any empty sick sensation 
Any fierce hunger, any pain
You’ll know is mere imagination.
( 1.5.84-87).
Such an attribution relies for its credibility and potency on asserting a qualitative 
distinction between animal and spiritual appetites; it relies, that is, on instating an 
arbitrary and untenable schism or prejudice as an external fact. It is the failure of the 
rationalisations that had given this prejudice the semblance of objective credibility that, 
in Dipsychus, motivates Dipsychus’ attempts to justify his habitually selective and 
judgemental relationship with reality. The Spirit later admonishes Dipsychus, “For a 
waste far off may-be overlooking/ The fruitful is, close by” (2.5.153-54).
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The averted stare is not merely a means of ignoring inadmissible data, it propels 
the commitment and approval of the ostensibly ideological vision. In Dipsychus’ 
selective focus, the dual influence of seeing what he wants to, and ignoring what he has 
to, demonstrates the closed circle of complicit causality which determines the 
conceptual xenophobia of ideological absolutes in an ambivalent world. Emotive 
persuasion has to address both the aversion and the desire, necessitating that its own 
rhetorical representation organise itself in the image of opposing arguments in order to 
reconstitute the contested idea to its own ends.
For arguments mounted in an environment that supports no common absolute, 
persuasion must proceed as carefully along the lines of exclusion as affirmation. The 
Spirit’s own world-view is a product of a vision no less selective than that which it 
attacks in Dipsychus’ idealism, and it is similarly averse to acknowledging the 
shortcomings of its ethic.58 But as the shepherd or con-man indulging in the husbandry 
of a straying ideologue (Dipsychus the lost sheep), The Spirit is a fertile device in 
exposing the recommendations of a pragmatism that disguises itself as non-ideological.
Initially Dipsychus has the multiplicity of the world (of which he is disapprovingly 
aware) tamed within a framework of transcendent ideals, authorized or ratified by a 
personalised lexicon of biblical analogy and sermonising strictures. In contrast to The 
Spirit’s light conversation Dipsychus intones his moral equations in the dense and 
esoteric language of his preferential worldview. The language in which Dipsychus 
carefully and ponderously unravels the pros and cons of succumbing to temptation 
throws up another barrier between himself and the world The Spirit touts for.
Shyness. ‘Tis but another word for shame;
And that for Sacred Instinct. Off ill thoughts!
‘Tis holy ground your foot has stepped upon.
( 1.3.194-96).
58 Not only is The Spirit’s world-view equally selective in its organization of ambivalent patterns of 
human behaviour into moral categories, the fundamental impulse which governs this habit, essentially an 
insistence that the world can be understood and ordered in relation to a singular unifying principle or 
dogma, is common to the world-views of both Dipsychus and The Spirit. As a consequence of this 
predisposition, both The Spirit and Dipsychus seek to prove that the particular human tendencies, 
predilections and appetites which, respectively, they favour and e^ult in, represent: doctrines of an
external, determining law.
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Dipsychus makes a similar use of the system of Christian virtue and humility later 
when, having accepted the insult of the Croat guard, he consoles himself with a vision 
of “How he and I at some great day shall meet / Before some awful judgement-seat of 
truth” (1.6.35-36). Similarly Dipsychus’ invocation of “The sword of the Lord and 
Gideon” (1.6.138) is a useful complaint. Dipsychus’ declamatory longing for the call of 
a higher cause suggests that, “things more merely personal to myself / Of all earth’s 
things do least affect myself’ (1.6.148-49), might indeed be the reason for his refusal to 
seek revenge. The use of these approved tropes aims at charting a deliberately 
controlled path of falsely uncommitted and inevitably self-affirming “speculation”, such 
as that which Clough had denounced in relinquishing his subscription to the 39 Articles. 
Dipsychus’ resort to a model of Christian humility allows him the consolation of 
seeming to resolve both his purely personal reluctance to fight and his uncertainties as 
to the valid elements of an essentially aristocratic and outmoded code of honour, with a 
gesture of impersonal deference to a higher truth. In short, such deference provides 
Dipsychus with a template capable of bringing order to his troubled conscience by 
providing him with justification to ignore the ambiguities it rightly throws up. While 
these assertions of doctrine serve well enough to justify passive resistance (and 
oppositional activity too for that matter), they seem unable either to propose positive 
virtuous action, or to respond to ambivalent challenges (such as biological 
conformation) without attributing their influence to the worst self of unreason.
No kindly longing, no sly coyness now 
Nor a poor petal hanging to that stalk 
Where thousands once were redolent and rich.
Look, she would fain allure; but she is cold 
The ripe lips paled, the frolick pulses stilled,
The quick eye dead, the once fair flushing cheek
Flaccid under its paint; the once heaving bosom -
Ask not! for oh, the sweet bloom of desire
In hot fruition’s pawey fingers turns
To dullness and the deadly spreading spot
Of rottenness inevitably soon
That while we hold, we hate -  Sweet Peace! no more!
( 1.3. 102- 13).
Throughout this scene in particular, the protective casing which Dipsychus’ language 
forms around his preferences meets with disapproval as he attempts to forge a
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communicative moral rapport with the external world. The authority of the language of 
Dipsychus’ biblical fables and expostulated strictures begins to fade with its failure to 
elicit The Spirit’s approval of its credibility. The Spirit is not bi-partisan or double- 
minded, neither is it committed in the way Dipsychus, for instance, would like to be. 
Nevertheless, The Spirit’s arguments project the semblance of a broadly considered 
conviction; it seems always familiar with Dipsychus’ protests, and ready with a 
defusing retort conveying their narrow particularity.
That is the high moral way of talking
I’m well aware about street-walking.
(1.3.97-98).
This rejoinder to Dipsychus’ description of “the flagrant woman of the street / Ogling 
for hirers, horrible to see” (1.3.95-96) offers a simple statement of the importance of the 
basic terms of persuasive definition.
Dipsychus’ dialogue is scattered with poetic formulations, proxied prayers for emotive 
affirmation, or touchstones at the very least, of order. Dipsychus’ relationship with 
these touchstones unravels dangerously on contact with The Spirit’s challenge to the 
terms of their authority. The longing to make a secret self-image vibrant and real which 
compels the sharing of these touchstones is thwarted by The Spirit’s dismantling of the 
conceptual relationships that Dipsychus seeks to have affirmed in this interaction. The 
worthiness of poetic stays and comforts seems challenged by the implications of this 
vulnerability. Touchstones do not dictate to the erratic and fallible human individual 
but exist as an extension of their desire; the value lies not in the poetic form but in the 
relationship that an individual forms with it.
The author of “Easter Day. Naples, 1849”, whether approached as Dipsychus or 
Clough,59 has organised himself and his environment into a form, through the 
expression of which he experiences a sense of liberation. “My brain was lightened 
when my tongue had said / Christ is not risen” (Dipsychus, 1.1.25-26). Dipsychus tells 
also how this realisation had come upon him in the street, “And did me good at once” 
(1.1.34).
59 In attributing “Easter Day. Naples, 1849”, along with fragments of Amours, to Dipsychus, Clough 
exhibits a compulsive propensity to qualify at distance. A discomfort at the prospect of sedentary self-
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Where they have laid Him is there none to say!
No sound, nor in, nor out; no word
Of where to seek the dead or meet the living Lord;
There is no glistening of an angel’s wings,
There is no voice of heavenly clear behest:
Let us go hence, and think upon these things 
In silence, which is best.
Is He not risen? No - 
But lies and moulders low -  
Christ is not risen.
(“Easter Day. Naples, 1849”, 147-56).
Dipsychus is exhilarated by his fledgling ability to throw off (or co-opt) the weight of 
the past, and also by the complementary propriety of speaking in accordance with the 
present, however confronting.60
Dipsychus’ verses generate an assurance which is genuine in its way but which 
nevertheless lacks the impervious universality of a principle distilled from a communal 
authority. As such this assurance survives on the strength of its emotional purchase; for 
Dipsychus this incorporates the proud sense that what convinces him is inherently 
convincing; his emotive clusters incorporate the nervous presumption that they 
command (or should command) universal approval. This presumption is swaddled in 
the abstract language of Dipsychus’ higher line, a store of formulae which neatly 
outflanks the disagreements of any merely worldly or particular objection.
D: . . . -  call you this a Cause? I can’t,
oh he is wrong, no doubt. He misbehaves. 
But is it worth so much as speaking loud?? 
And things more merely personal to myself 
Of all earth’s things do least affect myself.
affirmation leads him to temper consolations, whether his own or his characters’, with awareness of their 
contingency.
60 Containing these essentially uncomplicated and starkly distilled statements of the state of divine 
authority there is nevertheless an element in Clough’s shorter poems which anticipates and invites the 
refurbishing justifications which turn uncertainty back into faith. They exude a sense of wry certainty as 
to the fallibility of any proof or conviction, and an awareness of the inevitable opportunity for legitimate 
rejoinders permeates this expectancy. It is through this sense that Clough communicates the discord 
between intention and capability which is generated in these experiments with the language and 
credibility of ideological conviction. Clough’s impulse to destabilise his own authoritative voice does not 
diminish the poems’ capacity to deflate the epic tone of ideological discourse.
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S: Sweet eloquence -  at next may meeting 
How it would tell in the repeating!
I recognise -  and kiss the rod 
The methodistic voice of God 
I catch contrite that angel whine 
That snuffle human yet divine;
The doctrine own, and no mistaker,
Of the bland Philanthropic Quaker.
( 1.6. 145-57).
Dipsychus’ principles, preferences and presumptions are repeatedly undermined, as they 
are here, by The Spirit’s retorts; this habit persistently insinuates Dipsychus’ reliance on 
merely subjective images of “fact”, and the ostensibly general moral postures 
(subjectively approved) which these images appear to support (his condemnation of 
worldly contingency, for example). The disclosure of their inherently contestable 
nature is both legitimate and cynical, the disruption occurs as a reflection of Dipsychus’ 
prejudices but offers a new prejudice in its place.61
The speculative scepticism, for example, which Dipsychus both exercises and 
vents in his writings -
To please my own poor mind! To find repose, 
To physic the sick soul; to furnish vent 
To diseased humours in the moral frame.
(2. 1.33- 35).
- are dismissed by The Spirit as:
A sort of seton, I suppose,
A moral bleeding at the nose:
Hm; and the tone too after all 
Something of the ironical?
Sarcastic, say. Or were it fitter 
To style it the religious bitter?
(2. 1.36-41).
61 In Thomas Hardy’s Jude the Obscure, Jude Fawley demonstrates a comparable disposition when, 
having had his faith in the absolute authority of theological doctrines shaken, he funereally commits his 
religious texts to a grave in the garden. Since their aura of expert authority and legitimate command is 
tarnished Jude can find no place for any aspect of their teaching. Such dramatic gestures suggest a 
timorous naivete that can’t quite face up to or accept the anxieties of ambivalence and ambiguity, 
resorting instead to a histrionic indulgence of a distempered hostility towards the ambivalent world.
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Dipsychus’ writings suggest keepsakes, personal totems, but he seems unsure of their 
longevity. The Spirit attacks the credulous mawkishness of Dipsychus’ personalised 
stays, attacking his relationship to the method and authority of his poetry. “The 
shadows lie, the glories fall, / And are but moonshine after all”( 1.5.228-29). Tilting 
then at Wordsworth (1.5.256-61), The Spirit mocks the solely metaphoric credibility of 
lyricism, and its capacity to indulge a limitless mass of associations and formulas as 
foundations for the assertion of emotive fact: “Which and the sunset are bedfellows?” 
(1.5.261). Repeatedly throughout the poem, The Spirit points Dipsychus to his sources, 
Strauss, Berenger, Wordsworth and Goethe - “Trust me, I've read your German sage / 
To far more purpose e’er than you did” (1.5.88-89) - and thereby denounces his reliance 
on authorities and received hints even in the expression of his ‘inmost I’. “Not by one’s 
humour, which is the true truth” (1.4.37); the true truth, however, is just as likely a 
“pious rapture” (2.4.134) bom “by lucky chance / Of happier-tempered coffee” 
(2.4.132-33). But more importantly the “true truth” of one’s humour, aside from 
biological determination, is inseparable from the merely wishful and the repellent, the 
true truth cannot express itself without the terms that surround it because it has no 
substance in their absence, it is collaborative (or reactionary) not “received”. 
Dipsychus’ idealisation of the independent seifs capacity for fulfilment or genuine 
expressive uniqueness conveys the ritualised tunnel vision and assertiveness of the 
dogmatic infatuate. To Dipsychus’ mind the “dispassionate judgement” (1. 4.39) 
recommended by The Spirit is merely “vile consideration” (1.4.42).
The Spirit responds to Dipsychus’ initial panic in its presence (1.3.29-62) by stating that 
its manner, far from the corrupting influence it is charged with, is shaped by a 
therapeutic intention. It is determined to cure Dipsychus of an over-ripeness which is 
fast tending towards a poeticised non-existence, which requires that it also perform a 
catalytic role. By exploiting and provoking his ‘potential’ and aspirations The Spirit 
will induce a graduation in Dipsychus from one stage to another - “To play your pretty 
woman’s fool / I hold but fit for boys from school” (1.3.39-40) -  it guides Dipsychus 
towards a mark of mature capability which it has modelled in the image suggested by 
worldly savoir-faire.
The Spirit attempts throughout to familiarise Dipsychus with the nature of his 
urges, and the possible expressions or consequences of his desires. While directing 
Dipsychus’ stare towards the inadmissible provocations it avoids, The Spirit
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simultaneously challenges the legitimacy of the tender conscience’s self-perception. 
The persistence of Dipsychus’ pure repose relies on his ability to dismiss The Spirit’s 
emphasis on the “perfect show of girls” (1.2.33) as the solicitations of an “insidious 
lewdness” (1.3.23). In normalising the worldly world The Spirit’s deflations of 
Dipsychus’ overblown flights of pious dread seek to promote a reality in which the 
values and beliefs which support Dipsychus’ cherished ideals appear legitimately 
contested, and the human proportion of the transgressions he ponders is more accurately 
(though still strategically) ascribed.
O yes, you dream o f sin and shame 
Tm st me - it leaves one much the same 
- ‘T isn’t Elysium  any more 
Than what com es after or before:
But heavens! as innocent a thing 
As picking strawberries in spring. - 
You think I'm anxious to allure you.
M y object is much more to cure you[.]
(1.3.29-36).
In railing against the lost opportunities Dipsychus’ dreaminess has cost him The Spirit 
portrays his wastefulness as a crime against a natural order of which young ladies and 
young men, as much as any other creature, are a part. The Spirit carries on “With a hey 
and a ho, and a hey nonino”, evoking an innocent sexual idyll, “betwixt the acres of the 
rye”, featuring “pretty country folks” in “the pretty spring time” (1.3.126-31).62 Social 
interaction, regardless of sexual undertones and yet even more so because of them, is an 
immediate animal reality; disengagement from this is an affront to nature. Having 
argued the innocence of sexual activity, The Spirit appeals to Dipsychus in the rhetoric 
of duty, it begins to impress upon him the moral negligence of shying away.
Dipsychus’ anxieties for a possible future of irrelevance, irresponsible profligacy 
and instability propel his devotion to the wishful proposition of a dignifying absolute in 
obedience to which the fulfilment of his charge as a human being will be assured. In 
the Spirit’s image of Necessity he is now offered a form that takes the place of
62 A strategy that readily attaches itself to the problems of repression and overbearing “administration” of 
sexuality, as in Measure for Measure where prostitution out of hand sparks the hypocritical enforcement 
of the illegality of pre-marital sex. Claudio, condemned for his pre-marital affair, makes an unsuccessful 
appeal to the permissiveness implicit in the laws of nature and the open sexuality of bucolic idylls. The 
affected air of simplicity in both The Spirit’s and Claudio’s appeals invokes the strategic conclusion that 
human Law creates (or legislates) the perversions it then seeks to punish.
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omniscient divinity, requiring only that he affirm it as such by subjecting himself to the 
tide of laissez-faire. Fundamental to the Spirit’s persuasion though is the distortion of 
this subjection to fit the terms of Dipsychus’ wishful proposition. As the obligatory 
adjunct to ability or privilege, the virtuous multiplication of one’s “talents” haunts 
Dipsychus. Nevertheless, he seems far more concerned with maintaining the stock he 
starts with, the prospect that he might be responsible for a depletion or “fall” torments 
him fiercely. The essential uncertainty of risk and speculation (the foundations of much 
of Dipsychus’ anxiety), is answered and resolved in formulations like “life loves no 
lookers on” by the implication that commitment to Necessity and the time-stream is an 
act of approval and personal affiliation that will be reciprocated.
Who takes implicitly her will 
For these her vassall-chances still 
Bring store of joys, successes, pleasures.
But whoso ponders weighs and measures 
She calls her torturers up to goad 
With spur and scourges on the road;
He does at last with pain whate’er 
He spumed at first. Of such beware
(2.5.96-103).
It is, the Spirit notes, some wiser youth that succeeds with the girl. What kind of 
wisdom are we to suppose this is then? Superficial? Decadent? Or is it natural and 
harmless, innocent and proper? The fluidity of these esteemed distinctions reflects the 
contestable interpretation of morally loaded terms, the meanings of which are under 
challenge throughout Clough’s poem. The usefulness of these terms is not for 
establishing accord and fixed moral standards, but as ciphers through which individuals 
express, and potentially hone, their subjective impressions. In this context, “wiser” 
begins to suggest a comic inversion of Dipsychus’ implied definition: he no doubt 
considers himself wiser than his successful rival, but in The Spirit’s quip there is the 
seed already of a legitimate challenge and counter-claim to the qualities which confer 
“wisdom”.
Something of the ease and subsequent fragility of emotive conviction is apparent 
in The Spirit’s evaluation of Dipsychus’ abstract props and stays. Dipsychus’ 
consolation is genuine, but so is the sense of deprivation which necessitates it. ‘To 
cherish natural instincts, yet to fear them / And less than any use them” (2.4.109-10)
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while choosing in turn to “be consoled / With thinking one is clever”(2.4.111-12). The 
transformation from dissatisfied fear to the intellectual consolation of abstinence is 
effected on the strength of the proposition that an individually esteemed or simply 
approved order is present, in relation to which dissatisfaction can be redescribed in the 
language of virtue. The credibility of the approved order Dipsychus proposes, and, 
therefore, the suitability of his language of virtue, is readily shaken.
The Spirit asserts the inadequacy of Dipsychus’ terms, implicitly charging them 
with a reflexive dissembling which disguises their inability to reify the reality they lay 
claim to.
To bum forsooth for action, yet despise 
Forsooth, its accidence and alphabet^] 
Cry out for service, and at once rebel 
At the application of its plainest mles 
This, you call life, my friend, reality 
Doing your Duty unto God and man,
I know not what.
(2.4.118-24).
Dipsychus’ moral distinctions and preferences, The Spirit implies, are the result of a 
conceptual illiteracy for which his belief in the rights of “vain independentness” (2.5.36) 
is compensation and disguise. The Spirit works towards compelling Dipsychus to 
redefine his esteemed virtues in its lexicon, by disenchanting his own.
Dipsychus’ ideals are achieved through the self, or rather, affirmed therein. They 
are not, however, the organically assured internal convictions which they seem to him; 
this is one of The Spirit's most telling revelations. Alongside the reductive and 
trivialising explanations which The Spirit’s commentary offers, Dipsychus’ allegiance 
to the moral foundations of Christianity comes to seem a matter of circumstance, the 
receptacle of a mystic monastic appetite for devotion and surrender to a transcendent 
cause. His only justification, an individually purposeful commitment to socially 
uncommitted or purposeless “blank thought”, seems to him unfulfilling; potentially 
facile or selfish (it might be merely deluded self-indulgence), this uncommitted idealism 
does not fit the posture of devoted duty he had expected to adopt.
Is it a thing ordained then, is it a clue 
For my life’s conduct, is it a law for me
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That opportunity shall breed distrust 
Not passing until that pass.
(2.5.6-9).
Toying with this idea Dipsychus asks himself further, “How shall I then explain it to 
myself / That in blank thought my purpose lives[?]” (2.5.15-16). How, Dipsychus 
appears to wonder, can he formulate this intuition into an ethic, a story or personal plot, 
capable of satisfying his expectations of such. The actual facts of his “life’s conduct” 
suggest a directionless scepticism which is implicitly unsatisfactory to his aspiration 
towards the purposeful and prestigious affiliation to a higher line.
Dipsychus is briefly able to entertain the ambiguity (a stylised reflection of multiform 
truth) that imperfect knowledge, desire and reality make of moral equivocation: “What 
we call sin / I could believe a painful opening out / Of paths for ampler virtue” (2.4.42- 
44). At the same time, though, while his double-mindedness reflects his perception of 
multiple ethical possibilities, this is over-seen and made doubly problematic by feelings 
of responsibility to discern a single and unimpeachable certainty. It is this demand 
which is implicated in Dipsychus’ remonstration with his lack of conviction, “O double 
self! / And I untrue to both” (2.4.71-72), and which is behind the unconvincing 
organisation of this multiplicity into a selective qualification of the better and the worse 
self (1.3.6).
The Spirit seeks to dispute the underlying emotional self-image that nourishes 
Dipsychus’ Christian idealism by disrupting the associations and preferences this self- 
image projects as an affirming reality, supportive of its subjective insight. This 
projection is responsible for establishing the foundations and, therefore, the goals or 
“actions” of a dutiful existence. Dipsychus’ speech in the fourth scene of Part 2 seems 
genuinely bi-partisan (as are his arguments throughout Scene 3 for the virtue of either 
participating in, or refraining from, the mean world of petty actions). Point and 
counterpoint jostle together in genuine confusion, a condition which is notably absent 
from The Spirit’s shrewd engagement with ideas that might threaten its argument. 
Dipsychus expresses his preferences as possibilities (that is, tentative proposals) while 
their inadequacies and alternatives are voiced alongside. At times, “All is mean, / And 
nought as I would have it” (2.4.78-79), at others, “the vext needle perfect to her poles”
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(2.4.82). In what appears a commonplace fluctuation of mood the absolutism which 
Dipsychus deems incumbent on any worthy conviction gives him cause for febrile 
accusations. “O perfect, if ‘twere all. But it is not. / Hints haunt me ever of a More 
beyond” (2.4.38-39). With Dipsychus’ devotion to pure imperatives comes the 
propensity to “think indeed the perfect call / Should force the perfect answer” (2.4.63- 
64). The Spirit’s response erodes the solidity of the higher line, destabilising 
Dipsychus’ impression of the essential stability attainable through his ideals.
The Spirit’s allegedly didactic intentions are apparent in the tone of its committed 
deflation of Dipsychus’ faltering ethic. As the battle of analogies continues, The Spirit 
takes on the tone of an impatient school-master.
Up, then. Up, and be going. The large world 
The thronged life waits us. -
Come, my pretty boy,
You have been making mows to the blank sky 
Quite long enough for good. We’ll put you up;
Into the higher form. ‘Tis time you leam 
The Second Reverence, for things around.
(2.5.111-116).
Aside from undermining the particular ideas and images by which Dipsychus’ satisfied 
stasis is conceptually anchored, the tone and language of The Spirit’s curative “rough 
shake” are intended to corrupt them with a repellent immaturity. Such corruption aims 
to ensure that Dipsychus’ once proud posture of ideological protest becomes intolerably 
awkward. These corrosive associations fuse with Dipsychus’ fear of being “behind the 
world”, thereby registering a dismptive counterpoint to the ensemble of emotional 
associations which support his personal idealism. Alongside Dipsychus’ devotion to the 
idea of dutiful service and a sense of obligation as one of “Nature’s captains” (2.3.68), 
The Spirit renders Dipsychus’ prudence in the provoking image of “An o’ergrown baby, 
sucking at the dugs / Of Instinct, dry long since”(2.5.179-80).
The tone of this curative “rough shake”(2.5.109), is the self-assured superiority 
granted by a formulaic or readymade certainty (the domineering tone of an impatient 
schoolmaster). The Spirit speaks with an authoritative tone promising penetrating and 
particular insight; “yet as for you” is the prelude to further insult but it also asserts the 
seductive intimacy of a complicit audience. The intimacy of The Spirit’s insults 
capitalises on Dipsychus’ sense of dissatisfied division by recommending one particular
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prejudice as a source of clarity. The terms and images The Spirit invokes throughout 
belong to Dipsychus, they are drawn directly from his own array of negative and 
positive self-images and postures.63 Reason alone cannot save Dipsychus from The 
Spirit’s attack because reason admits the plausibility of its worldview. The poet’s uncle 
acknowledges, in the Epilogue, that though the poem contained “a great deal that was 
unmeaning, vague, and involved; and what was most plain was least decent and least 
moral”, The Spirit had said “much which if only it hadn’t been for the way he said it, 
and that it was he who said it, would have been sensible enough” .64
Dipsychus’ generalising instinct claims the abstract as a safe haven; it is the realm in 
which his discourse is most at ease, most expert. This is more properly a sense of 
expertise, based upon Dipsychus’ personal approval of abstract thought as an activity 
affording its subjects a dignity as absolute as the ideal of knowledge to which it is 
devoted. The Spirit’s relentless particularity forces Dipsychus to participate in a 
discussion which, logically, his faith would not suffer. In the course of this discussion 
the character of Dipsychus’ affiliation with the abstract changes as his own line of 
defence reveals that his faith is an article of personal approval and preference (for 
Dipsychus or the reader).
Simultaneously, though, there is a further “discussion” taking place; it involves 
the apparent inability of Dipsychus’ faith effectively to rest upon its own logical 
assurances, and therein his inability to dismiss the challenges that attend the “vile 
cravings” of a flesh and blood creature.
As a secular idealism, Dipsychus’ abstract code is vulnerable to The Spirit’s 
cynical sedition. While others live life, taunts The Spirit, Dipsychus will live in
63 The Spirit attempts continually to sour Dipsychus’ esteem for the habits necessitated by his idealistic 
unworldliness. To show the absurd inappropriateness in Dipsychus’ terms of evaluating his place and 
entitlements in reality: “To move on angels’ wings were sweet; / But who would therefore scorn his 
feet[?] / It cannot walk up to the sky / It therefore will lie down and die / Rich meats it don’t obtain at call 
/ It therefore will not eat at all. / Por babe! and yet a babe of wit. / But common sense? not much of it” 
(2.4.179-86). And of his devotion to discerning a pure inspiration -  “To see things simply as they are / 
Here at our elbows, transcends far / Trying to spy out at midday / Some ‘bright particular star’ which 
may, / Or not, be visible at night / But clearly is not in daylight” (2.3.168-73). Throughout the poem The 
Spirit challenges Dipsychus to admit that the distorted reflection of his ideological habits and convictions 
which it holds up to him registers the truth of his devotions. The discrepancy between this selectively 
distorted image and Dipsychus’ own self-conception are intended to provoke him to scorn and betray the 
allegedly defunct ideals: “This, you call life, my friend, reality / Doing your duty to God and Man” 
(2.4.122-23). The Spirit accepts the trajectory and intention of Dipsychus’ idealistic urges and 
commitment but shows him the Christian particulars and his personal application of them as quite in 
contradiction to the absolute order which it convinces him is inherent in secular capitalism.
64 Clough, Dipsychus, Epilogue, 3-11.
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imagined realities, building up “baseless fabrics of romance / And heroism upon historic 
sand” (2.4.116-17). And while burning “for Action”, he will “despise / Forsooth, its 
accidence and alphabet”, and baulk at the plainest rules of the service he cries out for 
(2.4.118-21). While The Spirit’s parodies of Dipsychus’ idealistic inertia seem justly to 
accuse him of a failure to match actions to words, they rely on a reductivist impatience 
with the ambiguous virtues of abstract thought.65 Although a cry for service 
incorporating or accompanied by resistance to its “plainest rules” does contain the 
possibility of hypocrisy, it might also convey sincere confusion or a genuinely 
scrupulous discrimination between desired and apparent gratifications. Throughout its 
attacks on Dipsychus’ preferences, The Spirit’s bombast drowns out the concerns which 
inform these eccentricities and holds them solely at the value of their superficial 
manifestation in public expressions which are unavoidably inchoate, speculative and 
vulnerable.
In the course of Dipsychus’ lament for a departed God (1.7.7-129) an assortment of 
traditional roles, vocations and consolations are set upon with a disdain for their merely 
partial truth. Dipsychus’ long rant suggests a reluctant and resentful acknowledgment 
of the grounds for The Spirit’s worldliness, alloyed with indignation at finding his idol 
incapable of supporting his position. Dipsychus is deprived of the kind of 
encouragement and approval which would galvanise his intellectual and emotional 
commitment to his abstract ideals into what he could consider a valid conviction. 
Dipsychus seems to consent to the implications of God’s death - “O pretty girl, who 
trippest along / Come to my bed, it isn’t wrong” (1.7.19-20) - but his reiteration of The 
Spirit’s catalogue of worldly virtues is invoked in a tone of sneering disapproval. The 
“damsels eager to be lovered” (1.2.46) for whom The Spirit touts, are still wed in 
Dipsychus’ mind to a prejudice which, denied recourse to “sin”, is maintained as a 
sense of personal (and therefore isolating) moral opposition. Dipsychus’ sullen disdain 
for worldly self-interest reduces The Spirit’s images of liberation to the “thin joys”
65 The Spirit claims its own rights to a certain higher line and code of propriety, in contrast to the way it is 
perceived by Dipsychus.
What? You know not that I too can be serious 
Can speak big words, and use the tone imperious;
Can speak -  not honeyedly of love and beauty,
But sternly of a something much like Duty?
(2.5.57-60).
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(1.7.122) that remain once the dissolution of mutual care and interest has stripped them 
of any dignifying depth of meaning.
0  Rosalie, my lovely maid
1 think thou thinkest love is true 
And on thy faithful bosom laid 
I almost could believe it too
The villainies, the wrongs; the alarms 
Forget we in each other’s arms 
No justice here; no God above;
But where we are, is there not love[?]
What? What? thou also go’st? For how 
Should dead truth live in lover’s vow[?]
(1.7.108-117).
Dipsychus begins to demonstrate the feelings of betrayal or desertion which later 
dominate his sullen submission to necessity. His inability to earn or sustain any 
external support or sympathy for a code he had considered absolute, god-given, leaves 
him hostile to and frustrated with the force he will submit to, and with the “silence” in 
the secular world of the authorities he had hoped would provide external support for his 
protest.
With the simple recollection of Dipsychus’ own habits, and with The Spirit’s flair 
for envisaging Dipsychus among other people (the scenario he disdains most), the 
particulars of the stolen child of heaven are reconstituted as the foibles of a feckless 
touring eccentric. The Spirit conducts its reductio ad absurdum on the associations by 
which Dipsychus has moulded stasis into a decisive poise.
Stay at Venice, if you will,
Sit musing in its churches hour on hour,
Cross-kneed upon a bench; climb up at whiles 
The neighbouring tower, and [kill] the lingering day 
With old comparisons. When night succeeds 
Evading, yet a little seeking, what 
You would and would not, turn your doubtful eyes 
On moon and stars to help morality.
(2.4.124-31).
Idealism has been cast as the brain-softening affiliation which marks “vague romantic 
girls and boys” (1.5.237). Dipsychus’ arrested development earns him the distinction of
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being addressed as “it”, a diminutive which is at once patronising, dismissive, and 
emasculating. And though neuter at present, The Spirit taunts Dipsychus with an 
eventual fall into sexuality: “The hapless prey / Of some chance chambermaid, more sly 
than fair” (2.4.142-3).
In The Spirit’s depiction, Dipsychus’ abstract rigour is portrayed merely as the 
solipsist’s mechanism of evasive self-preservation. Dipsychus’ isolation is given an 
emphasis which places consolation foremost as the determining factor of his table of 
virtues; The Spirit devalues Dipsychus’ association with earnestness, cleverness, 
heroism and duty (2. 4.104-47). The schema Dipsychus had considered an external 
ethical guide is disparaged as a collection of self-approved postures and self-affirming 
idiosyncracies. Dipsychus nests on himself in scrupulous deference to a specific end 
(virtue, salvation, purity), but this is simply disregarded, leaving the insinuations of 
solely circumstantial and personal motivations: “[T]o inhume / Your ripened age in 
solitary walks, / For self discussion”(2.4.105-07). The Spirit’s repetition of Dipsychus’ 
supplication to the “moon and stars” (lines 130-31 above) epitomises the deliberately 
literal approach with which The Spirit excludes the abstract associations that Dipsychus 
seeks to validate. The background from which Dipsychus’ emblems of purity draw 
their significance is simply not admitted, a restriction which reduces Dipsychus’ 
symbolic language to an absurdly discrepant fetishism or an arbitrary evasion.66 
Logically, mountains and stars have nothing to do with morality; their appearance in 
Dipsychus’ moral equivocations suggests, therefore, that they serve as totems of 
projected authority or as the arbitrary focus of a moral conscience undertaking evasive 
action (“O you shirk / You try and slink away” (2.5.121-22). Either way, the layers of 
metaphor which inform Dipsychus’ double-minded stasis are reduced, in The Spirit’s 
rendition, to a credulous dependence on forms that have no common substance. “Why 
will you fool yourself?” (2.5.123) The Spirit asks, “Why will you walk about thus with 
your eyes shut?” (2.5.124), deferring to the “self-made hues that float / On tight pressed 
pupils” (2.5.125-26). The Spirit has already attacked Dipsychus’ appetite for metaphor 
over fact, representation over reality, and its questions here contain an implicit
66 For providing an image of divine order, including such ideas as the music of the spheres and the 
various alignments of human significance in keeping with the Earth’s relation to the Sun and the Sun’s 
relation to some other centre, the arrangement of celestial bodies has a long standing resonance to 
spiritual concerns. Clinton Machann, in “ “The centre is no centre”: Astronomical Imagery in Clough’s 
Prose” (The Amoldian, 12, 1 (1984), 22-31), observes furthermore that cosmic imagery, “often appealed 
to Victorian writers dealing with themes of redefinition and uncertainty in social or religious vision in an 
age of transition from a religious apprehension of the universe to a scientific and secular one” (22).
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accusation. Dipsychus’ selective vision and “self made hues” sustain an accord 
between his particular perception of fact and his general expression of reality. 
Dipsychus, burrowing in his bedroom (2.4.137), is isolating and guarding his cherished 
“mouthful of air” (2.5.142) from “The strong fresh gale of life”(2.5.141) in which, 
asserts The Spirit, it will simply dissipate. Due to the nature of Dipsychus’ desired 
authority The Spirit’s judgement is right: Dipsychus is unable to value the symbolic and 
abstract protests implicit in his idealism. As simply a personal orientation to an 
ambiguous moral scene the values implicit in his ideals are useless because Dipsychus, 
dominated by his commitment to the kind of code and consolation provided by an 
external authority, cannot accept secular acts of moral discrimination as valid grounds 
for commitment. What he allows in their place though is a worldly travesty of the 
traditions this appetite embodies and perpetuates.
Again in scene 5, The Spirit’s policy is one of trivialisation; “making mows to the 
blank sky” (2.5.113) might well be what Dipsychus has been doing, but the material fact 
(which is all The Spirit will acknowledge) is again allowed to eclipse the underlying 
equivocations which determine Dipsychus’ deportment.
The “necessity” which The Spirit recommends is ultimately one of pessimism 
and pragmatism, subsequent to a denial of the prospect of any worthwhile inspiration. 
The sneering dismissal of hope and abstract commitment is similar to the cynical 
Christianity of Ivan Karamazov’s Grand Inquisitor, in each case ethical stagnation is the 
incidental price of an easy conscience.
Prate then of passions you have known in dreams 
Of huge experience gathered by the eye,
Be large of aspiration; pure in hope,
Sweet in fond longings, but in all things vague.
Breathe out your dreamy scepticism, relieved
By snatches of old songs; People will like that, doubtless.
Or will you write about Philosophy
For a waste far off may-be overlooking
The fruitful is, close by[?] Live in metaphysic,
With transcendental logic fill your stomach,
Schematise joy, effigiate meat and drink,
Or let me see, a mighty Work, a Volume,
The Complemental of the inferior Kant,
The Critic of Pure Practic; based upon
The Antinomies of the Moral Sense; for look you,
We cannot act without assuming x
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And at the same time y  its contradictory. 
Ergo, to act. People will buy that, doubtless.
(2.5.146-63).
The Spirit here sets its sights quite clearly on the specifics both of Dipsychus’ idealised 
self-conception and of the actual principles on which his abstinence maintains its status 
as a virtue. By way of an asserted contraction of the legitimate field of moral activity, 
justified by tone only, The Spirit marginalises Dipsychus’ equivocations. The 
transformation of Dipsychus ‘virtues’ from approbatory to pejorative categories is 
conducted with no engagement in the internal validity of Dipsychus’ argument, The 
Spirit simply presumes their irrelevance to the here and now. The dilemma which binds 
Dipsychus and The Spirit, the desire for and provision of objectively approved actions, 
reveals the trajectory of scepticism that is motivated by the prospect of rationally 
validating an absolute principle of action (as opposed, for instance, to guiding an
67individual decision).
By the end of the poem, The Spirit has turned Dipsychus’ feelings of resistance 
inside out, what had initially constituted a betrayal becomes an act of obedience to the 
“law” of human growth. The troubling implication of transgression against his ideal is 
evaded by a selective emphasis on those aspects of the trade which admit the image of 
dutiful acquiescence -  “Be it then thus: since that it must, it seems. / Welcome, o world 
henceforth; and farewell dreams” (2.7.20-21) - as opposed to individually initiated 
change. Beneath the surface of this concession therefore, Dipsychus avoids tarnishing 
the image of the ideal to which he had professed such a strong allegiance. He also, and 
more importantly perhaps, maintains an essentially similar posture of disinterested
67 Rather than acknowledging the unsettled fluid mass of secular moral abstraction as Claude ultimately 
does in his evocative analogy of a cormorant existence:
Ah, but ye that extrude from the ocean your helpless faces,
Ye over stormy seas leading long and dreary processions,
Ye, too, brood of the wind, whose coming is whence we discern not,
Making your nest on the wave, and your bed on the crested billow,
Skimming rough waters, and crowding wet sands that the tide shall return to, 
Cormorants, ducks, and gulls, fill ye my imagination!
Amours, IELiv.91-96.
I have discussed this passage in greater detail elsewhere. Dipsychus accepts the ambiguous dictates of 
worldly necessity to be the solid ground The Spirit depicts it as and consents to let himself ‘rest’ upon it. 
Dipsychus might as easily have been converted to Catholicism, perhaps, or a supernatural mysticism of 
some kind, though he would have still faced the problem of his worldly appetites. It is not surprising, 
though, that secular models which provide individuals with a sense of devotion to a cause greater than 
their own self-interest, such as socialism, do not appeal to Dipsychus: he requires an authority unsullied 
by the inadequacies of human intellectual induction.
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subservience which dilutes moral anxiety and allows him to rest on the solid ground of 
externally sanctioned conduct. The superficial change of emphasis (from transgression 
to obedience, as also with the Spirit’s confrontation of the sexual anxieties that 
dominate Part 1) is facilitated by Dipsychus’ willingness to perceive the Spirit’s law in 
the terms it offers him. These terms, after all, are tailored to Dipsychus’ desire for the 
ease and authority of commitment and action undertaken in subsequent accord between 
self-esteem and external approval. They are the seductive foundations of conservative 
and conventional ease of conscience, implicit in the world from which Dipsychus has 
previously been able to hold aloof. As his ideal begins to appear ambiguous and 
subjective, Dipsychus is forced, in spite of his continued emotional attachment and 
intellectual regard for the principles it embodies, to forego it. The compromised 
capacity of Dipsychus’ ideal to support his fidelity to it as an act of dutiful submission 
to an absolute, forces him to seek some creed that can. The possibility that Dipsychus 
might accept personal responsibility for the values his ideal previously authorised and 
sanctioned is anathema to his perception of the status and function of an abstract 
moral code.
It is plain that The Spirit’s “convictions” are as selective (and therefore as 
contestable) as it corrosively proves Dipsychus’ Christian idealism to be. Its claim to 
purvey an absolute mandate, though, is ultimately not founded in any singular or stable 
abstract virtue (“necessity” is the cipher it uses to gain its end), it is accountable solely 
for its capacity to “sell” the notion of an idealistic commitment to conformity. The 
Spirit speaks on behalf of accumulated norms - the commonplace values and 
conventions of impious middle-class materialism - from which Dipsychus has
/TO
deliberately and disdainfully (for the most part) held aloof. It extends an invitation to 
“join-in” which is not new to him but which had previously been easily silenced by a 
steadier faith. In expression, The Spirit’s principles are formed into whatever rhetorical 
devices are necessary to shift Dipsychus. The Spirit seeks out Dipsychus’ desire for 
certainty or “confidence” and uses it as the fulcrum to turn his relationship to the world. 
The Spirit’s moral position as such is not adequately definable in terms of its principles
68 At one point The Spirit throws Dipsychus’ perception of it - “This worldly fiend that follows you about 
/ The compound of convention and impiety / This mongrel of uncleanness and propriety” (2.5.48-50) -  
back in his face. This elliptical retort, reclaiming Dipsychus’ pejorative discrimination as the sign of his 
ignorance of new standards of propriety, presents a distilled example of The Spirit’s methods throughout 
the poem. The Spirit implies that Dipsychus’ disdain for “convention and impiety”, marks his values as 
outmoded, rather than marking the Spirit as base.
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(which are cynically hollow), but rather in relation to the imperative of gaining its end 
and the methodology this determines.
That Dipsychus does not counter The Spirit’s emotive strategies by undermining 
their particularities in kind is due partly to his maintaining the outward posture of faith, 
and partly to his awareness of the instabilities and ambiguities corrupting his previously 
assured point of resistance. The natural ambivalence which he begins to recognise 
wherever he seeks the support of supernatural authority, and which is the empirical first 
principle of secular individualism, merely serves Dipsychus as the formless background 
in which to locate a pattem capable of reaffirming the abstract virtues he maintains by 
preference but which are no longer ratified by higher powers. That this order is not 
forthcoming is the source of Dipsychus’ vulnerability to The Spirit’s cynical selectivity. 
In contrast to this selective persuasion, the distempered perceptions with which 
Dipsychus views a world abandoned by God effect a similar approval of the desirability 
of an extreme or absolute position. This sense of intermingled allegiance and 
abandonment generates the tension which determines the unpregnant pause. Promising 
an end to this uncomfortable state of equivocal rights and obligations, The Spirit binds 
Dipsychus to a false clarity.
Dipsychus’ devotion to the dignity of idealistic service provides the vital lever in 
The Spirit’s campaign to shift him from his idealistic nest. Like Don Quixote (or 
Conrad’s Lord Jim, whose honour code makes him predictable and vulnerable to 
exploitation by the cynical pragmatists, Cornelius and Gentleman Brown) such idealists 
are open to the abuses practised on them by individuals who do not share their ideals 
but nevertheless recognise their idealism as an easy point of exploitation. It is because 
of his idealism and his need for a platform of disinterested duty that Dipsychus 
surrenders the ideal he cherishes but cannot authoritatively qualify. He is no longer 
certain, not whether his otherworldly or Christian ideal is in itself valid, but whether it is 
pertinent to a changing world. Dipsychus’ ideal is remote, common practice is against 
it, but his inability to accept that the absolutes he desires do not exist (other than 
through the dignity independently invested in them as symbols) forces him to accept the 
law in which The Spirit, knowing his tastes, has idealised convention. To Dipsychus, 
convinced by The Spirit’s persuasion, submission no longer seems an abandonment of 
the ideal of dignifying subjection to a cause, but its only possible expression.
The Spirit manipulates Dipsychus’ need to invest his existence with a purpose 
which, if not higher as he would prefer, at least transcends mere personal desires and
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interests. The Spirit assures him that in serving “necessity” this is the case, and, though 
resentful and sullen, Dipsychus’ concession to mundane law also contains an element of 
relief. That Dipsychus’ particular personal desire is formed in the image of an 
abstemious ideal of disinterested service to a greater good adds an ironic element of 
travesty to his dutiful submission to The Spirit’s worldly image of an alternative mode 
of serving good through simple gratification of worldly requirements. The comforts of 
deferential subservience which he has become dependent on betray him to The Spirit’s 
false idealisation of acquiescence to circumstance.
The success of The Spirit’s arguments, in spite of their inherently contestable 
foundations, reflects furthermore the state of disrepair into which moral absolutism 
leads itself. Ultimately, The Spirit owes Dipsychus’ commitment to the contingent 
strictures of Necessity to his approval of the absolute obligation it has been presented 
as. The reverence for duty nurtured by his own “Most High” authority drives him 
dizzily into a paradoxical act of treacherous devotion. Dipsychus’ assertion that “How 
much soe’er / I might submit, it must be to rebel” (2.6.58-59), strikes The Spirit as 
special pleading through which he is “working out, his own queer way” (2.6.96), how to 
let go of one idea of duty for another without incriminating himself as a traitor, or his 
past ideals as hollow. Dipsychus’ situation reflects the difficulties of moral 
equivocation undertaken by the individual idealist in the absence of clear certainties. 
Under the influences of The Spirit’s fabricated semblance of moral certainty, these 
dilemmas or choices are subsumed into a sacrifice which is undertaken as a dutiful 
resignation to an undesirable but apparently legitimate new ordinance. As the coercive 
pressure of the world, or as the projected inspiration of unconscious appetites, the 
success of The Spirit’s arguments reflects the problematic dependence of “rational” 
foundations of absolute authority on a willingness to accept a false currency of reason.
In the secular and ambivalently natural world, abstractions such as honour, justice 
and morality lose the clear parameters guaranteed by divine sanction. Nevertheless, 
such abstractions remain conceptually strong as tools for establishing secular codes. In 
both Claude’s and Dipsychus’ quests to affirm a stable hierarchy of proprieties, though, 
an anxious dependence on external absolutes prevails and renders any contestable order 
of meaning unsatisfactory. At the same time, though, the context and tone of Claude’s 
negating acuity offer insights into the role played by abstract ideas of tmth or higher 
meaning in individuals’ relationships with an ambivalent world: the idea provides the
174
necessary support for a kind of conduct without which moral agreement would be 
impossible.
Once the realisation is made that no legitimate absolute position exists to 
disparage these finite choices, or otherwise recommend effective action, stable moral 
codes can be intellectually approved and chosen while also admitting their partial and 
particular credibility. It is the absolutists’ failure or refusal to make this concession, 
that renders their devotions to morality and truth so problematic, angst-ridden, and 
potentially dangerous in the natural or secular world.
Deep Waters
Neither Dipsychus nor The Spirit represents an ethic capable of a purely rational 
refutation of opposing convictions. Together, Dipsychus and The Spirit demonstrate 
how false truths result from any argument which, in spite of this limitation, aims at 
establishing a constant and certain position (a limitation representative of the field of 
abstract equivocation after the loss of a divine ordering presence). Dipsychus seeks 
approval for the code with which he resists the impositions of upper-middle class 
careerism and the conventions which idealise material contingencies of life. The Spirit, 
however, challenges Dipsychus’ sense of duty with a version of reality in which his 
only moral path is to abandon the ideals on which this code is founded. Dipsychus 
requires proof, his modem conception of faith incorporates an empirical responsibility 
in reaction to the kinds of arguments raised against it and in order to assure himself of 
religion’s worthiness of devotion. The empirical truth, though, as Dipsychus recognises 
and acknowledges, is that divine authority is open to query, and its tmths and laws 
appear accordingly tenuous. In his dutiful esteem for the role of external authority, 
Dipsychus is susceptible to the false certainties provided by The Spirit, and is 
compelled, willingly though resentfully, to deny his ideals. Given that he cannot 
convince himself of their general significance beyond his own contingent affirmations 
of their worth, Dipsychus will not, or cannot, grant his ideals a role in his relationship 
with reality. Through his desire for absolute certainty Dipsychus is doubly duped. He 
is forced to give up his ideals essentially because he cannot grant them meaning or 
value solely as subjective acts of engagement with concerns that transcend his 
subjectivity.
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The implication of the interaction between Dipsychus’ vulnerable and ultimately 
negligent absolutism, and the false authority the Spirit conjures to exploit it, conveys 
implications common to Clough’s work: the inability to locate common absolutes is 
intrinsic to the secular world; devotion to the idea of absolutes, whether as a critical 
quest to verify one, or in dutiful desire to serve any authority that appears in their 
image, results in isolation, delusion and dissatisfied hostility towards reality and others. 
Uncommitted ambiguity appears to offer the only rationally unimpeachable position or 
vantage point. However, the practical necessity of moral orientations requires that 
individual choices be made from a variety of credible possibilities, and that they be 
made while recognising that any one of these choices involves an accepted disregard for 
the valid but incompatible considerations implied in the alternative possibilities. It is 
Pyrrhonism galvanised with necessity to bring about choices aware of the philosophical 
or abstract structures they have breached, and more importantly why they have done so. 
As long as choice, or decisive appraisal (work or starve), is admitted, rather than being 
wrong-headedly externalised and dignified as duty to a law, the purity of the 
uncommitted ambiguity it proceeds from remains as the foundation of individual 
responsibility for participating in agreement.
In the course of “special pleading” (2.6.93) through which Dipsychus hopes to 
extricate himself from affirming the responsibilities of common commitment, he finally 
discovers a form which serves the purpose: the kidnapped child of heaven, submitting to 
rebel. The image serves Dipsychus, but it also serves The Spirit; it facilitates 
Dipsychus’ consent to acknowledge the “predestined figure” of submission, which, 
regardless of Dipsychus’ rationalisations, is the very outcome The Spirit had intended 
for him (2.6.92-99). Dipsychus’ most compelling need is clearly revealed in this 
salvaging act, he must feel himself aligned with a certain and certifiable right. For The 
Spirit to call him Joseph and Don Quixote (1.3.135) at the start is one thing, but with the 
doubt engendered by The Spirit’s insinuations that his virtue has been the delusion of a 
chivalry “That turns to nothing all” (1.3.137), his anxiety that this chivalry might 
actually brand him “infatuate” drives Dipsychus where The Spirit chooses. Dipsychus’ 
unresolved uncertainty of the credibility of Christian morality in the absence of God, is 
agitated by the emotional and psychological discomfort of his uncommitted limbo and 
his remoteness from any external provision of moral support. The pivot of his idealism, 
ever-vulnerable, is the proper allegiances and conduct of the enlightened elite. This is 
why John Holloway, in The Proud Knowledge, sees Dipsychus as representing a turning
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point in the quest narrative, wherein necessity and the everyday appear to triumph over 
agnostic allegiance to absolutes.69 Abstract moral equivocations aside, Dipsychus must 
earn his bread, and can no longer call on established truths, conventions or vocations to 
shelter him from this necessity. What Dipsychus had considered an actual link and 
guide to a greater meaning is persuasively presented to him as an internally contained 
and sustained impression of meaning. Dipsychus’ declaration, “I come into deep 
waters / Where no ground is” (2.5.106-7), announces his awakening to the aqueousness 
he has been trained to avoid.
69 John Holloway, The Proud Knowledge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977). In The Proud 
Knowledge, Holloway suggests that Dipsychus announces a reversal in the standards of validity of quests 
for absolute meaning. “The Mephistopheles-figure no longer leads the hero towards even an ignis fatuus 
of truth. It nudges him contemptuously away” (149). Thereby reflecting, Holloway implies, a cultural 
dismissal of the heroic status to which such quests for abstract absolutes had previously registered a 
claim. Holloway suggests that “[w]hat is significant from the standpoint of the quest-poem is simply that 
Clough is able to use the Faust legend, long a major vehicle for exploring the myth of the quest and its 
glories and its dangers, as if it had no such provenance” (148-49). Without an awareness of this 
provenance, though, such an exploration would be meaningless; it is the fundamental context of any 
comment the poem makes in relation to this myth. Similarly, Clough’s poem depends upon this 
provenance as the provokingly inadequate background to its depiction of the complex friction which 
permeates the secular dialogue between idealism and worldly engagement. Holloway makes Clough’s 
poem seem implicitly to affirm the path of Dipsychus’ reluctant conversion. That Mephistopheles no 
longer offers the diabolical temptation towards forbidden knowledge but rather, “a brisk and cynical, even 
callous, dismissal of all such nonsense” (149), is an accurate enough reflection of The Spirit’s modus 
operandi but seems to neglect the relationship to Dipsychus’ particular affinities for which this method is 
formed. Nevertheless, the apparent success of Mephistopheles’ “dismissal of all such nonsense” suggests 
to Holloway a shift away from any tangible justification of abstract quests, a suggestion which seems 
affirmed in Dipsychus’ reluctant submission to worldliness. But Clough’s depiction of an unravelling in 
the quest for absolutes is concerned with the particular fundamental predicates this quest had typically 
been guided by, and which had become dangerously retrograde, rather than with the quest for knowledge 
itself. Such quests are not shown by Clough to be meaningless or superfluous, rather these quests are 
merely in need of a clarification of the roots from which they stem and the purposes which they can and 
do serve.
70 In The Audience in the Poem (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1983), Dorothy 
Mermin suggests that the “casual”, “flexible” and familiar voice Clough uses in Amours, “asserts its 
rights as poetry largely by demonstrating that the romantic, lyrical tradition it intends to displace cannot 
be sustained in the everyday world. But this demonstration is not cynical, or even particularly sad. For at 
the end the poem offers us, unambiguously if rather quietly, the assurance that the modem world affords 
high and serious subjects for a new poetry” (126). When, though, did the lyrical tradition assert this 
position in the real world? Don Quixote did not prosper, and epic gestures were surely always recognized 
as such; real in their way but not “everyday”.
Mermin’s assertion, like Goode’s, and in keeping perhaps with Claude’s assertion of the 
ascendancy of “must” over “will”, suggests that Clough’s poetry demonstrates that the singular authority 
of a particular type of language has become obsolete in relation to a more thorough awareness of the 
essential purpose it serves. That the romantic lyrical tradition which, according to Mermin, is not 
sustainable alongside the poem’s rendition of the everyday, misconstrues the scenario Clough presents. 
As, for instance, with the comparison Robert Micklus makes in “A Voyage of Juxtapositions: The 
Dynamic World of Amours de Voyage” (Victorian Poetry, 18 (1980), 407-14), between lyric and letter, 
asserting that the contemporary everyday flexibility of the latter succeeds at the expense of the rigid 
delimitations of the former. Similarly in Dipsychus the persuasive success of The Spirit is not an 
affirmation of the paramount claims of necessity but rather a dramatisation of the fate of idealistic 
conviction in the absence of a shared or reliable source of authority.
177
Dipsychus’ declaration refers to the same state of “engagement” recommended 
in The Spirit’s encouragement, “Won’t you find it pleasant / To own the positive and 
present / To see yourself like people round / And feel your feet upon the ground” 
(2.7.81-4). The two statements reflect the impressions allowed by the selective 
predicates of Dipsychus’ and The Spirit’s respective terms of argument. While 
intellectually consenting to the new “law” conveyed by The Spirit, Dipsychus’ 
emotional state reflects his feeling of surrender to chaos.
Clough’s Mephistopheles is dealing with a naive but intelligent individual. Dipsychus’ 
double-mind is formed with a characteristically deft observation and imitation of the 
inflections of internal dialogue, such as is reflected in Clough's “Thesis and Antithesis”, 
and in many other poems whose fertility is not fully evident in isolation from the 
complementary “second thoughts” Clough often provides in companion pieces. These 
alter-images inevitably register the inadequacy of any single authoritative position, 
making gestures towards the abundance of independently legitimate alternatives that 
colonise the moral void in the absence of an external authority, and towards the inability 
of these gestures to sustain any attempt at arrogating the role of a lost authority.
In Dipsychus Continued, we see how disappointment with reality has been stored 
up for Dipsychus through The Spirit’s manipulation of Dipsychus’ need to feel aligned 
with unequivocal “good”.71 His ready reversion to the disquiet which his successful 
worldly career had seemed to resolve reflects the tenuous ability of the real, as of the 
ideal, to provide absolutely satisfactory blueprints of conduct and purpose. Clough
71 Dipsychus Continued was never finished, it is a short fragment in which a much older Dipsychus (thirty 
years have passed since Dipsychus submission to The Spirit) appears disillusioned both with the 
successful legal career and family life which his submission to The Spirit’s law of necessity has afforded 
him (see: “Dipsychus Continued”, The Poems o f Arthur Hugh Clough, ed. F.L. Mulhauser (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1974), 294-299). Dipsychus is visited, in his chambers, by a woman from his 
past. It is implied that in his submission to The Spirit’s pandering for necessity, Dipsychus had also 
relaxed his commitment to resist the casual sexual activity he so clearly hankers for in Dipsychus. 
Though he does not recognise her, the woman who visits Dipsychus tells him they were once lovers and 
that he fathered her child; she is not blackmailing him or seeking a handout, she merely wants him to 
acknowledge her. Dipsychus sends her away and starts to confront the callousness and apathy which has 
been nurtured and normalised through his “idealistic” submission to necessity. When Dipsychus makes 
the woman leave, she sets a deadline for his last chance to meet her request; the fragment, though, ends 
before the time arrives. Her role parallels, to some degree, the visitation of Goethe’s Faust by the ghost 
Care. Care challenges Faust to consider the damage his developments have necessitated and the lives he 
has effected; to consider, in short, the cost of his egocentric commitment to his ideal world. Dipsychus’ 
visitor informs him: “You called me Pleasure once, I now am Guilt” (IV. 19). The visitation forces him to 
reflect on the terms of his bargain with necessity. In so doing he appears to approach the possibility of 
recognising that the commitment which he had convinced himself he “must” make, merely represented a 
preference which had been unpalatable and inadmissible to his ideals, but which had nevertheless seduced 
his desire for certainty and stability.
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therein carries out a characteristic interruption of any simple polarisations which his 
poems might be seen initially to recommend.
Clough’s diminished Faust legend does not simply favour the dismissal of 
metaphysical and abstract questing in favour of a materialistic existence. Exploring 
Dipsychus’ initial preferences, and their erosion by The Spirit’s persuasive assertions, 
Clough’s poem ultimately approves neither one nor the other; it reflects rather the 
process by which temptation, doubt, confusion and desire, establish certainty out of an 
ambiguous and plentiful chaos of conflicting ideas. Beyond disrupting the traditional 
quest poem’s alignment to higher truths, Dipsychus presents a mode of conversation 
between abstract and contingent realities which exposes the implicit instability of 
ostensibly absolute convictions distilled from a conceptual horizon lacking a shared 
external authority.
The Faustian compromise can never deliver the kind of absolute satisfaction 
which the idealist typically craves. “You drive us into action as our duty. / Then action 
persecutes and tortures us” (“Sa Majeste Tres Chretienne”, 104-05 ); this regret for an 
unsatisfactory life of regal duty takes the relationship between dutiful service and living 
satisfaction for granted. Without the external credibility of the “you” whom this 
complaint addresses this presumption is one of the “sillier savings” which makes a fool 
of the present. Where preference and choice are not perceived as sacrifice, compromise 
or trade, but rather as obedience to an external principle, the expectations that a 
satisfactory outcome will be dispensed remain. This emotional dimension, on which the 
idealist mindset unwittingly thrives, maintains a hangover of dissatisfaction in those 
“new certainties” which, while eschewing the substance of ethics based on external 
authority, nevertheless pander to the needs it has nurtured.
While bracing himself against the momentum of The Spirit’s idealisation of 
necessity, and at the same time preparing himself to accept its goal, Dipsychus admits, 
“Draw the line where you will it will exclude / Much it should comprehend” (1.6.81- 
82). From a purely abstract stance then, there can be no reason to draw such a line. But 
Dipsychus’ conviction in his right to maintain this stance has faded, and contemplating 
- a life among other people he accepts the line must be made. Dipsychus’ approval of 
necessity over the “fancy” his ideals have been reduced to by The Spirit, his dutiful 
surrender to idealised reality, is in turn denied absolute approval (as representing, for
72 Clough, “5a Majeste Tres Chretienne” (1849-50), Clough - Selected Poems, ed. J.P. Phelan (London 
and New York: Longman, 1995), 252-56.
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instance, an illuminated triumph over ignorance) and, therefore, the mandate of a certain 
utility. But the dutiful surrender of his own ideals is not afforded the satisfying 
certitude stressed by The Spirit in its seductive advocacy of the ideal propriety of a 
committed approval of convention. What there is of Dipsychus Continued suggests 
Clough’s intention to reiterate the perpetual flux in which the self orientates itself to 
finite morality, and the incompatibility to this flux of narratives that seek their 
validation in the closure of absolute certainty. Rather than simply reflecting the value 
of his particular decision in a particular either/or situation, Dipsychus’ problematic 
career is a manifest repercussion of the false polarisation of a naturally ambiguous 
moral scene, through which the Spirit had compelled his commitment to a worldly 
existence.
Claude and Dipsychus are unable to verify their own moral and abstract impulses 
in the terms their idealisms (or their expectations regarding the terms they idealise) 
make available to them. This inability reflects the perpetuation of outmoded standards 
of truthfulness in which Claude’s ideals had previously participated. The potency 
Claude expects is the potency abstract truths previously exerted as components of a 
divine equation. However, unto themselves these “truths” are no longer direct 
evocations of authority and are required to become self-qualifying utilities. Like the 
sillier savings of Rome the traditional language of abstract idealism makes fools of 
uncritical modem disciples.
The body of Clough’s work coheres as a warning against resolving legitimate 
sources of uncertainty into a falsely unified authority (thereby obscuring both the 
largeness of the world and the pitfalls in it). In place of this resolution, Clough’s 
renditions of the ideological scene, Dipsychus in particular, encourage the 
acknowledgment that each decisive approval of an affinity reflects the conscious 
acceptance of a trade or compromise.73
7j In “Clough’s Self-consciousness”, The Major Victorian Poets: Reconsiderations, ed. Isobel Armstrong 
(London: Routledge, 1969), 253-74), Barbara Hardy celebrates the “tempered feeling” which, she 
suggests, is characteristic of Clough’s work. “Exposed to the temperate reason, and so strengthened, not 
explained away but not isolated and segregated from critical thought” (268). This tempered feeling is the 
source of an emotional health and clarity implied particularly by, though not attained in, Amours and 
Dipsychus.
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CHAPTER 5 - A D ignified O ccupation
The problems which transcendent idealisms, whether religious or political, encounter in 
reality are intertwined with an array of different though fundamentally related problems 
of thought and conduct. To go into these interconnections to the extent which they 
warrant well exceeds the possibilities of a single thesis; merely to note their existence, 
though, would diminish the vitality of the picture I hope to provide. I shall attempt in 
the following section to convey at least something of the breadth and complexity of the 
perplexities intermingled with uncertainty of divine authority, and to flesh out some 
representative particularities.
In the nineteenth century, notions of the autonomy and objective equality of selves were 
still relatively new (both as a political proposition and as an implication of evolutionary 
facts), a modem condition around which one could expect acts of encoding, 
incorporating its necessities and imperatives, to take form. By necessities and 
imperatives I mean those sentiments or values which mould it into an area of conscious 
and therefore manifest concern; a subject of aspiration and application; or merely the 
codifying of the new agenda which it appears to imply into an overt form available for 
public consumption. These acts occur concurrently with the very manifestations that 
provoke them. As such they necessarily represent a hybrid image wherein a new 
experience is recorded and possibly re-experienced in the adapted terms of the old.
In their depictions of individuals deprived of external faith, Clough and 
Dostoevsky each emphasise these individuals’ awareness of their consequent 
responsibility to organise their own individual moral preferences and self-image well (in 
recognition, for instance, of participating in a moral sphere or discourse that transcends 
their particularity), alongside the daunting feelings of confusion, inadequacy and stifling 
caution which this responsibility imposes. The theoretical proposition of a liberation 
from authority opens up a daunting field of possibilities and choices to the individual. 
In Dostoevsky’s works, in particular, characters deprived of any external guidelines or 
ideals frequently feel themselves entitled (or are compelled) to maintain a self-image at 
odds with what the reader can perceive as their actual nature and the limitations of their 
actual circumstance.
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To many intellectuals and idealists the apparent marginalisation of abstract ideals from 
the realisable directives of modem moral engagement suggested the extinction of a fund 
of dignifying and unequivocal directives, analogous to a chivalric code. Given the lost 
sanctity of the social roles which these characters gravitate towards (in particular their 
disillusion with the church as a worthy vocation), employment and worldly necessities 
provoke feelings of confrontation, opposition and, typically, superfluity in relation to 
the interests of their immediate community.
It is significant that the characters on whom I am focusing belong loosely to a 
class with a strong code of dutiful service which, in Russia, had recently been freed 
from the regimentation of military career, 1 and in the rest of Europe from an almost
1 Alexander Herzen, in Childhood, Youth and Exile (1852-53), observes a similar opening out of the 
possibilities and, therefore, the choices and concerns, accompanying education in Russia. In Herzen’s 
youth, idealism was stirring:
The formalism of theological training and Polish indolence had alike disappeared, and 
had not yet given place to German utilitarianism, which applies culture to the mind, 
like manure to a field, in the hope of a heavier crop. The best students had ceased to 
consider learning as a tiresome but indispensable byway to official promotion; and the 
questions which we discussed had nothing to do with advancement in the Civil service. 
Childhood, Youth and Exile (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 94-95.
Herzen’s enthusiastic reflections on the freedom to pursue higher learning for its own sake, rather than as 
the qualifications for a particular career, is paralleled by a more equivocal depiction in the proud 
declaration of Griboyedov’s Chatsky (the titular hero of Chats Icy or The Misery of Having a Mind (1823), 
The Government Inspector and Other Russian Plays, trans. Joshua Cooper (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 
Penguin, 1990), 125-213).
Chatsky: People can breathe more freely,
There’s no rush now to join the regiment of buffoons.
Famusov: The things he says! And so pat with it all!
Chatsky: To yawn at influential patrons’ ceilings,
To be seen and not heard, to kick one’s heels, fetch chairs,
To pick up handkerchiefs ...
Famusov: He’s on the verge of preaching liberty!
Chatsky: People who travel, people who live in the country...
Famusov: He doesn’t recognize Authority!
Chatsky: People who work for the job, not to please others...
Famusov: I wouldn’t ever have those gentlemen allowed 
In gunshot range of Petersburg or Moscow.
Chatsky, Act 2, 149.
In Chatsky, the misery of having a mind implicitly involves existing in impotent awareness of the 
hypocrisy and flattering delusions on which convention maintains the genteel stability of middle class 
pretension to dignity.
And now suppose that one of us,
That one young man is found who doesn’t tout for jobs,
Who hasn’t any use for rank and office,
But thirsts for knowledge, set on study;
Or else, suppose the Lord has raised in him a spirit
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implicit affiliation with the church. The attitudes and expertise of these individuals are 
no longer bound to or associated with a particular professional outlet or position in a 
regulated social structure. Simultaneously, though, outside the avenues conventionally 
laid out for them these attitudes and this expertise (literacy, abstract critical thought, 
scepticism, idealism and theoretical reflection, for example) appear of limited pragmatic 
use.
In addition to the range of choices available to the educated individual, or 
theoretically attainable by them, they face an absence of any authoritative directive 
through which to fix upon a particular duty or vocation. Idealistic individuals feel 
themselves required to choose from a variety of alternatives, but cannot recognise, and 
therefore cannot defer to, any authoritative criteria beyond their desires, preferences or 
subjective attempts at objectivity.
In relation to the roles favoured by transcendent idealists’ notions of dignity and 
by their implicit tables of virtues, participation in the workaday world often seems a 
demeaning burden. “We must eat”, observes Dipsychus, before solacing himself with 
the petulant: “Yet I could deem it better too to starve / And die untraitored” .* 2 3 The 
aversion to the workaday world exhibited by Dipsychus, Claude, and Raskolnikov 
reflects a tendency among idealistic intellectuals of the period to feel that worldly 
participation is somehow a betrayal of then better instincts and of their potential to
3provide their community with more valuable service.
The apparent necessity of banal drudgery in the workforce, and unresolved 
concerns over the worthiness of faceless public service propose problems for these 
characters, problems which are exacerbated by their persisting esteem for abstract and 
unworldly commitment to an idealised realm of disinterested inquiry.
It is an easier matter for us contemplative creatures,
Us, upon whom the pressure of action is laid so lightly:
Burning for beauty and creative art -  
They’ll cry at once ‘Fire, murder, thieves!’
And he’ll get called a dreamer! Dangerous!
Chatsky, Act 2, 157.
With the lesser regimentation of the purposes of higher education, the kind of galling dependency which, 
for example, makes Goethe’s Weither (who is educated but unprovided for) so irascible, is transferred 
from the patron to the individual’s unmediated responsibility to ratify their subjective self-opinion by 
earning its equivalent worth directly in the theoretically open market of liberal individualism.
2 Clough, Dipsychus, 2.6.61-62.
3 Similar dilemmas are faced by many of Chekhov’s gentlefolk in the waning of the landed classes’ 
privileged and specialised roles in the structure of Russian society.
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We discontented indeed with things in particular, idle,
Sickly, complaining, by faith in the vision of things in 
general
Manage to hold on our way . . .
{Amours, ILxiv.307-311).
Claude and Dipsychus disparage merely worldly pragmatism in deference to what they 
feel is both an obligation and right to serve a higher order of pragmatism which often 
requires them to act against their material needs and personal interests. (Dipsychus’ 
suggestion that starvation might be preferable to compromising his ideals through 
adherence to the necessities of a worldly existence, expresses what would be, in the 
terms of his ideal, an extreme but nevertheless pragmatic choice4). Such 
disparagements of a disenchanted reality, though, follow a recent history of rhetorical 
attitudes stressing the theoretical potential (even the right) of any individual, regardless 
of birth, to engage in actions and attitudes of epic significance.5 Dipsychus’ disillusion 
with his employment opportunities is not merely an aversion to tying up papers; it 
reflects a feeling that he has arbitrarily been denied an opportunity to live his life in 
deference to anything he could consider a higher purpose.
Aesthetic affinity for the forms and rituals of faith nurtures much in the religious 
disposition that, while still gamering emotional approval, had been rationally proven 
obsolete.6 Such affinities offer an alluring contrast to the resented reality of an
4 Such pragmatism is at the foundation of individuals’ commitment to and justifications of doctrines of 
violent revolution and terrorism as well as of idealistic self-sacrifice. Dipsychus’ essentially half-hearted 
gesture to this kind of commitment to pragmatically doing whatever is necessary to comply with the 
terms of one’s ideal, is pleasantly pliable, pleasantly disposed to compromise, it shows his position in- 
between the contradictory tides of the absolutist worldview he has inherited and an inchoate awareness of 
the inadequacy and impracticability of such worldviews.
5 Hegel’s world historic figure, and his stress on the pro-active role of humans in making rather than 
merely experiencing the epochal upheavals of history, provides the most striking $nd influential of such 
notions. Though Hegel’s world-historic figures are proposed as rare and intrinsically superior 
individuals, the notion that History was subject to the influence of individual wills offers an invitation to 
think of every individual existence as its own historical project, with the right to will itself into a 
particular form. As I have also noted, the influence of the democratic principles and philosophical 
justifications associated with the French Revolution offers a similar justification and even encouragement 
of ambitious self-improvement. If one is dissatisfied with one’s place, these principles imply, one has as 
much right as any other to act on the world in order to attain the place or rank one feels suited to. This is 
true, perhaps, but at the same time this right is not one that exonerates any individual of the actions 
through which they go about remedying their dissatisfaction.
6 John Heath-Stubbs, in The Darkling Plain: A Study of the Later Fortunes of Romanticism in English 
Poetry from Darley to W.B. Yeats (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1950), describes a similar tendency, 
which he associates with Arnold and Clough, as the mark of the “wistful unbeliever”. The wistful 
unbeliever is “unable to square his intellectual convictions with the traditional faith he has lost, whose 
passing he continually mourns” (111). Heath-Stubbs goes on, rather troublingly, to assert that this is a
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uncertain moral scenario in which one must choose pragmatic methods of serving 
merely partial ideals, rather than existing in a state of noble acquiescence to a higher 
power.
Dipsychus’ belief in the aristocratic prestige of unworldly spirituality, and his 
desire for chivalric surrender to service of his ideal, moulds and supports a posture of 
opposition to everyday conventions and, for him, justifies his disdain for the savoir- 
faire of worldly careerism.
On vile consideration. At the best 
With pallid hotbed courtesies to forestall 
O ne’s native vernal spontaneities 
And waste the priceless moments of the man 
In softening down grimace to grace.
(1.4.42-46).
But there is a wider horizon to Dipsychus’ position: his arguments, both against worldly 
commitment and for his own unworldly idealism are surrendered equally to the ritual of 
rational debate and justification (or semblance thereof) which he enters into with The 
Spirit. Dipsychus’ convictions then, are in a state of fraught equilibrium between two 
opposed ideologies: he favours one dogma but accepts that he cannot justify it as he 
would like; consequently, while he argues strongly for the sanctity of his ideals, he 
remains dutifully open to any system that can rationally and objectively be proven to 
represent a higher authority.
Dipsychus weighs up his conflicting duties to abstraction and worldly cares in a 
world that seems newly dominated by inescapable forces of materialism. Unlike Eliot’s 
Prufrock, who wonders, “Should I, after tea and cakes and ices, / Have the strength to 
force the moment to its crisis?”,* 7 Dipsychus exists at a point of more direct hostility 
between the virtues of heroic certainty and the anti-hero’s resilient choice of finitude.
sentimental state of mind which, due to its inherently conflicted nature, is incapable of producing good
poetry.
7 T.S. Eliot, “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock”, Collected Poems 1909-1935 (London: Faber & 
Faber, 1958), 11-15. John Goode has suggested that the comparison of Clough with Eliot is “irrelevant” 
due to Clough’s refusal to grasp after “surviving fragments of tradition in a culturally sterile world” 
(Goode, “Amours de Voyage: The Aqueous Poem”, 296). In “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock”, the 
poem typically cited in this comparison, Prufrock’s expression of the shifting foundations of certainty and 
self-expression register the same kind of disorientation, and unreliability of traditional frameworks, that 
Claude struggles with in Amours. Prufrock is perhaps just a little less surprised by the prospect of 
acknowledging the world to be a place of confusion and indefiniteness.
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The age of instinct has, it seems, gone by 
And will not be forced back. And to live now 
I must sluice out myself into canals 
And lose all force in ducts.
(2.3.105-08).
It is a similar sort of sluicing out which leads Dostoevsky’s Golyadkin, in The Double, 
into self-division; his desire for success, recognition and approval forces him to pursue 
lines of behaviour which are incompatible with his esteem for noble ideals of dignified 
and honourable behaviour; the implicit collaboration of these ostensibly exclusive 
motives cannot be admitted so Golyadkin splits into two entities to house them 
separately.
The new types of work on which these characters focus their aversion, are felt to 
be alien, unplaced and disorienting. Consequently, they are rarely depicted for what 
they are, but become negative symbols for what is felt to be absent. Raskolnikov’s 
isolation from reality, as I shall discuss later, is due in part to the measure it takes of 
him and the role it would allow him to play; he is not prepared to witness himself 
labouring anonymously as a translator or teacher. In Dipsychus this hierarchical 
problem of status is similarly problematic. Dipsychus would rather not sully himself 
with worldly labour at all, but given that he must, he insists that The Spirit find him 
work which harmonises with his self-image. However, this trade-off, which is not 
available to Raskolnikov, of a position of esteem, instigates the kind of transfer of 
identification and esteem to the worldly position of the ideals it has supplanted which in 
turn advances it, in spite of its initial stigma, as the sphere of purposeful endeavour. 
Dipsychus’ successful career as a lawyer and upstanding member of his community, in 
Dipsychus Continued, reflects a kind of redirected energy from his repressed ideal (a 
reactionary affirmation of the negation or denunciation of his ideal).
Dipsychus bemoans the demeaning measures necessitated by the modem 
occupations that were becoming typical of his social class. Dipsychus observes:
The modem Hotspur
Shrills not his trumpet of To Horse, To Horse, 
But consults columns in a railway guide;
A demigod of figures; an Achilles 
Of computation -
A verier Mercury express come down 
To do the world with swift arithmetic.
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(2.3. 108- 14).
Dipsychus’ discomfort draws on a heritage of noble service and spiritual devotion to 
deflect the phantoms of the suspicion, to which he anxiously subjects himself, that he is 
suffering personally for the affront to his vanity or self-esteem; he is suffering 
disinterestedly, he protests, on behalf of a transgressed principle and a problematically 
unrecognised scruple.8
We ask Action,
And dream of arms and conflict; and string up 
All self devotion’s muscles; and are set 
To fold up papers. To what end? We know not.
Other folks do so: it is always done;
And it perhaps is right. And we are paid for it.
For nothing else we can be. He that eats 
Must serve; and serve as other servants do:
And don the lacquey’s livery of the house.
(2.3. 131-39).
This is the reality, and this: “O could I shoot my thought up to the sky / A column of 
pure shape, for all to observe”, is the desire it thwarts.9
At the [huge] members of the vast machine 
In all these crowded rooms of industry 
No individual soul has loftier leave 
Than fiddling with a piston or a valve.
(2.3. 120-23).
The analogy through which Dipsychus lays out his dissatisfaction is extreme and 
evocative, but also seems conscientiously to be waiting on any qualifications it might 
provoke. As he juxtaposes the conventions of epic dignity with the confining banalities 
of bureaucratic delegation, Dipsychus seems more incredulous than dismissive; he
8 The danger inherent in idealism practiced in an unidealistic world, and its susceptibility to manipulation 
and betrayal, manifest clearly in the disastrous consequences of Jim’s fidelity to his idealised moral code 
which conclude Conrad’s Lord Jim. Jim’s expectation that Gentleman Brown would be compelled to 
honour his word in the same manner that Jim might, is suspiciously convenient to a passive desire not to 
sully his own moral conscience by acting with what he considers ungentlemanly ruthlessness. Jim’s trust 
- his adherence to his “shadowy ideal of conduct” - is charged, both in its consequences and through 
Marlowe’s narrative observations, with unwitting self-indulgence, and culpable naivete and negligence of 
practical worldly responsibility to other beings (as opposed to his ideal).
9 Clough, Dipsychus, 2.3.140-41.
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accepts the disenchanted world but hesitates at its capacity to support or warrant the 
kind of absolute commitment he still idealises.
Well one could bear with that; were the end ours,
One’s choice and the correlative of the soul.
To drudge were then sweet service.
(2.3.115-17).
Dipsychus puts it to himself whether “By thinking of the leagued fraternity, / And of co­
operation, and the effect / Of the great engine”, he might become genuinely inspired 
with a dignifying worldly devotion. 10 This potential consolation is appended, though, 
and deflated with reservations: what, for instance, if the great machine is merely a 
treadmill?
* * * *
Trying to decide what he feels after being insulted by a soldier, and how to respond 
without making himself in some way ridiculous, Dipsychus exasperatedly and 
indignantly declares that the coin of honour has fallen in the dirt. “Pure silver though it 
be let it rather lie”; the coin has been polluted by banalities of modem living and 
Dipsychus will not condescend to reinstate it. * 11 Dipsychus’ simile of an irredeemably 
sullied coin conveys the disruptive intrusiveness, into all points of honour, of the 
prevalence and ideological promotion of self-interest. 12 Dipsychus implies that where
10 Dipsychus, 2.3.127-29.
11 Dipsychus, 1.6.100.
12 This simile combines a concern for the dignity remaining to a code of conduct which had previously 
been more directly associated with the virtues of noble birth. In Diderot’s Rameau’s Nephew, Rameau’s 
Nephew provides one example of the effect of a commodification of the accepted signs and 
commensurate status of nobility: from being a quality intrinsic to or bom into an individual it has become 
a currency determined by fluctuating standards of social tastes, conventions and values. In Diderot’s 
dialogue, Rameau’s Nephew proudly demonstrates to the narrator how he intends to teach his children the 
dignity and happiness attainable to those in possession of hard currency. Though the power of money to 
demand esteem regardless of aristocratic status is nothing new, the idea that this power was now 
attainable by any member of the population (regardless of the rarity of the practical realisation of this 
idea) was. This idea meant that the rapid progress of the Industrial Revolution was accompanied by the 
notion that great wealth and power were no longer the special and rightful privilege of a class determined 
by birth; a notion that allowed class resentments and dissatisfaction to blossom into feelings of 
entitlement and even obligation to climb to a position of greater material comfort. The practical 
unlikelihood of fulfilling such “entitlements” and “obligations” meant that the most likely consequence of 
the possibility of social advancement merely engendered resentful feelings of deprivation and 
discrimination in society’s negligence of the equal essential worth of its citizens.
Dipsychus’ analogy for the value of chivalric devotion to unworldly ideals -  a coin, lying dirty in 
the street, which he will not sully himself by retrieving - reflects his fear for the devaluation of immaterial
188
honour codes are no longer common, one cannot stoop to restore the coin, or reprove an 
insult against a point of honour, without appearing to react against a merely personal 
offence or to be acting merely in one’s own interests. Dipsychus desires an abstract and 
therefore impersonal cause, heroic in keeping with his own conception thereof, and 
sheltered from suspicions of self-interest by the overt surrender of individual 
conscientiousness to the directives of the cause. This unrequited desire, though, is the 
only form in which he can maintain this particular notion of honourable action, given 
his distempered view of the world and his hypersensitivity to the corrupting 
individualistic pride of idealism.
Dostoevsky’s Underground Man, suffering under an alienating awkwardness of 
sceptical non-conformity and reflective self-consciousness, worries that a billiard-hall 
crowd “would all deride me if I started protesting and talking to them in literary 
language. Because among us to this day it is impossible to speak of a point of honor -  
that is, not honor, but a point of honor (point d ’honneur) -  otherwise than in literary 
language. In ordinary language there is no mention of a ‘point of honor.’ ” 13 The 
Underground Man here expresses a common concern and a genuine limitation 
experienced by idealists who feel their idealism to be redundant or incomprehensible to 
a general population who they consider is bound to conformity, convention and 
pragmatic reality. Abstract honour is conceived as an elite and esoteric discipline which
devotions brought about by the increasingly materialistic values of a community whose strongest bonds 
and only shared code appear to be the principles upholding a prosperous laissez-faire economy. This 
circumstance is further apparent in a popular play of the early 1850s, George Henry Lewes’ The Game of 
Speculation (The Lights of London and Other Victorian Plays, ed. M.R. Booth (Oxford & New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 49-102), which marries a farcical depiction of bourgeois pretence with 
the contemporary concerns of mid-Victorian business practice.
HAWK: ... How little you know the present age. Now, nothing but selfishness
exists. Everyone places his future in the Three-per cents. There lies our paradise. The 
wife knows her husband is insured; the son insures his father’s life. All our morals lie 
in dividends! As to servants, we change them every day. Attachment, indeed! Pay 
them their wages regularly, and they leave you without regret; but owe them money, 
and you keep them devoted to the last.
MRS HAWK: Oh! You, so honourable, you to utter such things?
HAWK: I utter what we all feel, but what few have the boldness to avow. Here lies 
modem honour. (Holding up half-a-crown) Chivalry has shrivelled into that! Shall I 
tell you why plays succeed which have scoundrels for their heroes? It is because the 
spectator is flattered, and says to himself as he goes away, ‘Come, come, hang it, after 
all I’m not such a scamp as he is.’
The Game of Speculation, 1.160-74.
Unlike Timon’s misanthropy, originating in his disappointment in the fickleness of his fellow men, Hawk 
speaks with the distempered and accusative hypocrisy of a businessman fallen on financial hard times.
13 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, trans. Richard Pevear & Linda Volokhonsky (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1994), 50.
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is of dubious intelligibility and credibility to the broad community. But the 
Underground Man’s fear for the reception of protests based on “points of honour” also 
reflects an unwillingness to face up to the challenge of this incompatibility, and a 
suspicion perhaps that the crowd’s disregard of such pragmatically meaningless 
abstractions will strip him of his honourable defence. Without his “beautiful and lofty” 
abstractions, the Underground Man would be left in their eyes, and his own, as merely a 
petty irritant and a coward, rationalising his way out of danger. This uncertainty is 
similarly latent in the various “points of honour” taken up and clung to by individuals 
seeking to resist intimations of chaos, and trying to establish an order beyond the 
concrete patterns of their material circumstances.
In Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov and his maid discuss the merits of his 
commitment to abstract thought:
“A fool she may be, the same as I am, and aren’t you a smarty, lying around like a 
sack and no good to anybody! You say you used to go and teach children before, so 
why don’t you do anything now?”
“I do something...” Raskolnikov said, reluctantly and sternly.
“What do you do?”
“Work . . .”
“Which work?”
“I think,” he replied seriously, after a pause.
Nastasya simply dissolved in laughter.
“And a fat lot of money you’ve thought up, eh? ” 14
Raskolnikov is not simply lazy, if anything he is over-ripe, as we discover later, with 
stifled potential for committed activity. Like the narrator in “The Meek Girl” his 
isolation suggests a fastidious act of pride and conscience. Raskolnikov deems the roles 
available to him as a participant in the world to be unworthy of his character or 
expertise; he commits himself to this vocational isolation and to abstract thought. The 
inherently unreal, or abstract, focus of this vocation, though, and the necessarily self­
validating affiliation, or faith, which it demands, renders it an inherently unstable, 
unsupported and anxious occupation.
The posture of stoical or sceptical aloofness, misanthropic or otherwise, widely 
used to deflect self-awareness of a complicity with life’s undignified compromises -
14 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, trans. Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky (London: Vintage, 
1993), 29.
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vanitas vanitatas -  seems to succeed until practical facts, such as the necessity of 
earning a living, are taken into account. As staples of the English public school and 
university system in the early nineteenth century, the Classics and the Classical world 
presented a moral framework which appeared to many a gratifyingly enlightened 
alternative to the fraught Christian tradition. As well as a moral counterpoint to 
Christianity, the Classical world held an otherworldly allure for intellectual escapism 
from “vulgar” forces of modernisation.15 Unfortunately Dipsychus, like Clough 
himself, is unable to indulge in the solace of such repose, as he will inevitably have to 
feed, clothe and house himself. The protestations of a Russian counterpart, Ilya 
Oblomov (the central figure in Ivan Goncharov’s Oblomov16), as to the worthiness of 
his stasis in comparison to the perpetual hollow motion of “society”, suggest a hostility 
to the idealistic delusions that look to validate engagement, preferring an entirely 
disengaged and interior life of the mind (the implication of evasive self-justification 
always remains). It is worth bearing in mind the status of some of these cynics. 
Initially, Ilya Oblomov is independently wealthy; his persistent refusal to participate in 
base dealings with the practicalities of business and domestic management results in the 
dwindling of his own fortune (and a complementary boom in that of his bailiff), but in 
the first place his detached idealism survives untried and untainted because he can 
afford it. The elder Mr Pitt, of Vanity Fair (1847-48), laughing at the vain business of 
the City, laughing at his maid's sincere imitation of mannered society, is buoyed (like 
Timon's misanthropy) by a firm sense of personal merit which is reliably underwritten 
by material wealth and independence. The way Pitt laughs at Betty Horrocks reflects 
the ultimately dismissive cynicism with which he consciously differentiates himself
15 The classical languages (Greek and Latin; fairly dependable marks of a particular type of privileged 
education and upbringing) open up postures of dignified dissociation and esoteric qualification providing 
consolation and solacing notions of serving a higher purpose while serving an implicit protest against an 
apparently chaotic populism which, to many among the privileged educated elite, seemed to herald the 
sleep of reason and order. In Virginia W oolfs Jacob’s Room (1922), exploring the reality, and unreality, 
of the worldviews and ideological affinities of an early Twentieth-Century Cambridge undergraduate, 
nothing much seems to have changed. The young men exist in a closed world in which their esteemed 
abstract virtues are mutually affirmed; the classics offer solace from the noisy street. W oolfs intellectual 
young men are averse to the modem world, but their alienation and retreat from its dilemmas are 
ambiguously punctuated by the sudden hostility with which it destroys them. Their alienation seems both 
justified and culpable in relation to the World War, in which Jacob is killed.
16 Ivan Goncharov, Oblomov (1859), trans. David Magarshack (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 
1954). Oblomov is perhaps one of the earliest representations of the ‘sleepwalking’ gentry, he exists in a 
state of apathetic indifference to his responsibilities as a landowner, and to the stagnation of his emotional 
and social existence. He is incapable of looking after himself, having grown up accustomed to servants 
and valets, and disdainful of any kind of worldly involvement or activity. He is in no ways a malevolent 
figure but he suggests an emblem of the sneaking damage permitted by abstraction from and negligence 
of a world beyond the cloistered sphere of his individual comforts.
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from the vanity and worthlessness of conventional human behaviour; he proudly 
dehumanises himself to give his cynicism unilateral licence over human vanity. The 
manner in which the cynicism of Diderot’s professional raconteur, Rameau’s Nephew, 
pragmatically lies dormant, offers an illuminating contrast: the necessity of earning a 
living is justification enough to indulge the hypocrisies and delusions of those with 
money enough to support him. The overt posture of the malcontent or the uncommitted 
intellectual, a disregard for hollow convention, is incompatible with the needs of a 
professional life.
In this regard Dipsychus’ reluctance to go amongst ordinary folk as an educated 
wage-slave (as he sees it) appears symptomatic of his nostalgia for higher holier things. 
His insistence that should he have to work it must be at something fitting demonstrates 
his requirement for something that provides the elitist license of a personal distinction in 
the way Pitt's fortune does. Dipsychus is after all gambling on an eventual inheritance 
that is the epitome of boom or bust (heaven, hell or oblivion). Ultimately, it is a 
deficiency in material funds that determines the role into which Dipsychus’ residual 
Christian idealism must evolve, just as Oblomov’s and Pitt’s financial self-sufficiency 
determines the ideological postures available to them. Raskolnikov’s fate is similarly a 
reflection of the discrepancy between his abject poverty and the value he places on 
himself; he will not consent to see himself a flunkey.
The circumstantial link between the cynicism of these characters and their 
financial security is suggestive: the comforting proportion afforded by abstract idealism 
(when it implies forestalling commitment rather than escapism) is analogously 
dependent on being unburdened by human responsibility in a different sense. The 
childless bachelor uncle looks on real life with a sense of gentle patronising affection, 
and simultaneously an embarrassed sensitivity to an intuited accusation of a neglected 
duty to society. In different circumstances, where others are intimately involved, 
idealism can seem merely a justification for a negligent escapism from responsibilities 
through a capricious disdain for reality.
For many idealistic individuals, frustrated and sceptical about the possibility of 
dignified conformity or participation in the world as it is, the security and shared 
purpose of monastic life - a community of individuals, willingly bound by common 
surrender to a higher code - often seemed a desirable and attainable idyll. Monastic 
retreat offered a trope of selfless conviction and conscientious unworldliness which
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offered an appealing alternative, if only as an idea, to the compromises necessitated by 
worldly involvement. In Amours, Claude reflects that:
... from the tumult escaping, ‘tis pleasant, of drumming 
and shouting,
Hither, oblivious awhile, to withdraw, of the fact and the 
falsehood,
And amid placid regards and mildly courteous greetings
Yield to the calm and composure and gentle abstraction 
that reign o’er
Mild monastic faces in quiet collegiate cloisters.
(IU.ix. 185-89).
Claude’s wistful portrait of tranquillity invokes an atmosphere of straightforward 
purpose and assurance which, as an idealisation, could apply, for example, equally to 
the school, or university, as it had the monastery. It is a type of retreat frequently 
shunned for its surrender of independence, and just as frequently longed for in
17recognition of the genuine comfort this dependency provides.
Directly confronted with the prospect of taking up a profession, Dipsychus’ 
salutes to the dignity of walking in God’s light become more insistent (the mere wage-
17 Religious indoctrination trains individuals to respond to the secular world as a situation governed by 
absolutes; in the absence of this doctrine the imprint of the training remains on those who were ever 
subject to it. There is an analogous historical moment when the monasteries opened during the 
renaissance and a population of educated individuals became free to pursue an independent career in the 
world; the exhilaration as well as the regret for lost security and for overt and authoritative purpose 
recurs. Referring to this process in The Tyranny of Progress: Reflections on the Origins o f Sociology 
(U.S.A.: The Noonday Press, 1955), Albert Salomon observes that:
. . . many philosophically minded ecclesiastics departed eagerly into the 
independence of the secular world. Nevertheless, a Petrarch’s enthusiasm for the 
life that lay beyond the walls was apt to be short-lived, for the problem of earning a 
living forced many of these newly-emerged intellectuals into the service of the 
princes, whose willingness to support poets and thinkers exacted in return a 
surrender to a new ministry of thought. The philosophers were hired as 
propagandists, and their status derived solely from that of their royal employers.
(The Tyranny of Progress, 25-26).
At the cost of their own sense of integrity, Salomon continues, intellectuals and scholars survived by 
providing counsel and indulging the pretensions of those secure in their superiority. This compromised 
freedom generated a certain nostalgia for monastic rigidity of purpose; Salomon cites Rabelais’ depiction 
of the Abbes de Theleme in Gargantua and Pantagruel. There is an interesting parallel in the kind of 
intellectual liberation, including an effective detachment both from religious employment in England (and 
Europe) and from military service in Russia (and later from employment paths laid down by seminarian 
studies), experienced by the nineteenth century malcontents and intellectual idealists. And in a cycle of 
liberation and disillusion, nostalgia for the certainty, the transparent proprieties and the moral support of 
conservative adherence to convention, often follow. Later in his life Clough, for example, experienced
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labour that beckons in place of spiritual vocation sharpens his appetite for higher 
service). Like many of his contemporaries (Carlyle, for example18), Dipsychus would 
really rather believe - belief offers him a more desirable and more morally comfortable 
life - but is galled by an intellectual responsibility not to.
For many educated individuals of the period, steeped in the values of a religion they 
could no longer faithfully serve and averse to worldly professions, the desire for a 
vocation through which they might transcend mere self-interest began to seem 
unrequitable. Resignation to a hollow “trudging service”, in which the ends and 
rewards seemed little more than provisions for material needs and desires, seemed 
unavoidable.19 In 1853 Clough wrote from America:
I really am very comfortably settled ... and have nothing to complain of, except 
perhaps the fact which appears to be true everywhere, that to get a livelihood one 
must do work according to other people's fancies, instead of one's own, which of 
course are the best, but under the circumstances must give way.20
Like Dipsychus, Clough’s right to remain true to his “fancies” was curtailed by the 
necessity, exacerbated in his case by his responsibilities to his fiancee, of making a 
living.21
In the dilemma of the self as career individual among a fabric that depends on its 
collaboration, duty to society and duty to the essence rather than the form of the 
purportedly abstract truths which allegedly guide it can be seen to diverge.
wistful longings for the vocation from which his exclusion from the professional university system, 
brought about by his refusal to sign the 39 Articles, had effectively exiled him.
18 A.N.Wilson’s God’s Funeral (London: Abacus, 2000) provides an extensive discussion of the various 
personal struggles with doubt and faith (and science), of a wide range of intellectual, literary and religious 
figures throughout the nineteenth century.
19 For a fuller discussion of Clough’s conception of “trudging service” see R.A. Forsyths’ “Trudging 
Service -  secularization and the ‘devotional pseudo-religion’ of Arthur Hugh Clough”, The Durham 
University Journal, 83 (1991), 27-38. Forsyth’s title draws on Dipsychus’ meditation on the imperative 
of those who would live in accordance with Christian ideals to “trudge it”, while relinquishing the 
expectation of any external guidance or affirmation, and the consoling notion of working in direcctt 
collaboration with God.
20 Clough, Prose Remains of Arthur Hugh Clough, 211.
21 Both Clough and Arnold were representative of an increasing reliance among writers and intellectuals 
on employment among “a growing bureaucracy of civil servants and government employees” 
(Armstrong, Victorian Poetry, 167). After his refusal to profess orthodox faith - Clough refused to 
subscribe to the XXIX Articles, a pledge of Christian belief which was mandatory for Oxford dons - cut 
him off from the possibility of earning a living as a teacher and academic, Clough worked in the
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So may the ear,
Hearing, not hear,
Though drums do roll, and pipes and cymbals ring;
So the bare conscience of the better thing 
Unfelt, unseen, unimaged, all unknown,
May fix the entranced soul ‘mid multitudes alone.
(“Why should I say I see the things I see not”, 54-59).22
In keeping with the paradoxical hear and not hear, wherein the acknowledgment of one 
implies the disregard of the other, each music has legitimate claims but each is 
simultaneously dubious as a singular ethic. Clough’s final image though, is of an 
individual arrested amid the dance by the inkling of an intuited “better thing”. In the 
first stanza the disruption depicted by such arrested motion -
he that stops I' the dance shall be spumed by the dancers’ feet, - 
Shall be shoved and be twisted by all he shall meet,
And shall raise up an outcry and rout
(ln.7-9).
- is attended by a cautionary admonition not to “forfeit” the “fair chance” of 
participating in life. It remains for the as yet uninspired individual to “keep amid the 
throng, / And turn as they shall turn, and bound as they are bounding” 24
At the conclusion of the poem, however, disruption seems to have been justified 
in spite of the risk of isolation, by virtue of its optimistic fidelity to the spectre of the 
“better thing”. As with Turgenev’s Dmitri Rudin, the idealistic posture is struck as 
ever, but the context remains one of relativism and individualist fidelity to the purity of 
the self. In The Bothie, Amours and Dipsychus, such fidelity is revealed as a factitious 
scruple generated around the same kind of seduction as the notion of productive social 
duty.
To those who believe that absolute rational justifications for conviction or belief 
do not exist, the appearance of belief or conviction in others may suggest hypocrisy, 
delusion, or the consequence of strategic persuasion.
Education Office, while Arnold, after serving as a secretary to Lord Lansdowne, was employed as an 
Inspector of Schools.
22 Clough, “Why should I say I see the things I see not”, Clough - Selected Poems, ed. J.P. Phelan 
(London and New York: Longman, 1995), 40-42.
23 “Why should I say . . . ”, In. 22.
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Go to church -  the world require you,
To balls -  the world require you too,
And marry -  papa and mama desire you,
And your sisters and schoolfellows do. 
Duty, 'tis to take on trust 
What things are good, and right, and j us t . . .  
“Duty -  that’s to say complying”, 14-20.25
Clough’s poems denounce spontaneous duty to convention for its obliviousness to the 
“Moral blank, and moral void” to which it deludedly looks for external justification.26 
Such conformity represents “the blind non-recognition / Either of goodness, truth, or 
beauty, / Except by precept and submission”.27 In the isolating devotion to essential 
meanings, though, there is a similar wrongheaded overscrupulousness such as the 
youthful Cain, in Clough's Adam and Eve, is advised against by his resiliently sceptical 
father. In “Why should I say I see the things I see not?”, the validity of conscientious 
objection to dutiful compliance is contrasted to the “coward acquiescence” of uncritical 
conformity. The poem adumbrates the disdain of Phillip Hewson, in The Bothie, for a 
kind of moral obedience that gives no thought to the rationale which every propriety 
represents. That there are reasons behind these proprieties is, therefore, implied. The 
kind of moral consciousness that merely observes the form (the quicker to enter the 
game) rather than fuses with the essence of morality, however, reflects a different kind 
of moral character. Clough's dismissive caricature of the mindless observance of social 
norms is on a direct reactionary scale with his sense of the hostility which such 
observance directs towards critical activity.
‘Tis the stem and prompt suppressing,
As an obvious deadly sin,
All the questing and the guessing 
Of the soul’s own soul within
(“Duty -  that’s to say complying”, 27-30):
Or so it seems to the isolated voice.
The limited scope available to the singular voice of the poet, even when it appears 
to express Clough’s own views, becomes less satisfactory as his intuitions of the
24 “Why should I say. . . ”, In. 25-26.
25 Clough, “Duty -  that’s to say complying”, Clough - Selected Poems, 42-43.
26 “Duty - that's to say complying”, 39.
27 “Duty - that's to say complying”, 36-38.
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multifaceted and mercurial characteristics of truth begin to emerge. Hence Clough’s 
habitual poetic rejoinders to his own poems; the alternative parts which particularise all 
his works as contingent human utterances rather than definitive reflections of beliefs 
and truths. Clough’s ability and commitment to insinuate a similar contingency (without 
disparaging the particularity it implies) into the array of possible convictions and 
certainties amongst which the characters of his major poems move, is based on a 
familiarity and indulgence similar to the avuncular concern from which Dostoevsky 
offers Crime and Punishment as a warning to “all our little girls and boys”. Again, 
Clough’s own ideological ambivalence allows an even-handed depiction of secular 
culture, more like the courtly sophistication of Stendhal’s comic acuity in both Scarlet 
and Black and The Charterhouse of Parma, than the urgent reactionary realism through 
which Dostoevsky seeks to repudiate and arrest the sway of secular ideology.
Both Clough’s and Dostoevsky’s individualistic idealists inherit from Christianity a 
kind of aristocratic convention dictating the prestige and worthiness of fidelity to 
transcendent moral codes, while simultaneously facing what seem to them demeaning 
careers as, at best, intellectual wage-labourers. The quixotic fidelity to ideals that 
attracts them often provokes conflict with, and jeopardises the necessities of, making a 
living (such idealism is a luxury, and a liability, therefore, for those who cannot afford 
it). Absolute devotion to an ideal requires that individuals grant themselves the right, 
tacitly or otherwise, to avoid obligations to others that conflict with devotion to their 
ideal. Where this luxury of social detachment (an absence of responsibility) is not 
available, the rigorous idealist is forced to claim or steal it from others, through neglect 
or denial of worldly responsibilities.
To an extent, Raskolnikov’s crime is engendered through his desire to claim this 
luxury. It is a privilege he feels intrinsically entitled to, in spite of reality’s refusal to 
value and recompense him in accordance with his measure of his own worth. The first 
step of the unique career Raskolnikov demands for himself is not financial 
independence, but reality’s approval of his right to exist in a privileged relationship with 
a higher authority.
Raskolnikov, like the pawnbroker in “The Meek Girl”, or Mr Jones in Conrad’s 
Victory, exhibits indolent objection and resentful hostility to a world he considers has 
denied him his rightful rank. Raskolnikov refuses to surrender (again like the 
pawnbroker and Mr Jones) to what he feels to be the indignity of witnessing himself as
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a wage-labourer in the everyday world. But unlike Jones and the pawnbroker (both of 
whom are gentlemen in exile from the dignity and privilege of their original social 
sphere), Raskolnikov’s notion of his insulted nobility is based solely on his recourse to 
the abstract consolations of intellectual idealism and his faith in their veracity. Because 
he thinks his theories are tme (which is natural given that they answer exactly the 
problem he finds in his relationship to the world), he imagines he sees further, knows 
better, is better than others.28
In one of four Petersburg feuilletons of the late 1840s, Dostoevsky writes:
When a man is dissatisfied, when he has not the means to show what is best in 
him, to express himself fully ... he at once gets involved in some quite incredible 
situation; he either takes to the bottle ... or becomes a gambler ... or a rabid duellist; 
or goes crazy because of such a silly thing as arrogance1291 while at the same time 
despising arrogance in his heart and even resenting the fact that he had to get into 
trouble because of such a silly thing as arrogance.30
At this early stage in his career, Dostoevsky’s preoccupation with arrogance and 
ambition manifests most strikingly in The Double. In Dostoevsky’s later work the 
circumstances of Mr Golyadkin’s identity crisis reappear in more naturalistic depictions 
of the imposition of social reality on the ideal self-image. The distorted pride and 
fixated scheming of Ganya Ivolgin, Ippolit Terentyev and Arkady Dolgoruky all 
suggest further exploration of a symptom Dostoevsky felt he had failed to fully 
articulate in The Double.
For Dostoevsky, the oppression of what is best in a person by a materialistic 
society encourages the supplanting of emotional and psychological bonds of community 
with the independent and isolating self-reliance of material power (whether financial or 
hierarchical). This compensating force becomes a pervasive answer to the anxiety over 
the dissolution of a common higher ideal. This is evident throughout The Double, in 
which Golyadkin compulsively yet strategically deploys his money to convince himself 
of a power and standing that accords with a level of self-esteem he is unable to
28 As I shall discuss later, it might also be said that because Raskolnikov wants to believe that he sees 
further, knows better and is better than others, he is forced to try to prove to himself that his theory, in 
spite of evidence to the contrary, represents an authoritative general rule capable of supporting his 
actions.
29 Joseph Frank, in Dostoevsky - The Seeds of Revolt, 1821-1849 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1979), translates this word as “ambition” and notes that the Russian word “ambitsid” is 
not as neutral as the English term “ambition”; it denotes a “pejorative sense of self-love, pride , and 
arrogance” (232).
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experience beyond his solipsism. The Underground Man has a similar relationship with 
money, and with the exception perhaps of Demons, the problematic intrusion of 
monetary concerns into human emotional interrelationships can be found close to the 
heart of all Dostoevsky’s major novels. An example from The Idiot will serve to 
convey the kind of distorted human relations Dostoevsky associated with the promotion 
of individualistic material concerns into the special status and moral role of abstract 
ideals.31
Nastasya Filippovna’s celebrations (The Idiot, Part 1, ch.13-1632) culminate with 
Nastasya bringing to a head the issue of her brokered marriage to Ganya Ivolgin. Ganya 
works for General Yepanchin who is in league with Totsky, a member of the gentry 
who adopted the orphaned Nastasya as a child and kept her on a secluded country estate 
as his mistress. Totsky wishes to marry and needs to placate Nastasya (she has already 
scuttled a previous engagement with a threat to expose Totsky’s debauchery). General 
Yepanchin and Totsky aim to have Ganya marry Nastasya in order to diffuse the heat of 
her spite, thereby facilitating Totsky’s wedding to one of the General’s daughters. 
Ganya, however, despises Nastasya and is involved in an ambiguous relationship with 
Aglaya, the General’s youngest daughter; he is, therefore, to be paid for his sacrifice. 
To add to the mercantile atmosphere of property under auction, Rogozhin enters with a 
late and higher bid for Nastasya’s hand. In the denouement of these proposed 
transactions Nastasya confronts all parties with the naked truth of their mutual situation: 
hard cash and commodification. Throwing Rogozhin’s hundred thousand on the fire
30 Dostoevsky, “Essay IV, June 1847”, Dostoevsky’s Occasional Writings, trans. David 
Magarshack (London: Vision Press, 1963), 33.
31 Georg Lukäcs suggests, in “Dostoevsky” (Dostoevsky: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Rene 
Wellek (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 146-58), that Dostoevsky’s characters reflect conditions 
symptomatic of the “moral and psychic deformation of man”, which the “evolution of capitalism” 
engendered (156). For Lukäcs, their fearless submission to “the socially necessary self-distortion”, and 
“their self-dissolution, their self-execution” constitutes dignifying martyrdom, and “the most violent 
protest that could have been made against the organization of life in that time” (156). Lukäcs’ attribution 
of blame here depends on a conviction of the existence of a proper form which capitalism has perverted. 
This conviction is necessary also for Lukäcs’ assertion that the distortions and dissolution which the 
idealisms of Dostoevsky’s characters undergo in the characters’ compromises with material self-interest, 
reflect their author’s intention to convey, in their anguished disapproval of reality (which after all opposes 
the ideal their interests suggest to them), a conscious protest against the necessity of submission to a 
merely materialistic social structure. Dostoevsky’s protests, though, are levelled primarily at the dearth of 
faith, the weak individualism, that leads these characters into this submission and allows immediate and 
materialistic interests to dominate the substructure of social convention. Had Lukäcs been writing of 
Dipsychus, who submits while nurturing intentions of a deferred rebellion, this suggestion would seem 
more fitting: it participates in the same kind of hierarchical opposition of idealism and reality to which 
Dipsychus pins his hopes while nevertheless submitting to the lower path of pragmatic realism.
32 Dostoevsky, The Idiot (1868), trans. Alan Myers (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 
1992).
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(thereby accepting his bid and depriving Ganya of the seventy five thousand roubles 
from Totsky) she invites Ganya to pick the money from the flames and make good his 
loss. Ganya is singled out as the focus of this symbolic challenge, he is the vulnerable 
aspirant; his service to his ‘idea’ is condensed into the indignity of clutching a fortune 
from the fire. Nastasya Filippovna effectively sells herself to purchase the privilege of 
luxuriating in the exposed indignity of Ganya’s greed, and therein orchestrating a 
personal triumph over the charade of moral decency by which she feels herself to be 
irredeemably owned. Nastasya relishes the punishment all the more for her own 
impotence in the midst of these market forces, she can deplore but not resist them.
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CHAPTER 6 -  Passionate Intensities
... I am a child of the century, a child of disbelief and doubt, I am that 
to day and (I know it) will remain so until the grave. How much 
terrible torture this thirst for faith has cost me, and costs me even now, 
which is all the stronger in my soul the more arguments I can find 
against it.
Dostoevsky to Mme Fonvizina - Feb 20, 1854.1
Foreword
In the following chapters I shall explore Dostoevsky’s engagement with the assurance 
and guidance which, in his opinion, people naturally demand from ‘ideals’. I shall 
firstly explore, particularly in relation to Prince Myshkin of The Idiot, Dostoevsky’s 
depictions of the nature and effect of the discrepancies which emerge between this 
‘natural’ need and the actual roles ideals can play in a secular and increasingly 
individualistic culture. Having explored some of the motivations behind Dostoevsky’s 
depiction of secular idealism and of the spiritual and social confusions that generated, in 
many, a thirst for new ideals and authorities, I shall focus on his depiction, in Notes 
from Underground, of how sceptical individualism can isolate individuals from any 
vital moral code or purpose. The Underground Man can recognise or conceive of no 
grand idea for which individual appetites and comforts might be foregone; left to 
ourselves, he suggests, “we won’t know what to join, what to hold to, what to love and 
what to hate, what to respect and what to despise” .2 With nothing to provide grounds 
on which to recognise or pursue the kind of higher purpose which he nevertheless 
yearns for (with a disappointed spitefulness), he becomes dependent on the hollow but 
satisfyingly straightforward structures of conduct and approbation gleaned, ready-made, 
from aestheticised depictions of life and reality.
I shall then discuss Raskolnikov’s relationship with the notion of transcendent 
ideals, and the way in which the theoretical rationalisations that this relationship allows 
for (and even nurtures) are affected by his attempts to justify his moral rebellion to 
others and by his wranglings with the moral implications of the unsuspected and
1 Quoted in Joseph Frank, Dostoevsky: The Years of Ordeal, 1850-1859 (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), 160. Frank cites the letter “Pisma, 1:142”, {Dostoevsky..., 310), which 
refers to the Russian edition of Dostoevsky’s complete correspondence: “F.M. Dostoevsky, Pisma, ed. 
and annotated by A.S. Dolinin, 4 vols. (Moscow, 1928-1959)” {Dostoevsky..., 305).
2 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, trans. Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky; 1993 (New York: 
Vintage Classics, 1994), 130.
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unexpected feelings provoked by his crime. I shall suggest that Raskolnikov ultimately 
discovers a source of compelling moral information available through interaction with 
others; his desire for support and understanding and his capacity to recognise and 
condemn transgressions (his own and others) reawaken him to the reality of the moral 
bonds which, chafing him, he had sought to disprove.3
When I call Dostoevsky a reactionary, particularly in relation to his religious faith, 
I do not mean to imply that he reacts against secularization and modernization from a 
position of convinced Christian faith but rather that his affirmations of Christianity are 
reactions against his own internal dividedness. He is divided between a vision of the 
world as it is and a vision of the world as he feels it ought to be. He reacts against the 
manifest uncertainties and injustices of the actual world, which he cannot deny, through 
paradoxical assertions of faith in the reality of a world these problems merely eclipse; 
but the division which prompts this reactionary assertiveness persistently resurfaces.
Dostoevsky’s affirmations of Christianity express a commitment to the necessity 
of a transcendent authority as the foundation of human moral codes. This 
‘commitment’ enjoys neither the consolation nor peace of mind provided unquestioning, 
blind, or ‘true’ faith. If at times I seem to overemphasise the reactionary elements of 
Dostoevsky’s affirmation of divine authority, and to under-emphasise his dividedness 
between faith and a scepticism in the efficacy and credibility of the Christian 
worldview, it is due to my focus on the manner in which Dostoevsky, in his writing, 
attempts to convey some inherent dangers of sceptical unbelief and moral ambiguity, 
and to suggest (as much in hope as conviction) that these dangers can be tolerably 
avoided through a return to the authority of Christian moral traditions. Dostoevsky’s
3 I would note at this point a common feature of such experimental or theoretical acts of deliberate 
transgression or the dissolution of conventional moral boundaries, that Raskolnikov’s own categories of a 
successful jump to a higher moral category are thoroughly determined by the terms and preconceptions 
instilled in him by that veryi'dte he aims to prove the factitiousness of. This feature is common to the 
amoral or nihilistic systems and protests of the vast majority not only of Dostoevsky’s radicals but of 
many of their peers in works concerned with similar moral circumstances. Individuals’ commitments to 
denounce the hollow contingencies of conventional morality are often galvanised by an urge to travesty 
the limits any social or democratic moral convention must necessarily impose on some aspects of 
individuals’ ‘right’ to be themselves. This galvanisation is often emphasised in depictions of such figures 
which intend to show both the rational inconsistencies and the pragmatic insensitivity which underlie the 
justifications given for such commitments. Dostoevsky provides a clear example of this kind of conflict 
in an episode in The Idiot in which a group of young nihilists, who have been announced before their 
arrival as having gone further even than the nihilists -  denying all rights - arrive in Myshkin’s home and 
begin to assert their case that Burdovsky’s ‘rights’ have been wrongly overlooked and that he deserves, 
ie. is entitled to, compensation. The particulars of this exchange are complex but the general implication 
Dostoevsky lends to this episode is that the denial of moral categories serves this group as a platform 
from which they can flout convention in order to demand that a broader social group recognise their 
particular perceptions of its moral responsibility to them and grant them their ‘moral’ rights. In this case, 
their dissatisfaction is not with an essential concept of morality, but rather with the particular types of 
groups and individuals which, to them, the conventional moral order appears to favour.
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reactionary seeming stance reflects, it seems to me, a compulsive binding of himself to 
God, as if to a mast, to counter undeniable intimations of humanity’s isolation from 
moral absolutes.
The unambiguous moral conclusions Dostoevsky attempts to elicit from the often 
intractable moral dilemmas his novels dramatise, rather than reflecting his own 
possession of such certainty and conviction, reflect his commitment to evoking a reality 
in which such certainty is credible; these conclusions are a part of his performance of 
conviction which his own doubts demand of him.
Idealistic Activity
In Dostoevsky’s work, commonly accepted tradition (or convention) and individuals are 
repeatedly brought into opposition as a consequences of the idea that absolute truths and 
unimpeachable moral guidelines can be discovered or constructed through the rational 
awareness of an independent human mind. This kind of positivism typically provokes 
its own repudiation, implicit, for example, in the inevitable failure of individuals’ 
attempts to validate internal images of reality as a key to external reality.
In “A Lie is Saved by a Lie” (1877), an article for A Writer’s Diary, Dostoevsky 
deems Don Quixote the “saddest of all books”, conveying “the most profound and 
fateful mystery of humans and humankind”.4
... humanity’s most sublime beauty, its most sublime purity, chastity, 
forthrightness, gentleness, courage, and, finally, its most sublime intellect -  all these 
often (alas, all too often) come to naught, pass without benefit to humanity, and even 
become an object of humanity’s derision simply because all these most noble and 
precious gifts with which a person is often endowed lack but the very last gift -  that 
of genius to put all this power to work and to direct it along a path of action that is 
truthful, not fantastic and insane, so as to work for the benefit of humanity!5
Even in this diagnosis it seems that at the mention of “the very last gift”, Dostoevsky 
turns from events and actual people to gesture allusively to a nebulous, inchoate ideal.
In an attempt to concretely express abstract absolute values, idealists (in the sense 
I am discussing) depend on terminologies (and the attitudes which support them, geared
4 Dostoevsky, “A Lie is Saved by a Lie”, A Writer’s Diary - Volume II, 1877-1881, trans. Kenneth Lantz 
(London: Quartet Books, 1995), 1127-31, 1129. Furthermore, in his notebook Dostoevsky asks himself: 
“What is more full o f despair than Don Quixote” (The Unpublished Dostoevsky: Diaries and Notebooks 
(1860-81), Volume II, trans. Arline Boyer and Carl Proffer, ed. Carl R. Proffer (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1975), 
145).
5 “A Lie is Saved by a Lie”, 1129.
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to patterns of absolute permission, duty, right and wrong) which ostensibly objectify 
what are essentially expressions of their particular dissatisfaction and desires. To their 
own minds, they are thereby able to express and reify a position where no actual 
common co-ordinates or approved values exist, and, to their own mind, to give it a 
fixity beyond mere subjective assertion. The nature of these individuals’ idealistic 
expressions convey, and often privilege, the particular moral framework against which 
they evaluate or monitor the “moral” implications of their self-images and social 
positions (their entitlements and obligations, that is, as determined by ‘moral’ terms, 
generalised from their personal ideals and idealised self-image). Such ideals determine, 
therefore, what qualities will confer the feeling of leading a good or bad existence. But 
this feeling is not generated by a simple relationship of disinterested deduction, it 
involves a desire to be satisfied with oneself which interferes with the standards by 
which this satisfaction is judged.
Dostoevsky invests great value in the idealistic urges and considerations of his 
characters, but readily allows these urges to evoke bitter recriminations when 
individuals translate them into authoritative ideological programs or systems. The 
inevitable contortions and compromises which this translation involves brings about the 
unwitting corruption of individuals’ essential ideal. Individuals who would express or 
reify their ideals are required to translate them from a solipsistic sphere in which they 
seem cogent, though intrinsically incomplete or unsystematic, utterances of humble 
optimism, and to forge them into the prosaic assertions on which their wider credibility, 
the possibility of understanding or approval, then becomes anxiously contingent. For 
Dostoevsky the initial idealistic urges, the spontaneous optimistic commitments to the 
notion of higher truth, adumbrate (or perhaps induce) faith, but in individuals’ attempts 
to consecrate them as serviceable and persuasive templates of transcendent meaning 
their commitment to higher truth transforms into foolish charades with potentially 
crippling consequences.
. . . these people, at the fateful moment, were unable to discern the true sense of 
things and so discover their new word -  this spectacle of the needless ruination of 
such great and noble forces actually may reduce a friend of humanity to despair, 
evoke not laughter but bitter tears and sour his heart, hitherto pure and believing, 
with doubt ....6
6 “A Lie is Saved by a Lie”, 1129.
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The discord between scene and character which is generated by radical idealistic 
activism in Dostoevsky’s work - whether like Raskolnikov’s selfish revolt or, in The 
Idiot, Myshkin’s selflessness - reveals his commitment to communicate particular 
shortcomings of this reality, while at the same time approving the capacity of the 
general currents of reality to cultivate the cloistered inspiration of individuals.
In the final book of The Idiot, the intolerable hopelessness of Myshkin’s 
abstracted altruism becomes fully manifest. The compromising worldliness and inertia 
that have taken hold of Myshkin frame a dilemma over the value of fidelity to either the 
practical or the theoretical credibility of idealistic protest. In dramatising the dilemma 
of an idealism that pollutes its own ideal in the course of translating its principles into 
realities, while simultaneously privileging the essential idealistic impulse which 
generates this dilemma, Dostoevsky relies on his readers’ approval of a sublime irony, 
similar to that which he felt was so intrinsic to the paradoxical triumph he perceived in 
Don Quixote’s ill-fated challenges to the ambivalence of the external world. The Idiot's 
penultimate chapter, centring on Nastasya’s corpse, declares the literal failure of 
Myshkin’s potential, the image of this failure is transformed, though, into a tableau 
which, admitting the absurdity and ostensible futility of Myshkin’s altruistic idealism, 
nevertheless extols a paradoxically resilient devotion to the impulse at its core. In spite 
of his inability to convey his ‘truth’, the final chapter (relating the aftermath of 
Myshkin’s stay) establishes that the gestures and tone of his attempts at least evoked 
understanding of the kind of selfless idealism he was trying to convey.
In “A Lie is Saved by a Lie”, Dostoevsky explains that when the absolute 
authority of an individual’s ‘truth’ is challenged the individual faces a crisis: ”if there is
n
one lie, then it is all a lie”. Rather than accept this, the individual would rather save 
the idea on which they have become ideologically dependent, and so, “to save the 
truth”, the devotee “invents another fantasy” to disprove the initial lie.7 8 This is how the 
overt credibility of a ‘truth’ is saved. In The Idiot, though, the credibility of Myshkin’s 
failed ideal seems to be saved with a mute anguish that eschews “another fantasy” out 
of strict fidelity to the natural trajectory of secular and emotive idealism.
Myshkin’s struggle to maintain and communicate his idealism while attending to 
the conventions of bourgeois eloquence, the friction between ideal intuitions and 
concrete expression, is emphasised by Dostoevsky to convey the essential poverty of
7 “A Lie is Saved by a Lie”, 1130.
8 “A Lie is Saved by a Lie”, 1130.
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Myshkin’s profane and inherently misconceived absolutism.9 That Myshkin’s ideal is 
benevolent and estimable serves to accentuate the stagnant and corrosive separateness 
on which individual inspiration necessarily depends to sustain its posture of absolute 
authority; it is this necessary separateness which disrupts, even in an ethic that 
advocates communion, the possibility of critical or flexible communication and 
agreement.
Myshkin’s need to communicate the potential of his compassion (as an abstract 
law, ‘true’ beyond his own merely immediate and particular demonstrations) involves 
him in attempts to establish a framework of communication, which jeopardise his own 
faith in the authority of his guiding idea. In trying to maintain his conviction that 
beauty will save the world, and to express and justify this conviction in reality’s terms, 
Myshkin discovers the tentative and experimental quality of his ideal. In his nebulous 
and unsuccessful attempts to communicate his faith, Myshkin begins to recognise the 
subjectivity and particularity of its foundations.
Dostoevsky’s idealists desire to see their internal visions as gestures towards 
external meanings. The eagerness for conviction which accompanies this desire 
necessitates the typically selective perceptions through which they enable themselves to 
recognise their particular propositions approved in the external world. They colonise 
the world with particular intuitions of significance and, in their eagerness to feel at 
home in the world, seek to ensure a general approval for these personal worldviews. In 
so doing the earnest scrupulousness with which they seek to justify their dependence on 
their solipsistic visions of absolute conviction is corrupted by habitual evasions.
Myshkin attributes the fanatical nihilism manifesting among elements of Russia’s youth 
to their desire, having been deprived by their historic circumstance of the possibility of 
an orthodox religious faith, to claim for themselves an equivalent conceptual ‘home’.
Throughout his work Dostoevsky seems to suggest, similarly, that secular 
idealism can only be a symptom of a confusing and directionless disappointment, never 
a cure for it. The ambiguities of human moral and idealistic impulses are plain to him,
9 The capacity and tendency of abstract idealists to translate personal or particular desires and 
deprivations into a general scheme of reform implies an inability to keep in mind the particularity of these 
desires and the determining influence of the circumstance in which they arise. Both tendencies rely on 
individuals’ desires to generalise, forming broad explanations which do not require further equivocation 
or concern for residual ambiguities. Prince Myshkin, in Dostoevsky’s The Idiot, encodes his personal 
experiences of circumstantial assurances and personal happiness as revelations of a path towards absolute 
solace. In this manner, he loses track of the personal contingencies which had generated the particular 
impact and meaning of these assurances, consequently the personal aspects are effaced and the original 
and essential substance of his assurances is only elliptically present in the ostensibly absolute principles 
he tries to convey to others.
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and thoroughly evoked in his work. But these ambiguities are ultimately inadmissible 
as neutral facts, they are offered instead as evidence implicating a type of moral 
reprehensibility in the reality he depicts, a reprehensibility that calls out for the 
rehabilitating influence of divine life-goals and moral dictates. Dostoevsky’s realism is 
ultimately an aesthetic tool of complex and often conflicted rhetorical purpose; it is 
never realism for realism’s sake (or naturalism) but a means of justifying authorial 
interpretations of reality (sometimes subtle, sometimes less so), and ascribing to them 
the status of ambivalent fact rather than personal preference. The complexity and 
conflict arise through Dostoevsky’s implicit interest in this end: he too requires his 
necessary truths to appear as rationally deduced empirical realities. The focus of this 
propaganda, though, is necessarily absent, and in the chaotic consequences its 
fundamental necessity is asserted. Dostoevsky’s distempered realism seems to provide 
an avenue in which the full range of his scepticism can be expressed in an impersonal 
fashion, a cathartic and cautionary experiment in which he animates all his worst fears 
and most pessimistic interpretations of ambiguous realities.
In “The Boy at Christ’s Christmas Party” (1876),10 Dostoevsky tells a story of a 
small boy freezing at Christmas. He admits he made it up but keeps “imagining that it 
really happened somewhere”.1* The boy’s mother has just died. He is alone and 
destitute, and while he freezes to death in the street, Jesus appears and invites him to his 
Christmas party, after which the boy dies happy. “So why did I make up a story like 
that” - precisely because he keeps imagining the reality it alludes to, and the neglect of 
important moral obligations which it reflects.12 Repeatedly Dostoevsky’s work asks, 
‘can we accept that this is simply ambivalent fact? It is too terrible. Therefore, if only 
the idea of God can guarantee a moral code that transcends self-interest, humanity must 
deify this idea’. Dostoevsky in this sense combines the capacity to propose the extreme 
consequences of god’s death with an affirmation of the cult of meekness Nietzsche 
attacked as the insidious foundation of Christianity. Ivan Karamazov asks a similar 
question to justify his hostility to the idea of a divine author; his lack of faith allows him 
to logically conclude that a God that approves the world as Ivan perceives it does not 
deserve human approval. For Dostoevsky, the extremes of this paradox provide an ever 
more compelling ground for faith; as the death of god becomes more apparent in the
10 Dostoevsky, “The Boy at Christ’s Christmas Party”, A Writer’s Diary - Volume I, 1873-1876, trans. 
Kenneth Lantz (London: Quartet Books, 1994), 310-14.
11 “The Boy at Christ’s Christmas Party”, 310.
12 “The Boy at Christ’s Christmas Party”, 314.
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world around him, his protestations of the importance of faith become proportionately 
more insistent. Dostoevsky wrote in A Writer’s Diary:
In “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man” (1877), a “moment” of clarity changes the 
dreamer’s way of seeing; it doesn’t change the world, but he does experience a typically 
epiphanic acuity: scales fall and what he now feels to be a true perspective of his world 
is attained. The Ridiculous Man’s dream leaves him with no particular vision for a new 
order or harmony, the particulars of his dreamed paradise were incomprehensible, but 
he now sees reality as the travesty of an ideal, and his repulsion is motivation enough to 
change the way he relates to this travesty. This is based on a program or method in 
which the ideal manifests as a prompt to activity (compelling the individual to dispel or 
discredit whatever eclipses it). However, the ridiculous man’s proportion now includes 
the ideal’s formative environment - a reality from which it is absent - as the context in 
which active fidelity to the ideal necessarily exerts itself. “That’s what we need to fight 
against! And I shall. If only we all want it, everything will be arranged at once”. The 
extrapolation of corruptions evident in the actual world, which had previously fuelled a 
cynical disdain for idealistic postures, galvanises the dreamer’s resolve to eschew any 
complicity with incipient chaos by acting “idealistically” in a protest (which against an 
abstract scale of general revolution seems futile, but in its limited and immediate 
context is indisputably benevolent) against the seeming unreality and impossibility of 
idealistic selflessness: “And I’ve found that little girl.... And I shall go on! Yes, I shall 
go on!”.14
In the body of this particular dreamer’s reflections, the interaction of self- 
awareness and critical reflection on the consequences of dreamed life establishes a new 
perspective that is not wholly contained within the aesthetic of dreaming.
13 Dostoevsky, “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man”, A Writer’s Diary - Volume II, 1877-1881, 960-61.
14 “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man”, 961. A similar indirect validation of what is in some ways the 
absurdity of idealistic and abstract investments in the otherwise brute reality of a meaningless fall from 
cradle to grave charges the close of Beckett’s The Unnamable (Molloy /  Malone Dies /  The Unnamable 
(London: Calder Publications, 1994), 293-418). As the narrator struggles to comprehend or place the 
moment of his death (wherein the obligation to keep saying words gives way to justified silence), and the 
point of his struggles at such a moment, the narrative’s closing words, “where I am, I don’t know, I’ll 
never know, in the silence you don’t know, you must go on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on”, attest to a strained 
but persistent resilience of intention (to make sense) that resolves the stumbling uncertainty of purpose or 
meaning that overtly, or literally, dominate the novel (Molloy /  Malone Dies /  The Unnamable, 418). In 
Richard Pevear and Linda Volokhonsky’s translation of “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man” (The Eternal 
Husband and Other Stories (New York: Bantam Books, 2000), 296-319), the direct resonance between 
these two assertions is lost: “And I’ll go! I’ll go!” (“The Dream of a Ridiculous Man”, 319). 
Nevertheless, in both translations the thematic sympathy - the consciously defiant assertion of what seems 
a hopeless optimism -  strongly anticipates the sober and resilient commitment to hope, in spite of a 
semblance of the rational absurdity of hope, which runs through much of Beckett’s work.
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Disinherited absolutists are often compelled by some moment of emotional or 
intellectual approval through which their ideals become more valid than conventional 
reality and any status quo, to actively attempt to bring their ideal into being: to act 
specifically on their ideal’s absence from reality. Rather than despair, the absence of 
the ideal provokes a resilient open-eyed commitment to its realisation. The Ridiculous 
Man’s change of heart comes about through a conscious personal choice, aware of its 
remoteness from any external authority or justification - a protest against apparent 
flaws, made in awareness of the unreality of the ideal it is justified by -  in which he, 
nevertheless, commits to kindling the worldly presence of attitudes and beliefs he 
idealises. This change potentially avoids, or rises above, the disillusioning discovery 
that what had appeared an absolute moral guide had all along reflected a merely 
personal, or at least partial, truth. Similarly, the feelings of betrayal and the urge to 
travesty what suddenly appears a weak and gullible altruism, which reverence for 
revealed or external ideals typically stores up for the idealist, are nipped in the bud; 
disappointment is expected, reality’s ambivalence is taken in stride.15
In relation to Dostoevsky’s ideological purpose in The Idiot, Joseph Frank (in 
Dostoevsky: The Miraculous Years, 1865-1871) writes:
... with an integrity that cannot be too highly praised, Dostoevsky fearlessly submits 
his own most hallowed convictions to the same test that he had used for those of the 
Nihilists -  the test of what they would mean for human life if taken seriously and 
literally, and lived out to their full extent as guides to conduct.16
The fearlessness of this submission is not surprising given that the failure of 
Dostoevsky’s beautiful idea is the fulcrum of his rhetorical effect. As Frank suggests, 
the fate of Myshkin’s ethic illustrates the implications of a literal application of his 
essentially Christian ideal. In Dostoevsky’s experimental exposure of a secular vessel
15 By contrast, “The Sentence”, one of Dostoevsky’s pieces in A Writer's Diary (October 1876, 1.4, 653- 
56), presents (parodically) the accusatory suicide note of an absolute idealist protesting against a hollow 
and rapacious materialism. Interlaced in the writer’s spiky denunciation of those who consent to go on 
living in complicity with such a world, there is a cameo of the inhibiting effect of a responsibility to 
sustain absolute categories of consent and resistance, without the counterbalance of optimism provided by 
faith. Suicide is the writer’s rational solution for fulfilling his idealistic dissatisfaction with the world.
The suicide note strikes an anti-materialistic line, claiming that eating, drinking and sleeping 
constitute stealing, not only property is theft but all forms of activity undertaken for the good of the 
individual. The writer is also pinned by Dostoevsky to a particularly silly and plainly obtuse rendition of 
the reflective individual’s longing for blissful ignorance, “Indeed, if I were a flower or a cow I would 
derive some pleasure” (654).
16 Joseph Frank, Dostoevsky: The Miraculous Years, 1865-1871, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), 341.
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of Christian patterns of virtue to a secular world, the historical development of 
Myshkin’s ideals and his subjective and emotional approval of their authority are of 
equal importance to his pseudo-messianic embodying of the “values of Christian love 
and religious faith”, and the “totally irrational and instinctive needs of ‘the Russian 
heart,’ Beyond Myshkin’s interior counsel, the particular meanings he considers 
himself to be invoking or participating with through his idealised terms are shown to be 
inherently contestable. For him, as for others, the authority of his ideals is contingent 
on nebulous conditions intrinsic to but unarticulated in his own involvement with them.
In Dostoyevsky: The Novel of Discord, Malcolm Jones suggests that, unlike many 
of Dostoevsky’s characters, Myshkin “does not strive to be original. He is naturally and 
spontaneously different” .18 Jones is perhaps thinking of Myshkin’s epilepsy, and his 
mystical intuitions, as signs of legitimate otherworldliness, but these are merely one 
element in the make-up of Myshkin’s visionary and didactic compulsions. The aspect 
that we learn about at the same time that we learn Myshkin is the idiot of the title, as 
well as what this means, is his rehabilitation in a Swiss sanatorium; his sentimental 
education is implanted as a fund of abstract moral prejudices. While Jones notes quite 
rightly that it is illuminating to consider Dostoevsky’s work as containing attempts to 
demonstrate the endurance of Christian values in the midst of chaos, his observation, 
that Dostoevsky “does not impose these values. He submits them to stringent tests 
which they often seem to fail”, suggests an eagerness to perceive an even-handed 
conducting of polyphonic voices. 19 The failures to which Jones refers are a part of the 
imposition which he claims they alleviate, they reflect the fate of characters who resist 
the values Dostoevsky implies offer the only possible order. Jones mistakes the nature 
of polyphony, or individual relativism, in Dostoevsky’s work as a source of 
unresolvable moral ambiguity (a polyphony which Dostoevsky is supposedly too 
scrupulous to curtail). It is rather more like a lesson in how to listen to the claims made 
from within a position of moral relativity, and how to interpret the relationships 
individuals form with an uncertain moral environment.
Rather than anathematising the human vessels that earnestly approve these secular 
travesties of transcendent morality, Dostoevsky discredits the tools which, by exploiting 
their uncertainty and their desire to commit to ‘higher’ purposes, bewitch them. On 
behalf of the “little boys and girls” of Russia, vulnerable and credulous in their
17 Frank, Dostoevsky: The Miraculous Years, 1865-1871, 328.
18 Malcolm V. Jones, Dostoyevsky: The Novel of Discord, (London: Paul Elek, 1976), 111.
19 Jones, Dostoyevsky: The Novel of Discord, 38.
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displacement and confusion, Dostoevsky dissects and stigmatises the provocative lure 
of secular certainties and the higher purposes they seem to define.
It would seem that Myshkin’s role in The Idiot ultimately serves Dostoevsky’s 
intention to show that ‘original’ positions are more likely to be constructed reactions to 
circumstance than the authoritative inspiration they can seem. ‘Authority’ can only be 
placed in God or Christ as representatives of an ideal which, though it might appeal to 
individuals due to their circumstantial desires and need for consolation, is nevertheless 
not independently formulated by them as their response to these prompts (the “idea” 
suggests a symbolic convention, rather, of conceptual solidarity). Dostoevsky binds 
Myshkin’s expansive gestures and his optimistic teachings both to his particular training 
by a Swiss doctor and humanist, and to the dismption of his personal development by 
mental illness. Myshkin’s “inspiration” is generated by particular circumstances, it is 
not a revealed or given object of faith, but suggests a benevolent subjective vision 
reacting against confusion. Nevertheless, the consequences of Myshkin’s idealism (his 
secular religion) are representative of the fate of abstract idealism in an increasingly 
materialistic and individualistic world. Myshkin offers a portrait of the essential or 
stripped back origin of any secular idealism and an argument as to why it has to be a 
disaster, no matter how beautiful its inception and intent, when the shadow of 
absolutism hangs over its moral accounting for its sacrifices and effects. Myshkin is not 
simply a victim of the chaos, the element of Dostoevsky’s novels around which Jones 
concentrates his study, he is a symptom of it also. The status of Myshkin’s “originality” 
in the novel, its effects and legitimacy, in relation to both its intended and actual effect, 
is one of Dostoevsky’s gauges of the corruption and the imminent disaster inherent in 
secular ideals and the moral independence of a profane population from a binding 
higher idea.
Myshkin’s collapse back into idiocy enacts a symbolic condemnation of the 
secular reality he is exposed to: he is incapable of persevering in a world which is 
inhospitable to the recognition of any common ideal as the foundation of brotherhood. 
Myshkin’s conviction cannot stand prolonged exposure to the element it aims to reform, 
he cannot approve a compromise (though he has repeatedly done so unwittingly and 
circumstantially) with the unbeautiful world and his mind shuts down, as if seeking out 
the asylum and sanctuary of imbecility.
In Crime and Punishment Raskolnikov learns to value, in contrast to the isolating 
obscurity of his solipsistic inspirations, the moral information available through
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communication and interaction with others. In The Idiot, though, the kind of latent 
communal values which rise up and triumph over Raskolnikov’s attempt to discard 
them bear the mark of corruption; they exist under suspicion of bad faith. Myshkin’s 
temporary surrender to conventions which he had seemed intrinsically hostile to 
proceeds through typically evasive and distracted rationalisations of the very habits 
which, initially he had instinctively opposed as inhibitions to the realisation of his initial 
idealisation of openness.20
Dostoevsky’s fear for the individual isolation and lost intimacy within 
communities living under the reign of bourgeois eloquence in The Idiot is infused into 
the cultural and social environment which embraces the characters in the novel. The 
characters oppose the constraints of this embrace through gestures towards transcendent 
ideals, such as openness and brotherhood, which, by the very standards of absolutism 
and disinterestedness that they invoke to justify conscientious objection, are rendered 
futile as tools of interaction with the actual world. The constraints of secular and 
materialistic social conventions, which ensure that these protests remain incompatible 
with reality, seem all the more insidious, though, and Dostoevsky’s “conclusion” all the 
more anguished, for the characters’ partial awareness of the divisive forces their 
disunity engenders, and their incapacity to resist or transcend these forces.
The victims in The Idiot are victims, like Raskolnikov, of the isolated incoherence 
of individualist idealism and of the conventions of social conduct equally; neither offers 
unequivocal solace or a foundation for transcendent moral guides and life-goals. 
Consequently, individuals are left to float unaffiliated until some semblance of authority 
offers the confidence and moral support they crave.
Dostoevsky is not so much depicting a process by which human beings learn from 
their mistakes (and therefore how to avoid them), but a process whereby they learn that 
mistakes are endemic to human interaction with the world. The positive humanism 
Frank seems anxious to attribute to Dostoevsky’s cautionary tales appears somehow 
unsuitable to registering the insistent uncertainty and ambivalence that lingers, whether 
intentionally or unavoidably, around every ‘moral’ resolution, insight or conviction 
which his novels often strive to frame. The kind of enlightenment Frank finds in 
Dostoevsky’s paternal didactic stance reflects a kind of desire to find an unequivocally
20 A significant part of Myshkin’s unworldly charisma, in The Idiot, is reflected in his capacity, initially, 
to disperse the need for strategic self-representation which Dostoevsky represents as intrinsic to 
interaction in the refined bourgeois world he enters. Myshkin appears to offer a nebulous but compelling 
alleviation of the salient (though contestable) standards of proper and desirable behaviour; he is a magnet 
for private denials of public personae, his presence repeatedly inspires imploring confessions that “this is 
not what I’m really like”.
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commendable (by Frank’s standards in this instance) agenda at the heart of 
Dostoevsky’s cautionary intention; this relies, though, on a capricious clearing of waters 
that Dostoevsky himself left muddy.21
Myshkin’s commitment to his ideal over reality suggests a genuine human fund of 
disinterested virtue. For Dostoevsky, though, without God to sanction tenable 
boundaries of moral accountability, forgiveness and permission, this fund, through the 
emotivist authorities it deifies, will inevitably lead to travesty and discontent (in The 
Brothers Karamazov, Ivan asks, “Is there in all the world a being that could forgive and 
have the right to forgive?” ). Without the embrace of spiritual authority, implies 
Dostoevsky, faith can only be an isolating contingent and problematic response to the 
need for these kind of boundaries.
Myshkin’s commitment to his abstract ideals, an apparent triumph over material 
self-interest, suggests a desperately enthusiastic gesture to obscure the ultimately 
contentious integrity of his initial ideal. This, suggests Frank, is “the framework within
y i
which the catastrophic destiny awaiting the Prince would be rightly understood.” 
What we see, though, is that these apparent negations, the practical contentiousness of 
Myshkin’s idealism in fact galvanise the faith which these negations appear to 
repudiate. It creates a gap of logic, and demands the a leap of faith which typically 
binds an idealist even tighter to an ideal which they recognise both as desirable and
21 Frank’s determination to see in Dostoevsky’s reactionary anti-nihilism the even handed concern of a 
noble about-face underplays the conviction and vigor with which, in spite of his sympathies, Dostoevsky 
condemns those who repeat the indiscretions of his own radical enthusiasms. I shall argue throughout this 
thesis that Dostoevsky virulently condemns habits and patterns of radical idealistic intellectualism out of 
repulsed and embarrassed recognition, rather than with the liberal even-handedness, and Christian mercy 
which Frank seems eager to impute to him. This woolly habit of inferring motives sympathetic to the 
particular critic, from what is an abundance of ambiguous conflicting tendencies within the works, is 
particularly common to Dostoevsky criticism. In relation to authors who deal in the ambiguous 
relationships which individuals and communities construct between faith, altruism, established order, 
moral absolutes, concrete necessities, and individual rights and responsibility, this is often the case. 
Shakespeare’s plays, for example, are routinely disputed over by an all but endless array of varying, 
opposing and mutually exclusive ideological camps, who respectively see in the same work justification 
for mutually exclusive interpretations and seek to establish their preference as fundamental. For a 
discussion of a similar tendency towards and reliance on tunnel-vision within Dostoevsky scholarship see 
S. Zhozhikashvili’s “Notes on Contemporary Dostoevsky Studies” (Russian Studies in Literature, 54, 4 
(1998), 56-92). Zhozhikashvili embarks on a rather disgruntled survey which draws particular attention 
to a propensity of many critics to rely on implicit claims of special insight - something like a mystical 
kinship with Dostoevsky - into the works. This supposedly special insight is then presumed to justify the 
offering up of merely asserted, speculative or subjective responses as a source of authoritative insight. 
Many Russian critics, suggests Zhozhikashvili, show few signs of having read one another; trusting in the 
unique insights afforded by their feelings of rapport with their subject, they suppose their own insights to 
deliver truths to which any reflections on or recognition of studies made by others would simply be 
superfluous.
22 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. David McDuff (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 
1993), 282.
23 Frank, Dostoevsky: The Miraculous Years, 1865-1871, 328.
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unreal. It is this kind of breach which Ivan Karamazov, contemplating a world typified 
by child abuse, cannot surmount; the ostensible circuit of faith, optimism and implicit 
approval invites what in Ivan’s rational approach amounts to a conscious complicity 
with an abhorrent and decaying world. Dostoevsky’s conviction that the horrors of the 
world pronounce the need for faith is dismpted for Ivan by a lack of optimism and a 
dependence on the forms of rational order. For Ivan the horror of the world dispels 
either the presence or the desirability of divine authority; God is either dead or 
incompetent. Ivan refuses to consign present sins to retribution in the by and by, “I 
want retribution, otherwise I shall destroy myself. And retribution not at some place 
and some time in infinity, but here upon earth, and in such a way that I see it for 
myself’.24 Ivan pronounces, “as long as I am on the earth I shall hasten to make 
arrangements of my own” .25 His conscientious objection protests against the 
prospective value of any future harmony that would approve with easy conscience its 
foundation in innocent suffering. While longing for certainty, indeed because of this 
longing, Ivan rejects the moral framework of divine retribution for its manifest failure to 
provide a comprehensible presence in human conduct.
Ivan’s conscientious objection and the purely human choice it necessitates occupy 
the void left by the rejected God. In an arresting exposure of an avoided self-image 
Ivan’s Devil taunts him with the disillusioning particularity of his supposedly logical 
responses to this situation.26 The absence of God leaves the individual unsupervised 
and a law unto themselves. From moral individualism the next progression is to the 
principle of separateness (in which the one is equal to all else), and then, Ivan’s devil 
proceeds on his behalf:
The place where I am will at once be the foremost place of all ... “all things are 
lawful”, and bastal All that is very charming except that if he intends to play the 
swindler why does he also, apparently, require the sanction of the truth? But such is 
our modern Russian manikin, without sanction he will not dare even to play the 
swindler, to such a degree has he come to love the truth.. .27
The ‘truth’ sanctions the actions of its subjects, and the crisis of faith provokes an 
urgent need of clear conduct and, therefore, an alternative focus of orientation to such
24 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 280.
25 The Brothers Karamazov, 281.
26 Ivan’s confrontation, essentially with his own past motivations and rationalizations, effects the same 
disruptive clarity as is experienced by Raskolnikov through the repellant recognition of his affinity to 
Svidrigailov.
27 The Brothers Karamazov, 750.
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truths: they become totemic objects serving as vessels for individuals’ devotion, rather 
than valid sources of authoritative external direction.
If vast miseries (such as thos^ which both Dostoevsky and Ivan register so 
clearly), are to be subsumed into an order or narrative sequence capable, in the by and 
by, of redeeming the authority that consents in the meantime to arbitrary suffering, then 
optimism, or faith, are necessities. Such optimism, or faithful commitment, though, is 
often in conflict with the demands of an immediate reality, it struggles to quiet the 
conflicting calls for immediate and contingent justice or moral protest, which arise in
90
particular circumstances and in the course of worldly relationships with others. 
Myshkin, for example, seems unable to comprehend the “crime” he comes to commit 
against Aglaya, but Radomsky demonstrates to him why it might nevertheless be 
reasonable, given the circumstances, for him to receive and accept blame. Ignorance is 
no guard against accountability (this is Raskolnikov’s lesson also); Myshkin can either 
admit the finite relationship between his ideal and the prompts of his mute anxieties or 
he can shut down in the manner of radical idealist retreat. Myshkin’s idiocy offers a 
refuge from the dilemma between idealistic impotence and conscious worldly 
compromise. It is a similar dilemma which informs Emma Bovary’s spiteful suicide, 
Kirillov’s dutifully theorised suicide, Axel’s triumphant suicide and Dipsychus’ 
rhetorically rationalised resignation to an existence he despises.
The tragic discord of inspiration and expression in The Idiot is not that of Christ made
human; it reflects rather the calibre of a human inspiration to reify the consolations
implied in the conditions of Christian brotherhood. Secular inspiration is intrinsically
emotive yet avails itself of the qualitative terms formed in the image of divine authority.
“Christ’s life as a system of salvation becomes a generality that can have only partial
30applicability in the lives of the particular individual’s [s/c] novel as a genre demands”.
28 Though such struggles seem to question the practical possibility of individual fidelity to an abstract 
idea, a situation where faith is so strong that such struggles could not take place -  a truly inhuman 
relationship with abstract guidelines - holds far more frightening prospects.
29 Kirillov, who appears in Dostoevsky’s Demons, commits suicide in order to prove his capability as a 
man-God to arbitrate over his own death. Axel, who is the main character of Villiers de l’lsle-Adam’s 
Axel, is a reclusive aristocratic aesthete. Through a variety of occult manipulations he draws his ideal 
woman to his castle, and after enjoying the consummation of their ideal love and an imaginatively 
projected future, he kills his lover and himself in order to preserve his vision’s sanctity against the 
inevitable disappointments of reality. Dipsychus toys with the idea of suicide, his final salute to idealism, 
“yet I could deem it better too to starve” (2.6.61-62), proposes the glory of refusing to live on in the 
absence of his ideal. He does not, however, act out this proposition, but, rather, absolves himself of any 
responsibility to die nobly rather than betray his ideal by rationalising his new alliance to reality as itself 
an idealistic surrender to the dictates of a higher authority.
30 Michael Holquist, Dostoyevsky and the Novel (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1977), 109. Holquist also suggests that The Idiot, “re-enacts the life-death-and-transfiguration of Christ,
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But the implications of Myshkin’s humanity are not limited to his lack of a divine grace 
of gesture. Aside from Myshkin’s inability to express his inspirations, their “partial 
applicability” to the lives of other people suggests an inevitable consequence of the 
solipsistic pedigree of any system or moral worldview issuing from a human brain. 
Through Myshkin’s heritage and his relationship with his intuited Ideals Dostoevsky 
stylises particular emotive provocations (for instance, abandonment and disorientation) 
in reaction to which secular idealism is typically constructed.
“But”, suggests Frank, “whatever the tragedy that Prince Myshkin and those 
affected by him may suffer in this world, he brings with him the unearthly illumination 
of a higher one that all respond to; and it is this response to “the light shining in the 
darkness” that for Dostoevsky provided the only ray of hope for the future”. Frank 
seems to mistake Dostoevsky’s intention in providing Myshkin with a genuine and 
compelling benevolence. Frank’s humanist impulse to accept the hope offered by the 
beautiful man to a population dominated by selfish materialism defuses Dostoevsky’s 
illustration of the impotence of human beauty or genius - however genuine, compelling, 
or inspired it might be - to compensate for the loss of external authority. Myshkin’s 
admirable qualities and the impoverished language of the community he enters are 
rhetorical extremes through which Dostoevsky stresses his point. The human individual 
cannot construct authoritative consolation without the provision of a stable impersonal 
frame of reference or language. Beyond his impulse to affirm his inspiration Myshkin 
is initially devoid of personality, but that impulse alone is self-interested enough to 
expose the weakness implicit in his desire to be certain. It is the ubiquitous weakness of 
anxious human beings deprived of faith.
If Myshkin is approached as a Christ figure or even as a holy fool the critique of 
his ordinary human idealism is disrupted by an emotive oversimplification of a situation 
which Dostoevsky intends to remain ambiguous. Myshkin’s failure to establish order in 
the image of human idealism is attributable to the absence of divine authority from the 
novel. The presence of God is inversely manifested in the fate and nature of the various 
frameworks of individual and communal order which His absence necessitates and 
facilitates.
In “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man” (1877), Dostoevsky depicts the apocalyptic 
contagiousness of the corruption intrinsic to the contemporary culture of individualism.
as if Christ were not the messiah, but as if he were an individual. What in the Bible is a series of acts 
interpreted according to their exterior, universal meaning, is rehearsed by Dostoevsky as the actions of 
particular men, whose meaning is inner, particular” (107).
31 Frank, Dostoevsky: The Miraculous Years, 1865-1871, 341.
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In his dream, the Ridiculous Man arrives in a perfect world and catastrophically infects 
it with his explanations of Western civilisation. Rather than provoking an inversion of 
the Ridiculous Man’s catalytic intrusion, Myshkin arrives as the innocent visitor, with 
inexpressible messages and unrealisable benevolence, and absorbs the problems of the 
individualist personality to which he had sought to provide an alternative. Myshkin’s 
relationship to the ethic of compassion and openness is somewhat more complex. 
Myshkin exists within his ethic’s semblance of divine sanction as a thoroughly human 
devotee, he is an unwitting infatuate of his need to believe in the possibility of a general 
human progression towards the recognition of an authoritative “good”. The vagaries of 
Dostoevsky’s methodology in portraying the role of secular idealism, particularly given 
his implicit condemnation of secular reality, allows Myshkin’s role in the novel to 
readily support overly sympathetic interpretations. Essentially partisan responses such 
as Frank’s appear to be in this instance, obscure Dostoevsky’s embracing though latent 
criticism of the wrong-headed approval of human enlightenment as a sanction of greater 
authority or knowledge. The embarrassing propensity to act foolishly is not outgrown 
through suffering, but accepted as a perpetual potential necessitating external checks.
Alongside the transcendent virtue which Myshkin’s ethic of selfless compassion 
aspires to express, Dostoevsky emphasises the undeniably particular aspects of his 
ostensibly other-worldly enlightenment and the implications of its garbled and 
compromising reception. In limiting the degree of understanding and intimacy 
available, the inertia that attends convention’s diffusion of challenge, and the isolation 
of individual inspiration, both point very deliberately to a particular conclusion: the 
catastrophic absence of God and the consequent loss of a code of truth and morality, 
commonly accepted as being external to and above human construction.
The fate of Myshkin and the profile of the bourgeois Westernised Russia to which 
Dostoevsky exposes him are both components of the reactionary realism through which 
Dostoevsky deliberately targets the atmosphere of abstract discourse in Russia and 
Europe. With the passion and irascible self-scrutiny of a recovered infatuate 
Dostoevsky infiltrates the processes of ideological devotion and self-sacrifice to 
ultimately confront his revolutionaries with the ridiculous contrivances that sustain their 
image of truth.
Frank writes that in The Idiot the “limitation of the narrator, however, is not at all 
meant to indicate a definitive evaluation of Myshkin by the author (as distinct from the 
narrator). What Dostoevsky sought to convey was the sense of a character transcending
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all the categories of worldly moral-social experience” .32 That the narrator’s “desertion” 
of Myshkin is not definitive is tme, but rather than ensuring the reader’s allegiance or 
otherwise it seems to demonstrate the gap (of comprehension or sympathy) that exists as 
a genuine obstacle to Myshkin’s communications. He does not transcend the 
“categories of worldly moral-social experience”, their obstruction of his message is 
Dostoevsky’s message. The nebulousness of Myshkin’s communication is not the 
indecipherable other-worldly perfection encountered in “The Dream of a Ridiculous 
Man”. Myshkin is human and his message originates through his human circumstance 
and personality, but he is unable to relinquish his aspiration to express himself in 
absolute terms or his desire to believe that such terms exist. His anxious aversion to the 
explicit possibility of catastrophe, which resides in unadulterated ambiguity, demands 
an emotive inspiration capable of assuring him that his personal assurances represent 
Truth. If Myshkin’s character transcends anything it is through his refusal to 
compromise his own commitment to an ideal he cannot clearly express or translate into 
a feasible ethic. This refusal asserts a desire for certainty and Dostoevsky’s conviction 
that divine faith is the only way in which this desire can safely be requited.
In The Idiot and less centrally, perhaps, in Dostoevsky’s work as a whole, the reaction 
of the community to the disruptive roles of individual idealists (typically perceived in 
“practical” terms as barren, superfluous and awkward) has become allied with bourgeois 
approval of a hollow moral structure disguised and bolstered by eloquence. In times of 
readily recognisable, or at least widely approved, abstract authority, Dostoevsky seems 
to imply, the malcontent or devotee of abstract values could protest against communal 
malaise in the name of recognised and esteemed virtues which, somehow, have fallen 
into neglect or been unwittingly overwhelmed by contingent compromises. With the 
spread of sceptical dissociation from common frames of authority, and with the 
increasing corruption of abstract idealism by a compulsion to idealise the pursuit (as 
Dostoevsky notes) of individual happiness and merely material contingencies, though, 
unimpeachable common terms are no longer available to the prospective malcontent; 
they cannot even be sure themselves what exactly their ideal is authorised by or directed 
against.
In the responses of the communities confronted by Raskolnikov, Myshkin and 
Ippolit, Dostoevsky illustrates the vested interest in the social harmony which is 
challenged by the individual’s quest to approve the validity of their abstract terms of
32 Frank, Dostoevsky: The Miraculous Years, 1865-1871, 291.
218
self-orientation. The challenge asserted by radicalism and discontent threatens the inter­
relationship of individuals. Porfiry Petrovich’s interest in the moral profile of 
Raskolnikov is more than simply that of a detective and Sonya’s response to 
Raskolnikov’s confession voices a more explicit concern on behalf of the communal 
bonds his crime has affronted. Sonya’s faith in the solidity of human community is 
unequivocal. This faith is less apparent in Dostoevsky’s depiction of social interaction 
in The Idiot. The curiosity with which unconventional behaviour is viewed is fraught 
with the kind of uncertainty that attends the dual observation of natural and 
conventional hierarchies in Dostoevsky’s anatomy of modem social hierarchy (the best 
people). Myshkin’s openness disrupts the observation of social convention but 
simultaneously seems to galvanise the conviction of the majority that such disruptions 
merely expose “impossible” impulses. It is the fact that they are indeed impossible 
within the framework of conventional good manners and status quo that Dostoevsky 
intends to stigmatise.
Milieu
It is evident from the Winter Notes on Summer Impressions (1863), that Dostoevsky’s 
visit to London provided him with an emblem of the stubborn and devious force of 
individualism, and a catalogue of symptoms which he began to diagnose in his 
homeland. In the conditions and behaviour of the vast urban populations of both 
London and Paris, Dostoevsky’s grave suspicions of the secular bourgeois complacency 
that held the potentially disparate elements of laissez-faire capitalism and individualism 
in stasis were crystallised in his spontaneous reactions to concrete social patterns. 
Observing the cultural ‘sickness’ of the English and French provided Dostoevsky with 
the conceptual tools to diagnose similar social dilemmas developing in Russia, and 
nurtured the bias from which he could stigmatise them as intrinsically alien. In the 
essay ’’Baal”, Dostoevsky observes:
Every abruptness, every contradiction, gets along with its antithesis and stubbornly 
walks hand in hand with it; they contradict each other yet apparently in no way 
exclude each other. It seems that they all stubbornly stand up for themselves and 
live in their own way, yet they apparently do not bother each other. At the same 
time, there is a stubborn, blind, already inveterate struggle here, a struggle to the 
death between the general individualistic basis of the West and the necessity of
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somehow getting along with each other, of somehow putting together a community 
and settling into a single anthill ,..33
Dostoevsky finds the English betrayal of the essence of idealism overtly dismal for its 
cynical acceptance of a vacuum of transcendent moral values which French eloquence 
aims at concealing.34 The communities of London and Paris are linked by “the same 
desperate struggle to maintain the status quo out of despair, to tear from oneself all 
desires and hopes, to curse one’s future, and to bow down to Baal” .35 Dostoevsky 
perceived London as the likely outcome of the blueprints of utopian society, stressing 
the harmonious balance attainable in individuals’ rational and utilitarian attendance to 
their self-interests, which radical socialists like Chemyshevsky were preaching at the 
time.36
It is necessary briefly to contextualise Dostoevsky’s antipathy to Western 
influences on Russia. One might call his position retrograde, but that would be 
inappropriate, his nationalism is echoed in one form or another in most countries after 
the Napoleonic Wars. It is neither elitist nor xenophobic, though in various settings it 
strikes these poses and more. One could almost think of Dostoevsky as welcoming
33 Dostoevsky, “Baal”, Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, trans. David Patterson; 1988 
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1997), 35-42, 36.
34 In this regard, implies Dostoevsky, the difference between the English and French exists merely in the 
outward trappings of a common ideology of material self-interest: the Parisian pretends to fleece you out 
of sacred duty while the English would acknowledge the primary motive of individual profit. Each 
merely resorts to a different justification for pursuing personal satisfaction. See Winter Notes on Summer 
Impressions, 45.
35 Dostoevsky, “Baal”, 36. In comments like this one, Dostoevsky’s extreme concerns for the 
implications of individualism and materialism in late nineteenth century Europe take on a tone and 
posture strongly resembling Matthew Arnold’s polemic juxtaposition of right reason and philistinism in 
Culture and Anarchy. In both authors, respective fears that the moral habits of the ignoble populace 
contain a threat to eclipse more rigorous self-denying codes of ‘spiritual’ idealism generate similar 
reactionary hostilities to modernity’s disruption of conventional degree.
36 Chemyshevsky’s emblematic utopia, the crystal palace of What is to be Done?, would actually end up, 
implies Dostoevsky, resembling the sullen and suspicious materialistic dystopia he perceived in the slums 
of London. In Notes from Underground, the Underground Man rails against the ‘Crystal Palace’, it is 
nothing more than a chicken coop, in which the absence of choice or' individual desire would reduce 
individuals to organ stops or cogs in a machine.
37 It is possible to distil from Dostoevsky’s notion of the Western Man the personification of a cultural 
malaise, rather than a delineation of national or racial characteristics. It is the diagnosis of a problematic 
relationship between cultured individuals and their idea of community that is the vital impulse, while the 
nationalist enthusiasms which Dostoevsky’s optimistic prescriptions pin these to reflect the speculative 
response to a legitimately registered malaise. Dostoevsky, however, chose to see these as inseparable 
complements (the sickness and the cure) of a global rebirth. It is not necessary to prove he was wrong, it 
suffices to say that the pertinence of his distinctions related to the intention of his social criticism. The 
men of Europe are not absolutely destined to be Western men and, as Dostoevsky and many of his peers 
demonstrate, the educated Russian citizen is no more secure in their Russian-ness than they are immune 
to the genuine cultural influence and nourishment by the West. The essence of their crisis is a cultural 
upheaval, and the consequent dilemmas between equally abstracted notions of tradition and civilised 
progress. The undeniable miscegenation of culture at the educated levels of Russian society and the 
confusion of origins, heritage and belonging which it engenders, suggests that the idealisation of “the 
people” was almost a logical necessity in making a clear distinction of a national character possible.
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the spectre of westernisation as a revivifying threat allowing him to clarify the manner 
in which values, travestied or displaced by modem individualistic principles, remain 
vital and relevant. Nevertheless, at this point it is of more value to examine the 
symptoms without applying Dostoevsky’s ideological agenda, but bearing it in mind 
nonetheless. For through Dostoevsky’s depictions of the encroachments of Western 
culture into Russia, and in the pervasive significance of these depictions in his work, 
some symptoms of modernisation are helpfully anatomised. Dostoevsky is liberated 
somewhat by the notion that the human symptoms and idiosyncracies of western 
modernisation are alien and exorcisable, rather than common human traits flourishing 
through social and cultural change. In Dostoevsky’s epidemiology of social and 
individual character the foreign bodies which carry such a threat to his ideal are 
allusively linked to their symptoms. Dostoevsky’s fascination with the role of the West 
in Russia incorporates both admiration and repulsion; he was stimulated by the urgent 
moral dilemmas -  relating to cultural tradition, reform, evolution, revolution, faith, 
moral community and chaos -  which their juxtaposition could bring so strikingly into 
relief.
While Dostoevsky seeks ostensibly to particularise and distance his observations 
of the West (they involve ‘Parisians’ and ‘Londoners’), he thinks the cultural depravity 
he equates with the Western metropolis is contagious and regards it as the ominous 
adumbration of a Russian future. Appearing immediately after the trip which provided 
the stimulation for these winter notes, the Underground Man suggests something like a 
distillation of Dostoevsky’s diagnosis of the type of character formed in the artificial 
retort of Western individualism. In the Underground Man’s closing complaints against
Rather than the particulars of the national character, though, it is the actual idealisation, with its capacity 
to assuage the anxiety for a dwindling national heritage, which generates the enthusiasm for the curative 
potential of pure Russian-ness.
While complaining, in A Writer’s Diary, of the new conventional hierarchy of the money bag and 
the calamity that threatens through the “terrible majority” that acknowledge its status, Dostoevsky reveals 
the optimistic prospect of a humane and anti-materialist ethic. The Russian people, whom “we” (the 
educated upper classes), “in our enlightened pride and, at the same time, our naive ignorance, were wont 
to consider ‘incompetent’ ” (A Writer’s Diary -  Volume 1, 674), had risen up en masse and gone to 
Serbia, to offer their lives “for the sake of some of their brethren” (673). In undertaking this “crusade”, 
suggests Dostoevsky, they have clearly demonstrated their conception of “the best person”: “the one who 
does not give in to material temptation” (674). It remains for the enlightened to synthesise from this 
demonstration a convention capable of leading Russia and the rest of Europe away from the chaotic rule 
of the money-bag.
Of course, Dostoevsky was far from alone in his fears for national identity, and similar kinds of 
optimistic and naive idealisation of fertile interaction with the Russian peasantry appear also in Tolstoy’s 
work as an antidote to the existential malaise of the gentry. Throughout most of the middle and late 
decades of the nineteenth century, questions relating to the future of Russian national identity were 
ubiquitous in intellectual, aesthetic and political debate. This debate was polarised by the Slavophiles, 
preaching the moral superiority of a simplified return to peasant traditions, and Westemisers who 
supported an effective surrender of Russian identity in deference to the refinement of the West.
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the circumstance that has formed him, though, the outlines and implications of 
Myshkin’s heritage are present also.
It’s a burden for us even to be men -  men with real, our own bodies and blood; 
we’re ashamed of it, we consider it a disgrace, and keep trying to be some 
unprecedented omni-men. We’re stillborn, and have long ceased to be born of 
living fathers, and we like this more and more. We’re acquiring a taste for it. Soon 
we’ll contrive to be born somehow from an idea.38
By transposing the “beautiful idea” of compassionate self-sacrifice, exemplified for 
Dostoevsky by Christ, into a social atmosphere extrapolated from the sterile 
separateness and aestheticism of the Underground Man, Dostoevsky travesties his 
fondest hopes in order to communicate the impossibility of secular brotherhood. The 
repercussions of this impossibility are implicitly manifest in Lizaveta Prokofievna’s 
denunciation, after Myshkin’s collapse, of liberalism and abstraction for engendering, in 
Russia, the hollow and cynical contingency of Western culture. “There’s been enough 
getting carried away with things, it’s time to listen to common sense. And all this, and 
all this abroad, all this Europe of yours, it’s all just an illusion, and all of us abroad are 
nothing but an illusion. . . ” .39 Both the bourgeois eloquence which had resisted 
Myshkin’s ethic of openness and compassion, and the philanthropic enthusiasm that 
forged his anxieties into a conflicted crusade, exist and arrive in Russia as 
manifestations of “abroad”. In amplifying the prevalence of Western eloquence and 
secular individualism in Russia, Dostoevsky projects the prospective condition of a 
society existing in displacement from its cultural tradition. The community’s loss of 
traditional foundations is manifest in the separation and alienation of its subjects, it is a 
condition which points to the broader loss of credible frameworks of communal vitality. 
A loss, that is, which extends beyond nationalistic concerns to feelings of disinheritance 
from a divine lineage. In The Idiot, Keller’s enumeration of contemporary parallels to 
Revelation emphasises the modem political pattem of decisions reached “by
38 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, 130. Pevear’s and Volokhonsky’s translation is the most recent 
of which I am aware; it differs only slightly throughout from another recent translation by Jane Kentish, 
Notes from the Underground and The Gambler, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). Pevear’s and 
Volokhonsky’s version, however, is more spare and direct; the Underground Man’s awkward, insistent 
and slightly overwrought manner is consequently more apparent in the form as well as substance of his 
writing, than it is in other translations. Pevear, however, makes a point of translating one of the 
Underground Man’s recurring terms of self-definition, “z/oy” (which is often translated as “spite” or 
“spiteful”) as “wicked” which, Pevear suggests, is the more appropriate and accurate term. Defending 
this decision in the introduction to his translation, Pevear explains that the use of “wicked” reintroduces a 
spiritual and moral element to the Underground Man’s distemper which Dostoevsky meant to be explicit 
but which the translation “spiteful” obscures by inviting or allowing a merely psychological or 
behavioural interpretation of his position and its implications.
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agreement”, implying a moral frame determined by the strategic compromises of 
intrinsically separate individuals, rather than observation and application of an 
unimpeachable body of moral law.
To Dostoevsky’s mind the moral rationalisations allied with and alloyed to 
materialistic individualism, and exemplified by the idealisations of stasis he associated 
with the French bourgeoisie, intrinsically excludes brotherhood (this is evident in the 
remainder of “An Essay Concerning the Bourgeois”). In Dostoevsky’s Edenic 
conception of ’brotherhood’, brotherhood is not only the end to which utopianism might 
progress, it is also the only means by which it can be perpetuated. And yet, in the very 
soil out of which Dostoevsky believed such redemptive brotherhood might erupt and 
flow out over Europe he observed an increasingly individualistic mind-set taking root. 
The apparent fervour of Dostoevsky’s conviction that Russia was destined to redeem 
the spiritually barren state of Western civilisation, owes as much to an awareness of the 
potent inroads ‘bourgeois’ individualism had made into more advanced Western 
cultures, as it does to his faith in the fertility of Russian spirituality. The relationship 
between the reactionary character of Dostoevsky’s ideology and its circumstantial 
prompts - Russian manifestations of ‘Western’ individualism - offers a doubly revealing 
relationship. In his hostility to its presence Dostoevsky anatomises a common trend of 
Western civilisation at that time, the proliferation of the social and cultural symptoms 
he focuses on is unmistakable throughout the Western world.
Best People
In an 1873 issue of A Writer's Diary, Dostoevsky noted: “Our bankruptcy as ‘fledglings 
from Peter’s nest’ is now beyond doubt. The Petrine period of Russian History was 
truly ended by the 19th of February [1861], so that long ago we entered into a period of 
complete uncertainty”.40 In Crime and Punishment, Razumikhin particularises some of 
the consequences of this uncertainty.
It’s what your Moscow lecturer answered when he was asked why he forged lottery 
tickets: ‘Everybody else is getting rich one way or another, so I wanted to get rich 
quickly, too.’ I don’t remember his exact words, but the meaning was for nothing, 
quickly, without effort. W e’re used to having everything handed to us, to pulling
39 Dostoevsky, The Idiot, trans. Alan Myers (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 652.
40 Dostoevsky, “Vlas”, A Writer’s Diary -  volume 1, 169.
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ourselves up by other men’s bootstraps, to having our food chewed for us. Well, 
and when the great hour struck, everyone showed what he was made of[.]41
Razumikhin refers to the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, the great hour when the 
feudal basis of Russian society was dismantled. From the Moscow lecturer’s crime and 
motive Razumikhin extrapolates a disruption of the basis on which the vitality of moral 
and ethical distinctions had rested.
In a later issue Dostoevsky discusses the ramifications of this disruption in 
relation to its effect on the values and individual qualities which formed the backbone 
of social hierarchy: “[t]he best people ... these are people without whom no society and 
no nation can live or endure”.42 They consist of two kinds, “those to whom the people 
themselves and the nation itself pay their reverence voluntarily, recognising their 
genuine valor”, and “those to whom all or very many of the people or the nation pay 
reverence through a certain compulsion ... rather as a matter of convention and not 
completely or genuinely” 43 This division of an unconscious recognition and sympathy 
with particular human qualities as opposed to an observance of conventional forms 
underlies the social reality Dostoevsky aims to stigmatise in The Idiot. On a community 
steeped in, and potentially sterilised by, the conventions of Western individualism, 
Dostoevsky unleashes Myshkin as an unworldly embodiment of an ostensible 
selflessness. Myshkin is capable, therefore, of eliciting the reverence of a “genuine 
valor”; but it is the nature of this valor to be intertwined with compromising ambiguities 
which challenge any absolute reverence for its role and worth in the modem realities 
which Dostoevsky’s novels depict.
Examining the significance of the two divisions of this important class 
Dostoevsky describes the change from the chivalric boyar knights to the Petrine 
reforms’ sorting of the “best people” into the fourteen categories of the civil service. 
The “great hour” to which Razumikhin refers draws near: “suddenly there occurred one 
of the most colossal revolutions Russia had ever experienced: serfdom was abolished 
and everything changed profoundly”.44 The fourteen classes remained but the “best 
people” began to falter as the population’s views on what was best began to change. 
That previous notions of the best had become inadequate was undeniable but no 
alternative had announced itself. “Whom can we now consider our best people? Most
41 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, trans. Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky (London: Vintage, 
1993), 151.
42 Dostoevsky, “The Best People”, A Writer’s Diary — volume 1, 663-666, 663-4.
43 “The Best People”, 664.
44 “The Best People”, 664.
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important, where shall we find them? Who will take the responsibility for proclaiming 
them the best, and on what basis? Does someone need to take this responsibility? And 
finally, do we know what this new basis is? Will anyone accept that this is the proper 
basis on which we must build so much anew?”.45 Writing in 1876 Dostoevsky could 
begin to proffer some answers to these questions. Dostoevsky reflects that in the initial 
dissociation of the agreed criteria of what is “best” in people from traditionally class 
based distinctions, a rationale for maintaining the status of the actual qualities of 
previous “conventionally best people” was sorted into the notion of “naturally best 
people”.46 In redirecting the esteem of natural virtues to socially approved forms, 
convention proclaims the authenticity of the spontaneous reverence which determines a 
community’s “natural” hierarchy, while perpetuating traditional prejudices at the level 
of criteria. In Turgenev’s Fathers and Children the nihilistic youths, Bazarov and 
Arkady, pay a visit to Matvey Ilyich, an older relative of Arkady’s and a high official. 
Mindful of the progressive principles of the younger generations Matvey Ilyich 
recommends the pair pay their respects to the local Governor thus: “I advise you, my 
dear boy, to go and call on the Governor,... you understand, I don’t advise you because 
I adhere to old-fashioned ideas of the necessity of paying respect to authorities, but 
simply because the Governor’s a very decent fellow”.4' In such ways the effective 
distinctions of respected authorities are transposed into “natural” virtues.
“In the place of the former ‘conventional’ best people”, Dostoevsky suggests,
. . . there appeared a new convention that almost immediately assumed a most 
terrible significance among us. Oh, of course we had the money bag earlier as well; 
it always existed in the person of the former merchant-millionaire; but never was it 
elevated to such a status and given such a significance as in our recent history.48
Dostoevsky further distinguishes the former merchant caste and the present 
merchant caste through their relationship with the upper class. The crowning 
achievement of the former merchant was to entice a dignitary to their dinners and balls 
and thereby sanctify their improved though still inferior status. The present merchant 
class “no longer needs to lure a ‘personage’ to his house for dinner or give a ball for 
him; he already has become his kinsman and mbs elbows with him ... he himself is now
45 “The Best People”, 666.
46 Dostoevsky, “On the Same Topic”, A Writer’s Diary -  Volume 1, 667-74, 667.
47 Ivan Turgenev, Fathers and Children, trans. Constance Garnett, rev. Patrick Waddington (London: 
J.M. Dent; Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle, 1998), 59.
48 Dostoevsky, “On the Same Topic”, A Writer’s Diary -  Volume 1, 668.
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a somebody, a personage”.49 The tone recalls Thackeray’s Book of Snobs, and the 
content reflects the experience of a similar social realignment.50 In both cases social 
esteem for the status and privileges conventionally associated with nobility are 
maintained, but the strict hierarchical boundaries (essentially of breeding), and the 
virtues this hierarchy had purportedly reflected, are compromised by pragmatic 
materialistic concerns.
The trajectory of the dilemma that ensues from this disruption of traditional social 
degree is exemplified in the fate of such aspirants to the highest eschelons of public life 
as Gogol’s Poprishchin51 and Dostoevsky’s Golyadkin. A general atmosphere of 
merely competitive aspiration flourishes in this opened out hierarchy. The sudden 
semblance of attainability which attaches itself to aspirations and expectations 
previously unthinkable plays a vital part in the division of self, or mental incoherence, 
which distinguishes the considerable population of literary doubles emerging in the 
nineteenth century.
The extension of the Western style of being to the provincial minions allows and 
entices Dostoevsky to indulge in his most parodic and direct depictions of 
individualism’s destabilisation of conventional social degree. In The Village 
Stepanchikovo (1859), Vidoplyasov, with his farcical demeanour and the doubly self- 
indicting rejection of his given name, ends in a mad house. In The Double Dostoevsky
49 “On the Same Topic”, 670.
50 In Thackeray’s The Book of Snobs (St. Lucia, Queansland: University of Queansland Press, 1978), the 
inter-marrying of money and nobility is jeeringly exposed: “Perhaps the best use of that book, the 
peerage, is to look down the list, and see how many have bought and sold birth -  how poor sprigs of 
nobility somehow sell themselves to rich City Snobs’ daughters, and how rich City Snobs’ purchase noble 
ladies -  and to admire the double baseness of the bargain” (36).
Any parallel here is most likely due to the similar social transitions which prompt these kinds of 
inter-class transactions, nevertheless, Dostoevsky was certainly familiar with Thackeray. In the April 
1876 Edition of A Writers Diary Dostoevsky casts his mind back thirteen years and reflects on an attempt 
to borrow on of Thackeray’s novels from a library. The young librarian dismissively announces, “We 
don’t keep such rubbish” before citing the “rational demand” of social progress which has no use for art 
(A Writer’s Diary I, 647-48). Dostoevsky’s negative rendition of this experience of ideological 
censoriousness redresses, perhaps, a similar example, also invoking Thackeray’s work, of the utilitarian 
appraisal of art for its social utility in Chernyshevsky’s novel What Is To Be Done?. The comparative 
utilitarian merits of Thackeray’s works are delineated in order to offer a sort of litmus test of productive 
reading: the progressive Rakhmetov responds with pleasure to the social criticisms of Vanity Fair but, 
finding nothing new and, therefore, nothing useful, in Pendennis, casts it aside after 20 pages (see What 
Is To Be Done?, 283).
51 Poprishchin translates as “career”.
52 Turgenev makes use of a similar trope to establish the discordant and somewhat absurd dissemination 
of urban, cultivated, Westernised fashions, of attitude, clothing, reading etc., to isolated provincial 
communities. In the opening to Fathers and Children, where Arkady’s father awaits his son’s return 
from university (and the city), a minor cameo of the clash of modem urban ideas with traditional order is 
adumbrated in the dismissive presentation of the clownishly ä ia mode servant Piotr. What Turgenev 
implies, and Dostoevsky tends to do something similar, is that under-educated and ambitious minions like 
Piotr, or Smerdyakov, merely ape the surface of cultural and intellectual progress and cultivation with no 
understanding of the deeper currents these surfaces express. Lacking this deeper knowledge these 
characters tend to end up travestying the values to which their posturings superficially defer.
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had already reworked the fate of Gogol’s Poprishchin, but in the further revisitation in 
Vidoplyasov’s ambition, the disorientation of the individualist upstart is grafted to the 
predominantly intact feudal traditions of the rural gentry. In this context the hubris of 
individualist ambition seems even more absurd, while its social implications have 
become both more pervasive and disruptive. Vidoplyasov is the protege of the parasitic 
petty tyrant and self-appointed haut-bourgeoisie Foma Fomich who is also “civilising”
C O
the serfs with French lessons. In The Brothers Karamazov, the sight of Smerdyakov 
in spectacles, studying French vocables, both confronts and affronts Ivan with a vivid 
image of a potentially chaotic dismption of the conventional foundations of social 
degree.54 Smerdyakov, like Vidoplyasov, is a provincial underling aspiring to attain the 
outward trappings of his intuited self-worth and a feeling of more than theoretical 
equality.
It is worth noting that the relationship between Ivan and Smerdyakov -  reflecting 
Dostoevsky’s juxtaposition of a well-proportioned, aristocratic lineage of knowledge 
and ideas with the eager, impressionable, sometimes envious and undifferentiating, 
adoption by individuals with a less rounded intellectual heritage - is analogous to 
broader cultural trends and disharmony in Russia’s relationship with the intellectual 
culture of the West. From Peter the Great’s Europeanism to the instability of the Tsarist 
state which Dostoevsky registered with anxious intensity, it is often noted that Russia 
proceeds through a whirlwind of the historical developments of its Western 
counterparts: “their history did not seem to parallel that of those privileged states in the 
West which shared a Roman Catholic Middle Ages or Renaissance Humanism” .55 
Having been grafted without regard for the constitutive circumstantial substructure
53 Foma Fomich, whose vanity and eloquent manipulations of reality announce his Underground 
affinities, tyrannises the credulous and incredulous characters equally, through his intrusive control and 
revision of their versions of him. Without this sly tyranny, the other characters might credibly challenge 
his self-perception. “Do you realize you have debased and dishonoured me by your refusal to refer to me 
as “Your Excellency”, he berates his patron, host, and social superior, “you dishonoured me because in 
failing to understand my motives, you made me appear a capricious fool who ought to be put away in an 
asylum” (The Village of Stepanchikovo, trans. Ignat Avsey; 1983 (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin 
Books, 1995), 96). His well bred host is of course sincerely apologetic and placating, to challenge him 
would be undignified (an ignoble and ill-bred assertion of rank), and Foma knows it. Foma’s rule, 
exerted through manipulative tantrums and accusations, is particularly hard to crush, due to the nurturing 
indulgence which his outlandish postures call forth from those who patronise him as an overwrought half­
man. This novel has also been translated as A Friend of the Family.
54 For Jones, in Dostoyevsky: The Novel of Discord, disorder is one of the fundamental influences on and 
preoccupations of Dostoevsky’s work: “above all, Dostoyevsky grappled with the great problem which 
overtook European man in the wake of the French Revolution and the growth of urbanisation: the old 
certainties, the old unitary views of the world were crumbling” (10). Jones writes also that Dostoevsky 
understood “that the breakdown of the old religious certainties and ethical values was related to the 
breakdown of the social order, that individualism, fragmentation, the multiplication of differing ideas and 
philosophies of life was a phenomenon which made no distinction between social, philosophical, 
psychological and other factors” (15).
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which European culture expressed, the habits of the West penetrated the character of 
nineteenth century Russia with a similar sort of hierarchical esteem of self-conscious 
cultivation to that which Dostoevsky reveals as the heart of the modem individual’s 
self-alienating duality.56 Mr Golyadkin’s loss of self-orientation within the stifling 
artifice of the unreal city is the burlesque sounding of an alarm which in later works is 
more cynically portrayed in the paradoxically self-reverential self-stifling of the 
adolescent careerists (such as Ganya, Arkady Dolgoruky and Raskolnikov). The 
embittered isolation of Dostoevsky’s raw youths is proffered as evidence of the infertile 
hybridity of a representative generation that has been deprived of the nurture of 
communal belonging by the pervading individualism and materialism of modernising 
Russian society: “For the Russians after Peter the clock -  or calendar -  was always 
West European, with the consequence that they felt out of phase at any given 
moment” .57
In Lizaveta Prokofievna’s denunciation of “abroad”, which is “all just an 
illusion”, Dostoevsky concludes The Idiot on a note of trepidation: with this ‘illusion’ 
encroaching, how will the bourgeoisie, and modernising, ‘westernising’ Russia, avoid 
the extinction of their Russian characteristics and avoid becoming subordinate to 
currents they have no organic involvement with.58 This is the wider concern in relation 
to which the particular communal dilemmas take place; Dostoevsky’s reactionary 
nationalism suggests a form of consolation for what he depicts as the infiltration of 
Western habits into Russian society. Having envisaged Western culture as a disease 
Dostoevsky can identify social discord as symptomatic rather than endemic, and is 
consequently liberated to indulge the extremes of his scepticism. In the name of 
cautionary diagnosis, he is able to register a reality which might otherwise suggest the
55 Holquist, Dostoevsky and The Novel, 4.
56 Sketching the intellectual heritage of nineteenth century Russia, in Dostoevsky and the Novel, Michael 
Holquist invokes the feeling of orphanhood as an analogy for the historical and spiritual condition which 
many Russian authors directly addressed. Paraphrasing Chaadev, Holquist writes, “it is at just that point 
when history seems most necessary to the Russians that they discover they do not have one” (14). Where 
Russia looks for the “understanding of the past, knowledge of the factors which controlled its 
development through the ages” (14), it finds “nothing durable, nothing permanent; everything flows, 
everything passes without leaving traces either outside or inside. In our own houses we seem to be 
guests, in our families we look like strangers...” (14-15). The struggle of individuals against historical 
and biographical discontinuity is one of the central themes of Holquist’s subsequent analysis of 
Dostoevsky’s novels. Holquist’s observation that, “in The Idiot the generation of the fathers has not 
passed on to the sons those principles by which the worth of things may be determined” (121-22) 
expresses in miniature his sense of the importance of the metaphorical condition of orphanhood with 
which Dostoevsky repeatedly expresses the crisis of modem individualism. Holquist’s observation could 
equally be applied to Crime and Punishment, Demons, An Accidental Family and The Brothers 
Karamazov.
57 Holquist, Dostoevsky and the Novel, 4.
58 Dostoevsky, The Idiot, 652.
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extinction of the “natural” potential for selfless devotion or faith, on behalf of which his 
evocation of despair pleads its case.
“Abroad” in this instance indicates the West, but effectively it signifies the 
imposition and esteem of cultural artifice which avoids and denies reality rather than 
being tempered and customised in collaboration with it. It is an artifice which comes to 
dominate and reflexively challenge what Dostoevsky thinks of as natural human order 
rather than accepting its answerability to the actual conformation of people and their 
social world. While the West seems cynically immune to the despair implicit in the 
synthesised utility which authoritative terms and convictions become, the Russian 
bourgeoisie, with a kind of national predisposition to the adolescent habit of deification, 
seems to imbibe the form with a sincere faith in its positivist faqade. Myshkin, along 
with the young atheists whose earnestness he defends, reflects the awkward 
consequences of sincerely absorbing the alien synthesis of human choices with the 
residual language of absolute justifications. As long as secular idealism avoids or 
denies its dependence on emotive usages of ostensibly authoritative language, the 
individual or relativistic sanctity of each separate “idea” is promoted to the detriment of 
any grounds for communal discourse; which are reduced to a stagnant conglomerate of 
fragmented and often incompatible truths. In Demons, the various revolutionaries 
acting with Pyotr Stepanovich have a variety of personally nurtured, ostensibly 
ideological motivations. The variety alone is suggestive of Dostoevsky’s doubts about 
the credibility of secular activism. In the light of the atrocities performed out of a desire 
to test and empower these motivations, Dostoevsky exposes the corrosive desperation 
that tends both to facilitate this method of dispersing uncertainty and subsequently to 
compensate for its unexpected inadequacy.
Dostoevsky deliberately disperses and undermines traditionally firm moral and 
social and spiritual conventions to evoke the metaphysical uncertainties of the sceptical 
and secular world. In response to the conscientious befuddlement engendered by this 
world, actions are often performed out of a blind or half-aware need (exacerbated by 
necessities of practical social interactions) to provoke or precipitate definitive feelings 
and ideas, which might clarify or imply the absolute moral significance of particular 
types of action. I shall explore this disjunction between conviction and intellectual 
certainty more thoroughly in relation to Crime and Punishment. The desire to provoke 
the external world into exerting clear boundaries recurs in more banal circumstances 
throughout Dostoevsky’s work: under the guise of pre-emptive acts of incipient
229
conviction, all manner of tentative acts of self-experimentation seek out the certainty 
they claim to reflect.
Often, these tentative acts of inducing certainty are attended by an anxiety for 
their credibility which, as with Raskolnikov and in the case of Pyotr Stepanovich’s 
nascent dissident cell in Demons, actually compels the ‘convinced’ individuals to act 
more rashly and with increasing disregard for any ambiguities their convictions deny. 
Shatov is consumed to vivify Pyotr’s insurgent cause and to redress the undermining 
threat of his increasing estrangement from abstract ideology. The genuinely idealistic 
proposals implicit in Myshkin’s enthusiastic benevolence are similarly neutralised by 
the sheer necessity of an eloquent status quo in granting the population their immediate 
“right” to pursue their particular happiness.
The Pitfalls o f Eloquent Emplotment
“Eloquence”, notes Holquist, “is conceived by Dostoevsky not as forceful expression, 
but as bombast; the characteristic trait of language so used is a disparity between event 
and expression: eloquence is a term used by him to indicate language’s power to 
deceive; it is form put into the service of concealing content” .59 This “content” is not 
only concealed from the listener; the act of expression involves a sort of unwitting 
nullification of undesirable knowledge for the one exerting their eloquence also. Both 
the actor and the audience have the same stake in eloquence’s ability to veil events. 
Those who keep to themselves (Golyadkin and the Underground Man for instance) are 
constantly both orator and auditor. The effects of eloquence, though, are not limited by 
Dostoevsky to the areas in which, in Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, he finds 
them exemplified. Eloquence is not merely the mode through which dreamers, 
underground cynics, and politicians disguise and diffuse the implications of their 
evasive truths from themselves and others. The instances Dostoevsky explores are 
extremes in which the habits and symptoms of eloquence are most apparent. The 
implication drawn from these instances is of an insidious circumstance, associated with 
the pervasion of Western ideologies and culture, in which abstract truths have become 
divorced from a common framework of external authority. The recognisable terms of 
these undermined truths consequently become a fertile language for rationalising, for all 
manner of reasons, subjective needs and desires in the ostensibly authoritative language
59 Holquist, Dostoevsky and The Novel, 46.
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of impersonal abstraction. This is not merely due to the availability of these terms, but 
also reflects the vacuum-like influence of a feeling of having lost an underlying 
meaning, which demands replenishment.
Holquist suggests that “the underground man is Dostoevsky’s French bourgeois 
raised to the level of a phenomenological type” .60 Or rather, the Underground Man is 
Dostoevsky’s warning that a disquiet similar to that which breeds the eloquent self­
justifications he attributes to the Western bourgeoisie, is spreading as “the anxiety of 
modem man” .61 And the discourse of the bourgeois, the eloquence of their “strategies 
for deceiving”, is becoming the fundamental tool in the anxious individual’s combative 
rationalisations or denials of discrepancies between real facts and their subjective ideals.
By emplotment (one of Holquist’s terms) I mean to imply a process through 
which an individual’s self or self-image becomes the focus of a means of understanding 
experience in the real world as a type of narrative in which the individual is the primary 
protagonist. It is the key to individualists’ active interpretative experience of reality, 
and becomes a distorting avidity for lucid tropes of estimable existence.
In “An Essay Concerning the Bourgeois”, Dostoevsky argues that the moral 
habits of the bourgeoisie are formed by an intention to perceive, in spite of the reality, 
their state as one in which everything has been “resolved, signed and sealed”; or rather, 
amongst themselves they have tacitly agreed to affirm this perception.62 “If it were not 
so,” Dostoevsky continues,
then [the bourgeoisie] might think that the ideal had not been attained, that in 
Paris there is still no perfect earthly paradise, that there might be something more to 
desire, that therefore the bourgeois himself is not completely satisfied with the order 
for which he stands and which he forces on everyone, that there are rifts in society 
which must be mended”.63
Through depictions of similar symptoms of anxious self-delusion throughout his work, 
Dostoevsky clearly marks many of his Russian characters with what he characterises 
here as a particularly Western malaise.64 In placing static secular impersonations
60 Holquist, Dostoevsky and The Novel, 48.
61 Holquist, Dostoevsky and The Novel, 48.
62 Dostoevsky, “An Essay Concerning the Bourgeois”, Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, 43-52, 44.
63 “An Essay Concerning the Bourgeois”, 44.
64 It is something of this sense of the pathology of the bourgeoisie, individually and as a group, that 
Dostoevsky was straining to make apparent in The Double. Written in 1846, The Double indirectly holds 
Petersburg society accountable for many of the same flaws and patterns of behaviour that are openly 
criticised in “An Essay Concerning the Bourgeois”; it marks Dostoevsky’s first diagnosis of the Russian 
strain of spiritual corrosion which individualism (for Dostoevsky an intrinsically European illness) 
promotes. Dostoevsky was convinced that there was greater significance in The Double than had been
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(generating the mere semblance of hope) in the place of external ideals, eloquence 
perpetuates the disruption of idealism from a valid goal, a disruption for which, initially, 
it had been sought out as a remedy. Dostoevsky implies that the weight of secular 
individualism’s promises to itself imposes a fundamental distortion on the idealist urge, 
channelling it towards equally stagnant digressions into false certainty and commitment.
Throughout Dostoevsky’s work, the strategies characters rely on for telling their truths 
serve also to evade the undesirable dimensions of ambivalent fact and defuse any 
psychological aftershocks of this evasion. This is one of the primary tasks of 
eloquence; but what “necessity” demands it? If eloquence serves the bourgeois, who 
“smears the little holes in his boots with ink lest, God forbid, anyone notice them!”63 in 
the same way that ink serves his shoes, what are we to understand as the holes which it 
masks? Holquist suggests that the characteristic trait of eloquence is a disparity 
(unacknowledged) between event and expression; that is, between facts and individuals’ 
versions of them. This disparity is made-over, eloquently, to support some pre-existing 
and desired framework of meaning. The fundamental prompt of eloquence, therefore, is 
the disparity rather between event and expectation. There is an intrinsic dissatisfaction 
implicit in the deployment of eloquence, what ‘ought to be’ (according to a particular 
worldview) is not, but in order to avoid the disruption of admitting this to be the case, 
what ‘ought to be’ is made to seem as if it is. Eloquence is developed, it would seem, as 
the capacity through which the bourgeoisie (in this case) reconcile themselves to the 
discrepancies between their actual reality and their theoretically justified impression of 
reality. The alternative to this eloquent reconciliation, acknowledging a flaw or 
delusion in the expectations to which this impression deems them entitled, would 
surrender the grounds of their self-esteem.
“Eloquence” indicates a strategic “style of being” which Raskolnikov comes to 
rely upon similarly in his attempts to evade the reality and consequences of the 
inadequacy of his own theory. This discrepancy seems inevitable for a class that 
consider themselves (by necessity, Dostoevsky suggests) the perfect end product of 
human culture. However, the proliferation of this species of eloquence (alongside the 
Western principle of the individual) suggests that this kind of discrepancy is dependent
acknowledged, though his conviction wavered in his initial disappointment at the story’s poor critical 
reception. He conceded that his sense of an unfulfilled potential might be due to weaknesses of execution 
and made attempts throughout his career to revise the work and clarify the implications of Mr 
Golyadkin’s relationship with himself.
65 Dostoevsky, “An Essay Concerning the Bourgeois”, 44.
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rather on the pride associated with individualism, and the response of individualists to 
the real world’s ambivalence to what they consider their entitlements and ambition.
Babble ?
The abstract eloquence of the French bourgeoisie becomes isolated “babble” in the 
mouths of modem individualists; the Underground Man confesses: “I’m a babbler, a 
harmless, irksome babbler, as we all are. But what’s to be done if the sole and express 
purpose of every intelligent man is babble - that is, a deliberate pouring from empty into 
void? ” .66 Turgenev’s Hamlet of the Schigorovsky District defines his peers through 
their chatter, as do Raskolnikov and Razumikhin, and Myshkin’s final assertion that no 
one was saying what they were supposed to points to the confusion of chatter also. 
Again this suggests a symptom of, or reaction to, the challenge of a moral void or 
uncertainty.
Eloquent self-justifications of ideas and ideals work at an emotive level, requiring 
no foundation or validation from a singular or common source of meaning. 
Fundamental to emplotment, or emotivism, eloquence is the ideal tool for eliciting 
unimpeachable authority out of an otherwise interminably contestable ontological scene. 
Ambiguities, with their capacity to demand qualification from any secular truth, are 
strategically discredited or denied to facilitate the kind of certainty that had seemed 
logically unattainable in the absence of a common external authority
Like Myshkin’s symbolic encoding of his mute anxieties into the symbols, memories 
and beliefs which serve as the touchstones of his faith, emotivist moral forms reflect 
associations that appear to justify moral positions but actually assert them. They are 
consequently proposed as ordered principles rather than the reactionary manifestation 
that they are.
66 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, 18. In Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, Dostoevsky 
represents the eloquence of the French parliament as the emblematic dialect of bourgeois bad faith. In 
The Idiot, Keller’s delight in the manner in which members of the English Parliament “address each 
other” suggests the desired effect of this etiquette, “I mean all these nice expressions, all this 
Parliamentarism of a free people -  that’s what’s attractive to folks like me!” (). The formal indirectness 
of “ ‘the noble viscount sitting opposite’, ‘the noble count who shares my opinion’, ‘my noble opponent 
who has astonished Europe with his proposal’ ” (392), suggests a charade and at the same time a potential 
conduit of abstracted discussion of principles. Even though Keller’s pleasure implies an ironic disbelief 
in the sentiment beneath these expressions, their superficial forms are no less enchanting.
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Discussing the ramifications of the loss of a commonly approved framework of 
virtue, in After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that when “[m]oral judgements lose 
any clear status and the sentences which express them in a parallel way lose any 
undebatable meaning” these “sentences become available as forms of expression for an 
emotivist self which, lacking the guidance of the context in which they were originally 
at home, has lost its linguistic as well as its practical way in the world” .67
When such moral judgments are received as individual expressions, their 
circumstantial particularities become revealing dimensions of the overall 
character of such judgments’ fuller “meaning”. Moral positions imply a 
historical, sociological and psychological narrative rather than providing the 
individual with a means of orientation to an external moral frame.
In The Idiot, the appearance of the delegation supporting Burdovsky in his claim against 
Myshkin is pre-empted by the eager curiosity of the gathering, predominantly gentry 
and adult, “to have a look at these young people”, who, Lebedev informs them, have 
“gone further than the nihilists”. Lebedev adds:
Nihilists are sometimes well informed sorts of people, even scholarly, but these have 
gone beyond that because, first and foremost, they’re men of action, ma’am. ...
They don’t express themselves through newspaper articles, they act directly, ma’am; 
its not a question of the pointlessness of Pushkin or anything like that, or the need to 
break Russia up into fragments; no, ma’am, nowadays it’s regarded as an absolute 
right that if anybody wants something badly, all barriers should be disregarded...69
With public acts of justification and rationalisation deemed obsolete, stubborn, self- 
sufficient silence descends as the prevailing ideological atmosphere of a field of moral 
agreement. Unalterable personal convictions are expressed in postures which betray a 
valuable and jealously guarded certainty. But aside from the proposed freedom of such 
an ethic there is an equal motivation to avoid the inhibiting ambiguity of actual 
rationalisation and abstract explanation. The inarticulateness of the “young people” 
represents a denunciation of eloquence but also reflects their continuing dependence on 
feelings of absolute authorisation (they cannot be sure of agreement, so they rise above 
it in a posture of certainty). Only eloquence (reviled as the chicanery of the bourgeois 
status quo) can furnish expression of abstractions with absolute certainty. Expression,
67 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 60.
68 Dostoevsky, The Idiot, 270.
69 The Idiot, 270.
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therefore, offers nothing but stultifying ambiguity; it is redundant to the categories of 
justification offered by rational individualism in the place of moral absolutes.
In depicting the desolate end-point of a paradise contaminated by worldliness in “The 
Dream of a Ridiculous Man”, Dostoevsky recycles his apocalyptic vision of the 
conditions experienced by the inhabitants of London (in Winter Notes on Summer 
Impressions). He renames London “Baal”: in Baal everyone is drunk, “not with cheer 
but dismally” and “in rather a strange way, silently”. The desperation and “suspicious 
silence” he encounters in the slums of London become symptoms which, for him, 
characterised the populations of wilfully separate individuals formed under the flawed 
idealism of bourgeois “western” individualism.
On returning from paradise, the Ridiculous Man reflects, “While understanding 
the words, I could never comprehend their full meaning” .71 Similarly the ridiculous 
man has to convey his approval for the paradise in the sun with gestures. A fragmented 
communication seems possible, explanation of concrete facts and relationships, but 
regarding the beliefs and ideals, abstract assurances and the social blueprint of the 
paradise there is an unbridgeable gap of incomprehension.
In “Bobok”, the convention of eternal reward for spiritual virtue is starkly 
contrasted with the overheard “reality” of the afterlife: an eternity of mundane chatter 
and intractably worldly trivialities. This travesty provocatively implies a fundamental 
limit to the capacity of humanity (particularly cultivated, western humanity), when 
addressing morality, spirituality, or any other abstract “virtue”, to transcend their merely 
worldly interests and existence. It insinuates the mere contingency and hollowness of 
any intellectually formulated promises of anything “better” to come.
As MacIntyre suggests in After Virtue, due to the persistence of incompatible modes of 
moral discourse, the emotivist, novelistic, or simply ontologically disparate scene is 
typically experienced as a state of deprivation. For similar reasons, individuals seeking 
stable order and personal certainty tend to experience an ambivalent and uncertain 
reality as a scene of implicit and unavoidable insult. The origin of this supposed insult, 
and the reason for its prolonged reverberations, is the individual’s self-conception, 
which, having become a focus for feelings of self-esteem and moral authority, they 
aspire to justify as an objective reality, empirically manifest in their emotions, thoughts
70 Dostoevsky, “Baal”, Winter Notes on Summer Impressions, 38.
71 Dostoevsky, A Writer’s Diary -  volume II, 955.
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and actions. Determined by pride, will, or vanity, the health of such self-conceptions is 
consequently reliant on fragile subjectivism alloyed with a feeling of being 
outnumbered but not outdone by ambivalent fact.
As long as potential disruptions can be diffused, the disparity between experience 
and a cherished ideal can be discounted; but ambivalent reality always contains an 
immanent threat. In Dostoevsky’s work both the threat and the reality of being insulted 
are primary stimuli to eloquence, rhetorical deflections of potentially degrading 
interruptions are fundamental to sustaining the credibility of the cherished self-image. 
Eloquence at once provides a means of retaliation and compensation for the sense of 
humiliation and diminishment the insulted individual experiences. The individualist 
experiences the scale of this in accord with the authority invested in their individual 
self. Without any overriding moral criteria or etiquette to defer to, the individualist that
79suffers the “telling” insult is threatened at the root of their self-orientation.
In “The Meek Girl”, the first insult received by the pawnbroker -  his exclusion by 
his military peers after his failure in a point of honour - is absorbed into the narrator’s 
monologue as the notion of his own martyred innocence and the wickedness of the 
world. The reproach he experiences when he discovers that the meek girl sings in his 
absence, however, disrupts the foundations of his implied authority. The girl’s singing 
is not intended as an insult, but it shocks the Pawnbroker and confronts him with his 
culpable neglect of the girl’s independent existence. The meek girl’s autonomy has 
been stifled and then eclipsed by the pawnbroker’s self-solacing assumption of her 
independently sympathetic understanding of his fate.
72 Dostoevsky’s gestures towards the higher development of personality, in which an individual 
surrenders his or her interests in deference to the interests of others, typically include the character’s 
failure or refusal to respond to or register insults or impositions in the self-solacing manner of convention 
and of his or her peers. The anomaly of such a breach of the easy conventions of supporting public 
dignity and pride is reflected in the concerns of such character’s “allies”, who suffer on behalf of their 
friend’s insulted honour. In The Idiot, for instance, the Yepanchins (Myshkin’s allies) are incensed by 
Myshkin’s refusal to denounce, rather than merely refute, the Burdovsky group’s attack on his character. 
The antithesis to the kind of self-abnegation Myshkin’s forgiveness gestures towards is the irascible 
egocentric paranoia of the Underground Man. The observation Dostoevsky made in his notebook, 
“Contemporary man. He avenges all the injuries which no one did him, nor thinks of doing him” {The 
Unpublished Dostoevsky: Diaries and Notebooks 1860-81, volume III, 133), to which I have referred once 
already, seems particularly pertinent to this distinction. The attribution of insults and their effect on 
individuals’ pride and sense of individual dignity serve as significant measures or standards, in 
Dostoevsky’s exploration and depiction of individualism and its potential ramifications.
Kolya’s father in The Brothers Karamazov, and Makar Dolgoruky in An Accidental Family 
(respectively a downtrodden pragmatist and a cuckolded mystic), offer two allusive depictions of the 
deportment of, and the misunderstandings invited by, characters who are affiliated with codes of conduct 
which deflect worldly challenges to the dignity of the individual self in deference to a selfless concern for 
values on which this dignity might impinge. In addition to the indignities and limitations imposed by his 
social inferiority, Kolya’s father suffers under his son’s disappointment in his apparent incapacity to 
assert his right to decent treatment and respect. This too, he accepts, though in extreme anguish, as a 
burden he cannot do otherwise than bear for the sake of his family.
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The Underground Man notes how he:
. . . owing to my boundless vanity, and hence also my exactingness towards myself, 
very often looked upon myself with furious dissatisfaction, reaching the point of 
loathing, and therefore mentally attributed my view to everyone else.73
It is to break a similar circuit that the pawnbroker needs the meek girl: his attempts to 
cultivate in her his own understanding of his predicament, and to then impute this 
understanding as her own, allows him to feel that his cherished self-image has been 
approved unbidden in recognition of its inherent justness. He is able therein to dispute 
the legitimacy of the insults he feels from a world which, in its misunderstandings of his 
circumstance, challenges his entitlement to his self-esteem. Both the Underground Man 
and the pawnbroker prey upon vulnerable others to counterbalance the fluctuating 
credibility of their idealised self-images. In maintaining these self-images, they provide 
themselves with a shelter against the compromises into which they are naturally drawn 
by a world of ambivalence and uncertainty. Their exploitation of others, then, seems 
justified to them as a means of compensating themselves for their existence in a world 
which, in its lack of any absolute structure or code of conduct capable of providing 
them with the kind of support and guidance necessary to maintain their subservience to 
ideals, seems morally reprehensible.
While the sickness and incoherence of the Underground Man’s perpetually re-plotted 
life seems particular, the intensity of Dostoevsky’s depiction of this affliction is 
grounded in a sense of the virulence inherent in the very banality of its origins.74 The 
pathology of the Underground Man’s bookishness and imitation, though his case is 
extreme, is typical: similar symptoms in other characters suggest a similar relationship 
with the world. Basic elements of the Underground Man’s conflicted self-centred 
objectivity are common: radical doubt as an expression of radical individualism, for 
instance, along with the tendency of this scepticism to induce a cult of selfishness,
73 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, 43.
74 The Underground Man gives some examples of the ’’quite ready-made” forms o f reality which he has 
‘‘stolen from poets and novelists” {Notes from Underground, 58):
For example, I triumph over everyone; everyone, of course, is lying in the dust and is forced 
to voluntarily acknowledge all my perfections, and I forgive them all. I fall in love, being a 
famous poet and court chamberlain; I receive countless millions and donate them 
immediately to mankind, and then and there confess before all the world my disgraces, 
which, of course, are not mere disgraces, but contain an exceeding amount of “the beautiful 
and lofty,” of something manfredian. Everyone weeps and kisses me (what blockheads
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wherein “I am unique” or Je suis autre, implies that T  need not concede to any external 
order, but will defiantly adhere to my own. The sphere in which such notions of 
originality and uniqueness typically exist, though, is highly standardised and 
conventional: “everytime I came to work I made a painful effort to carry myself as 
independently as possible, so as not to be suspected of meanness” .75 The Underground 
Man discovers, however, that the techniques of self-generation which are necessary to 
satisfy his desire to appear independent ultimately drain his “unique” character of any 
meaningful significance in isolation from the external conventions he flaunts. The 
Underground Man is as susceptible to the notion of his independence as he imagines his 
audience to be; the superficial significance that his behaviour imparts reinforces his 
dependence on it. After all, these strategies are developed to provide the impression of 
an external significance capable of disguising from oneself the absence of commonly 
accepted absolutes. Though such strategies are essentially barren, they are useful 
nevertheless; they placate the inhibitively fragile and spiteful self-dependence of his 
sceptical individualism.
The Underground Man’s predicament, within his own self-imposed system of 
fictive significance, demonstrates the infertility of a mind which, through an idealisation 
of the role of absolute truth leading to an unhappy marriage of expectation and sceptical 
perspicacity, has become dependent on “eloquent” fabrications of certainty from the 
multifaceted substance of a genuine confusion. The Underground Man resentfully 
depends on seeming truths in which he merely pretends to believe (and is cheapened in 
his own eyes by this pretence).
Holquist suggests that for the Underground Man “the idea of order itself’ has 
collapsed.76 Consequently, Holquist continues, he “must make up plots for himself to 
figure in, because none of the available systems used by others to structure their lives 
are for the underground man acceptable” .77
Why, though, is this the only ordering technique available? Why “must” the 
Underground Man, as Holquist writes, “make up plots”? Holquist’s emphasis on the 
Underground Man’s compulsion towards emplotment is well-founded, but there is an 
important determinant a further step back: that is, the prior construction of a framework 
in which literary models determine what the Underground Man considers an estimable 
and desirable existence. This framework in turn determines both his sense of reality’s
they’d be otherwise), and I go barefoot and hungry to preach new ideas and crush the
retrograde under Austerlitz. {Notes from Underground, 58).
75 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, 43.
76 Holquist, Dostoevsky and the Novel, 56.
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inadequacy, and the form his imaginary gratifications take. And again, a further step 
backwards in causality directs us to a mindset that requires external authority to dictate 
meaning and impose a higher purpose on existence. Self-emplotment need not be 
literary (religious faith, for example, offers a kind of archetypal emplotment), but will 
typically have a narrative element facilitating the creative interpretation of events and 
experiences as causally related factors of a just whole. The nature of these narrative 
frameworks, with emphasis on causal relations between events and ethical 
consequences, resembles the kind of interdependency of action and outcome endorsed 
by the gospel tradition, and fundamental to the purposive element of Christian virtue.
No matter how discontinuous or fragmented a book, text, work, or expression is, 
as an exertion or compulsion it remains a demonstration of a desire to communicate.78 
Communication involves a gesture of faith, however despairing at times, in the 
possibility of establishing sympathy and understanding for subjective interior moral 
frameworks and justifications; the possibility, that is of orienting subjective truths to a 
wider frame without their subjective and partial authority being provoked into, or 
adopting by necessity, postures of forced certainty; it invites the consummating input of 
another’s reaction and interpretation.
He H= *  Hf *
The outward demeanour of dreamers reflects the necessary betrayals and evasions, both 
of the real and the ideal, to which they are constantly driven. The narrator of “White 
Nights” describes this demeanour as:
... the look of an unfortunate kitten perfidiously captured by some children and then 
crushed, terrified and generally maltreated by them to the point of utter confusion, 
which then finally creeps away from them and hides under a chair in the dark, where 
for a whole hour it must bristle up, spit out its frustration and wash its insulted face 
with both paws, and for a long time thereafter looks with hostility upon life and 
nature.79
77 Holquist, Dostoevsky and the Novel, 58.
78 Individuals who struggle with an incapacity to align the moments in their life into sequence are 
nevertheless reacting, in this struggle or uneasiness, in terms of a shared whole. This is perhaps obvious 
and does not offer any alleviation or comfortable sense of cohesion; what it does point out, though, is the 
distempering involvement of a dissatisfied consciousness underlying what are felt to be discontinuous 
moments.
79 Dostoevsky, “White Nights”, Uncle’s Dream and Other Stories, trans. David McDuff 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1989), 71-121, 85-86.
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For absolute idealists, the experience of ambivalent reality has a similar effect; the 
obliviousness of reality to their respective ideals gives rise to feelings of persecution 
and deprivation. The disillusioned idealist is often a spiteful creature, feeling cheated 
and cheapened by their faith in the possibility of attaining the ideological fulfilment to 
which they feel somehow entitled. In The Idiot, Ippolit’s feelings of disinherited 
isolation, anguish and futility fuel his conscientious protest against what he considers 
the essentially unjust patterns of actual existence. His “Necessary Explanation” 
constitutes a catalogue of intolerable but ubiquitous suffering and dissatisfaction; these 
concrete failings compel his conscientious objection to a world that is essentially 
recalcitrant to conceptions of higher justice. Ippolit’s curiously chimeric complaint is 
typical of the reactionary disillusionment invited by naive presumptions that the natural 
world obeys and can be understood through a principle conducive to human 
understanding and notions of order (or chaos); but it also exemplifies the human 
engagement with confusion in which moral conventions and agreements have their 
inception. It is one of the characteristically self-defeating habits of this kind of protest 
against uncertainty that, in protecting the ideals it engenders and the protests they 
motivate from the mortification and disruption latent in the perspectives and “truths” 
observed by others, these characters isolate their moral activity from the possibility of 
interaction with others. Their necessarily self-reliant reverence for abstract ideals 
remains stagnant and sterile, with the burden of its apparent futility exacerbating the 
sense of disinheritance from a dignifying common tradition.
In “White Nights”, the narrator insistently emphasises the addictive nature of imaginary 
self-indulgence: it constitutes a “subtle, voluptuous poison”. The alienation from 
ordinary reality which such addictions breed reinforces these individuals’ belief in the 
legitimacy of their dissatisfaction with reality, further perpetuating their dissociation 
from it. The emphasis placed on independent desire in the first part of the
80 “White Nights”, 89.
81 Similarly, Emma Bovary’s impatience with ordinary reality and her propensity to lay the blame for her 
dissatisfaction at its feet, is a side effect of her dependence on the measure of reality which she takes from 
romance novels. There is something gentler about Don Quixote’s no less insistent refusal o f the sanctity 
of ordinary reality. Though they are essentially the same, the kind of hollow bourgeois background from 
which bovaryism emerges, and its typically selfish preoccupation, lends the addiction to the seductive 
self-esteem promised or supported by a false reality a more uncomely vein of spiritually impoverished 
compulsion. Nevertheless, the same uncomely patterns can be seen behind Don Quixote’s chivalry: 
“Seeing that he was in fact unable to stir, it occurred to him to resort to his usual remedy, which was to 
think of some passage in his books” {Don Quixote, trans. J.M. Cohen (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1950), 52). Raskolnikov consults his “authority” - the idea of Napoleonic power and 
impunity - in a similar fashion; he has also been becalmed in uncertain and ambiguous reality and 
requires an overt directive to spur him to committed activity.
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Underground Man’s notes (one of the esteemed abstract principles which mould his 
self-image) is ironically juxtaposed, in the final scenes with Liza, with the actualities of 
his hollow freedom and barren individuality. The Underground Man’s need to maintain 
the self-esteem he experiences in following the bookish templates he has invested with 
absolute value and virtue, drives him repeatedly to perform actions which, though he 
approves their general aptness, he finds problematic and unsettling as means of treating 
an actual person.
The Underground Man’s dependence on bookish conventions to superimpose 
meaning and purposefulness on his otherwise tenuous involvement in the circumstantial 
events of his life produces a self-perpetuating pattern of hollowness and mediated 
existence. Of course, the interweaving of literary nuances, explanations and 
significances can offer a harmless means of therapy and comfort (books play a similar 
role to this in Poor Folk). However, the Underground Man does not absorb but is 
absorbed by his bookish fantasies, he is not nourished but consumed.
But how much love, Lord, how much love I used to experience in those dreams 
of mine, in those “escapes into everything beautiful and sublime”: though it was a 
fantastical love, though it was never in reality applied to anything human, there was 
so much of it, this love, that afterwards, in reality, I never even felt any need to 
apply it; that would have been an unnecessary luxury.
Rather than framing responses to the “suggestions” of reality the Underground Man’s 
plots exert strict and compromised acts of censorship. The Underground Man’s method 
of emplotment strives to make what happens in reality conform to pre-existing (and 
borrowed) models, the meaning of which has already been settled in his own 
understanding. He tries to order the world through received fictional templates, 
refusing to acknowledge the contentious presence of that which lies outside a process 
which has become crucial to his sense of existence.
Everything, however, would always end most happily with a lazy and rapturous 
transition to art - that is, to beautiful forms of being, quite ready-made, highly stolen 
from poets and novelists, and adapted to every possible service or demand.83
The Underground Man’s reliance on this recourse to bookishly idealised tropes of 
behaviour is evident throughout the second part of his notes.
82 Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, 57.
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. . . I’ll say, ‘Look, monster, look at my sunken cheeks and my rags! I lost 
everything - career, happiness, art, science, a beloved woman - and all because of 
you. Here are the pistols. I’ve come to discharge my pistol, and... and I forgive 
you.’ Here I’ll fire into the air, and -  no more will be heard of me...”
I even began to weep, though I knew perfectly well at the same moment that all 
this came from Silvio and from Lermontov’s Masquerade. And suddenly I felt 
terribly ashamed, so ashamed that I stopped the horse, got out of the sledge, and 
stood in the snow in the middle of the street. The jack watched me with amazement 
and sighed.84
This passage establishes a concrete association of momentum, literal and narrative, with 
feelings of meaning or purpose. The Underground Man’s shame for the plagiarisms on 
which he absurdly props up his self-esteem literally stops him in his tracks, but his 
awareness of the absurdity is ultimately permissive, he goes on regardless, resigned to 
the ridiculous subterfuge of his motives. In The Double, Golyadkin expedites his 
pettiness, disproportionate pride, envy and mean ambition (none of which he can admit 
to), by disclaiming his personal agency; in the Underground Man’s absurd mental 
pantomimes an estimable self-perception is maintained by projecting dignified 
rationales onto his actual motives. The Underground Man’s affinity with this manner of 
super-imposed significance appears to be determined by a shameful addiction to his 
inflated self-opinion and the spiteful denial of the purely eloquent means through which 
this phantom is sustained. When his suspicions of this inadequacy come to the fore, 
however, sequence is suddenly arrested and the Underground Man finds himself 
exposed to a very daunting uncertainty. The merest hint of this uncertainty - “What was 
to be done? To go there was impossible -  the result would be a nonsense; to leave
or
things as they were was also impossible, because the result would then be...” - exposes 
the necessity of a kind of rigorous grappling with groundlessness, which the 
Underground Man avoids in favour of sheltering from uncertainty in borrowed narrative 
sequences. The stasis weighs so heavily on the Underground Man due to his poverty of 
internal resources, values or directives; the possibility of gradually discovering internal 
appetites and traits is dismissed by the burden of an appetite for assurance which the 
semblances of external truths leached from literary templates had previously satiated
To recall at this point the Underground Man’s claim, reacting against the edicts of 
utopian socialism, that man needs only independent desire, is not necessarily to refute it 
or to accuse him of hypocrisy. Independent desire, he alleges, is of the highest value,
83 Notes from Underground, 57-58.
84 Notes from Underground, 84-85.
85 Notes from Underground, 85.
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“whatever this independence may cost” .86 This “cost”, however, is the formlessness of 
having no authority above or external to himself. It is a cost which the Underground 
Man intellectually approves but from which he instinctively flees into the diverting 
sequences of emplotment. The sequence above is emblematic: recoiling instantly from 
a disrupting scrutiny of his motives the Underground Man returns to the comforting 
momentum of the sledge as it carries him forwards in the narrative pattem he has 
invoked to make sense (<desirable sense) of his situation.
The stalling of the Underground Man’s bookishly plotted impetus briefly 
disperses the assurances around which he has developed his personality. He finds 
himself reliant on an appropriated jumble of impulses and ideas for which suddenly he 
can recognise no grounds of discrimination and organisation. Falling back on an 
expostulated incantation of conviction, a ritual fittingly farcical and melodramatic, the 
Underground Man recommits himself to a narrative momentum: “Lord! How can I 
leave it?! After such offenses!” .87 The dubious reality both of the insult and his 
reactions is trumped (but not resolved) by the necessity of maintaining the momentum 
provided by a ready-made plot.
The price the Underground Man pays for his selective rearrangements of reality 
becomes clear in his interaction with Liza, the prostitute he has embroiled in a personal 
drama of philanthropic compassion. After a disastrous sequence of reality’s disruption 
of his ready-made expectations, the Underground Man seeks to re-establish a feeling of 
prescience and control by maliciously insulting Liza. She evades his gesture with her 
own, scorning his charity. “I could have expected her to do that” he suggests with self­
mockery, before admitting: “No. I was so great an egoist, I had in fact so little respect 
for people, that I could scarcely imagine she, too, would do that” .88 The Underground 
Man knows he is callous and destructive, but this is what he feels justifiably reduced to 
in order to sustain himself in the void of values produced by his thoroughgoing sceptical 
individualism.
Liza, an external uncontrollable reality, presents a dangerous threat to the 
credibility of the Underground Man’s narrative organisation of his life: “I was so used 
to thinking and imagining everything from books, and to picturing everything in the 
world to myself as I had devised it beforehand in my dreams, that at first I didn’t even
86 Notes from Underground, 26.
87 Notes from Underground, 85.
88 Notes from Underground, 127.
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understand this strange circumstance” .89 Plot-ing quickly takes over, though, it 
consumes unexpected and uncomfortable realities; even when these are not consciously 
evaded the Underground Man’s turn of mind leaps to dilute any threat to the coherent 
tone of his existence.
When Liza arrives in his apartment, having responded to his insistence that she 
start a new life and to his offers of kindness, they have sex (this is not stated, but is 
implicitly plain). Afterwards, he makes it clear that she is no longer wanted, and as she 
is leaving he pushes a five-rouble note into her hand. The Underground Man 
instinctively travesties the possibility of radical personal reform (she has intervened in 
her fate) which Liza’s optimistic and supplicatory arrival in his home has confronted 
him with: he compulsively and knowingly humiliates her, reinstating her previous 
unhappy state as a sexual commodity. Aside from the personal demands it imposes on 
him, Liza’s appearance brings with it an implicit but potent challenge by affirming the 
possibility of radical activity.90
Such game playing - covertly or indirectly imposing particular contexts onto 
random events so that they yield implications desirable to himself - provides the 
Underground Man with ostensibly objective validations of his self-esteem, thereby 
protecting the only impulse which imposes imperatives on his otherwise meaningless 
existence. Consequently, he is unable to support a moral character, and must merely 
embellish reality with the particular meanings necessary to support the image or 
impression he has approved as representing worthy or moral behaviour.
Supporting this image, though, thwarts the possibility that his self-conception 
(which, to him, feels valid as long as this esteem seems, again to him, ostensibly 
reasonable) might grow or change through any recognition of its merely solipsistic 
foundations. In such instances, within these bookish games, a concealing and evasive 
motive is to the fore; these are strategic manoeuvres: the play of imagination struggles 
to subdue the credibility of reality’s disruptive intrusions into its fancied forms.
89 Notes from Underground, 123.
90 It is important to the Underground Man’s continued feelings of justified stasis that the prospect of 
change or self-improvement be deflated. This overwhelming tendency towards conceptual stasis seems to 
make a lie of the Underground Man’s proclamation that he would let his tongue be cut out, if “it could be 
so arranged that I myself never felt like sticking it out again” ; if, that is, “an edifice, at which it is 
possible not to put out one’s tongue” were to materialise {Notes from Underground, 36). It is always 
worth remembering, though, the credulity towards his own self-knowledge which seems necessary to the 
Underground Man’s “healthy” relationship with his ready-made postures and motivations (he is 
particularly indulgent of, and willing to believe in, his own intuitions and ideas about himself). That the 
Underground Man can stick his tongue out at Liza’s reform, for instance, is due more to his well-drilled 
rhetorical defences than to any intrinsic flaw or insincerity in Liza’s approach.
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Subsequent to his sham-philanthropic rant at Liza in the brothel, and prior to 
Liza’s appearance in his home, the Underground Man suffers a few days of anxiety 
before calming down enough to consign the possibility of Liza acting on his advice to a 
suitable fantasised literary scenario. The “sweet dreams” which Liza’s absence 
facilitates centre on the sensitivity with which he would have treated her devotion to 
him as her benefactor and saviour. The Underground Man then lets his “tongue run 
away” with him, “in some such European, George-Sandian, ineffably noble refinement 
...”; after which he sanctifies the imaginary romance with a couplet of poetry, before 
recoiling, suddenly “sticking my tongue out at myself’.91 He is frustrated and repulsed 
by the mediocre petering out of the storyline once the trope gives way to his own 
imagination, he can control reality with his narrative tools but he cannot change or add 
to it. The pleasure which the Underground Man experiences through borrowed story 
lines is in counterpoint to the impotence of his own imagination, but it is tainted also by 
his frustration at the dependence this necessitates. In his recourse to “completely ready” 
forms he catches a glimpse of his dependence on a mediocrity which the stylised 
melodramatic profundity of the models he is drawn to shows him desperately trying to 
evade. His incantations of the sublime, lofty and original style of being are by this point 
only the dregs of a floundering idealism, and the only satisfaction it affords him is the 
mockery he directs at his persisting dependence on such forms.
But try getting blindly carried away by your feelings, without reasoning, without a 
primary cause, driving consciousness away at least for a time; start hating, or fall in 
love, only so as not to sit with folded arms. The day after tomorrow, at the very 
latest, you’ll begin to despise yourself for having knowingly hoodwinked yourself.
The result: a soap bubble, and inertia.92
The Underground man does not shy away from the deep incompatibility between the 
literary tropes he esteems so highly and the facts of his deportment in real life. The very 
couplet that had inspired his fantasised romance with Liza is reiterated with perverse 
pride as a banner embracing the humiliations that result from the arrival of Liza, in the 
flesh, in his home.
The bitter nature of the Underground Man’s insistence that there are no feelings, beliefs 
or rules which are capable of offering him (or anyone) stable and certain foundations, 
reflects a distempered truth, a despised clear vision which is then blurred in the backlash
91 Notes from Underground, 111.
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of disappointed expectations. This distemper typifies the consequences of approaching 
the moral confusion of secularism with an initial commitment to form such foundations 
only on absolute tmth (the kind of despised perspicacity which dogs the Underground 
Man is shared by Dostoevsky, one feels, necessitating the overly stylised or symbolic 
moral conclusions which, while conforming to the moral templates he wants to approve 
as feasible realities (for his own benefit as well as his readers’), seem suddenly abrupt 
circumscriptions of his creative explorations into sprawling moral ambiguities). The 
Underground Man’s experience of ambivalence does not appear to confirm a 
disinterested prediction or intuition of chaos, it merely thwarts his desire for order. 
Ambivalent fact, “living life” ,93 dissipates the solipsistic credibility of his ideal self- 
image and he construes it, therefore, as the nemesis of his idealism when it is nothing of 
the sort. Due to the chaos which his sceptical individualism and his thwarted idealism 
seem in conjunction to confirm, the Underground Man is driven to structure his reality 
by recourse to ready-made models which convey, through merely aesthetic effect, 
ostensibly worthy and stable moral and behavioural codes. He exalts in fancies of 
George-Sandian philanthropy; imputes to himself the brooding pride of Byron’s 
Manfred; shapes his intentions to mirror a romanticised chivalry he takes from Pushkin 
and Lermontov.94 The ready-made models he esteems - literary rarefactions of actual 
life - are stylisations, though, which are inconsistent with the full testimony of 
multifaceted reality. But rather than readdressing the modes by which he consequently 
finds himself “incoherent”, an approach which might transform panic into revelation,
92 Notes from Underground, 18.
93 As Liza’s actual, as opposed to fanciful, presence begins to panic him, the Underground Man notes “ 
‘Living life’ so crushed me, unaccustomed to it as I was, that it even became difficult for me to breathe” 
{Notes from Underground, 126). Her presence is “unbearably burdensome” (126), stifling the self-reliant 
and necessarily isolated habits which sustain and placate him.
94 The Underground Man’s notes are littered with allusive invocations of literary and historical templates; 
I have already discussed some of these passages and this habit at greater length. The particular allusions 
to which I have referred, George Sand, Manfred and Pushkin and Lermontov, are, respectively, at pages 
111, 58 and 85. This habit of imitation, or self-emplotment along the lines of literary tropes and genre 
conventions, is particularly evident throughout nineteenth century literature. There are precedents, Don 
Quixote, for example, and the disorienting influence of fiction on readers of novels, particularly women, 
fuelled a good deal of suspicion and criticism of imaginative literature by English Augustans such as 
Johnson and Addison (in the same period Charlotte Lennox wrote The Female Quixote, updating the 
scenario of Quixote’s idee fixe to the late 18th century and replacing Quixote’s templates of literary 
chivalry with those of romantic novels). In the nineteenth century this tendency has its archetype in 
Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, which has given rise to the term ‘Bovaryism’ (or Bovarysme in French). In 
Bovaryism, as opposed to Quixoticism, there is prominent dissatisfaction with a reality that thwarts 
individuals’ received notion of what constitutes a worthwhile existence. The world is rarely transformed 
in the way in which it is by Quixote’s expansive solipsism, leaving the dual plot-lines of life-as-it-is, and 
life as the individual has come to feel they are entitled to experience it (as it appears in aesthetically 
romanticized and ready made renditions), locked together in mutual antipathy. The Underground Man is 
peculiar among the figures who are at the mercy of this kind of learnt dissatisfaction with ambivalent 
reality, because he is aware of his own disproportionate and unjustified dependence on versions of reality 
he has appropriated from art.
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his disorientation and need for certainty drive him back to ready-made strategies of 
therapeutically overt meaning (duelling for one’s honour, or saving exploited damsels 
from a heartless world, tropes which are travestied by his artificial motivations). 
Through these he realigns, affectedly, his sense of self with an impression of a world of 
higher meaning than the banalities of material subsistence, and sustains the assurances 
provided by received notions of ‘living life’. These notions inhibit him, though, from 
recognising or valuing any other form of sequence, or assurance; he becomes isolated 
within the limited frame of ready-to-hand literary tropes of existence, behaviour and 
meaning, which he both despises and depends on. This dependence is, furthermore, 
abstracted from his particular existence, it orders it but there is no inter-relation. The 
Underground Man himself is able to play every part in these tropes, but never himself 
(too unliterary). In part that is the idea - a denial of his position in the world which 
disparagingly encompasses world and self equally - but it is also the source of his 
cynical aggression towards this habit of merely acting out a self-image he supposes 
might satisfy him.
The Underground Man admits to having wanted desperately to fall in love and, by 
his preconceived standards, to having succeeded twice in doing so. On these grounds, 
he proclaims the convoluted reality of the suffering his love exposed him to: “I did 
suffer, gentlemen, I assure you. Deep in one’s soul it’s hard to believe one is suffering, 
mockery is stirring there, but all the same I suffer, and in a real, honest-to-god way” .95 
He suffers for his inability to suffer, or feel, in a way fitted by convention to whatever 
adventure he has imposed on himself. This suffering is out of “boredom”, like the 
adventures he imposes it is necessary to fill up a void. He does so arbitrarily, and 
certainly with no concern beyond the limits of his own self, which, he suggests, merely 
appreciates the divertissement of recognisable (that is, literary) signs of an involvement 
in the living of a life. Even while playing out these roles of suffering, pleasure, and 
purpose, though, he suffers inwardly for the very fact that they are hollow rituals. Like 
the “point of honour” which the Underground Man considers unintelligible to a crowd 
of ordinary people, the credibility of his suffering is also dependent on his isolated 
approval of the context it seeks to validate itself in. The Underground Man seems 
uncertain whether his private torments equate to the external idea of genuine suffering, 
whether they are “real”; he is aware simultaneously that his discomfort is real and that 
beyond his special interest in himself it might not be.
95 Notes from Underground, 17.
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The Underground Man’s cynicism suggests an incremental spitefulness: as the 
certainty which his penetration into the abstract foundations of his community aims 
ultimately to discover repeatedly fails to materialise, he is driven further and further into 
expressions of disillusion in the hope of arriving at a point of conviction (to be verified 
by the equilibrium of expectation and experience). Recurringly, sceptical idealists like 
the Underground Man recognise the intellectual credibility of a position Nietzsche later 
described and celebrated as the role of the disinterested scholar, but many idealist- 
sceptics are unable to harmonise with this position because ultimately they are not 
disinterested, no matter how hard they try to be.
Late in his career Dostoevsky recorded in his notebook the conviction that life was a 
continual effort of composition.96 The Underground Man stands as an emblem of the 
futility of composing in a self-administered vacuum; his sense of control (which is little 
more than the practical imposition of approved patterns of “sense”) is his only comfort; 
it necessarily isolates him, however, from any real (or at least genuine and original) 
emplotment. The underground man composes away from real life, it is not an 
explorative or speculative project but rather a consuming species of escapism which 
devolves into a lifetime of game-playing.
The Underground Man is offered as an example of the incapacity of secular 
narratives to compensate for the stagnation and sterility with which his continued 
preference for absolute certainty is infused by the sceptical individualism he relies on 
(ostensibly to keep him safe from factitious convictions). Crime and Punishment 
reveals the same poverty of secular convictions, but where the Underground Man 
remains bitterly dependent on artificial life, Raskolnikov abandons himself to reality’s 
judgement, both of his particular desired certainty and of the impact of the desire for 
certainty on his relationship with an uncertain world. In the moral disorientation and 
displacement which proceeds through Raskolnikov’s selective devaluation of those 
aspects of reality that do not comply with his personal needs, Dostoevsky anathematises 
what he considered an indicative spirit of the age.97
96 “Man does not live his whole life, but composes himself ’, quoted in Dialogues with Dostoevsky 
(Stanford University Press, 1993), 242. Jackson’s reference is to one of Dostoevsky’s notebooks; it is 
footnoted thus: “F.M. Dostoevskij ob isskusstve, ed. S. Aleksandrov (Moscow, 1973), p.461”; fn 18 (cf 
ch.12), 329.
97 From The Idiot onwards, Dostoevsky’s deprecating representation of this ‘spirit’ becomes the life­
blood of the worlds in which the characters exist and by which they are formed. The overt extremity and 
grotesque oddity of Mr. Golyadkin’s (in TheDouble) and the Underground Man’s distorted relationships 
with reality gives way to a more commonplace (and more insidious for the subtle corruptions this 
supports) distortion or disruption in the nature of individuals’ interactions with an ambivalent external 
reality, including each other. For instance, intermingled with the trappings of the tragic heroine, Nastasya
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Filippovna carries the stamp of the underground and the bourgeois duplicity of Golyadkin. Though 
Nastasya Filippovna’s unsinkable pride means that her protestations of “me” and “not me” lack 
Golyadkin’s pitiful sense of an irresistible external determination, they nevertheless recognise the same 
forces. In the devotion to surfaces displayed in their respective devotion to the status of carriages, they 
are quaintly and more concretely marked with a common affliction by individualistic materialism.
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Chapter 7 -
“Instead o f  dialectics, there was life”1 2- Educating Emotive Preferences
Coercive Disruption
In 1873, A Writer's Diary included “Vlas”, a meditation on the increasing instances of 
nihilistic tendencies disrupting the conventional moral framework of Russia’s provincial 
youth. Dostoevsky updates the figure of Vlas from Nekrasov’s poem of that name.3 
The old Vlas had murdered his wife and lived among thieves and bandits until, 
repenting of worldly vanities after a vision of hell, he becomes a wandering beggar and 
pilgrim spreading the word of God. Dostoevsky’s updated Vlas involves a young 
villager vying with his peers, out of pride and youthful one-up-manship, to undertake 
the most outrageous desecration of conformity they can think of. Vlas is led into a 
symbolic murder of Christ: a “Mephistopheles” among his peers commands him to save 
the Eucharist from a church service, place it on a stick and shoot it. As he fires, Vlas 
sees the Eucharist transform into a vision of Christ on the crucifix. He collapses and 
later, compelled to seek mortification, surrenders himself to a church elder for penance.
It is the “Vlases”, suggests Dostoevsky, who, “repentant and unrepentant, will say 
the last word; they will say it and will show us a new path and a new way out of all 
those apparently insoluble tangles”4 - Vlases like himself, and like Raskolnikov: “let us 
remember Vlas and be calm: at the critical moment all the falsehood, if indeed it is 
falsehood, will burst forth from the People’s hearts and confront them with incredible 
accusatory power”.5 Throughout his later novels, Dostoevsky attempts to depict the 
partial and essentially unsupportive nature of secular ideals and moral codes. He 
demonstrates how individuals who are dependent on such ideals, when exposed to the 
dilemmas entailed in attempts at living idealistically (integrated with others yet without
1 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, trans. Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky (London: Vintage,
1993) , 550.
2 Dostoevsky, “Vlas”, A Writer’s Diary - Volume I, 1873-1876, trans. Kenneth Lantz, (London: Quartet,
1994) , 158-69.
3 Nikolai Alekseevich Nekrasov (1821-77) was a poet who concerned himself primarily with social issues 
and was closely affiliated with the radical social critics Nikolai Chemyshevsky and Nikolai Dobrolyubov. 
Dostoevsky used an excerpt from Nekrasov’s verse to lead into the second part of Notes from 
Underground (“Concerning the Wet Snow”). The association between the Underground Man’s postured 
social conscience in his interactions with the prostitute Liza, and the kind of superficial and hypocritical 
lip-service Dostoevsky felt such ‘critical’ intentions as Nekrasov’s sought unsuccessfully to dignify, 
places the two in a similar category of merely eloquent social outrage which does little more than spice up 
their respective modes of divertissement. The Underground Man at least despises his hollowness and 
insincerity, while the pompous sincerity of Nekrasov’s poetic protests (Dostoevsky implies) suggests his 
obliviousness to the self-solacing facets of his radicalism and protests.
4 Dostoevsky, “Vlas”, 160.
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betraying their ideal), either gradually and reluctantly relinquish their individualistic 
devotion and the assurances it provides (as with Raskolnikov), or resort to hostility 
towards or isolation from the aspects of reality which proclaim the inadequacy of 
absolute idealism (as with Myshkin who, in spite of his outward benevolence, 
essentially refuses to exist in a world so antipathetic to his ideal conception of justice). 
Dostoevsky’s vigorous exposure of the consequences that stem from individualists’ 
dependence on subjectively ratified ‘truths’ emerges from their inadequacy as absolutes.
The weight of reality’s intrusive disruptions, which eventually crush or ‘exile’ 
solipsistic worldviews in Dostoevsky’s novels, does not proffer an affirmation of 
dialogic awareness, but a reversion to the distant proper authority of God. In this 
meditation on the agitation of provincial nihilists, and their potential threat to society, 
Dostoevsky essentially seeks to assure his readers that the nihilists’ abuse of freedom is 
no cause for concern, as it will ultimately deliver them into dependence on traditional 
authority. Raskolnikov is the clearest example of this Vlas-ness, while the 
Underground Man implies Dostoevsky’s explanation of why transgression and suffering 
are necessary to disclose the new path. “If he has the capacity to rise up out of his 
fallen state, then he exacts a terrible vengeance on himself for his past fall, an even 
more painful vengeance than he had exacted on others for the secret torments his own 
dissatisfaction with himself caused him while befogged in his degradation” .5 6 The 
consequences of an incapacity to incite this regenerative rebellion or protest are 
apparent in the Underground Man’s barren and bitter self-denigration.7 The stagnating
5 “Vlas”, 168.
6 “Vlas”, 163.
7 The role which feelings of guilt, repentance, and unforced moral ‘surrender’ can potentially play in 
clarifying the nature of peoples’ tendency to feel and observe abstract moral qualms is the focus of a 
discussion in The Idiot. Amid millenarian interpretations of contemporary events as heralds of the 
apocalypse, Lebedev tells the story of a 12th century cannibal monk’s sudden surrender to justice, and 
asks: “Who was it then who prompted him to denounce himself?” (The Idiot, 399).
Therein lies the solution! There must have been something stronger than the 
stake, the fire, even the habit of twenty years! There must have been an idea more 
powerful than any disaster, famine, torture, plague, leprosy, and all that hell which 
mankind could not have borne without that one binding idea which directed men’s 
lives and fertilized the springs of life! ... Show me a force which binds today’s 
humanity together with half the power it possessed in those centuries.
(399).
Lebedev’s statement, “there is no more a binding principle” (399), perhaps amounts to little more than the 
nostalgia of hindsight, or a wilful blindness to the false closure of retrospective perspectives. The form 
misleads him, he recognises the traumas of that era, and that at such a time a binding directive was 
probably something of a necessity. The challenges in his own time are ostensibly different (not famine, 
leprosy and plague for instance), but are the anxieties? Lebedev’s contemporary uncertainty of 
metaphysical place and meaning seems an unprecedented confusion because they have not been encoded, 
explained or historicised in the way that the twelfth century fanaticism has; this is intrinsic to their nature, 
they are challenges of self-conscious incomprehension and inarticulateness. The process of Crime and
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scepticism of the Underground Man’s radical doubt and his need for an explicit purpose 
together confine him to a dependence on ersatz realities which he despises but cannot 
replace or dismiss.
Dostoevsky borrowed a word from drafting, Stushevatsia (to fade to nothing), to 
describe the gradual erasure of individual personality or identity under the anonymous 
bureaucratic organisation of individually meaningless work. Dostoevsky’s notion of 
fading to nothing reflects a process (against which Raskolnikov, for instance, rebels, 
leaving him fading to nothing at a different extreme in the meaninglessness of his 
isolation) whereby desires and expectations which are central to individuals’ self­
perceptions are gradually rendered inadmissible to their actual existence among others: 
individuals are reduced to their official function, as in “A Weak Heart”, and even lose 
themselves, as in The Double, in juggling the contradictory demands of worldly 
ambition and abstract ideals of personal dignity. These characters struggle with an 
uncertain dependence on publicly approved roles, which they neither feel emotionally 
bound to nor are able to reject. Alternatively, and as is more often the case in 
Dostoevsky’s characterisations of the distorted individuals which such circumstances 
produce, the particular characters become embroiled in solipsistic resistance to external 
reality’s judgement of their worth and role. Rather than fading to nothing, the self- 
images of these characters encourage them to eclipse reality by selectively denying the 
pertinence (that is, the essential reality) of the compromised actions reality in fact 
demands of them (which are rightly denied, they feel, as not relating to their “real me”, 
or essential self).
The emotional and financial impoverishment which leads Raskolnikov to his 
crime is initially wilful and almost self-inflicted; his flight into destitution galvanises his 
right to a revulsion from reality. He seems intuitively to recognise that the kind of 
moral freedom he envisages represents an alternative state of being, not a ‘human’
o
moral state at all, and which one cannot choose to participate in. In accordance, he
Punishment, Raskolnikov’s eventual concession to and approval of the moral dictates of community, 
effectively answers Lebedev’s challenge. Addressing the confusion over the nature and reality of man’s 
“moral-side”, Dostoevsky notes adamantly: “despite all your arguments about the non-existence of man’s 
moral side - it exists. And that is just where all the power is.” (The Unpublished Dostoevsky: Diaries and 
Notebooks (1860-81), Volume II, 10). It is the light of this underlying certainty (which is troubled but not 
extinguished by ambiguity) that Dostoevsky allows gradually to dawn across the seemingly disordered 
worlds of his novels.
8 I shall be discussing Dostoevsky’s implicit construction of a moral category determining human and 
inhuman beings, among biologically human individuals, later in this section. It is o f course possible and 
not at all uncommon, for humans to act in an ‘inhuman’ manner, but any human that does not 
acknowledge moral boundaries will tend to find themselves punished for any incursions against the
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attempts to divest himself of the attachments and obligations which might keep him 
from or challenge the rationalised impunity which his theory provisionally grants him. 
At the same time this drift into alienation, or the underground, offers a posture in which 
Raskolnikov’s refusal to consent to what he considers the unjustly limiting obligations 
society requires of him personally, and his evasion of the compromises which fair 
relationships with others would reveal beneath his idealised self image (eg. parasitic 
shiftless son) can be envisaged by him as proof of his transcendence from a lesser 
sphere of existence.
Unexpected feelings of guilt and shame are fundamental to Raskolnikov’s 
reluctant awakening to his dependence on moral boundaries. The coming into focus of 
Raskolnikov’s guilt dismisses the ambiguous ethical numbness of his intellectual denial 
of moral boundaries, leaving genuine remorse and a morally reorienting surrender to 
external and shared patterns of culpability and penance.
Initially, it is not a sense of sin or criminality to which Raskolnikov responds, but the 
raw experience of exclusion and separateness. In this state, Raskolnikov’s moralising 
self-justifications and confessions conform essentially to a conventional inclination to 
locate valid moral orientation through agreement (a kind of deliberate or conscious 
scrutiny of his solipsistic values which seeks to incorporate external responses to them). 
Even when Raskolnikov has lost faith in his entitlement to sin, but still rejects the 
jurisdiction of any conventional sentence,9 he explains to Sonya how he came to commit 
the crime, the circumstances that generated it, “Then I realized, Sonya ... that power is 
given only to the one who dares to reach down and take it” . 10 Raskolnikov consistently 
seeks to contextualise his actions (even when he begins to feel they were wrong) in such 
a way that they might appear somehow circumstantially justified, or at least
standards of humans who do recognise such bounds. Though they might reject the morality of such 
punishments they are unlikely to escape them on these grounds. Alternatively an individual who rejects 
morality might retreat into seclusion, like Conrad’s Axel Heyst, but when other people become involved 
and mutual consequences and explanations become necessary something recognisably resembling moral 
rights and obligations will tend to resurface. In Heyst’s case, though, his retreat from the hollow laws of 
Western tradition, a rejection which compels him to exist in a state of conscious quarantine from its 
manifestations, rejects a particular type of moral structure but does so from a position of idealistic moral 
disdain. Heyst does not so much deny the imperative of moral structures, but rather places himself in a 
position where he will not be called upon to invoke, apply or adhere to ‘moral’ conventions which he 
considers inherently corrupt or hollow. He has no alternative so he must isolate himself from the prospect 
of any morally contentious event.
9 “How am I guilty before them?”, he challenges Sonya (Crime and Punishment, 420, my italics).
10 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 418.
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understandable, and perhaps even excusable. He seeks Sonya’s complicity in this 
project, but is forced instead to silence her dissent.
Raskolnikov’s reliance on proud defiance of external judgement becomes stronger 
as the criminal investigation proceeds; it is a hostile and contingent response and a 
shelter against the intrusive prospect of being understood and judged by others. Like 
the ideological armour that hardens around acts of revolution, Raskolnikov’s theoretical 
expressions of justified rebellion harden around him after the crime. Certainly their 
substance, the logic and the presumptions, existed before, but now they are not just 
abstract arguments but necessary emotional stanchions.
This is evident in Raskolnikov’s conversation with Zamyotov in the ‘Crystal 
Palace’, where he teasingly recounts his hiding the trinkets under the rock as something 
thoroughly premeditated and, as such, a credit to his self-possession in the midst of 
severe transgression. It is a fabricated detail that nevertheless allows Raskolnikov to 
experimentally retune his recollections of what was in truth a fraught and half-conscious 
fiasco to comply with his notion of cold-blooded deftness. In its inception 
Raskolnikov’s account is self-indulgent bravado, a front to defy Zamyotov, but through 
this and similar fronts Raskolnikov trials hopeful explanations in which he might 
recognise a credible and desirable explanation of what took place. While evading the 
forces of conventional morality, Raskolnikov is able to entertain the image of himself as 
a superior man. This image, then, is founded on his awareness of having committed a 
crime; without this awareness he cannot luxuriate in the extraordinariness of his literal 
impunity (he hasn’t been caught). As his proud conviction in his superiority fades, this 
simple expression of his status is debased; it becomes the empty last resort, a diverting 
indulgence in individual competitiveness. Though this last resort never solidifies into a 
convincing proof it is a necessary aid in forestalling the flood of guilt which threatens to 
fill up the empty void of his separateness. Ultimately though, his dependence on 
competitiveness to prompt the postures of resistance necessary to his act of moral 
rebellion, merely confirms the hollow reactionary pettiness of the arguments he is 
forced to rely on to meet his desire to perceive his isolation as triumphal. Gradually, the 
yearnings and anxieties which challenge this desired triumph come to offer a source of 
moral directives and worthy compromises which his abstract distemper and his rational 
rebellion had initially failed to reckon with and were later unable to dispel or discredit.
Putting the rhetoric of ‘stepping over’ aside, Raskolnikov’s main compulsion in 
proposing and committing the murder of the money lender (aside from his desire for 
quick money) appears to be his desperation to cast-off the disorientation and complete
254
disaffection into which he is sinking. Finding that convention, received truth, and his 
own rational intellect are unable to furnish him with anything that can satisfy or stand 
up to his dissatisfied scepticism, Raskolnikov has been unable to affirm grounds for the 
kind of singularly authoritative moral code he desires. He has no established grounds 
either, therefore, from which to condemn or order merely contingent impulses and 
appetites.
In the number of justifications which Raskolnikov flirts with prior to and after his 
violent personal revolt, it becomes apparent that essentially he had reacted against 
uncertainty rather than with any clear positive confidence in a specific path of cause and 
effect. Raskolnikov’s crime is a speculative protest against an uncertain and complex 
moral scene. The persistence of emotional, intellectual and moral reactions 
incompatible with those required by his ‘theory’’, testifies to a reality in which the 
laziness and culpability of his attempt to empower himself through the suffering of 
others can only be made over as the privilege of a higher moral category through special 
pleading against fact. The principles which theoretically induce his crime are 
inadequate to explain and guide him through the reality it precipitates. The blunt and 
panicked logic of Dmitry Karamazov’s “everything is permitted” suggests a similar 
compounding of feelings of uncertainty, hysteria and abandonment into a supposedly 
rational denunciation of moral ties.11 Raskolnikov’s fatalistic acquiescence in the idea 
of murder, and his feelings of being only partly present in its execution, emphasise the 
awkward uncertainty that precedes (and follows) his surrender to an unconvinced and 
essentially experimental translation of ideas into activity. Though he carries his 
experiment out to the letter, placing himself outside moral conventions, Raskolnikov is 
never fully convinced or committed to it; he does not believe in its terms, but is trying to
11 The sense of deprivation that descends on idealists bereft of an authority they had considered to exist as 
an external guiding presence seems often to distort their perception of the moral character of a merely 
human ethics and to inhibit their capacity to assert even the same moral categories and judgements as 
being still worthy of observation. In Dipsychus and The Spirit, Dipsychus relates a dream in which God 
has died (1.7.7-129). He bitterly recounts scenarios of inconstancy and the dissolution of bonds of trust, 
honour and fidelity between people. “O pretty girl, who trippest along / Come to my bed, it isn’t wrong” 
(1.7.19-20), though later, pleasure fades, “a silly girl is a poor friend” (1.7.24) and the consequences, to 
Dipsychus, seem a comfortless partnership or the loneliness of separation. Indifference to others no 
longer offend God, because “Dong, there is no God; dong” (1.7.14). “No justice here; no God above; / 
But where we are is there not love[?] / What? what? thou also go’st? For how / Should dead truth live in 
lover’s vow [?]” (1.7.114-17). How then, Dipsychus seems to challenge the unbelieving world, can this 
offensive dissolution be condemned and rectified? He ignores, though, the possibility of turning his own 
persisting moral feelings - his outrage, and his despair at the loss of external justifications for his outrage - 
into something more, a starting point for secular moral guidelines, for example. But what his bitter and 
disdainful regret really signifies is the antipathy to partial and pragmatic moral guidelines by which such 
complaints are often motivated. Dipsychus feels approval for the same moral standards as had been 
dictated by God’s law, but his practical allegiance to them is troubled by his inability to call upon any 
platform of external authority and dictates to validate and ratify these standards as sound and good.
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prove their existence. Raskolnikov’s self-abandonment to the tempering and mediation 
of concrete consequences makes it clear that, however he contextualises the goal of his 
actions, he is compelled- equally to flee uncertainty (Holquist notes a similar 
compulsiveness, but instead emphasises the allure of what he feels is Raskolnikov’s 
goal - discovering his identity). Raskolnikov forces the wheels into motion in order that 
an objective external force will evaluate his actions and reactions and deliver a verdict 
in relation to which the dimensions of his self, which have proved so fathomless to 
internal speculation, will begin to assume concrete form. That is, weighed down by his 
doubts, speculations, fantasies, fears and desires, Raskolnikov forces himself into a train 
of events which will take the measuring out of his own hands; he incites an external 
process and defers to history to provide him with a plot or case history in which to 
discover himself. 12
Raskolnikov’s simultaneous fascination with, and uncertainty about, his 
relationship to his crime provides him with a potent stimulus to find a meaning in the 
act and its subsequent effects. Michael Holquist observes, “Raskolnikov is forced to 
take up a new role, that of detective of his old seifs motive, in order to create a new 
identity, a new life for himself’. 13 The manner of Raskolnikov’s response to this 
stimulation, however, is more accurately one of flight than detection. Though 
ostensibly hunting out or investigating the profile of his crime Raskolnikov is seeking 
rationales capable of dismissing accusations he cannot afford to admit. He is not 
hunting for truth but for the plausibility of a particular desired explanation. After the 
murder Raskolnikov looks through the newspapers “greedily” and with “convulsive 
impatience” for information on the crime. 14 In the hypothetical account he then gives to 
Zamyotov, he proposes another image of the crime, and later his return to the scene 
seems a further attempt to locate some point of certainty about his role in the crime and 
its implications. There is something inevitably token about Raskolnikov’s various
12 In Dostoevsky and The Novel, Michael Holquist suggests that “Accepting history as the ultimate source 
of meaning, [Raskolnikov] can find no way to appeal its verdict... the sequence the moment of his crime 
has condemned him to is final” (92-93). Holquist suggests Raskolnikov was “seeking to gain a new 
identity by his own actions” (93). But the idea of history he relies on is not the latent significance in 
experiencing a real course of events (the “experience” of history), rather, it is the idealised and iconic 
residue of historical actions, bronze statues and immortality. It is Dostoevsky not Raskolnikov who uses 
the effect of “history” to answer Raskolnikov’s uncertain attempt to provoke a feeling of certainty. And 
again, his surrender to equivocation by concrete events is made under the influence of strong desires and 
preferences relating to the ideal outcome of his test. He is not seeking to gain just any new identity, but 
rather to verify (or otherwise) his right to the identity he already imagines himself entitled to. The verdict 
he ultimately comes to accept is of little importance without the drawn out campaign he wages in an 
attempt to absolve himself of his responsibility to admit its aptness. This campaign reflects his resistance, 
in allegiance to his desired worldview, to objectively naming the stimuli he is swamped by in the 
aftermath of his crime and his evasion of the clear implications of his moral position which these carry.
13 Holquist, Dostoevsky and The Novel, 88.
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explanations which seems to indicate that their value lies not in their potential capacity 
to reveal his “self’, but in offering him a diversion from the implications of the moral 
force which the world of the novel brings quite relentlessly to bear. Holquist’s 
suggestion that Raskolnikov is both hunter and hunted is true in this sense but the 
significance of his hunt is determined by his awareness of pursuit and essentially 
constitutes the search for a place to hide. Raskolnikov hunts the circumstances before, 
during and after the crime for an angle from which he can repudiate his guilt and shelter 
his pride with notions of efficacy. The appeal to the authority of bronze statues 
unleashes a benign (in this instance) Bronze Horseman, 15 a relentless force of 
accusation, in flight from which he relies on his detection to disprove its jurisdiction. 
Raskolnikov’s quest for self-knowledge in the aftermath of the crime pits him against 
the tangible world of circumstance and other characters; it is not a quest for real 
knowledge but a quest to discover credible explanations capable of verifying desired 
images of the self and of reality. It is in the failure of this quest, or rather in 
Raskolnikov’s abandonment of it having realised its cost, that he becomes able to 
recognise and accept the feelings of accusation and condemnation as evidence of the 
existence and vitality of the communal moral force he had tried to outpace, and of his 
fundamental sympathy with it.
An Exemplary Tale
You feel that this (the world, the stars) is not above your understanding and for the 
happiness of feeling this you have to lose nothing more than your human face.16
This note follows a short prayer: “Lord, I thank you for the face of a man Thou hast 
given me. (In contrast to suicides) ” . 17 Dostoevsky implies, here as in his work, that the
14 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 159.
15 Beneath Raskolnikov’s reverence for the men of bronze, there is an undertone of the tyrannical 
totalitarianism associated with the bronze statue of Peter the Great. In Pushkin’s “The Bronze 
Horseman”, an anonymous and essentially benevolent Tittle man’ called Eugene (a name in which 
Edmund Wilson, in “In Honour of Pushkin” ( The Triple Thinkers (London: John Lehmann, 1952), 37- 
63), perceived the hint of a link to Pushkin’s more famous Eugene Onegin), loses everything he cares for 
and all his “roots” in one of Petersburg’s serial floods (Wilson’s essay includes a translation of the work, 
see pages 56-63). Peter’s artificial city, it would seem, is destined to undermine the attempts of its 
citizens to mature beyond a direct dependence on the patronising and infantilising ministrations of the 
totalitarian Tsarist state. After the flood, Eugene confronts the statue of Peter. The statue seems to move; 
under Eugene’s dissatisfied challenge its static authority transforms into a pervasive threat. Eugene runs 
through the streets driven on by the sound of hooves behind him. Raskolnikov’s desire to emulate the 
men of bronze is formulated from a feeling, similar to Eugene’s, o f unjust oppression, Raskolnikov’s 
solution, though, is predominantly influenced by his pride and egotism.
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posture of the omniscient man-god, to which Raskolnikov appears at times to aspire, 
depends on an inhuman isolation which he ultimately cannot tolerate or approve. 18
In Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor writes:
In the light of our understanding of identity, the portrait of an agent free from all 
frameworks rather spells for us a person in the grip of an appalling identity crisis. 
Such a person wouldn’t know where he stood on issues of fundamental importance, 
would have no orientation in these issues whatever, wouldn’t be able to answer for 
himself on them.19
Where this absence is not experienced as a “lack”, then, one has a picture of 
“frightening dissociation” .20 Taylor’s understanding of identity is of course particular, 
cohering around his proposition of a human agent’s inescapable orientation to a socially 
embedded “good”.
Raskolnikov’s intention, to demonstrate that he does know ‘where he stands’, 
proves the opposite. It is precisely the discrepancy between the fact of Raskolnikov’s
16 Dostoevsky, The Unpublished Dostoevsky: Diaries and Notebooks (1860-61), Volume II, 106.
17 The Unpublished Dostoevsky: Diaries and Notebooks (1860-61), Volume II, 106.
18 I use “human” here not as an objective factual term, (and not, therefore, as a blindly optimistic 
exaggeration of the benevolent civilising capacities of individuals and groups) but as denoting a state 
determined by the acceptance of an obligation to ground abstract moral decisions and convictions in 
consideration and awareness of an actual group of other beings to which it also pertains. In relations to 
this group one can be held accountable for both good and bad decisions, productive or destructive, but the 
kind of impunity of being beyond morality becomes a simply alien state rather than a transcendent 
progression. Raskolnikov tries to be inhuman but finds he in fact does not favour the conditions 
inhumanity demands; he is not prepared to surrender the rights and privileges he has himself travestied in 
rejecting his own obligation to the world of others. In sympathy with the implications Dostoevsky 
attaches to the term, I use it qualitatively; a usage which is particularly apt for the pejorative emphasis it 
gives to the antitheses of what Dostoevsky’s biases approve as “human”, such as individualism and 
materialism.
In September 1865, Dostoevsky wrote to the publisher Katkov about the nature of moral 
reawakening Raskolnikov’s crime engenders:
Insoluble questions arise before the murderer; unsuspected and unexpected 
feelings torment his heart. God’s justice, earthly law, comes into its own, and he 
finishes by being compelled to denounce himself. Compelled, so as to become 
linked to people again, even at the price of perishing at penal servitude; the feeling 
of separation and alienation from humanity that came over him immediately after 
committing the crime has worn him out with torment.
(Complete Letters, Volume Three 1860-67, trans. David A. Lowe (Ann Arbor,
Michigan: Ardis, 1989), letter 266, 175).
Subservience to moral agreement and the communal moral values it instates, then, becomes a kind of 
criterion for the participation in a kind of communal moral care which does not deprive Raskolnikov of 
‘character’ and freedom but is the fundamental facilitator in enabling him to recognise and esteem these 
qualities.
For Dostoevsky, transgression and immorality are not inhuman, but the kind of subsequent 
remorselessness on which Raskolnikov had intended to found his future, is.
19 Taylor, Sources o f The Self, 31.
20 Taylor, Sources o f The Self, 31.
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situation and the boundlessness of will that Nietzsche claims for his Übermensch that 
roots him to the ground. But this discrepancy is not particular to Raskolnikov, 
Dostoevsky gives it a broad human relevance. A superman of the kind Raskolnikov 
aims to prove himself would not be a better human, it would not be a human at all. 
Dostoevsky implies that this kind of impunity from conventional moral categories is 
only attainable by individuals who are willing and able to surrender themselves to 
complete self-reliance and isolation; to forgo the human face.
Throughout Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov’s awareness of his incapacity 
and essential reluctance to surrender himself in this fashion dislodges his commitment 
to his idealised self-image that depends on them, and demonstrates to the initially 
evasive Raskolnikov where he actually stands. This is accompanied by the 
simultaneous emergence of Raskolnikov’s responsibility to “answer for himself’.
He was indeed ashamed even before Sonya, whom he tormented because of it with 
his contemptuous and rude treatment. But he was ashamed not of a shaved head and 
chains: his pride was badly wounded; and it was from wounded pride that he fell ill. 
... he judged himself severely and his hardened conscience did not find any 
especially terrible guilt in his past, except perhaps a simple blunder that could have 
happened to anyone. He was ashamed precisely because he, Raskolnikov, had 
perished so blindly, hopelessly, vainly, and stupidly . . .21
Raskolnikov has cut himself off from a possibility he nevertheless still considers 
himself inherently entitled to: he judges himself in relation to his fidelity to the 
authority he invests in his idea, dismissing any actual signs of incompetence or failure 
as reality’s wrongful deviation from the terms of his ideal.
Unlike the impersonal judgements of conventional “authority”, the judgements 
Raskolnikov imagines his mother, Dunya, or Razumikhin might make cannot so readily 
be disparaged. The disquiet provoked by his inability to attain the sympathetic 
understanding of any individual he respects, esteems or otherwise wishes to be 
understood by, begins to suggest to him that while the superficial forms of conventional 
morality seem stale and rigid, they are formed and underpinned by a conduit of moral 
support and orientation to others for which he discovers a strong desire.
Similarly, Porfiry Petrovich’s psychological tactics and taunts (aside from 
demonstrating an intimacy with and sympathy for his predicament beyond the mere
21 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 543.
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detection and capture of a murderer22) impose feelings of incompetence and inferiority 
on Raskolnikov. Raskolnikov had banked on meeting his pursuers and accusers with 
the composure and impervious self-conviction of a higher being; in Porfiry’s company, 
though, he is the scolded raw youth, brooding and sullenly rebelling against the 
evidence of his naivete.
... you’re not one to be afraid or ashamed of confessing your guilt.”
“Ehh, I spit on it!” Raskolnikov whispered scornfully and with loathing, as though 
he did not even wish to speak. He again made a move to get up, as if he wanted to 
go somewhere, but again sat down in visible despair.
“You spit on it, really! You’ve lost your faith and you think I’m crudely flattering 
you; but how much have you lived so far? How much do you understand? He came 
up with a theory, and now he’s ashamed because it didn’t work, because it came out 
too unoriginaily!23
On learning of the crime Sonya immediately understands the implication Raskolnikov 
has been trying to avoid, “What, what have you done to yourself!” .24 Sonya, like 
Porfiry Petrovich and Svidrigailov, intuitively perceives Raskolnikov as the victim of 
his own actions and of the idea behind them.
“And live, how will you live? What will you live with?” Sonya exclaimed. “Is it 
possible now? How will you talk to your mother? (Oh, and them, what will become 
of them now!) But what am I saying! You’ve already abandoned your mother and 
sister. You have, you’ve already abandoned them. Oh, Lord!” she cried, “he 
already knows it all himself! But how, how can one live with no human being! What 
will become of you now”.25
22 Porfiry Petrovich is aware of Raskolnikov’s frustrated, ambitious self-interest and his frustrated desire 
to undertake a genuinely higher cause, which are compounded to precipitate his crime. It is not that 
Porfiry sympathises with or approves of any particular aspect of Raskolnikov’s theory, though, but rather 
with the impulse that drove Raskolnikov to formulate it in the first place: he recognises in Raskolnikov 
someone who, in spite of the travesty he came up with, was seeking, though not solely or without 
corruption, to develop a credible cause to which he could surrender himself, and therein a willingness to. 
His crime and manner have about them the trappings of thought, of a paradoxical moral application, 
which conveys Raskolnikov’s commitment to a moral discourse. This commitment is redeemable; it can 
be rehabilitated. Porfiry’s manner towards Raskolnikov reflects the kind of anguished sympathy which 
Prince Myshkin demonstrates in his diagnoses of the nature and proliferation of Russian atheism. It also 
closely resembles Dostoevsky’s own feelings about the crimes and criminals he attributed to the modern 
secular ideals of radical youths throughout the 1860s and 1870s. In his famous concern for Russia’s little 
boys and girls, Dostoevsky is at his most avuncular and sympathetic, while in the more strident tones he 
employs throughout A Writer’s Diary his refusal to tolerate the consequences of individuals’ devotion to 
their ‘new words’ is to the fore.
23 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 459.
24 Crime and Punishment, 411.
25 Crime and Punishment, 420.
260
Ultimately, Raskolnikov’s idealism cannot dissolve his human ties, and therein the 
proof of his humanity, or provide him with the kind of support these offer.26
In contrast to Raskolnikov’s disorientation and irascibility, Razumikhin is given a 
stability and internal assurance. Neither cloyingly spiritual nor complacently moralistic, 
Razumikhin seems to be inherently good, and he is given all the good things from 
which Raskolnikov systematically estranges himself.27 Rather than falling into 
disrepute through Raskolnikov's determination to disown them (as mere sentimental 
ballast, for instance, or the stifling comforts of conformity), these qualities (essentially a 
family bond, and the mutual regard and nourishing of care) thus remain valuable. 
Raskolnikov's intention of placing himself above such ordinary concerns results only in 
a separation which, if anything, raises these banalities well above his compromised 
reach. “I wanted to tell you ... as I was coming here ... I wanted to tell you, mama ... 
and you, Dunya, that it’s better if we part ways for a while. ... Whatever happens to
26 Myshkin, by contrast, proceeds towards a catastrophic affirmation of the inhuman incoherence of his 
abstract idealism. Raskolnikov’s own moral sense is maintained by a similar instinct to Myshkin’s; and, 
accordingly, fails for the same reason that Myshkin’s fails. In both, it is the failure to recognise or value 
the fertile coercive influence of an actual community and respond to the field of agreement which 
condemns the idealistic vision each character seeks to promote. In The Idiot, though, this field is tainted 
with implications of bourgeois individualism, and approval for its corrective imperviousness to 
Myshkin’s individualistic supplication is tempered and almost withheld (in Crime and Punishment this 
qualification is unnecessary as Raskolnikov, not the community, is the carrier of the corrupting principles 
of western individualism). Though Myshkin’s failure to successfully communicate with his audience 
stands as a legitimate condemnation of his program, the condemnation encompasses both the scene, and 
the incapacity to be flexible which is revealed as fundamental to Myshkin’s intentions.
Myshkin’s unlimited, and primarily indiscriminate, compassion is frequently the source of a 
disruptive indulgence of other characters’ idealistic desires. Though welcomed at first, Myshkin’s 
indulgent compassion is ultimately disruptive as it affirms others’ desires and ideals not as gestures of 
abstract orientation or subjectively meaningful codes of conduct, but as worldly possibilities regardless of 
their unworldly terms. Myshkin’s compassionate reinforcement of symbolic expressions as potential 
truth perpetuates the dissatisfied antipathy towards, or righteous retreat from, secular reality which 
absolutist idealism necessitates in the secular world. Nastasya Filippovna, for instance, turns Myshkin’s 
first marriage proposal away, in spite of her recognition that he was the saviour she’d been waiting for: 
“And did you really think I’d ruin a babe-in-arms like that?” (The Idiot, 179). Nastasya reveres her ideal 
and preserves it by keeping it separate: her dream has seemingly come true but this dream is an 
expression not a request, fruition is not its point. Myshkin’s promise of that desired fulfilment forces a 
sharp re-evaluation of the proper value of idealistic orientation; idealism expresses a relationship with 
reality, but cannot hope to control or satisfactorily circumscribe it.
27 Razumikhin’s name suggests a fond diminutive of razum, meaning “reason”; the intended effect of 
which, as suggested by Professor Iain Wright (in conversation), might be something like “little-Mr- 
Reasonable”. In Dostoevsky: The Miraculous Years, 1865-71, Joseph Frank notes the resonance of 
Razumikhin’s name, suggesting that Razumikhin is Dostoevsky’s gesture to the warm and spontaneous 
qualities of a living flexible reason, and a corrective to the kind of disinterested utilitarianism with which 
rational clarity was stereotypically associated (99). In Dostoyevsky: An Examination of the Major Novels, 
Richard Peace notes further: “Razumikhin jokingly says that his name is ‘Vrazumikhin’ (i.e. from 
vrazumit’ = ‘to knock sense into someone’): see D.5, p.125. Luzhin, unable to remember Razumikhin’s 
name correctly, calls him ‘Rassudkin’ (i.e. from rassudok = ‘reason’, ‘intellect’): see D.5, p.313. 
Svidrigailov carries on this idea when he says that Razumikhin’s name suggests that he is ‘a man of 
reason’ (i.e. rassuditelnyy), and that he must be a seminarist: see D.5, p.496” (note 4, 313). Peace’s page 
references relate to a Russian edition of Dostoevsky’s collected works: F.M. Dostoyevsky, Sobraniye 
sochineniy v desyati tomakh (Moscow, 1956).
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me, whether I perish or not, I want to be alone. Forget me altogether. It’s better . . . “ .28 
Thus Raskolnikov announces his exile and tries to depart; his mother’s and sister’s 
outcry dampens his resolve and, agreeing to return, he leaves. Razumikhin follows 
Raskolnikov who has waited to speak with him, “I knew you’d come running ... Go 
back to them and be with them ... Be with them tomorrow, too ... and always. I’ll 
come ... maybe ... if I can”. Raskolnikov’s appointment of Razumikhin as caretaker 
of his loved ones serves Dostoevsky’s moral purpose by allowing this sudden hostility 
to familial tenderness to be particularised. Raskolnikov’s mother reciprocates, deeming 
Razumikhin “Providence” and declaring that she regards him “as one of our family” .30 
By mutual association, Raskolnikov’s mother, Dunya and Razumikhin, maintain the 
presence of a symbolic community in relation to which Raskolnikov’s isolation appears 
a state of deprivation, not “privilege”. Raskolnikov here is quite clearly the victim of 
his actions rather than the world historical victor triumphing with disdain.
One new, insurmountable sensation was gaining possession of him almost minute by 
minute: it was a certain boundless almost physical loathing for everything he met or 
saw around him, an obstinate spiteful, hate filled loathing. All the people he met 
were repulsive to him -  their faces, their walk, their movements were repulsive.31
In The Double Mr Golyadkin has a nightmare in which the city streets are populated 
solely with replica Golyadkins; he panics; every encounter confronts him with the 
image of Golyadkin as he is, and declares the absence of Golyadkin as he would be. 
Raskolnikov’s hostility stems from a similar root, everything and everybody, he feels, 
implicitly accuse him of either fraud or failure. His overt hostility to a reality that 
persistently deviates from his conception of how it should rightly be, allows him 
initially to moor himself by maintaining the credibility of his basic conceptual 
foundations. Raskolnikov experiences all discrepancies between his own worldview 
and conventional reality both as accusations and as signs of his entitlement to oppose 
the latter. For one so dependent on making a particular sense of his circumstances, 
differences of opinion are similarly dangerous; for Raskolnikov, unmediated 
interactions with others holds the possibility of encountering unsympathetic 
worldviews. When Raskolnikov confesses to Sonya, she responds provocatively to the
28 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 313.
29 Crime and Punishment, 313. 
j0 Crime and Punishment, 221.
31 Crime and Punishment, 110.
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rationalisations he proffers: “Nothing, he understands nothing!” .32 His need to evade or 
defy Sonya’s dissent galvanises and is subsequently reinforced by a further resort to 
extremes of merely asserted certainty: “I know everything. I thought it all out and 
whispered it all out when I was lying there in the dark ... I argued it all out with myself, 
to the last little trace, and I know everything, everything!”.
While confessing to Sonya, Raskolnikov appears “in some sort of gloomy ecstasy. 
(Indeed, he had not talked with anyone for a very long time!) Sonya understood that 
this gloomy catechism had become his faith and law” .34 Raskolnikov guards his law 
accordingly:
“To kill? The right to kill?” Sonya clasped her hands.
“Ahh, Sonya!” he cried irritably, and was about to make some objection to her, but 
remained scornfully silent. “Don’t interrupt me, Sonya!35
The scornfully closed nature of Raskolnikov’s explanation is an indicator of its 
vulnerability; like the pawnbroker in “The Meek Girl” he requires a barrier between 
himself and the implications of external judgement. The self-censorship of his 
confession is an irony that points to Raskolnikov’s own incomplete awareness of the 
nature of his guilt.
Primarily, Raskolnikov does not experience his own transgression or immorality, 
he simply experiences isolation; the approval of moral criteria comes as the necessary 
adjunct to regaining a voice in human affairs. “If the room were now suddenly filled 
not with policemen but with his foremost friends, even then, he thought, he would be 
unable to find a single human word for them, so empty had his heart suddenly 
become” .36 His emptiness is not the sang-froid or indifference of a superior moral 
vantage, but seems rather to reflect a necessary silencing or denial of various 
rationalisations, feelings, ideas and arguments going on within him which he cannot 
acknowledge, both for the fact that they reflect his continuing uncertainty and imperfect 
conviction, and for their particular implications of his sin.
In counterpoint to the emotional squalor and despair into which Raskolnikov’s 
experimental transgression delivers him, the interactions between Razumikhin, Dunya, 
Raskolnikov’s mother, Porfiry Petrovich and Svidrigailov communicate the persistence 
and advantages of the moral ‘functions’ Raskolnikov had sought to deny. These
32 Crime and Punishment, 418.
33 Crime and Punishment, 418.
34 Crime and Punishment, 418.
35 Crime and Punishment, 419.
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relationships convey the character of a ‘larger world’ - a world of people and interaction 
rather than mere hollow conventions and unthinking conformity -  which re-emerges 
from the shadow of Raskolnikov’s ‘theory’ and alters the emotivist foundations of his 
idealistic convictions and commitment. Raskolnikov’s emotional retuning takes place 
at the hands of an impersonal force of moral coercion. While its substance appears 
ideological its form and process are less so, developing Raskolnikov’s recognition of 
the contingent character of individual conviction rather than his convinced affiliation to 
a single and particular manifestation of these strategies.
The sense of failure which comes to tell psychologically against Raskolnikov’s 
attempts to rationalise away his guilt stems not from his faltering loyalty to the theory 
with which initially he had so fiercely aligned himself (this, after all, proves a chimera), 
but rather from his awakening to the compromised vision which had facilitated his 
theories of impunity and the trial he made in their name. Though Raskolnikov briefly 
seeks to isolate himself from realities which might force him to acknowledge and 
confront the implications of his confused and troubled conscience, the moral appetite 
implicit in his desire to rationalise, one way or another, his crime drives him reluctantly 
towards his fellows, and towards an admission of his dependence on them, rather than 
away from them into a necessarily solipsistic exile. The problems which secular moral 
discourse inherits from absolutist models such as divine authority (or Platonic Ideals), 
are taken by Dostoevsky to reflect a corrosive inadequacy intrinsic to any attempt to 
deal in secular absolutes. The circumstantial coincidence (orchestrated by Dostoevsky) 
of the profanity of these absolutes and their detrimental incapacity to fulfil their 
supposed intentions, therefore, recommends the unifying order of supernatural faith as 
an object of devotion worth striving to keep.
The narrator of Dostoevsky’s The House of the Dead (1860-62) describes a desperate 
relationship between the incarcerated and the wishful hopes that sustained them:
This habitual restlessness, which was displayed silently but obviously, this strange, 
impatient fervour of involuntarily expressed hopes which were at times so divorced 
from reality that they resembled a kind of delirium and which, perhaps most 
strikingly of all, persisted in men of the most hard-headed intelligence -  all this
created an extraordinary atmosphere in the place ... One somehow felt at once,
37almost at first glance, that there was nothing like this outside the prison.
36 Crime and Punishment, 103.
37 Dostoevsky, The House of the Dead, trans. David McDuff; 1985, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1985), 303.
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It is exactly this atmosphere which Dostoevsky evokes as the characteristic milieu of 
communities over-populated with prisoners of their own individualism. Dostoevsky 
introduces these deliriums and absurd hopes, which “were possibly [prison’s] most 
characteristic feature”, into the world at large as the measure of a type of incarceration 
intrinsic to a society that replaces external authority with the deification of principles of 
material individualism.
Here everyone was a dreamer, and this was immediately obvious. The place had a 
morbid feel to it, stemming from the fact that this daydreaming made most of the 
convicts look sullen and morose, and somehow unhealthy. By far the greater 
number of them were silent and malicious to the point of hatred and did not like to 
display their hopes openly. Forthrightness and frankness were held in contempt.
The more unrealizable were the hopes of these men, and the stronger their own 
sense of their unrealizability, the more stubbornly and chastely they would keep
•2Q
them to themselves, unable, however, to renounce them.
Dostoevsky’s analysis of his fellow prisoners’ necessary delusions suggests a 
relationship between the hostile solipsism of individuals’ monologic self-esteem and a 
condition of essential incarceration. The obvious unhealthiness of Dostoevsky’s 
dreamers and ambitious campaigners reflects the exiling selectivity of ideological 
infatuation.
The ideologue and the dreamer are would-be tyrants; held back by conscience, 
cowardice or convention, they are redeemable. “The human being and the citizen perish 
forever in the tyrant, and a return to human dignity, to repentance, to regeneration 
becomes practically impossible for him” .40 It is Raskolnikov’s long-lived inability to 
sense “a profound lie in himself and in his convictions” that stands between him and the 
possibility of “his future resurrection, his future new vision of life” .41 Almost to the end 
Raskolnikov seeks to defend the credibility of his theory regardless of his inadequacy to 
enact it: “Instead he allowed only for the dull burden of instinct here, which it was not
38 The House of the Dead, 303.
39 The House of the Dead, 304.
40 The House of the Dead, 242.
41 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 545. The Russian word ‘prestuplenie', which is translated as 
‘crime’ in the title of the novel, is effectively over and step, in moral terms it refers to the stepping 
outside, or transgression, of moral bounds. Raskolnikov’s recurring meditations on his capacity to step 
over, and his formulation of his experiment in these terms, picks up therefore, this resonance from the 
title. It is perhaps as if he were deliberately stripping the terms of their moral overtone, to enable him as 
it were to act transgressively, stepping over, without having to acknowledge his accountability in any 
terms other than the practical bare facts of stepping over and remaining unpunished.
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for him to break through, and which (again owing to weakness and worthlessness) he 
had been unable to step over” 42
The resurrection proposed for Raskolnikov here by the narrator harmonises with 
the significance of physical release from jail in The House of the Dead, “Freedom, a 
new life, resurrection from the dead ... what a glorious moment!” .43 In this harmony, 
the moral imprisonment of Raskolnikov’s solipsistic pride registers quite separately 
from his physical imprisonment, and his own resurrection from the dead occurs, in spite 
of his continued physical incarceration, through his acceptance of his guilt and 
accountability. At the same time, the isolating commitment to ideological 
transcendence is exorcised, allowing this surrender to external accountability to suggest 
inspiration or enlightenment rather than a weak lapse from the rigours of individualism. 
“To confess one’s guilt and one’s original sin is little, very little; one must wean oneself 
away from them completely. And that takes more than a little time” .44
Svidrigailov taunts Raskolnikov that his unhappy conscience belies his claim to the 
originality of genius and any connection to a “higher” moral category; he has reacted 
like “a citizen and a human being”, in which case he “shouldn’t have butted into this” .45 
Svidrigailov castigates Raskolnikov for arrogantly stumbling in over his head; if he 
cannot stomach tales of debauchery and exploitation he has no right to the pride he still 
holds in his theoretically compelled transgression.
Long after his guilt has been pragmatically and legally established, Raskolnikov 
maintains the notion that the amoral freedom of men of genius is a fact, but one that 
simply does not apply to him. Raskolnikov’s fidelity to his idea of this higher category 
reflects his inability to accept ordinary life as the sphere of a worthy existence. The 
manner of Svidrigailov’s taunts seems to be in accordance with this notion, implying 
condescension and disdain for Raskolnikov’s vanity and deluded ambition. But within 
the novel the credibility of this ambition and the hierarchy which it presumes is dubious. 
Svidrigailov is no more free than Raskolnikov: after the brief prospect of discovering in 
Raskolnikov a comrade who could understand and share the thrill of travestying moral 
guidelines in criminal debauchery, Svidrigailov’s self-absolving isolation is too 
inhuman a place to return to. At the same time, the crippling of Raskolnikov’s abstract 
self-justifications releases him to return, sullenly, to a condition of citizenship and
42 Crime and Punishment, 545.
43 Dostoevsky, The House of the Dead, 357.
44 The House of the Dead, 243.
45 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 485.
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humanity. Porfiry Petrovich confronts Raskolnikov with a hypothetical criminal whose 
behaviour after a crime mirrors his own: “He lied incomparably, but he failed to reckon 
on his nature” .46 Porfiry allusively stresses that he is talking about a very particular 
case; in the moments when Raskolnikov’s “nature” betrays him Dostoevsky points, 
though, to a general condition (something like a moral appetite) which these betrayals 
reveal.
The urge to ‘step over’ is often founded in want, and in the ambivalence of reality to the 
standard, whether abstract or material, by which individuals esteem themselves and seek 
to be esteemed.47 In financial power, though, a common language suggests itself in 
which individuals’ desire to see their self-image externally approved, and their thwarted 
self-esteem, can attain the widespread approval which abstract terms cannot earn them. 
In The Idiot and An Accidental Family those who will step over the obstacles of their 
financial and social obscurity (Ganya Ivolgin and Arkady Dolgoruky, for instance) plan 
to do so with the authority of hard cash. Ganya’s friend Ptitsyn has done just that, and it 
is implied also that Totsky’s absorption of Filipp Barashkov’s three daughters and his 
eventual exploitation of Nastasya Filippovna are absolved in practical terms as the 
privilege of a property owning gentleman. Raskolnikov’s moral transgression is of 
course partly founded on notions of a similar financial self-propulsion48 In the
46 Crime and Punishment, 342.
47 In The Idiot, Radomsky foretells a criminal career for Ippolit Terentyev: “I tell you again, crime is too 
common a recourse for these talentless, greedy, impatient nobodies” (The Idiot, 444). The nihilistic 
denial of moral bounds, he implies, merely facilitates the free-hand to act on feelings of personal 
entitlement without having to admit to any responsibility for, or guilt in offending, the rights of others, 
and precedes all manner of criminal negligence.
48 Dostoevsky took some inspiration for Raskolnikov’s character, and the problems of utilitarian 
transgression and blinkered ambition which he faces, from Pushkin’s story “The Queen of Spades” (1833) 
(The Complete Prose Tales o f Alexandr Sergeyevitch Pushkin, trans. Gillon R. Aitken (London: Vintage, 
1993), 273-305). Hermann, the story’s hero, “is a truly romantic figure; he has the profile of a Napoleon, 
and the soul of a Mephistopheles” (295). Which is to say he has the pride, ruthlessness and commitment 
to his ambitions of a military leader meticulously superintending a campaign, and the moral disorientation 
engendered by a goal that transcends his merely probable reality. “The game fascinates me,” said 
Hermann, “but I am not in a position to sacrifice the essentials of life in the hope of acquiring the 
luxuries” (276). Hermann’s refusal to gamble is entirely pragmatic. However, when he believes the 
element of risk has been removed by the old lady’s advice (play on three, seven, ace), Hermann invests 
his inheritance and, therefore, his future. Like Raskolnikov’s, Hermann’s fall comes about not through 
foolishness or rash spontaneities, rather, it is the blinkered commitment of a highly serious devotion to 
future success. The reversal of his fortunes on the play of the third card comes as a complete surprise to 
Hermann, he had not for one moment considered that his ambition would not be realised.
... instead of an ace, before him lay the queen of spades. He could not believe his 
eyes, could not understand how he could have slipped up.
At that moment it seemed to him that the queen of spades winked at him and 
smiled. He was struck by an unusual likeness...
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company of Ganya, Ptitsyn and Arkady, whose programs, though fuelled by spite and 
offended vanity, are fundamentally ethical, Raskolnikov’s rationale seems more plainly 
grotesque and insidious than in isolation.
This distinction can perhaps be made clearer in relation to Joseph Frank’s 
suggestion that “Raskolnikov had not been able to “step over” because he had still clung 
to moral conscience” .49 To say Raskolnikov “still clung” to what we recognise as moral 
convention deprives his final repentance of its affirmative impact. Raskolnikov does 
not fail to step over, never quite making good his getaway from moral boundaries, but 
rather arrives outside these limits and finds an inhospitable void. Initially, Raskolnikov 
tells himself it is not a void, and also that his discomfort merely proves him inadequate 
to the terms of his idea.50 His final surrender, though, is far more corrosive of the 
fundamental credence he gives to the idea of the world-historical or absolute sphere. 
Raskolnikov steps over the manifest boundaries of moral convention and discovers a 
latent boundary of humanity which one cannot choose to escape. “You can’t overleap 
nature by logic alone!” suggests Razumikhin.51 The utopian rationalism of Fourierist 
Phalansteries, against which Razumikhin is reacting here, is founded on the same over­
abstracted rationalism as Raskolnikov’s “not a crime”. Raskolnikov’s eventual return 
to the confines of conventional morality is attributable to his incompatibility to the 
environment ‘beyond good and evil’. He does not cling to morality, but finds himself 
feeling deprived without it. His crime places him outside conventional patterns of 
moral support and he pines for the assurances and guidance they provide.
Svidrigailov’s suicide, as much as Raskolnikov’s eventual repentance, reflects 
Dostoevsky’s commitment to demonstrating that abstract moral impulses exist as an
“The old woman!” he shouted in terror. (305).
Hermann walks away from the tables financially ruined and personally annihilated. In the madness that 
he sinks into he is haunted by the two sequences that divide his desired and his actual fate, “he answers no 
questions, but merely mutters repeatedly: “Three, seven, ace! Three, seven, queen!” (305). The moment 
of sudden betrayal and the catastrophic irony of Hermann’s rational self-interest and foolish gullibility 
seems present as an immanent possibility throughout Raskolnikov’s avoidance of his crime. 
Raskolnikov’s attempts to avoid the mortifying recognition of his own rejected impertinence are brought 
to a symbolic peak in a dream which resembles Hermann’s final encounter with the old woman, winking 
from the card.
49 Frank, Dostoevsky: The Miraculous Years, 1865-71, 131.
50 Raskolnikov has stepped over in the same way that, with a conviction that he could walk on water, he 
might have stepped out of a boat and begun to move his arms and legs as if he were on solid ground. For 
as long as he continues to believe he is in fact walking on water he will sink, but when he accepts that he 
requires solid ground to walk on he will be able to start swimming instead, perhaps back to the boat, and 
at least to accept that walking is not possible on water. One might say that Raskolnikov is not able to 
accept the necessity, in keeping with this analogy, of swimming rather than walking in water, and though 
he never relinquishes his essential conviction in the propriety of solid ground, he does nevertheless step 
off the boat.
51 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 256.
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inherent quality of human-ness. As such, this connection (between morality and 
human-ness) is nevertheless vulnerable to suspicions of having merely a nominal 
relevance. Svidrigailov, we might say, becomes human through his suicide but prior to 
his appearance in the novel has led an existence outside or beyond the conditions of 
humanity. The potential to re-enter humanity, though, reflects an affirmation that the 
“inhuman” existence had been a miscalculation, an error; the capacity to redress it 
implies an acceptance that present moral engagement involves accountability for the 
past.
In The House of the Dead, Orlov -  for Dostoevsky, a quintessential^ amoral 
criminal - scorns the narrator’s inquiries after his conscience; the narrator feels himself 
accused of a kind of inexperienced moral provincialism: “in his eyes I had suddenly 
become a silly little boy to whom it was impossible to talk as one would to an adult” .52 
Orlov’s obliviousness to moral equivocations is further conveyed through his 
implacable isolation: existing outside the barriers of morality, Orlov has no urge to 
justify himself and nothing to say to those who ask him about a quality he cannot 
recognise within himself. Consequently, isolation such as Orlov’s is intractable. The 
complete moral schism reflected in the pathological (rather than flawed or reactionary) 
criminal renders him irrelevant to the bonds of human moral agreement. Orlov exists as 
an external challenge to the application of human moral judgements but not as a 
coherent challenge to the level at which these are generated.
Like the tyrant, the moral illiterate does not participate as human being or citizen 
in the moral agreements of the community with which they cohabit. Such figures are 
rare in Dostoevsky’s moral equations: he is more concerned with the latent moral 
principle which influences the ordinary criminals’ typical awareness that they have 
transgressed against something real.
Raskolnikov’s and Svidrigailov’s last meeting juxtaposes their parallel responses 
to their mutual failure to elicit from each other a word that will make them bearable to 
themselves. Svidrigailov’s suicide, contextualised by his dream of his victims, suggests 
an act of approval for the moral values which he has revelled in transgressing, while 
simultaneously acknowledging his irredeemable separation. Svidrigailov’s suicide is 
associated with none of the implications of protest or self-affirmation such as those 
which, in Demons, surround Kirillov’s abrogation of God’s power over life and death, 
but seems rather an acknowledgment of the impossibility both of rehabilitation and of 
unchanged continuation. It is in keeping with Nastasya Filippovna’s self-destructive
52 Dostoevsky, The House of the Dead, 83.
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submission to the inevitability of Rogozhin’s knife. Both Nastasya and Svidrigailov 
seem literally to destroy themselves in intuitive acts of self-restraint and deference to 
virtues which their existence could only continue to offend. In the prelude to their 
deaths both Nastasya and Svidrigailov waver between gratuitous predatory self- 
indulgence and reverence for human qualities from which they feel entirely alienated. 
Svidrigailov attempts to blackmail Raskolnikov’s sister Dunya with his knowledge of 
the crime. Svidrigailov seems drawn to Dunya, his former employee and unattainable 
object of desire, as a potential saviour (inspired, perhaps, by Raskolnikov’s optimism 
for the prospect of a redemptive new beginning with Sonya). Svidrigailov lures Dunya 
to him and seeks to trade Raskolnikov’s continued freedom for her affection. He has 
her in his power, the door is locked and he is armed, but suddenly she is spared, he 
hands Dunya the pistol and invites her to shoot him. Dunya hesitates and Svidrigailov 
orders her to leave before his uncharacteristic refusal to domineer fades.
Svidrigailov turns once more to Raskolnikov, as to a potential peer, to declare 
himself and, he hopes, in Raskolnikov’s sympathy to re-establish the support of 
community (again, as Raskolnikov had tried to do with Sonya, considering her a fallen 
being like himself). The failure of Svidrigailov’s attempt not only reveals his own 
irrevocable solitude but jars Raskolnikov back into complicity with the moral 
conventions he has felt himself alien to.
After parting from Raskolnikov, Svidrigailov prefaces his grand gesture of self- 
annihilation with a more modest show of his capacity to discriminate good from bad. In 
an act of apparent penance Svidrigailov leaves his money to Sonya, recommending that 
it be managed by Razumikhin. Svidrigailov singles out Razumikhin, with his equally 
critical and heartfelt acceptance of the world, to administer a material bequest to the 
humble and self-sacrificing Sonya.
Svidrigailov seems to have chosen death with his last remnants of indignation, 
shame and despair. He avoids what seems an imminent fall into the complete moral 
atrophy and alienation which Stavrogin, in Demons, appears to be suffering. 
Svidrigailov has an appetite for sin, he luxuriates in the vileness of his self-indulgences, 
but remains vulnerable to the chastening recognition of his loneliness; Stavrogin is 
incapable of even this perverse kind of moral impulse. Stavrogin’s suicide, though 
ostensibly brought about by a final spasm of moral self-disgust similar to Svidrigailov’s, 
seems still to contain a significant element of pardon; of simply letting himself off the 
hook. Before Stavrogin hangs himself, he writes, “I know I ought to kill myself, to 
sweep myself off the earth like a vile insect; but I’m afraid of suicide, because I’m
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afraid of showing magnanimity”; evidently he conquers this fear and acts on a moral 
self-revulsion that has emerged from latency. Whether he had overcome it or not, 
Svidrigailov’s ‘fear’ betrays his continuing fixation with the terms of conventional 
morality: he will not commit suicide because it would be an act of confession, or 
contrition, and an acknowledgment of his failure to thrive outside moral boundaries; it 
would reaffirm the reality of the position he had tried to deny. He cannot help but 
evaluate the significance and success of his protests and dissatisfactions in their 
relationship to conventional morality and its habitual patterns of thought. In their 
separate ways, Raskolnikov and Svidrigailov are brought to this “magnanimous” point 
of surrender through their inability to sustain the emotional, as opposed to logical or 
abstract, credibility of the impunity their actions had presupposed in theory; 
Raskolnikov’s surrender parallels the moment of magnanimity in which Svidrigailov 
exterminates himself.
Raskolnikov’s ‘trial’ exposes him to an active moral force, while his coming to 
grips with this force reveals the nature of its influence, but his experiences (Sonya’s 
innocent fallen-ness, and Svidrigailov’s brazen immorality for example) show also that 
this presence is subject to subversion by individual and communal need. As Wellek 
(attempting to counter implications, encouraged by Bakhtin’s emphasis on the 
‘polyphonic’ nature of Dostoevsky’s novels, that Dostoevsky advocates moral 
relativism) notes: “thou shalt not kill” is an edict which Crime and Punishment clearly 
endorses.54 But it is attributed to the agency of the dramatis personae rather than to 
their observation of a received and accepted rule. Formed through the interaction of 
Dostoevsky’s scepticism, optimism and realism, morality in Dostoevsky’s works exists, 
regardless of his varyingly overt recommendations of divine authority, as a commitment 
(and addiction) to interaction; its particulars are plastic and subject to perpetual 
appraisal.
Dramatis Personae
- “The living soul is suspicious, the living soul is retrograde!” 53
Bakhtin’s idealising tendencies, implicit in his concept of dialogue (“All else is the 
means; dialogue is the end”56), are particularly apparent in his conception of the
53 Dostoevsky, Demons, trans. Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky (London: Vintage, 1994), 676.
54 See: “Bakhtin’s View of Dostoevsky: ‘Polyphony’ and ‘Camivalesque’ ”, Russian Formalism: A 
Retrospective Glance, eds. R.L. Jackson & Stephen Rudy (New Haven: Yale Center for International & 
Area Studies, 1985), 231-241.
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relationship between Dostoevsky’s characters and their guiding ideas or ideals. “All of 
Dostoevsky’s major characters, as people of an idea, are absolutely unselfish, insofar as 
the idea has really taken control of the deepest recesses of their personality”. It is 
true, as Bakhtin observes, that Dostoevsky’s characters are often identified primarily in 
“the image of an idea”. This identification suggests either a common posture of 
necessary devotion or the particular path of a traceable individual preference. Either 
way, it is the individual character not the idea which is the point of origin (the appetite 
for subjection or self-aggrandisement), and the apparent selflessness of their extreme 
devotion is in fact a superficial reflection of a human compulsion towards sustaining 
certainties. What Bakhtin defines as unselfish devotion would require the idea to be 
significant for its own sake, as a focus of personal absolute faith. He also observes, 
though, that “were one to think away the idea in which they live, their image would be 
totally destroyed”. The ideas of the individualists who appear in Dostoevsky’s later 
work, though, are typically given preference over wider worldly facts as the rightful 
entitlements of rational individualism; it is primarily in the earlier works that the idea 
exists as a life-giving ideal for its own sake. Bakhtin’s assertion that the ‘thinking 
away’ of the seifs idea leads to the total destruction of the seifs image is credible in 
relation to Dostoevsky’s early half-gothic extremism, but much less so in the 
sophisticated psychological ambiguity of the later novels 60
55 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 256.
56 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, trans. Caryl Emerson (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984), 252.
57 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 87.
58 Bakhtin, Problems o f Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 87.
59 Bakhtin, Problems o f Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 87.
60 In Netochka Nezvanova, Dostoevsky’s unfinished first attempt at the novel form (curtailed by his arrest 
in 1849), the gothic romanticism of Hoffmann (1776-1822) is to the fore in the telling of a tale of 
egotistic delusions of grandeur. Dostoevsky’s exposition of the violinist Efimov’s dependence on the 
fixed idea of his musical genius, and his complete collapse after this idea is irrevocably disrupted, 
provides a clear affirmation of Bakhtin’s claims. “[Efimov] died when his last hope had vanished, when 
in one instant everything with which he had deluded himself and which had sustained his entire existence 
disintegrated before his eyes” (Netochka Nezvanova, trans. Jane Kentish (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1985), 68). This eventuality had been predicted by Efimov’s former friend, the 
responsible and disciplined B. : “Prove to him that he’s not a musical genius and I assure you he’d die on 
the spot, thunderstruck. It must be terrible to part with a fixed idea to which one’s whole life has been 
dedicated, and which rests on genuine foundations, for he had a true vocation at first” (51-52). B. is 
uncertain, however, that any actual proof of this fact could register with Efimov, believing that “his 
madness is stronger than the truth and he’ll quickly invent some counter-argument” (52). Similar 
situations in Dostoevsky’s later writing suggest, however, a far more subtle relationship between the self 
and its “idea” and images. Even Myshkin, the idiot, who appears to go out with the extinguishing of his 
ideal is not straightforwardly devoted to it: as well as reflecting his incompatibility to a world which is 
ambivalent to human ideals, Myshkin’s disintegration is brought about by the collapse of the individual 
support and consolation he personally depended on the feasibility of his ideal to provide in its actual 
absence. Though his infatuation is not overtly self-interested it is, nevertheless, dependent not merely 
devoted.
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The flexibility of monologic habits, which evades such ‘thinking away’, attests to 
the dimension in which this devotion to an idea is most significant: not in the absolute 
legitimacy of the idea but in providing stability and credibility to the self image that has 
formed around it. The particular ideas that are sustained in this fashion (rather than 
being cast off the moment their ideal credentials become questionable) merely close a 
devotional circuit of the individual’s self affirmation and are invested with the 
gratification it facilitates: unto itself the particular idea remains unremarkable, one of 
many. In “A Lie is Saved By A Lie”, Dostoevsky suggests that when an individual 
comes to cherish “a certain dream, an idea, a theory, a conviction” as truth, the 
discovery of its fallibilities will be deflected by lies.61 Therein, individuals’ 
relationships with their personalised ideals are protected, and their guiding ideas’ 
limitations as abstract authorities are obscured by compromise.
Bakhtin suggests that all the alternatives to Raskolnikov’s “solution” of his uncertainty 
are entertained by him in an inner speech which reflects his latent interaction with the 
polyphonic scene. " While the positions implicitly proposed by the other characters are 
absorbed by Raskolnikov, as Bakhtin implies, as contentions to be dulled, his own 
stance seems rather to reflect his persisting commitment to deflecting challenges, 
implicit in alternative perspectives, to a particular “truth” that he desires to believe in. 
In the novel, though, we see an external body claiming Raskolnikov as one of many, 
rather than Raskolnikov acknowledging the legitimate multi-facetedness of his own true 
self. Rather than suggesting what Raskolnikov might have done, the alternative moral 
positions suggest what others, characters who are not Raskolnikov, might have done in 
similar circumstances. Raskolnikov’s need to silence these alternatives does not 
necessarily reflect the multiplicity contained within him, it might simply reflect his 
capacity to acknowledge the credibility of other responses, or, more particularly, his
In “The Meek Girl”, a similar sustaining delusion is unravelled by the pawnbroker: the sudden 
overload and mental collapse which does for Efimov is replaced by an ambiguous process of revelation 
which seems to knit a new image from the frayed refuse of the old. The potency of this relationship is to 
be discovered in the actual formation of the idea and in the individual’s responsibility for its status, rather 
than in the idea itself. The narrowness, or purity, of Efimov’s self-delusion is incapable of change; the 
value he places on his self is indelibly imprinted in the image of artistic genius. It is not idealism as such, 
around which his pride formulates his self-image, but a highly particular prejudice in which musical 
genius is fixed upon as the greatest happiness and a most estimable human virtue. The pawnbroker in The 
Meek Girl is unhindered by such genuinely abstract values. Efimov’s dependence on his ideal places him 
in a situation where, in its absence, he must accept humiliation or insensibility: that he will not humble 
himself suggests the presence of a naively romantic vanity which gives way, in the monologues of secular 
individualism, to far more flexible rationales.
61 Dostoevsky, “A Lie is Saved By A Lie”, A Writer’s Diary -  Volume II, 1877-1881, 1127-31, 1130.
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increasing uncertainty of his capacity to establish the moral impunity which he had pre­
emptively presumed for himself to expedite the crime. This acknowledgment suggests a 
challenge as potent to the nature of Raskolnikov’s individual authority, as 
acknowledging the internal polyphony which, suggests Bakhtin, forms the latent profile 
of every individual consciousness. The former, though, acknowledges also that moral 
agreement among a population of decentred authorities does not depend on a population 
acknowledging their essential similarity (where all people contain all possibilities of 
action and justification behind the actions and justifications they actually manifest) but 
rather on acknowledging a capacity to decipher the implications of their differences and 
recognise the intersections which nevertheless bind them.
Though Raskolnikov is aware of the rational credibility of numerous alternative 
explanations of his situation, initially none has an exclusively compelling emotive 
purchase. He recognises and understands the implications of this range of potentially 
condemnatory possibilities, but feels them to be unsuitable, wrong or inferior to his own 
“solution” (this aspect of being better than others, which requires his awareness of 
existing in the midst of other inadequate responses, is fundamental to the demonstration 
of his innate superiority which Raskolnikov hopes his rebellion will make). It is only 
his pride and the theories required to safeguard it that inspire him to act as if out of 
certain abstract conviction. The combat he thrives on is the attempt not to be absorbed 
by the ambiguities which his initial paralysis of uncertainty (before he thought it all out 
in his room63) had registered. Raskolnikov fights his incipient moral revulsion with 
himself in order to maintain a favoured explanation of his motivations, and he only 
begins to acknowledge the limitations of the explanation he had desired and chosen 
when his emotional affinities, and the priorities of his self-image, begin to align with 
values which, through his problematic but compelling need for interaction with other 
people, his own unwitting approval ratifies as a functional moral frame. Rather than 
failing to smash what needed smashing, or failing to step over convention, Raskolnikov 
has done as radical edicts of the period recommend and, suggests Dostoevsky, in the 
moral directives that crystallise around his desire for interaction and understanding, he
62 This is a recurring theme throughout Bakhtin’s discussion of Raskolnikov’s confusion, and also the 
interactions between numerous other characters in other novels (see particularly Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 238-39).
63 Having solved the problem of his uncertainty and dissatisfaction in complete isolation Raskolnikov, in 
essence, only comes out of “his room” when admitting his sin, all the rest is an attempt to maintain the 
integrity of the solipsistic illumination that had come to him in his darkness. He attempts to superintend 
his interactions with the external world as if it was all still an abstract manifestation of his theoretical 
solution argued out in solipsistic isolation. Finally, though, he consents to acknowledge the merely self- 
perpetuated and isolated credibility of his “theory” and emerges into a clear-sighted and tempered 
orthodoxy.
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has revealed and reinstated a genuine and vital convention. This recognition comes 
about through the intolerable vacuousness demanded of him by his initial position as a 
moral outcast; the theory he had expected to sustain him isn’t first disproved and then 
logically abandoned, but rather the position it requires him to maintain becomes 
uninhabitable, thereby forcing Raskolnikov to face the unreality of the justifications for 
his crime.
The intoxication by ideas under which Raskolnikov suffers is a perpetual 
possibility in the worlds of Dostoevsky’s novels. A variety of convictions are allowed 
to float about but they always remain fundamentally separate from the individuals who 
seek to found metaphysical certainties on them; it is their very inadequacy which 
compels fanaticism. Hence Raskolnikov’s repulsion by political notions which accord 
with his own when espoused by Luzhin incorporates the unwelcome recognition that his 
individual convictions and ideals are formed from ideas floating in the air; ideas, that is, 
which exist outside his relationship with them, and with which others also form 
“understandings” and relationships (even if it is as superficial and callous as Luzhin’s 
adoption of these floating ideas as the accoutrements of a modem man of thought64). 
Rather than thoroughly unique individual inspirations, Raskolnikov begins to recognise 
the rootedness of his ideals in his reactions to external and common problems of 
identity, expectation and reality.
In Dostoevsky’s novels, it is one of the fundamental implications of the tension 
between idealism, reality, convention and community that there is a standard (intrinsic 
to fertile moral interaction and conventions, agreement and intimacy), which 
individualistic monologic behaviour transgresses. Dostoevsky’s individualistic idealists 
acknowledge this reluctantly; it is an undeniable consequence of their recognition 
(shared with the reader) of the natural world’s limited tolerance for absolute idealism, 
and of the corruptions inherent in the monologic behaviour which sustains it (such as 
the seductive capacity to sustain the false semblance of its own authority). Rather than 
affirming the preference of a particular alternative (such as dialogic openness), this 
realisation merely approves the irrelevance or impossibility of humanly created or 
intelligible ‘systems’ .65 In this regard, the implied ideological wisdom of the characters,
64 Raskolnikov dismisses Luzhin’s enthusiastic endorsement of their generation’s “useful new ideas” - 
“...many harmful prejudices have been eradicated and derided ... In short, we have cut ourselves off 
irrevocably from the past, and that in itself, I think, is already something, sir...” (148) -  as the rote 
regurgitation of commonplaces, to recommend himself to his potential brother in law.
65 God and dialogic openness, respectively, are Dostoevsky’s and Bakhtin’s answers to the questions 
proposed by the reality portrayed in Dostoevsky’s fictional worlds. In place of Bakhtin’s mutually aware 
and open dialogue, the finite reduction (implicit, for instance, in Clough’s depiction of the unpregant 
pause) of moral responsibility to communication and individual choice founded on the repudiation of
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and of the novels they appear in, progresses in different rhythms: revelations of new 
truth, new clarity, or new words, which convince characters (such as the pawnbroker) 
that their previously deluded relationships with reality have given way to unmediated 
truth, take place in contexts which allow these ‘revelations’ to offer reflections on the 
general needs and uses which these alleged truths can be made to serve. The truth of 
God or faith remains a separate, wholly different proposition in Dostoevsky’s criticism 
of secular authority; it is the saving grace, the only way to truly exist in the embrace of 
an absolute. Around all the contentious voices which flourish as a consequence of the 
decentred status of truth in Dostoevsky’s novels, Bakhtin attempts to construct a system 
which reconciles their apparent hostilities and shows that they each serve and adhere to 
a single and common purpose. Dostoevsky, though, is concerned with the common 
processes through which people, with their suspicious and retrograde souls, come to 
terms, in their varied and irreconcilable ways, with the immediate implications of their 
metaphysical disorientation. He is concerned, that is, with a common habit that results 
in self-righteous separateness. Even those characters who appear to harmonise with the 
openness of the dialogic scene face in others the same problematic tendencies which 
they appear to have overcome in themselves. They are forced therefore to employ 
strategic means of making their ‘openness’ salient to others, or risk appearing alien or 
simply incomprehensible to those whom they would be open with. The complexity of 
Myshkin’s selfless compassion, along with the erosion of the apparent credibility of its 
foundations and the desirability of its effect, exemplifies the many-sidedness of the 
problems provoked by the individual’s quest for certainty without common conventions 
of authority. The extrapolation of Dostoevsky’s criticisms of monologic habits to some 
kind of utopian affirmation, whether of dialogic openness or brotherhood, seems 
capricious. The greatest strength of these criticisms lies simply in their compelling 
condemnation of a perverse and inadequate but increasingly commonplace means of 
interacting with reality.
monologic individualism incorporates both the reality of Dostoevsky’s portrayal of individual psychology 
and the dignifying acknowledgment of human and social limitations which typically inhibit individuals 
from developing ‘open’ and selfless relationships. The difficulties that exist in the equal communication 
of ideas and abstract orientations between ‘unsupervised’ individuals, are registered with an anguish and 
longing that reflect their unwillingness to relinquish the possibility of a renaissance under the authority of 
a new word or idea (whether it be the rights of the individual, natural supematuralism, communism, 
Platonic Idealism, or some other ideological system). It is this unwillingness, though, that keeps 
absolutists from accepting the ambivalence of the natural world, and determines that the only satisfaction 
of their idealism lies in isolated fanaticism or reactionary dependence on essentially unsustainable 
patterns of devotion.
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Rather than moving towards an awareness of their possession of a latent sympathy 
with the ‘voice’ of every other character (as Bakhtin suggests66), Dostoevsky’s ‘heroes’ 
move towards an awareness that other individuals’ ‘voices’, and the alternative 
worldviews they express, are based in individualistic authorisations similar to their own. 
Often, though, they cannot or will not acknowledge this awareness, though, due to their 
desire or need to consider their own voice absolutely authoritative; the awareness is 
consciously refuted, rationales are introduced to prove its impossibility. Though it 
might be argued that a conscious denial of an acknowledged reality can only be cynical 
and never naively literal, the point is rather that these denials form a ritual which allows 
the individual, regardless of their essential beliefs or knowledge, to act as if aspects of 
reality that disrupt their visions of order and authority did not exist. The result is the 
irascible and distempered relationship with reality which is characteristic of the 
monologue: every unexpected or unexplained disruption to the self-determined terms of 
its authority contains a threat of the eruption of a background fraught with inadmissible 
dilemmas.
The psychological processes of Dostoevsky’s characters - not their idea, per se, 
but their dynamic interaction with their idea, and the means by which they maintain the 
idea’s authority and prestige - play a significant part in his depiction of the role and 
repercussions of secular absolutes. This internal interaction takes place as a fluid 
relationship with an unfinished and unstable foundation.67 In the dependent nature of 
their interaction with ideas and systems of ideas, and the way in which this dependence 
distorts their worldview, Dostoevsky’s characters reveal the insistent nature of their 
desire for meaning and the reactions of this desire to the challenges and ambiguities of 
external reality. The ideas which Dostoevsky’s characters can readily be identified by 
are not resolved emblems, they are tentative and anxious. The novels do not proceed as 
feats of ideological ventriloquism in which the pros and cons of particular systems are 
debated (though the characters occasionally indulge in such activities), they characterise 
rather the underlying relationship that exists between individuals and their ideas in 
general. The implication is not one of qualitative distinction - for instance, “do the
66 Throughout the chapter “Discourse in Dostoevsky” in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (particularly 
“Dialogue in Dostoevsky”, section iv, 251-66), Bakhtin draws on examples of dialogue from a variety of 
Dostoevsky’s major novels to suggest the accords and resonances that are often struck within characters 
by the ostensibly opposing statements, opinions or moral positions of their interlocutors.
67 By contrast, Bakhtin stresses the role of the “ideas” of Dostoevsky’s characters, and their interaction as 
a more removed act of experimentation based in the interactions of individuals who themselves embody 
abstract systems of thought or ideologies. For Bakhtin, Raskolnikov’s “inner speech unfolds like a 
philosophical drama, where the dramatis personae are embodied points of view on life and on the world, 
realized in living situations” (Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 239).
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Slavophiles make more sense than the utopian socialists?” or “does radical nihilism 
dispel morality?” - but rather makes a general point about the inadequacy of intellectual 
or emotionally proposed authorities as foundations of absolute authority. The tentative 
individuals who anxiously attest to the authority of a particular “idea” subsequently 
participate in the dramatisation of their isolation and unadmitted thirst.
The constant intrusions of incompatible others on the inner speech of Dostoevsky’s 
characters is a pattern which, for Bakhtin, dominates and defines the nature of their
zro
interrelations. This pattern, though, does not give further emphasis to the necessity of 
admitting the tmth of a polyphonic relativism, but rather impresses how little of reality 
any “idea-system” can embrace; and how much, therefore, remains inadmissible, though 
tangibly present, to individuals who cling to these systems and promote their authority. 
But to acknowledge this multiplicity as implicating openness as truth (rather than just 
openness) would be akin, for Dostoevsky’s characters, to accepting ambiguity as clarity. 
Ambiguity may be just that - a clear reflection of an ambivalent natural world69 - but 
Dostoevsky’s characters typically experience it as a daunting disorientation; the kind of 
arduous freedom which the Grand Inquisitor is confident that his flock would rather not 
be offered. Bakhtin’s approval of the dialogic mode of interaction under-emphasises 
the genuine panic which prompts individuals to evade ambiguity through monologic 
self-assertion.
“The idea lives not in one person’s isolated individual consciousness - if it 
remains there only, it degenerates and dies. The idea begins to live . . . only when it
70enters into genuine dialogic relationships with other ideas, with the ideas of others'’.
It would seem, though, that what we see in the novels is that the idea actually dies when 
it enters into this relationship, because the character’s desire was not for self-expression, 
or an inquisitive interaction with reality (which could survive ambiguity and relativity) 
but for certainty, in the erosion of which the potency, not of “the idea”, but of their 
particular idea, also fades. In Dostoevsky’s works, “the idea” plays its narrative role in 
motivating characters’ attempts to avoid the kind of open relationship to external reality 
which would disprove its authority and discredit their dependence on it. This 
dependence will not fade out in accord with the discrediting of the idea it pertains to, 
but would merely provoke feelings of moral destitution. The characters’ concern,
68 See the chapter “Discourse in Dostoevsky” in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, particularly “Dialogue 
in Dostoevsky” (section iv, 251-66).
69 As in Clough’s work, for instance, where ambiguity is simply the foundation on which finite moral 
choices must be made.
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therefore, is not with truth foremost but with sustaining the credibility or certainty of 
their conviction. This certainty is maintained through solipsism and isolation which, in 
an introverted, self-deluding and self-solacing way, support the masquerade of a 
dialogue with reality. This differentiation has significant repercussions in guiding one’s 
approach to the shape and legitimacy of characters’ interaction with the ideologies that 
participate similarly as the dramatis personae of Dostoevsky’s worlds.
The notion, then, that Dostoevsky’s characters are typically represented by their 
“idea” perhaps only recognises the superficial signs of a much more complex and 
interesting relationship between the two. It is through the suitability of the relationship 
between people and their cherished ideas - how well they resolve individuals’ 
uncertainties or the manifest suitability of the moral code they provide - that 
Dostoevsky explores the credibility of abstract moral allegiances and life-goals, where 
God is not present to cut the Gordian knot of their provenance and credibility. As 
ciphers externalising personal worldviews and subjective assurances (which these ideas 
frequently are), the drama extends beyond the mere dialogue between various particular 
systems to their general inadequacy to fully satisfy or express the breadth of an 
individual’s overt and unacknowledged self-awareness. Their ideas hint at symbolic 
embodiments of the characters’ individual personalities and general circumstances, but 
it is their ultimate incapacity to make good on these hints, and become something more 
than the mere intimation of order, truth or conviction, on which Dostoevsky focuses in 
his depiction of their role in his characters’ attempts to feel certain. The possibility of 
an inherently fulfilling fusion of self and idea motivates conscious ideological 
alignments, but it is typically a mirage (telling, both for the desire with which these 
mirages are initially apprehended, and for the particulars they fixate on).
The New Trichinae
While in jail Raskolnikov dreams of the “new trichinae” .71 Consisting of “spirits 
endowed with reason and will”, its symptoms imply a rampantly individualistic
70 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 87-88.
71 The allegory of the new trichinae is revisited in Demons through Stepan Verkhovensky’s biblical 
analogy of Russia overrun by exorcised spirits. In Stepan’s interpretation of the biblical allegory, Russia 
is the man possessed, and the hordes of ideological demons massing over his body are evidence of a 
cathartic expulsion. Russia must suffer the demons’ manifest presence, represented in the novel by Pyotr 
Verkhovensky’s terrorist cell and the variety of sick souls that orbits around it, before it can be free of 
them, but by their very presence the possibility of further ‘infection’ is implicit. The allegory implicates a 
population riddled with infected bodies. In Crime and Punishment and The Idiot, Raskolnikov and
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positivism, encouraging individuals to deify their rationalised self-interests, and serve 
them accordingly: “Never, never had people believed themselves so intelligent and 
unshakeable in the truth as did these infected ones. Never had they thought their 
judgements, their scientific conclusions, their moral convictions and beliefs more 
unshakeable” .72 This allegorical cameo of the novel as a whole presents the image of 
Raskolnikov arguing from within the grip of this infection; his “unshakeable” 
convictions struggle furiously to assert themselves against a background of contrasting 
insights and interpretations.
For as long as Raskolnikov avoids his crime, the distance which persists between 
himself and the rest of the world encourages him to perceive the conventions governing 
his dealings with both his aggressors and allies as intrinsically absurd. Banal rituals and 
concerns jar with, but persistently disrupt, his abstract fretting over life and death; he 
perceives them as odd, out of place and insignificant, and yet they persist as indicators 
of real and organic moral impulses. Reunited with his mother and sister after three 
years, Raskolnikov begins to squabble with Dunya over which one of them has the 
greater right to sacrifice themselves for the good of the family. Initially, Raskolnikov 
rails against Dunya’s proposed marriage to Luzhin, before recollecting himself:
“Strange,” he said slowly, as if suddenly struck by a new thought, “why am I 
making such a fuss? Why all this outcry? Go and marry whomever you like!”
He spoke as if to himself, though he said it aloud, and looked at his sister for some 
time as if in bewilderment.73
These moments of suspension between abstract and material involvement with the 
world show the strain of an individual stmggling to assure the supremacy of a single 
conviction. The awkwardness of Raskolnikov’s suppression of instinctive acts of 
sympathy demonstrates, in Frank’s words, “the manner in which Raskolnikov’s ideas 
have been affecting his personality” .74
As Raskolnikov, Arkady and Ippolit each spontaneously involve themselves 
unselfishly with others, Dostoevsky alludes to the fertility of instinctive impulse 
(towards charity in these cases), in order to denigrate their individualistic intellectually 
approved conduct. As with Kolya Krasotkin, a serious thirteen year-old in The Brothers
Myshkin appear in the midst of populations that contextualise their abstract ‘illness’, and simultaneously 
display the loss of cogent social values that seems to provide both characters with further justifications for 
their radical activism.
72 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 547.
73 Crime and Punishment, 233.
74 Frank, Dostoevsky: The Miraculous Years 1865-71, 108.
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Karamazov, the strain of mustering “the proper casualness of manner”, necessary to 
stifle unexpected and awkward fellow-feelings and sympathy for others’ sufferings, 
causes ruptures in his front of coolly rational sang-froid.15 To the affected 
sophistication and worldliness of the ideologically committed raw youth, such feelings 
are, at least by their logic, mere sentimental slop, and must be treated with appropriate 
disdain. Such spontaneous (and often ‘rationally’ repented) betrayals of ideological 
dictates emerge as set-pieces, recurring throughout Dostoevsky’s work, which enact the 
smothering of emotional impulses towards brotherhood, by conscious fidelity to 
rationally approved templates of individually idealised moral codes. Some deeper 
current of human socialisation seems to direct behaviour by a hidden rationale while the 
idiosyncratic ethics produced by intellectual rationale counter by asserting the reflexive 
privilege of their explicit and particular relevance to each individual they are concocted 
by. Raskolnikov’s “bewilderment” conveys a radically disruptive intimation of the 
idiosyncratic nature of his intellectual ideals. This bewilderment is curiously suggestive 
arriving at a stage most conducive to reinforcing a sense of the absurdity of 
Raskolnikov’s abstraction. Neither of these appellations, “artifice” and “absurdity”, 
discredits the finite and individual significance of the intellectual principles they 
embrace but in Raskolnikov’s situation his dawning awareness of the thoroughly 
particular origins of their credibility, rather than their general theoretical salience, short- 
circuits his desire for impunity.
In 1869, Sergei Nechaev, the leader of an alleged network of radical terrorist cells 
(which possibly did not extend beyond the five members of his own cell), arranged with 
his four comrades to murder a co-conspirator who had threatened to inform on the 
embryonic organisation. Nechaev himself escaped arrest, but the cell was discovered 
and his accomplices went to trial in 1871. Dostoevsky attended the trial and used the 
covert terrorist cell and their crime as a founding motif for Demons:
I wanted to pose the question and, as clearly as possible, provide an answer to it in 
the form of a novel: how is it possible in our changing and astonishing society of 
today to have not a Nechaev but Nechaevs, and how does it happen that these 
Nechaevs eventually acquire their own Nechaevists?”.76
75 Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. David McDuff (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 
1993), 623.
76 Dostoevsky, “One of Today’s Falsehoods” (1873), A Writer’s Diary -  Volume 1, 1873-1876, 279-92, 
279.
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Dostoevsky’s portrayal of the Nechaev-like figure, Pyotr Verkhovensky - he is cold, 
vicious and parasitic - reflects the characteristics which he had come to associate with 
ideologically grounded acts of violent dissent.
The affair brought to light an encoded revolutionary credo written by Nechaev 
and Mikhail Bakunin. Charles Moser observes:
The whole document is impregnated with an extravagant, other-worldly fanaticism.
‘The revolutionary is a doomed man’, reads the first paragraph. ‘He has no interests 
of his own, no affairs, no feelings, no attachments, no belongings, not even a name.
Everything in him is absorbed by a single exclusive interest, by one thought, by one 
passion -  the revolution’.77
Nechaev’s revolutionary agenda and orchestration of the mutually binding murder of a 
rogue peer provided Dostoevsky with the framework for Demons.
Turgenev’s Dmitri Rudin, a superfluous man who drifts into revolutionary action 
as a despairing self-sacrifice (in Rudin), and the stunted personality of Maxim Gorky’s 
revolutionary pawn, Yevsey Klimkov (protagonist of The Life o f a Useless Man), are 
depictions of revolutionary activism which suggest that, rather than reflecting the 
vocation of a special class of moral rebels, it might simply be pursued as a prop to 
individuals’ feelings of vulnerability, confusion and uselessness. These figures reflect a 
causal reversal, implicit in Nechaev’s declaration of revolutionary passion, wherein “no 
affairs, no feelings, no attachments, no belongings, not even a name” become 
preconditions for revolutionary zeal, rather than necessary side effects of selfless 
commitment to a consuming abstract authority.78 These activists have not weaned 
themselves from moral guides in deference to a higher order of truth, they clutch at 
causes to ease the discontents of a pre-existing moral void.
In “A Few Words About Young People” Dostoevsky wrote:
Ideas fly about through the air, but they certainly follow some laws; ideas live and 
are spread in accordance with laws too difficult for us to grasp; ideas are infectious, 
and do you know that within the general mood of life a certain idea, a certain 
concern or longing accessible only to a highly educated and developed mind, may 
suddenly be passed on to a creature who is semiliterate, coarse, and who has never
77 Moser, Antinihilism in the Russian Novel of the 1860’s, 56.
78 Similarly, in Andre Malraux’s Man’s Estate, the sacrifices of revolutionary commitment does not seem 
to be made purely (in devotion to a cause) but through a mixture of alienation and self-loathing, hostility 
to authority and a fascination with redeeming a futile existence through a self-aggrandising death.
282
been concerned about anything; and that such an idea may suddenly infect the 
person’s soul with its influence?79
It is clear again that the ideas of these characters are not predetermined expressions of 
individuality or even external inspirations that have become entrenched in this role: 
these ideas and characters exist effectively as two separate populations tentatively 
aligned in relationships which are, therefore, intrinsically circumstantial, arbitrary and 
dubious. The extreme commitment which this alignment can engender is a reflection of 
this fundamental but highly destructive collision between genuine uncertainty and the 
apparent necessity of conviction in the pursuit of worldly ambition. The new world 
envisaged by Goethe’s Faust is selectively engineered so that conviction need not 
contest with uncertainty.
Naivete is not innocent in Dostoevsky’s works, but it is redeemable. Sorrow and 
frustration temper his anger and condemnation of its consequences. But his sorrow is 
not merely the parent’s didactically intended disappointment in a child’s indiscretions, it 
encompasses the “children” as victims also of their inexperience and unworldly 
altruism. Thus Dostoevsky avoids appearing to stand in righteous judgement over the 
tendency of individuals’ immature demands for certainty to lead them self-righteously 
towards antisocial extremism. Still, Dostoevsky’s sympathy is for the individuals, 
never the ideas they sought to promote; that these ideas were embraced with genuine 
altruism (or, as Frank suggests, with “so much self-sacrificing dedication and moral
79 Dostoevsky, “A Few Words About Young People”, A Writer's Diary - volume I, 1873-1876, 738. An 
example of the different relationships a highly educated and a semiliterate mind can form with the same 
idea is, in the different reactions of the Ivan and Smerdyakov, and also Ivan and Dmitry to the hypothesis 
“All is permitted” at the heart of The Brothers Karamazov. Dostoevsky intimates that it is perhaps 
Smerdyakov’s upstart appropriation of a seemingly credible argument which, essentially, he does not 
understand beyond its apparent approval of his destructive hatred. Smerdyakov lacks the intellectual 
heritage or foundations which give Ivan ballast (sometimes) in his abstract moral doubts and speculations, 
and cannot grasp, it is implied, the hypothetical or critical nature of Ivan’s proposition (neither can 
Dmitry), who, like Smerdyakov, grasps only the surface, “All is permitted”, feeling it to provide a general 
principle that solves a merely personal grievances. Dmitry is uneducated but too passionate, while 
Smerdyakov, Dostoevsky invites us to conclude, suffers from an extremely destructive manifestation of 
ressentiment and snobbish imitation: he claims the privilege of moral impunity as if it were a measure of 
class, a rank, but in his application shows the intrinsic naivete, or bad tone, of the arriviste. Fyodor 
Pavlovich tauntingly calls him Balaam’s ass: his casuistic logic and revolutionary free-thought, are, 
Fyodor implies, the language of a race or class from which, by birth and conformation, he is excluded; an 
ass might even seem to speak sense, but the mere fact of its doing so will even then seem ridiculous. Ivan 
looks upon Smerdyakov with similar disdain, deeming him the cannon fodder of an imminent social 
revolution. Such explicit expressions of scorn for the intellectual pretensions of the lower middle classes 
are not uncommon in Dostoevsky’s later novels, and often these explicit expressions seem to be affirmed 
by the works as a whole, they are implicitly ratified in the consequences Dostoevsky plots for malcontents 
like Smerdyakov (in Demons and An Accidental Family similar figures, though more incidental to the 
main plots, are numerous). Among other things, it reflects Dostoevsky’s suspicion of increasing 
disruptions to social degree which was resulting from an apparent loosening, in the 1860s, of Tsarist 
autocracy, a spread of literacy and the growth of a semi-educated middle-class clerks to serve a growing
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fervour”80), neither mitigates the actions this dedication produced nor privileges the 
ideas that earned this fervour. It merely acknowledges that the compulsion of these 
figures to subordinate themselves to new certainties originates in an ambivalent need for 
assurance and order. It is because he takes this need as an intractable feature of human 
nature that Dostoevsky is unable to entertain the possibility that uncertainty might 
require neither reactionary affirmations of faith nor the dubious inflation of secular 
ideals to standards of absolute authority. For Dostoevsky, sceptical dissolution of 
certainty leads to the spiteful dissatisfaction of the Underground Man, who can neither 
support the idea of faith nor tolerate or approve the ambiguity that exists without it. The 
recognition of a healthy finite mode of moral discourse is unthinkable for Dostoevsky: 
the secular world is treacherously ambiguous, and uncertainty is an intolerable burden; 
Dostoevsky’s only recourse is divine faith.
In attributing Raskolnikov’s crime to ‘intoxication’ with ideas, with Dostoevsky as 
anguished overseer,81 Frank approvingly notes Phillip Rahv’s emphasis, in “Dostoevsky 
in Crime and Punishment”, on the influence of Hegel’s world-historical individual over 
Dostoevsky’s characterisation of Raskolnikov. Rahv writes: “It is in Hegel rather [than 
Nietzsche] that we discover a direct and obvious source of Raskolnikov’s notion of 
inferior and superior men, the superior ones having the right to commit breaches of 
morality while the inferiors are obliged to mind their business” .82 By having 
Raskolnikov attempt to declare himself superior by performing a conventionally 
immoral act, Dostoevsky entangles him in “what is in truth a comedy of mistaken 
identity: an obvious victim of the historical process -  a small man in search of personal 
security and happiness laughably taking himself for its hero. In this sense he is no 
better than a clown, and he does indeed laugh at himself from time to time”. In direct 
sympathy with Raskolnikov’s own attempt to salvage the theory behind “stepping
bureaucracy, and the influence of the west, particularly individualism, which encouraged all individuals 
to consider themselves inherently worthy (at least hypothetically) of any place or role in society.
80 Frank, Dostoevsky: The Miraculous Years, 1865-1871, 54.
81 Frank makes much of this intoxication, it prepares the way for the mitigatory plea he makes on behalf
of Raskolnikov’s diminished responsibility. But this is to ignore that Raskolnikov is not intoxicated by 
just any ideas, the theories that bewitch him all nurture flatter or support a perspective of reality which 
Raskolnikov’s pride and self-esteem deem preferable to merely ambivalent reality. His intoxication, then, 
is itself a culpable indulgence, a weakness to begin with which engenders his indifference to aspects of a 
reality he has drunkenly decided is inadequate. In his challenge to Bakhtin’s characterisation of 
Dostoevsky’s technique as polyphonic, “Bakhtin’s View of Dostoevsky: ‘Polyphony’ and
‘Camivalesque’ ”, Rene Wellek includes a similar perspective of Raskolnikov’s moral confusion as a 
dimension of the novel’s clear moral purpose.
82 Phillip Rahv, “Dostoevsky in Crime and Punishment”, Dostoevsky: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. 
Rene Wellek (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 16-38, 34.
83 Rahv, “Dostoevsky in Crime and Punishment”, 34.
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over”, Rahv attributes the particular failure of his attempt to prove himself worthy of his 
theory as a merely particular rebuttal: Raskolnikov is simply not the man he thought he 
was. It is the world around Raskolnikov, however, that is the source of his failure and 
its implications are unilateral. Raskolnikov’s trial is ultimately not a personal test of his 
ability to go beyond moral confines but a component of Dostoevsky’s general argument 
against the existence of such a position. The mistaken identity is not simply 
Raskolnikov’s: the black comedy of his attempt to be someone else is not based on the 
comical high hopes of an inferior ordinary being, it is based on a false reification of the 
abstract expressions of finite reality. The world historic individuals and bronze statues 
have not happened upon a higher code. Rather, they have been adopted as the symbols 
of extreme change which they pre-empt (and, for many, embody) but do not form.
Recounting the exemplary virtues of his authority, Raskolnikov explains that
“if indeed there was no other path for him [Napoleon], he’d up and throttle her 
before she could make a peep, without even a moment’s thoughtfulness! ... So I, too 
... came out of my thoughtfulness ... I throttled her ... following the example of my 
authority ... And that’s exactly how it was! You think it’s funny? Yes, Sonya, the 
funniest thing is that maybe that’s precisely how it was... [.]85
Raskolnikov’s satanic pride - the mark of Byronic heroism and the romantic sehnsiicht 
of Schillerism66 - is a common trope of the antinihilist depictions of radical idealists
84 Agreeing with Porfiry Petrovitch’s suggestion that Raskolnikov would withstand any torture as long as 
it were for “faith or God”, Rahv concludes that Raskolnikov’s inability to maintain his revolutionary 
program reflects merely a mistaken initial platform of revolt and subsequently an aversion to and 
inadequacy for the ordeals it necessitates. “That Raskolnikov stands in an inauthentic relation to his 
crime is thus confirmed by the author’s spokesman in the novel. The crime does not truly belong to him, 
and that is the reason he affects us as being almost ludicrously inadequate to his deed” (“Dostoevsky in 
Crime and Punishment”, 35). It would seem rather that the crime really does belong to Raskolnikov and 
that his discovery here is the absurdity of the framework necessary to the conviction that his murders are 
“not a crime” (Crime and Punishment, 71). The attempted negation of the ‘criminal’ aspect of the murder 
is important to Raskolnikov as a means of deflecting the implications this attribution holds in relation to 
the version of his own character which it validates (rebel idealist, rather than criminal).
Rahv sees Crime and Punishment as defending the “right to violent rebellion” (“Dostoevsky in 
Crime and Punishment”, 37). Dostoevsky, though, shows no intention of defending any of his rebellious 
characters from the consequences of their rebellions, allowing these consequences to overburden, distort 
and, typically, to dissolve the abstract or ideological commitments which had prompted their breach with 
moral conventions.
Rahv writes “what better way was there of dramatising the struggle within him between guilt and 
scornful pride than by showing him entering almost in spite of himself into relations with people who for 
reasons both good and bad are intent on penetrating his isolation?” (25-26). Rahv implies that only in 
isolation could Raskolnikov maintain the idea that he in particular could survive outside the boundaries of 
morality. But Dostoevksy seems intent on demonstrating the general failure of the ‘idea’ to materialise as 
actual support, rather than simply delineating the particularity of Raskolnikov’s incapacity to fulfil the 
requirements of ideological stepping over.
85 Dostoevksy, Crime and Punishment, 415.
86 Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin critically examines the authenticity and viability of such tropes, exposing 
particularly the empty vanity that isolates Eugene and smothers any internal life or personality.
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which proliferated throughout Russian novels in the 1860s.87 Raskolnikov’s Satanic 
pride does not mark him out as a special case, it identifies him with a crowd of 
individuals who, in their uncertainty, impressionability and irascible narcissism, are 
profoundly ordinary.88
While world historical figures (Alexander, Lycurgus, Napoleon) and romanticised 
hero/villains, such as Schiller’s Karl Moor, furnish Raskolnikov with estimable 
authorities (as they might have a young Dostoevsky), it is ultimately the unreality of 
these templates and the immorality of the roles they serve which the novel sets out to 
show. Raskolnikov’s relationships with the moral presence of other characters in the 
novel, moulded and reinforced by the directives of his ‘theory’, prompt and focus 
Dostoevsky’s simultaneously pedagogical strictness and paternal indulgence.
The bleakly comic absurdity of his actions is an implication which Raskolnikov, 
with his proud aversion to acknowledging his shame and foolishness, strains to silence. 
Raskolnikov is the butt of a joke, a black comedy; the concrete ramifications of the 
crime he conceives as an abstraction, though, are far too serious for his story to proceed 
as a lampooning of his theory of a carefree revolt against convention. After the 
sleepwalking unreality which expedites his experiment, the manifest frailty and 
unsettledness of Raskolnikov’s rationalisations accentuates the essential meanness of 
his purportedly unimpeachable motivations. Dogged by both the image of the reality he 
hoped to forge and the image of the reality he has forged, it is precisely the underlying 
but insistent ridicule, warranted (certainly in his own eyes) by his theoretically justified 
but pragmatically indefensible action, which he seeks to defray in defending himself 
from the claims of actual or moral accountability.
Raskolnikov becomes a willing puppet of the justifications which are necessitated by 
his attempts to exonerate his selfishness; his ideas, plans and actions are directed by his 
need to fit them into particular arguments on which he hopes to rest. An individual 
capable of acting outside the common conventions of right and wrong would not, for 
instance, feel personal guilt for any transgression they deem necessary to an approved 
end. Raskolnikov feels the strain of this discrepancy, the postures he is required to
87 In Antinihilism in the Russian Novel of the 1860’s, Charles Moser devotes a chapter to the characteristic 
aspects of antinihilst portrayals of the contemporary radical. Of their egotism Moser writes, “This theme 
runs “like a red thread” through all the antinihilist novels. Some nihilists are thorough scoundrels, others 
are blindly following the leader, but all, except a few like Reiner, have a most excellent opinion of their 
own achievements” (153).
88 It is with similar wilfulness and pride, for example, that Carlo Collodi’s Pinocchio steps over the voice 
of conventional wisdom (which seeks to remind him, among other things, that he has a wooden head) by 
squashing the Talking Cricket.
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adopt seem inadequate and unequitable to him, but his theories deem them right and 
necessary to the kind of being he desires to be (or seem to be). Raskolnikov does feel 
personal guilt but is unable to acknowledge it as such without conceding his 
ordinariness. The murder, intended as an act of freedom, of kicking loose from 
conventional moral limits, proceeds as an act which, in spite of his intellectual approval 
and identification with its purported goal, is never consecrated as a satisfactory personal 
expression of his character. This is fundamental to Dostoevsky’s depiction of the 
relationship between “our little boys and girls” and the ideas which they commit 
themselves to. It is necessary also for Raskolnikov’s eventual rehabilitation, and his 
realignment with one of the novel’s greatest “goods”, human belonging, that the evil of 
his crime be confined to ignorance and pride rather than focused malice or cruelty. In 
Manzoni's The Betrothed the unlikely repentance of a feared bandit lord, who has traded 
with evil on a grand scale, pays homage to the strength of the spirit to move even the 
most stubborn of sinners. This dubious trope of moral regeneration is paralleled by the 
implications Lebedev, in The Idiot, draws from the sudden and unprompted repentance 
and confession, after years of habitual killing, of a man who had survived a period of
OQ
extreme famine by murdering and eating monks and children. What compelling moral 
idea had suddenly possessed him? Lebedev wonders, alluding also to the impossibility 
of such a binding idea, “stronger than the stake, the fire, even the habit of more than 
twenty years”, among the intrinsically separate and self-serving pseudo-moralities he 
attributes to the late nineteenth century.90
While similar to these rituals of deference to a compelling external authority, the 
self-condemnations of Schiller’s Karl Moor and Byron’s Manfred simultaneously 
salutes the nobility of self-determination as well as the nobility of a spontaneous and 
free surrender to moral impulses. Each sentences himself for the crimes he 
acknowledges and each executes the sentence out of respect for the dignity of moral 
independence. The credibility of the repentance of Manzoni’s bandit lord is assisted by 
the fact that the reader has never directly encountered his tyranny. It is reported, like 
Karl Moor’s baby killing exploits, in the context of conveying the extraordinary 
phenomenon of their repentance. In contrast to the moral stage-managing of these 
grandiose gestures towards spiritual dignity and noble awakening, Raskolnikov’s crime 
takes place, in detail, right before us. Dostoevsky describes firstly the blows to the old 
lady: Raskolnikov bends down to see her bulging eyes and convulsed face. As he
89 Dostoevsky, The Idiot, 396. Lebedev interprets the crime at length throughout Part 3, chapter 4.
90 The Idiot, 399.
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hurriedly prises open drawers, the pawnbroker’s sister Lizaveta enters; Raskolnikov 
attacks and the narrator observes that “this wretched Lizaveta was so simple, so 
downtrodden, and so permanently frightened that she did not even raise a hand to 
protect her face” .91 Raskolnikov’s blow splits “the whole upper part of her forehead, 
almost to the crown” .92 By sheer unhappy circumstance Raskolnikov has been forced to 
extend his strictly utilitarian trial to the pawnbroker’s sister, and though we are 
informed that “[h]is own strength seemed to have no part in it” -  as if he accepts his 
moral accountability for the “necessary” murder but not for the necessities that are 
consequent on it - when proffered as a kind of alibi this notion belies the intrinsic 
avoidance of fact which sustains his feeling that he represents a higher category of 
human.93 Nevertheless, the atmosphere of fevered unreality ensures that should we later 
recall the image of Lizaveta’s split skull, we will condemn the intoxication of pride and 
ignorance which claims Raskolnikov as one of its sleepwalking victims rather than 
merely its personified tool of destruction.94
Unsuspected and Unexpected Feelings
Such is Raskolnikov’s desire for certainty, suggests Porfiry Petrovich, he would smile 
under torture for the sake of a credible authority. The capacity of idealists for delayed 
gratification in the name of their “higher line” is potent, and reflected in this potency 
and willingness to suffer is the often distorting avidity with which they seek to validate 
their cause by “discovering” signs of its objective authority.
Reflecting on the theories his own generation had idealised, Dostoevsky noted: 
“[w]e were in a great hurry and did very little practical living, and we are ashamed of 
many of the most natural things because they do not fit into the theory” .95 Living
91 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 79.
92 Crime and Punishment, 79.
93 Crime and Punishment, 76.
94 In the actual course of events up to and including the crime, Raskolnikov feels moved by forces of 
circumstance or fate from point to point in a sequence that carries him towards and through the murder. 
Raskolnikov is most thoroughly identified not with any particular motive but rather with the underlying 
frustration and desire which determine that he cannot pass up these directives. Raskolnikov acts so that 
he might know one way or another and thereby quell the babble that torments his inactivity.
Rather than being a victim of his environment, though, Raskolnikov is a victim of his response to 
his environment, of which he is simultaneously the perpetrator. Both Sonya and Porfiry Petrovich judge 
Raskolnikov with an awareness of his unwitting fall into self-torment. Raskolnikov is the victim of the 
ignorance and pride of his answer to the moral chaos he perceives in contemporary culture. In his 
mother’s death (implicitly of a broken heart) Raskolnikov’s role as both the criminal expression and 
victim of rational individualism is profoundly apparent.
95 Dostoevsky, The Unpublished Dostoevsky, Volume II, 162.
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information comes too indiscriminately; it is too subtle, too diffuse and disorderly to 
support absolute certainties; it offers neither a rule nor an answer, and fits into neither 
‘theory’ nor the ideals theories often reify.
The confusion and indefiniteness of contemporary ideas comes about for the 
simplest reason: ... so far we have gathered by fa r  too few facts to deduce any 
conclusions from them at all. And meanwhile we rush to make these conclusions, 
obeying our law of development. Only the most limited natures ... whatever they 
call themselves, can deduce absolute results // from the facts on hand today and be 
content with them. I/96
“Our law of development”, rushing towards conclusive certainties, is behind 
Raskolnikov’s precipitate activism.
In his article on crime, Raskolnikov suggests that the Napoleons, Muhammads, 
and Lycurguses are “those who have the gift or talent of speaking a new word in their 
environment”. The rest of the population “preserves the world and increases it”, while 
the gifted body of “people proper”, “moves the world and leads it forward” .98 Initially 
condemned as transgressors, these leaders are eventually placed on pedestals; they are 
the Bronze Statues Raskolnikov aspires to emulate.
“I should have known,” he thought, with a bitter smile, “and how, knowing myself, 
anticipating myself, did I dare take an axe and bloody my hands! I had to have 
known beforehand . . .  Eh! but I did know beforehand . . . ” he whispered in despair.
At times he stopped still at some thought.
“No, those people are made differently; the true master, to whom all is permitted, 
sacks Toulon, makes a slaughterhouse of Paris, forgets an army in Egypt, expends 
half a million men in a Moscow campaign, and gets off with a pun at Vilno; and 
when he dies they set up monuments to him - and thus everything is permitted. No, 
obviously such men are made not of flesh but of bronze!”99
The passage suggests that, rather than “testing” himself, Raskolnikov committed the 
crime out of an intense desire to avoid acknowledging, affirming or accepting what he 
recognised as limits on individual freedom. 100 Raskolnikov knew, but didn’t want to 
acknowledge or acquiesce in such knowledge; he “knew” in a manner that held no
96 The Unpublished Dostoevsky, Volume 1,41-42.
97 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 260.
98 Crime and Punishment, 261.
99 Crime and Punishment, 273-74.
100 Even Raskolnikov’s world-beating ambition to attain a Napoleonic stature turns out to be merely a 
common symptom encouraged by the social upheaval and spiritual confusion of the period. “Who in our 
Russia nowadays does not consider himself a Napoleon” (Crime and Punishment, 265), quips Porfiry 
Petrovich to Raskolnikov, teasing him with the banality of his egotism.
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decisive weight against desires, uncertainties and alternative possibilities, one that had 
no equivocal weight. His moral perplexity left him directionless; his heart, “chafed by 
theories” , 101 is susceptible to the balm of false certainty and fanaticism. 102
Raskolnikov’s neglect of the fact that men of bronze were flesh first and were 
made into icons by others, reflects his own fixation on the status of power and the 
veneration attributed to ‘heroic’ deeds. His preoccupation with Bronze Statues recalls 
Pushkin’s “The Bronze Horseman” (as I have discussed previously), in which a statue 
of Peter the Great, embodying the unjust and unaccountable hierarchies on which man­
made social and political orders tend to rely, exerts a ghostly, malevolent and 
inescapable power over Petersburg’s urban poor. These hierarchies marginalise, with 
no avenue of recourse, the protagonist Eugene’s interests and sufferings. Having lost 
everything that was dear to him in one of the Petersburg floods Eugene shakes his fist at 
the bronze statue of Peter the Great. 103 When he turns away to leave, he hears the sound
101 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 456.
102 In the second part of the passage above we have the distinction between iconic symbol as form and 
symbol as essence; that is: the great man as a statue and catalogue of feats, detached from any 
proportional notion of their source and isolated significance. Raskolnikov interprets this status as the 
manifestation of an internal quality which others merely recognise and record rather than generate in 
response to some need. To Raskolnikov’s selective and hungry gaze, the statues of great men, their 
imagined moral mandate, their superiority - which is, as it were, the rhetorical or lyrical flourish which 
transposes their status from history to myth - is their entirety. These ‘flourishes’, though, are ratified by 
communities in relation to the success with which they embody a quality or qualities they cherish or 
desire. The bronze statues of heralded men exemplify the kind of misleading ready-made truths which 
Dostoevsky considered the 1860s radicals to be unavoidably drawn towards and dependent on. “At least 
it is perfectly clear that our younger generation are destined to seek out its ideals and the higher meaning 
of life for itself. But this isolation of our younger generation, this abandonment of them to their own 
devices is something dreadful . . . .  Our young people have been so placed that they have absolutely 
nowhere to get advice about the higher meaning of life” (“A Few Words About Young People” (A 
Writer’s Diary -  Volume l, 1873-1876, 737-40), 738-39). In what they receive from their fathers, their 
families, and from tradition, they respect nothing; with their naive impressionability and a single-minded 
desire for decisive guidelines, they are particularly susceptible to the tenuous assurances of unequivocal, 
unsubtle and often inadequate “higher” meanings.
103 In Pushkin’s tale, the oppressive omnipresent power of Tsarist authority exists in natural (and 
reprehensible) opposition to the desires and capacity of a recently urbanised populace to lay down roots 
and develop a mutually reaffirming relationship with their ‘artificial’ environment. The very foundations 
of urbanisation (responding to needs and forces that appeared so strange, so sudden and so unnatural to 
those for whom a more familiar and comprehensible world seemed to be fading out before their eyes) 
seem to thwart this desire by keeping its citizens in a vulnerable state of constant disorientation.
This enforced rootless-ness alludes to the ‘artificial’ city’s discordance with organic or natural 
order. Petersburg was built on reclaimed marshland (like Faust’s new world in Goethe’s Faust -  Part II) 
and was often depicted, particularly by Dostoevsky, as having come into being through theory and 
artifice, and existing on an intrinsically tenuous metaphysical foundation. The Petersburg floods, one of 
which washes away Eugene’s home, and essentially his life, in The Bronzee Horseman, suggest the 
visitation of a backlash which occurs as the natural forces which the artificial city exists in defiance of, 
demand a forfeit or take their tithe. These floods, in Pushkin’s story, cyclically wash away the stable 
foundations which might have allowed for the development of fertile relationships between city and 
citizens; Eugene, like Dostoevsky’s Underground Man and other tormented Petersburg chinovniks, is 
tormented by the impossibility of putting down roots or taking any part in the life of the city other than as 
faceless flotsam, suffering on behalf of the abstracted whims of its totalitarian rulers.
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of hooves on the pavement. Eugene flees, but he is unable to escape the feeling of 
pursuit and persecution; he hears phantom footfalls throughout the city.
Raskolnikov’s fixation on Bronze statues is a manifestation of an intrinsically 
destabilising dissatisfaction with his own normality, which finds expression in an 
envious desire for the power which he feels could redress his frustration. While 
Pushkin’s Eugene curses the oppressive statue, a protest against the authoritarian state it 
embodies, Raskolnikov wants to be a ‘statue’ in order to escape from the indignity of 
his vulnerability.
Raskolnikov cannot properly distinguish the particular process and values that 
give his icons of power their lustre (either in general, or for him specifically). In order 
to circumvent the sometimes humiliating and debilitating confusions which partners 
development, Raskolnikov adopts the finished forms of others; prestigious others, 
because he loathes the possibility that his insignificance is fitting and intractable.
Razumikhin chastises Raskolnikov for being a foreign translation, stigmatising his 
demeanour and ideas as the product of European rationalism. Razumikhin is himself a 
translator, but while transplanted western thought possesses Raskolnikov and is 
esteemed by him as a gnostic privilege or higher truth, Razumikhin maintains a 
pragmatic awareness of the contingency and worldliness of the strange floating ideas 
(they are his bread and butter not his gospel/catechism). Razumikhin, “ardent, sincere, 
simple, honest” , 104 appears blessed by Dostoevsky with the ballast and security of an 
implied “folk” goodness and critical engagement with the concrete reality of his 
motherland.
The majority of Dostoevsky’s main characters exist in similar states of 
conflicted cultural heritage: there are Prince Myshkin (perhaps the most striking 
representative of an inorganic grafting of Western intellectual heritage onto Russian 
sensibilities), Nastasya Filippovna, Rogozhin, and Aglaya Yepanchin in The Idiot, 
Stavrogin, Pyotr and Stepan Verkhovensky in Demons’, Smerdyakov, Dmitry and Ivan 
Karamazov in The Brothers Karamazov’, and Prince Versilov, Arkady Dolgoruky and 
his adolescent friends in An Accidental Family. All these characters, and many others, 
are characterised by varying admixtures of characteristically Russian and Western 
qualities; their hybridity reflects the reality of Russian-ness for the educated and middle 
class since the Europeanism of Peter the Great. Dostoevsky portrays this state as the 
self-defeating fusion of Russian sincerity and selflessness with European intellect and
m  Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 205.
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individualism. These might equally be associated with the innocence of childhood and 
the self-consciousness of maturity, or rural simplicity as opposed to urban 
disorientation. Dostoevsky’s nationalistic overtone is a nominal preference; the 
collision Dostoevsky implies through it, particularly if one considers it with regard to 
stereotypes of rural and urban existence, is characteristic of individuals and groups 
facing the emergence of what appear alien and more complex ways of life.
In the cold reason which Raskolnikov flaunts in his article on crime, and in his 
immediate interest in an overheard discussion of utilitarian extermination (an idea in 
harmony with his own speculations), Dostoevsky marks Raskolnikov with some 
emblematic taints of “European” rationalism and of a tendency to treat subjective 
abstractions as independent aspects of reality (the symptoms of the “new trichinae” he 
dreams of in prison). Raskolnikov’s concerns for the vulnerable drunken girl and for 
Marmeladov's family, though, exhibit superficially contradictory signs of heartfelt 
fellow-feeling which suggest the taint of rationalism is not “natural” to Raskolnikov, but 
an intellectual appropriation. At no point is Raskolnikov totally owned by the notion of 
the extraordinary man; his program of radical utilitarianism (kill a louse to live a worthy 
life) and his hopes of discovering in himself a man beyond moral categories are 
unresolved. The awareness of his transgression is blatant, but it is simultaneously 
suspended or deferred, in the name of possible impunity, exoneration or vindication 
which persist as the corollaries of his uncertainty as to why and of what he is, logically 
or rationally, guilty. 105
A similar trail of inconsistency between his ideas and the consequences they 
breed leads Raskolnikov to the unsettling recognition that as he had not killed for 
money (his initial reason to murder a rich louse), his real motives are uncertain, and his 
rationalisations implicitly dubious.
105 Raskolnikov’s combative jousts with his pursuers and accusers, reflected in his private councils and 
his attempts to make himself understood by those he judges likely to be sympathetic, are expressions 
patched together from fragments of esteemed ideas, desired outcomes, necessary solaces and censored 
accusations. Raskolnikov‘s pride encourages him to resolve his problematically ambiguous motivations 
and his unshakable feelings of moral disquiet through the mitigating trope of ideological rebellion. The 
comfortable deflection of individual responsibility remains, while he also avails himself of the posture of 
heroic devotion to a higher moral code.
The ideological justification Raskolnikov tries to attach to his crime (“smash what needs to be 
smashed”) echoes Razumikhin’s explanation of the “well known” “views of the socialists” (256). 
Razumikhin briefs Porfiry Petrovitch: “crime is a protest against the abnormality of the social set-up -  
that alone and nothing more, no other causes are admitted” (256). Porfiry’s laughter provokes 
Razumikhin to assure him that with the socialists, “one is always a ‘victim of the environment’ -  and 
nothing else!” (256). The use to which Raskolnikov puts this argument allows Dostoevsky to insinuate 
its primary evasion of individual responsibility and the dispersal of moral discrimination which it 
perpetuates.
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Haven’t you seen children here on the street corners, sent out by their mothers to 
beg? I’ve learned where these mothers live, and in what circumstances. Children 
cannot remain children there. There a seven-year-old is depraved and a thief. But 
children are the image of Christ: ‘Theirs is the kingdom of Heaven.’ He taught us to 
honour and love them, they are the future of mankind ...”
“But what, what can be done, then?” Sonya repeated, weeping hysterically and 
wringing her hands.
“What can be done? Smash what needs to be smashed, once and for all, and that’s 
it -  and take the suffering upon ourselves! What? You don’t understand? You’ll 
understand later ... Freedom and power, but above all, power! Over all trembling 
creatures, over the whole ant-heap!”106
This passage follows Raskolnikov’s explanation to Sonya that, to his mind, she, like 
himself, has “stepped over”; in which he implies that their respective dissociation from 
society is the corollary of conscious and justified social rebellion. 107 In the passage 
quoted here, Raskolnikov redoubles his attempts to justify his criminal activism as a 
revolutionary reaction against overt symptoms of social injustice. At the same time, 
though, in his tilts at convention Raskolnikov attempts to divert personal accountability 
for his crime into a theory of justified schism and reform; this notion is one of the 
explanations for his crime which offers, to Raskolnikov’s mind, to sanction his agency 
while absolving him of responsibility. By retroactively conscripting his previously 
abstract speculations into service as ‘convictions’, Raskolnikov answers his need to 
claim the murder as an act performed in ideological good faith, rather than self-interest 
or sheer malevolence. But this need alone is not enough to sustain his allegiance after 
the practical inadequacy of this ‘conviction’ (its inability to provide more than 
theoretical support) manifests. Under its auspices, Raskolnikov can prove to himself 
that he has acted appropriately, but this proof is not objectively compelling, or 
persuasive, and the ferment of conscience persists.
Raskolnikov’s persisting dissatisfaction with himself and his rationalisations 
provide unsettling challenges to the authority which he had supposed his idea would
106 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 329-30.
107 Raskolnikov’s notion that he and Sonya are equals neglects the fact that she had sacrificed something 
she valued while he had only learnt to value moral communion after deliberately casting it aside. “What 
sustained her? Surely not depravity? All this shame obviously touched her only mechanically: no true 
depravity, not even a drop of it, had yet penetrated her heart” (323). And yet, in spite of the purity of 
Sonya’s self-sacrifice she feels herself to be legitimately fallen; to have broken, no matter how justifiably 
or unwillingly, rules that cannot be broken free of consequences. With Raskolnikov’s mother and sister 
she offered a quick “lost glance, and suddenly looked down” (237). Raskolnikov is disappointed by 
Sonya’s show of self-abasement - her identification with the conventions that deem her fallen - he had 
hoped to establish a shared front of defiance, the solidarity of dissident non-conformity, to counterbalance 
the feelings of accusation and exclusion he feels subjected to by the conventions of care he has travestied. 
Svidrigailov looks to Raskolnikov for the same relief later.
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exert. Typically, the uncertainty which these challenges provoke drives Raskolnikov 
towards a more absurd and isolated posture of superior self-sufficiency.
“Leave me, leave me, all of you!” Raskolnikov cried out frenziedly. “Will you 
tormentors never leave me! I’m not afraid of you! I’m not afraid of anyone now, 
not of anyone! Away from me! Alone, I want to be alone, alone, alone!”108
When left “alone, alone, alone”, Raskolnikov experiences “some strange, sudden 
calm” 109 and goes out into the city eager “to talk with everyone” . 110 In the presence of 
others Raskolnikov feels accused and hunted and seeks their absence, while in their 
absence he becomes disoriented and feels the need to test the credibility of his various 
embryonic convictions against external judgements. Here Raskolnikov’s real trial 
begins, he seems driven to discover whether or not he can still exist among other 
people. The experiment does not go well, the sudden calming of his troubled 
conscience recurs, but only in moments of combative resistance to the dismissive 
judgements which Raskolnikov automatically presumes others will pass on him. The 
“cynicism of perdition” with which he initially reacts to the prospect of discovery, 
suggests an attempt to disengage himself from the kind of psychological burden 
imposed implicitly by conventional templates of moral conscience. * 111 As long as his 
“theory” of a higher moral category holds (and whether he belongs to it or not), his 
rational conviction that murder can be justifiable also survives, and justifies in turn his 
resistance to the ready-made standards which would condemn him purely, he thinks, as 
a matter of convention. Raskolnikov’s disdain for the jurisdiction of conventional 
morality and law, and his conviction of the alternative moral plane which his crime took 
place on, are mutually reinforcing.
“Don’t be a child Sonya,” he said softly. “How am I guilty before them? Why 
should I go? What should I tell them? It’s all just a phantom...”!.]112
Raskolnikov’s violent aversion to accepting or acknowledging any shame is the snag on 
which his theory will eventually unravel. His ideological reaction against the prospect 
of being judged by others is galvanised by his aversion to admitting his own nascent
108 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 153.
109 Crime and Punishment, 154.
110 Crime and Punishment, 156.
111 Crime and Punishment, 94.
112 Crime and Punishment', 420.
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sympathy with their intuited judgements. In his merely particular failure he holds out 
the prospect that a higher moral order, the realm of a new word, does in fact exist. 
While he has not been able to sustain a step over into any new moral order, the merely 
conventional moral realm is disparaged regardless. As the conviction that his theory of 
moral impunity will logically absolve him of the conventional anxieties of guilt and 
shame fades, Raskolnikov’s relationship to his “idea” shifts from professing the 
entitlement of the elect to claiming the diminished responsibility of a hapless devotee. 
By backsliding in this manner Raskolnikov instinctively salvages the moral framework 
that, by asserting the inferiority of the law he has broken, mitigates his crime.
Discussing the possibility of criminals keeping their head Zamyotov challenges 
Raskolnikov, “And you think you could stand it? ” . 113 Raskolnikov is irked by 
Zamyotov’s presumption, in this challenge, of his normality; similarly, in anticipating 
the judgements with which conventional law will deem him merely an ordinary criminal 
Raskolnikov is able to transfer his feelings of outrage over his wrongly slighted self­
esteem to energise a pseudo-rational commitment to his act of moral rebellion. His 
aversion to this anticipated assertion of his ordinariness galvanises his desire to evade 
detection and condemnation by other ordinary individuals and helps him to repress his 
compulsion to flaunt his crime: “Again Raskolnikov suddenly felt a terrible urge to 
‘stick his tongue out.’ Shivers momentarily ran down his spine” . 114 In a pragmatic 
sense, Raskolnikov wants to outpace or dismiss conventional morality to avoid paying 
for his crimes but he simultaneously relies on the thrill of having broken mles (rules 
which imply, for him, the distasteful equality of all those who observe them), to provide 
him with a feeling of personal superiority to those who accept the limitations of 
conventional moral law. Essentially, his protest is provoked not by a lack of belief 
in conventional moral codes, but merely by the conviction that in his case they must be 
subordinate to his right to complete individualistic freedom.
Raskolnikov’s continued denial of the absurdity which his moral rebellion 
becomes binds him to protests and rationalisations which, appearing increasingly 
capricious, rely primarily on his hostility to the worldly bodies who will judge him. 
Even as he begins to show signs of a growing awareness that he had acted intolerably 
and unjustifiably, he still recoils from the demeaning prospect of condemnation, and 
thrills in the prospect of proving himself effectively, if not theoretically, above 
conventional morality by flouting its capacity to reach or impose itself on him: “I’m not
113 Crime and Punishment, 163.
114 Crime and Punishment, 163.
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going to let them get me. I’ll still fight them” . 115 When he has become more familiar 
with the bind he has trapped himself in, and with his theories thwarted by his severe 
moral outrage at Svidrigailov’s sins, Raskolnikov concedes “spitefully”, “do you think I 
don’t seem ludicrous to myself right now? ” . 116 He is confronted by an intrinsic 
similarity between the theories which had ostensibly justified his individual rebellion 
and the principles which justify conventional moral structures, and by the dependence 
of his arguments on moral logic he had claimed to dismiss.
When Svidrigailov, disappointed in his hopes of a sympathetic hearing from 
Raskolnikov, seeks to put his knowledge of Raskolnikov’s crime to good use as a 
source of power over his sister, he represents Raskolnikov’s motivation as originating in 
“a so-so little theory” involving an obsession with Napoleon and the idea that “men of 
genius disregarded isolated evil and stepped over it without hesitation”. Svidrigailov 
continues his trivialising diagnosis of Raskolnikov’s monumental folly by nakedly 
stating the crux of his action and his error, “he seems to have imagined that he, too, was 
a man of genius” . 118 This, of course, is only half of Raskolnikov’s mistake: regardless 
of whether or not it legitimately relates to him, his theory as to the moral impunity of 
genius is shown by Dostoevsky to propose a category which does not exist as a moral 
consideration (it pertains to what he considers an hzhuman void of moral inclinations, 
capable of sustaining neither altruism, guilt nor the thrill of transgression). The nature 
of Raskolnikov’s suffering conveys an impression of the essential inhumanity necessary 
to live apart from a dependence on moral communication. His inability to attain the 
comfortable immorality which he supposes to be characteristic of a moral conscience 
that sees beyond mere convention, is not simply a case of having mistaken his 
dissatisfied normality for genius. 119 The kind of character necessary to support the 
stepping over Raskolnikov had planned is shown to depend on an alien, 
incommunicable, and morally irrelevant condition; an inhuman separateness quite 
unlike the triumphant involvement and power which he had envisaged as the moral 
rebel’s due. Raskolnikov’s remoteness from the higher moral category he idealises is 
evident first and foremost in his plotting out his course to genius and later in his 
persisting reliance on conventional moral terms in his practical and emotional response 
to his crime (he hides, he feels anxiety). His failure to step over in the manner he had
113 Crime and Punishment, 421.
116 Crime and Punishment, 482.
117 Crime and Punishment, 491.
118 Crime and Punishment, 491.
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planned merely proves to him, and in the terms of his theory, that the conventions of 
ordinary human morality have a claim on him.
“I’m a scoundrel! That’s the whole point! But even so, I won’t look at it with your 
eyes . . . ”
“ ... and now more than ever I fail to understand my crime! Never, never 
have I been stronger or more certain than now!...”
.... But as he was uttering this last exclamation, his eyes suddenly met 
Dunya’s, and so great, so great was the anguish for him in those eyes that he came 
involuntarily to his senses. He felt that after all he had made these two poor women 
unhappy. After all it was he who had caused.. .”.120
Dostoevsky is not primarily concerned with discriminating legitimate hierarchies of 
secular morality, or the politics of justified transgression (these are Raskolnikov’s 
concerns, the contentious grounds of his sanction for murder), but rather with conveying 
the dangerous fertility of uncertainty and secular moral ambiguity. He shows how 
readily, in such conditions, phantom convictions solidify into dangerous idols of 
authority, capable of isolating individuals from the tempering responsibilities of moral 
agreement.
Porfiry instructs Raskolnikov, “give yourself directly to life, without reasoning . . .  - it 
will carry you straight to shore and set you on your feet. What shore? How do I know? 
I only believe that you have much life ahead of you” . 121 Porfiry continues: “Who am I? 
I’m a finished man, that’s all. A man who can, perhaps, sympathize and empathize, 
who does, perhaps, even know something - but completely finished” . 122 Here is the 
layering of wisdom, the passing on of knowledge, the past invoking a healthy future 
through its faith - hope is sustained - Porfiry Petrovich is a finished man, and in this 
sense both spent and completed, of the past but nevertheless able to address the present 
from a fixed point. If we consider Raskolnikov as the emblem of the poor deluded boys 
and girls that Dostoevsky saw filling the nihilist ranks, we have in this scene a vignette 
of the potentially nourishing interchange between selfless authority and the appetite for 
reform.
119 Phillip Rahv (in “Dostoevsky in Crime and Punishment”, Dostoevsky: A Collection o f Critical Essays, 
ed. Rene Wellek (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 16-38) sees Crime and Punishment as depicting
121 Crime and Punishment, 460.
122 Crime and Punishment, 460.
precisely this mistake.
20 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 518-19
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Porfiry, like Sonya, imposes an “implacable sentence” on Raskolnikov, enforcing 
an arduous awakening to his own moral contrition and personal shame. 123 Raskolnikov 
repeatedly flees from this process; to Svidrigailov, for instance, in the hope of hearing a 
new word that will grant him an easier passage: “Oh, how sick he was of it all! / And 
yet here he was hurrying to Svidrigailov; could it be that he expected something new 
from him - directions, a way out? People do grasp at straws!” . 124 Svidrigailov’s tales of 
murder and debauchery in fact force Raskolnikov to admit his sympathy with the old 
words of conventional morality; he is repulsed by Svidrigailov’s transgressions, and 
subsequently feels himself caught in a ridiculous contradiction.
“Stop, stop your mean, vile anecdotes, you depraved, mean, sensual man!”
“Look at our Schiller, what a Schiller, just look at him! Ou va-t-elle la vertu se 
nicher? And you know, I’ll go on telling you such things on purpose, just to hear 
your little outcries. Delightful!”
“Isn’t it! And do you think I don’t seem ludicrous to myself right now?” 
Raskolnikov muttered spitefully.
Svidrigailov was roaring with laughter[.]125
And after all, it would seem that Svidrigailov had been drawn to Raskolnikov for 
similarly wishful reasons: Raskolnikov, as the self-styled amoral murderer, “ offers a 
potential source of deliverance from a growing sense of the exiling inhumanity of his 
own intolerable corruption. Alluding to the murder Svidrigailov tells Raskolnikov, 
“You have your own opinion and were not afraid to have it. It was that in you that drew 
my curiosity” ; 127 he is also on the alert for something new, “directions, a way out” of his 
own predicament.
In practice, quests for new words in Dostoevsky’s novels are more akin to 
the strategic process of “making sense” of himself, in which the pawnbroker (in 
“The Meek Girl”) seeks to forge, from his autonomous wife, a sympathetic judge 
to affirm the sense which supports his preferred self-image. Raskolnikov and
123 Crime and Punishment, 463.
124 Crime and Punishment, 463.
125 Crime and Punishment, 482.
126 Raskolnikov’s explanation of his notion of a higher moral category -  a category of people whose 
capacity to sin with a quiet conscience reflects an unconventionally broad moral license - is not made to 
Svidrigailov directly; Svidrigailov overhears Raskolnikov’s confession to Sonya and his attempts to make 
her accept his theory that higher moral beings can commit crimes with impunity, if committed in service 
of their (and history’s) higher purpose. Svidrigailov associates Raskolnikov with his theory from the 
outset, his disappointment in finding Raskolnikov unable to maintain it as a vital raison d ’etre mirrors 
Raskolnikov’s own. Svidrigailov is equally frustrated by the breakdown o f Raskolnikov’s relationship 
with his ‘theory’, as its persistence would have provided him with a comrade, and assuaged his own need 
for rationalisations to quash his growing revulsion with the ghosts of his intractable sadism (murder, rape, 
child abuse), and with himself.
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Svidrigailov are each drawn to the other in the hope of hearing a new word. 128 
The initial attraction is bom, though, out of a tacit sense of solidarity and a 
suspected like-mindedness, suggesting that what they actually hope to hear is an 
external justification which will illuminate and consolidate the suitability of the 
code by which they already seek to live. Their seeking out each other’s potential 
accord and approval reflects the tenuous and unconsolidated nature of purely 
individualistic assurances: both Raskolnikov and Svidrigailov are unable to 
dismiss the anxiety of being unable to prove to themselves in isolation that their 
notions of moral impunity had not been simply permissive solipsistic fictions.
%  sjc
Raskolnikov is associated with death on two occasions; in the second, Marmeladov’s, 
he seems to perceive an avenue by which he can atone for the first. In his lurch towards 
the possibility of some form of atonement, a mute logic makes it clear that Raskolnikov 
has not floated away to a realm beyond the conventional consideration of good and evil. 
Had he risen in a triumphal sense, he would be unlikely to show a tendency towards 
binding himself back to society through self-mortification or penance.
At the scene of Marmeladov’s accident (which ultimately proves fatal) 
Raskolnikov is “surprisingly excited” . 129 He calls for a doctor and slips “something” to 
the police for carrying the injured man home; four times he assures the crowd “I’ll 
pay” . 130 The tragic circumstance of Raskolnikov’s meeting with the Marmeladov 
family provides an opportunity to do penance, reassert his potential and establish an 
understanding with those to whom he will be able to make sense of himself as he wishes 
to, rather than as he fears he must. Sonya offers the prospect of community without 
shame. “I’m just coming from a dead man’s house, some official who died ... I gave 
them all my money ... and besides, I was just kissed by a being who, even if I had killed 
someone, would still ... in short, I saw another being there Raskolnikov is
buoyed by the prospect of a new community capable of recontextualising his shame. As 
with the pawnbroker’s attempts to train and control the meek girl’s understanding of his 
fall, Raskolnikov’s excitement is generated by an instinctively parasitic recourse to a
127 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 466.
128 Effectively, ‘new words’ would deliver an unconventional truth or code of conduct capable of 
providing a new basis or convention capable of normalising attitudes and actions which had previously 
constituted unacceptable transgressions.
129 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 176.
130 Crime and Punishment, 176.
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prospectively vulnerable source of external approval (Sonya’s own perception of her 
moral state, for instance, is ignored). Raskolnikov’s excited hopes of establishing a new 
community and moral norm, removed from the circumstances surrounding his crime, 
are immediately compromised, though, as he returns to his room to find his mother and 
sister waiting: “A cry of rapturous joy greeted Raskolnikov’s appearance. Both women 
rushed to him. But he stood like a dead man; a sudden, unbearable awareness struck 
him like a thunderbolt. And his arms would not rise to embrace them; they could 
not” . 132
When Raskolnikov begins to confess his crime to Sonya, his attempts to 
simultaneously convey the rationalisations which exonerate his actions render his 
account opaque. Sonya interjects: “You’d better tell me straight out ... without 
examples” . 133 Raskolnikov’s rhetorical flourishes, whether of self-promotion or 
depreciation, are means of persuading himself of his perspicacity and self-control. 
Requesting an account of the bare bones of Raskolnikov’s crime, Sonya seeks 
intuitively to unravel the strategies of his selective understanding and to uncover a clear 
unprivileged view of the basis of his confession. Straight out, and without examples, 
the old lady is not a louse, he is not stepping over, and Lizaveta is not conveniently 
invisible. In the posture of combative challenge to authority, Raskolnikov has been able 
to shelter in spontaneous reflexes of self-preservation. When finally he does speak 
without “thinking about his words or weighing them”, it is to entreat his mother, 
“Mama, whatever happens, whatever you hear about me, whatever they tell you about 
me, will you still love me as you do now?” . 134 Though it might be suggested that 
Raskolnikov is simply gauging a last resort of approval, his spontaneous supplication 
seems rather to herald the final erosion both of the rationale of moral revolution which 
supported his combative resistance of conventional judgment, and of the conceptual 
isolation which sustains his pride. Raskolnikov’s perception of himself as an 
exceptional being serves throughout as a bulwark against the admission that his flight is 
from the prospective contempt and condemnation his crime warrants, and similarly 
from the intensity of his own contempt for what he considers a grotesque and 
demeaning miscalculation. “My mother, my sister, how I loved them! Why do I hate 
them now? Yes, I hate them, hate them physically, I cannot bear having them near me
131 Crime and Punishment, 191.
132 Crime and Punishment, 192.
133 Crime and Punishment, 415.
134 Crime and Punishment, 514.
300
99 135 Raskolnikov knows that his own answer to the question Dunya asks of 
Svidrigailov - “And remorse of conscience? You mean you deny him all moral feeling? 
Is that what he’s like?” 136 - will force him finally to admit the absurdity of his 
relationship with his theory. He is not at all like that, but to acknowledge this, as 
Svidrigailov observes, is to admit his lack of genius: “Now that,” asserts Svidrigailov, 
“for a vain young man, is truly humiliating, especially in our age. . .” .137 In 
Raskolnikov’s plea to his mama, the fear of humiliation and punishment is apparent, but 
far stronger is the fear of loneliness, isolation or abandonment. In this supplication it 
becomes apparent that, after the killing, much of Raskolnikov’s moral accounting has 
served to discredit his fear that he has wilfully relinquished a right to something which 
he simultaneously discovers he cherishes above all. Raskolnikov is scared of what his 
crime makes him (inhuman, unlovable), and scared that the superior moral isolation he 
had plotted for himself will actually be imposed in the form of punitive exile.
... as if indeed he could imagine thinking now about the same things as before , and 
being interested in the same themes and pictures he had been interested in ... still so 
recently. He even felt almost like laughing, yet at the same time his chest was 
painfully constricted. It was as if he now saw all his former past, and former 
thoughts, and former tasks, and former themes, and former impressions, and this 
whole panorama, and himself, and everything, everything, somewhere far down 
below, barely visible under his feet ... It seemed as if he were flying upwards
somewhere, and everything was vanishing from his s ig h t............. It seemed to him
that at that moment he had cut himself off, as with scissors, from everyone and 
everything.138
Raskolnikov’s perspective seems to allude to the titanic altitude of a statue or 
monument, but it is reminiscent also of the bird’s-eye view of Gogol’s madman 
Poprishchin after the evaporation of his personality into the atmosphere over Europe. 139 
In Byron’s Cain, Lucifer flies the dissenting Cain through space, showing him a 
celestial realm filled with other planets and stars, as opposed to gods or heaven, as an 
insinuation of his own right to individualist self-determination and an incitement, 
therefore, of rebellion against conventional order. In contrast to the implied allure of 
responding to the sudden emptiness of heaven by becoming a man-god, Poprishchin’s 
astral projection expresses the desolation and hopelessness of his sense of orphanhood
135 Crime and Punishment, 275.
136 Crime and Punishment, 491.
137 Crime and Punishment, 491.
138 Crime and Punishment, 114-15.
139 Nikolai Gogol, “Diary of a Madman”, Diary of a Madman and Other Stories, trans. Ronald Wilks 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972), 17-41,41.
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and displacement: “Press a wretched orphan to your breast! There’s no place for him in 
this world!” . 140 Raskolnikov’s intuition that he has cut himself off from the realm of 
conventional interaction and meaning is further confused by a struggle to validate as 
‘real’ the favoured explanation: ‘statue’; without having to concede to the interpretation 
suggested by actual facts: ‘irrelevant alien’. This desire for realism leads Raskolnikov 
to Sonya, who he feels cannot judge him, and then to Svidrigailov, who he hopes will 
approve his stepping over and rescue him from acknowledging his mere normality.
The nature of the strange isolation Raskolnikov experiences after the crime 
suggests that he has unwittingly dissolved into a wraith-like inhabitant of abstractions, 
problematically alien to the ordinary fleshly concerns of his fellow creatures. 
Raskolnikov’s neglect of Lizaveta’s death alongside her sister, “as if I hadn’t killed 
her”, appears “strange” to him.141 This point of disquiet reflects an oversight allowing 
him to relate to his guilt as a theoretical lapse rather than a crime against people. His 
equanimity depends, therefore, on attaining an inhuman self-sufficiency. Amid 
Raskolnikov's subsequent strivings for the easy conscience of amorality, a sense of 
personal unworthiness is also implied. What was meant to be a morally liberating 
stepping-over has proven to be a stepping-off into a dizzy chaos.
* * * * *
Hm ... yes ... man has it all in his hands, and it all slips through his fingers from 
sheer cowardice ... That is an axiom ... I wonder, what are people most afraid of? A 
new step, their own new word, that’s what they’re most afraid of ... I babble too 
much, however. That’s why I don’t do anything, because I babble. However, 
maybe it’s like this: I babble because I don’t do anything. I’ve learned to babble 
over this past month, lying in a comer day in and day out, thinking about ... 
cuckooland.142
In Dostoevsky’s work, the generation who perceive themselves as the inheritors of a 
social order held together by the ideologically devalued language of eloquence 
frequently seeks or aspires to utter a ‘new word’. The ‘new word’ will communicate an 
ideological illumination or rebirth capable of precipitating devotion to principles 
abstracted from contingent individual circumstance and interest. It owes more to 
frustrated reaction than ideological inspiration. Porfiry confides to Raskolnikov that he 
regards him as “one of those men who could have their guts cut out, and would stand
140 Gogol, “Diary of a Madman”, 41.
141 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 275.
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and look at his torturers with a smile -  provided he’s found faith, or God. Well, go and 
find it, and you will live”.143 In the absence of this “faith, or God”, Raskolnikov’s thirst 
forces his attempt to construct and impose his own ‘new word’ as a legitimate figure of 
devotion.
In Dostoyevsky: An Examination of the Major Novels, Richard Peace notes:
. . . ambiguity under whatsoever guise it appeared could not be tolerated by the 
radicals. Thus Dobrolyubov attacked the liberals for their equivocation on social 
reform, branding the discrepancy between their words and their deeds as 
lOblomovism,[144]. Ideal human behaviour, on the other hand, as prescribed by 
Chernyshevsky in What is to be done? is always straightforward, clear-cut and 
rational -  it has that singleness of purpose which befits the monistic nature of 
man.145
Crime and Punishment was written in response to an atmosphere of competing 
ideologies. In Antinihilism in the Russian Novel of the 1860’s, Charles Moser explores 
the characteristic traits of special pleading which are apparent within depictions of the 
radical nihilists by both their sympathisers and opponents. Given their inevitably 
common fund of raw material, these depictions typically rely on contrasting and 
competing rhetorical conventions to selectively approve those elements of reality that 
validate their convictions. To the neutral or undecided reader these conventions can be 
seen as competing to affirm the veracity and persuasive potency of the convictions in 
which they are based.
The radicals, Chemyshevsky and Pisarev for example, wrote for the young, “and 
it never occurred to them that adult standards might be applied to their production by 
men like Katkov and Dostoevsky”.146 Their negligence is perhaps aesthetically
142 Crime and Punishment, 4.
143 Crime and Punishment, 460.
144 Ivan Goncharov’s novel Oblomov (1859) depicts the existence of a land-owning nobleman, Ilya 
Oblomov, whose occasional bursts of intellectual activity and esteem for commitment cannot overcome 
the inertia of his privileged, insular and characteristically sleepy existence. Oblomov fails to win his ideal 
bride, losing her to his best friend (a German man of action), while his estates are gradually siphoned off 
by corrupt underlings he does not keep in check. “Oblomovism” implies the remote dreaminess and 
negligent lethargy of a gentry raised in the certainty of their position of benevolent privilege, but who are 
increasingly superfluous to, and unable to keep in step with, a changing social structure.
145 Richard Peace, Dostoyevsky: An Examination of the Major Novels (London: Bristol Classical 
Press, 1992), 33.
146 Charles Moser, Antinihilism in the Russian Novel o f the 1860’s (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1964), 26. 
In the passage below Chemyshevsky’s new man, Lopukhov, is debating the reception of an ostensibly 
charitable act of self-sacrifice- of the unsubtlety to which Chemyshevsky characteristically resorts in his 
determination to fuse characterisation with ideological explication and allusion:
That will distress her. ‘Oh, what a sacrifice he made for me!’ But I hadn’t 
been planning to make sacrifices. I haven’t been foolish enough to make any so far; 
and I hope I never will. I did what was best for me. I’m not the sort of person who
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mitigating, but, whether cynical or in earnest, this focus on a Russian youth made 
pliable by their thirst for certainties is morally suspect. 147 Moser quotes V.V. 
Rozanov’s attempt to illuminate the nature of the audience to which radical criticism 
and propaganda were addressed: “An adult needs to know the truth, while an adolescent 
needs to deify the instructor, without which faith in him is lost and the teaching itself 
dissipated” . 148
Dostoevsky exploits the foundations of this concession: the appeal of the clear 
and simplistic absolutism of nihilism, particularly for confused youths, with limited 
experience of the world, limited emotional ties, and a tendency to define themselves in 
nonconformist reaction against a society in which they feel deprived of a fulfilling 
position or role, and the adolescents’ selective and egocentric tunnel vision are firstly 
allowed as givens. But these givens and the relationships to abstract ideals which they 
facilitate, are eroded by a reality which Dostoevsky allows to expose the feet of clay 
which inevitably root emotivistic ‘authorities’ or ideals to a disenchanting world of 
chaos and compromise. 149
makes sacrifices. No one is. It’s a fallacious concept. Sacrifice is all stuff and 
nonsense. One does what’s most pleasurable. But go and try to explain that to her!
It’s theoretically comprehensible, but as soon as a person is confronted with the 
facts, he becomes emotional.
(What Is to Be Done?, 149-50).
In his own certainty of the propriety of this complaint against a social reality dominated by irrational 
emotional bonds to defunct traditions, Chemyshevsky produces a positive statement of secular ideology 
(in comparison to Dostoevsky’s negative statement in Crime and Punishment) which submits itself 
unwittingly to a self-parodying obliviousness to the practical limits of positivistic truths. It is a kind of 
unwitting parody utilised similarly in deliberate literary challenges depicting the practical limits of the 
radicals’ positivism. Lopukhov is in the vanguard of Chemyshevsky’s ‘new men’, “this type appeared 
quite recently but now it’s propagating quickly” (What Is to Be Done?, 212). He registers the tension of 
the first engagement, wherein theoretical lucidity can promote an emergent challenge to the status quo, 
the subsequently manifest inertia of which is sign enough that the challenge has scored a hit. All the 
traumas associated with living in the conventional world along the avant-garde principles of rational 
individualism, or Chemyshevsky’s personal vision of socialism, are included as problems which reflect 
the first inadequacies of a soon to be obsolete status quo. What is uncomfortable or awkward now, will 
become normal once the world at large has caught up with the new men who will suffer righteously in the 
meantime.
147 In The Idiot, Myshkin bemoans (with sympathy and anguish) the rush to atheism by Russian youths 
deprived of traditional certainties. They cannot exist, he implies, without something more than material 
values in which to put their faith. Like any other romantic idealisation, this kind of devotion exposes 
individuals to the possibility of exploitation by others serving purely finite political or personal interests, 
who do not share but clearly recognise the nature of their thirst and their need to quench it, and the 
vulnerability this need implies. Of course, Chemyshevsky, like many other proselytising radicals 
(whether conservative, reformist or something other), sincerely believed he was aiding these lost youths 
by showing them a way forward in which he sincerely believed. This sincerity (as compared to the 
cynical ambivalence which facilitates the persuasive efforts of The Spirit in Clough’s Dipsychus and The 
Spirit) is no less suspect, from Dostoevsky’s perspective, it only made the certainties nurtured by such 
secular positivism all the more dangerous.
148 Moser, Antinihilism in the Russian Novel of the 1860’s, 26.
149 In the journal of the raw youth Arkady Dolgoruky (the text of An Accidental Family), Dostoevsky 
depicts the collision of this ‘adolescent’ need to deify or idealise aspects of reality with an adult world of 
ambiguities, ambivalent facts, and irrational events. Dostoevsky and Nikolai Leskov, two of the most
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Raskolnikov’s antipathy to the chatter of the Russian intelligentsia, “I was so sick, 
so sick of all this babble then!” , 150 is representative of a wider frustration. The “circles” 
at which Raskolnikov has become so overstuffed with mere words have repulsed 
Razumikhin similarly, while the Underground Man has gone irretrievably and self­
consciously adrift in the reactionary isolation of his scrambled chatter. 151
For radicals like Raskolnikov, or Turgenev’s Bazarov, who react against 
convention and tradition, ‘old words’ and the eloquent conventions that served them 
seemed merely a dissipating anachronism. Eloquence was shunned and disparaged by 
the “new people”; their very demeanour deliberately declared its redundancy. 152 While 
they considered themselves men of rational certainties, words suggested a recourse to 
persuasive manipulations of emotivist sympathies (open persuasion also risks the 
exposure of the rationalisations on which these certainties are ostensibly founded to the 
subjectivity of interpretation). In The Idiot, Ganya Ivolgin, recovering his composure 
after an uncharacteristic burst of openness in conversation with Myshkin, defends his 
credentials as a serious and mature individual: “By the way, you don’t think I’m usually
1 C O
such a chatterbox do you?”. For committed individuals like Ganya or Bazarov, 
explaining oneself, seeking another’s approval, suggests a concession that the
accomplished and enduring of the Russian anti-nihilist writers, had personally experienced a similar 
collision, each starting out in youthful sympathy with, and proceeding towards a mature opposition to, 
radical ideology. Along with Moser, Joseph Frank, Rene Wellek and Richard Peace, appear to be in 
accord in seeing Crime and Punishment as a novel that, while transcending its genre and circumstance, 
among the antinihilist novels of the 1860s, is nevertheless significantly depleted without them. For 
Wellek and Moser in particular, the alignment of Dostoevsky with the antinihilist conventions of the 
period is particularly pertinent in clarifying some of the broadest moral dilemmas raised by the novel 
(see: “Bakhtin’s View of Dostoevsky: ‘Polyphony’ and ‘Camivalesque’ ”, Russian Formalism: A 
Retrospective Glance, eds. R.L. Jackson & Stephen Rudy (New Haven: Yale Center for International & 
Area Studies, 1985), 231-241; and Antinihilism in the Russian Novel of the 1860's (The Hague: Mouton 
& Co., 1964). Moser, for example, describes Dostoevsky as, “the most outstanding antinihilist writer of 
the 1860’s” (Antinihilism . . ., 68); and it is by tying Raskolnikov’s crime to the rhetorical context in this 
ideological discourse that Wellek, reacting against Bakhtin’s tendency to relativise every virtue and 
transgression in Dostoevsky’s work, points confidently to the novel’s clear endorsement of the 
commandment “thou shalt not kill”.
150 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 418.
151 In Turgenev’s “Hamlet of the Schigorovsky District” (Sketches from a Hunter’s Album 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1967), 179-209), the titular character is also a victim of the 
dissipation and disorientation engendered by endless abstract discussion, and of the distempered antipathy 
towards ambiguous reality and finite choice which this inability to verify any single abstract conviction 
typically engenders.
152 It is a commonplace in literary depictions, whether sympathetic or critical, of the 1860s nihilists to 
stress their unorthodox disregard for the niceties of polite society and their often deliberate flouting of 
good manners as a means of declaring their independence from and protest against tradition. Turgenev’s 
Bazarov is variously impertinent, ungrateful, rude, sullen and abrasive in his arrogant disdain of 
convention; Chemyshevsky’s “new men” are empirical men of fact and empirical theory, sensitivity or 
empathy are not in their repertoire; and Dostoevsky’s radicals are wilfully tactless and proudly 
unsympathetic. For a more thorough survey of this representative trope of the studiously dispassionate 
abruptness of the radical nihilists see Charles Moser’s, Antinihilism in the Russian Novel of the 1860’s.
153 Dostoevsky, The Idiot, 130.
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“rightness” of their ideals is not self-evident, and that this “rightness” might in fact 
depend on their personal representations of the sense it makes to them. 154
While, as Porfiry suggests, Raskolnikov might accept any suffering for the sake of 
a conviction, he cannot tolerate the uncertainty which seems intrinsic to abstract and 
moral discourse in the absence of divine or external authority. The pressure 
Raskolnikov experiences in his inability to align himself with any external moral 
framework, and which induces his individualistic “theory”, is apparent also in the 
intolerable weight of uncertain suspicion which Porfiry manipulates in an attempt to 
induce Raskolnikov’s independent acknowledgment of his guilt and shame. Fencing 
with his prey, Porfiry explains to Raskolnikov that a premature arrest provides the 
criminal with “moral support” . 155 By placing the criminal in a “definite position”, 
Porfiry suggests, “I would be, so to speak, defining him and reassuring him 
psychologically, so that he would be able to hide from me in his shell: he would 
understand finally that he is under arrest” . 156 In the police station after the crime 
Raskolnikov’s thoughts run along similar lines. He is tempted to confess “just to get it 
off my back!” . 157 His uncertainty as to the degree of suspicion he has aroused, and over 
the implications of his unwanted moral quiet taints his freedom indelibly.
Raskolnikov’s attempt to step over is forced by the same thirst for certainty which 
Myshkin associates with fanatical atheism. In Dostoevsky’s conception of the 
psychology of moral orientation the denial of God inevitably leads individuals to
154 Bazarov’s generally reticent manner and his reluctance to engage in verbal justification, hints at an 
assumed suspicion or antipathy towards eloquence and rationale. A similar disdain for mere principles 
and empty talk, exacerbated by the heights of meaningfulness to which these idealistic individuals 
essentially aspire, paradoxically torments the Underground Man in the stream of his constant chatter. His 
frustration with the incapacity of abstracted theory to achieve consensus or absolute justification, or to 
locate an authoritative mandate for convinced action, infuses his eloquent rationalisations and theorising 
with a potent vitriolic self-abhorrence. The causal relationship between action and sweet eloquence 
appears dubious; undoubtedly eloquence can sanctify whatever choice is eventually made, but it cannot 
offer unimpeachable directives to do one thing instead of another. Unable to tolerate the perpetually 
shifting ground of moral sanction, individuals begin to align their actions with an entirely separate code of 
plausibility: aware that there are no unimpeachable justifications for the actions which, for whatever 
reasons, they take or refuse, in the pre-emptive moral dialogue they often opt for silence, postponing 
moral evaluations until consequences arise.
In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill attacks a similar tendency of responding to the need for agreement 
and compromise with a deliberate censorious silence; a posture through which individuals and groups 
refuse to entertain the possibility that any perspective other than their own could possibly have any merit 
or warrant interaction. “To refuse a hearing to an opinion because they are sure it is false is to assume 
that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of 
infallibility” (On Liberty (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1985), 77). This assumption, 
Mill continues, is complemented by the condemnatory assuredness which is inherent in censorious 
silence.
155 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 338.
156 Crime and Punishment, 339.
157 Crime and Punishment, 104.
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demand absolute authority from merely finite proxies. To force reality to meet their 
own demands they brutalise an ambivalent moral horizon into submission.
The abstract theoretical chatter which is necessary in sustaining the apparent 
vitality of secular absolutism is vehemently denounced by Razumikhin:
Listen to me. I announce to you that you’re all, to a man, babblers and braggarts!
Some little suffering comes along, and you brood over it like a hen over an egg!
Even there you steal from other authors! There isn’t a sign of independent life in 
you! You’re made of spermaceti ointment, with whey instead of blood in your 
veins! I don’t believe a one of you! The first thing you do in any circumstances is 
try not to resemble a human being!158
The implicit emptiness of the terms of this sterile babble, which facilitates such shallow 
appropriations and subjective usage of ostensibly constant terms, reveals a further 
dimension of the trial that Raskolnikov claims to be making. He has told himself that 
his ‘trial’ is just words, and at its point of origin it is. Raskolnikov essentially shares 
Razumikhin’s revulsion with the lip-service paid to grand schemes and ideals, but 
Raskolnikov reacts by going to the opposite extreme: where Razumikhin disdains the 
meaningless core of this babble, Raskolnikov seeks to reify the merely theoretical 
contentions by acting as if they defined an actual state. 159
While he maintains it, Raskolnikov’s allegiance to his idea illustrates the 
destructive potential of such earnest infatuation and unsubtle certainty. The self-serving 
lip-service to radicalism displayed by Dunya’s suitor Luzhin, and the sincere but empty 
headed liberalism of Lebezyatnikov, represent the kind of atmosphere from which 
Raskolnikov’s violent rebellion hopes to release him. The eloquent babble of 
interminable abstract debate, intermingled with the self-interested scheming of 
competing self-interests, repulses him.
Overview
Secular ideology is reified by Dostoevsky to a point where it almost exists as a thing, an 
evil genius which lures its devotees into disaster. This reification is performed, though,
158 Crime and Punishment, 167. Razumikhin might have been addressing the Underground Man, his 
accusation echoes the latter’s disdainful evaluation of himself and of his peers who, like him, are bom of 
an idea.
159 Recalling his own intoxication with “the whole truth” - a truth into which Belinsky had initiated him 
in 1846, incorporating “the whole sanctity of the future communistic society” - Dostoevsky notes in A 
Writer’s Diary that the “new ideas of the time had tremendous appeal for us in Petersburg; they seemed to
307
as the necessary prelude to an exorcism which is intended to restore the body of Russia, 
through its constituents, to an authentic possession by Christian faith.
Dostoevsky depicts the kind of relationship which his characters are compelled to 
form with abstract systems of their own creation as the manifestation of an intrinsic 
human impulse which had been diverted from its proper path. It is a reality of 
Dostoevsky’s faith that secular independence is automatically conflated with 
individualistic constructs of absolute authority (emotivism). While Dostoevsky depicts 
the multifaceted ambiguity of the relationships between individuals and circumstantially 
constructed ideals, in evaluating their role solely in the terms they arrogate - that is, 
from within an absolutist mindset - he is compelled to impose a judgement on behalf of 
the moral reality he believes in (or favours).
In Crime and Punishment, as in Demons and The Brothers Karamazov, 
individuals’ ideas participate with the characters; they are real presences which catalyse 
murder. But as “participants”, these ideas do not offer the associated individuals 
exoneration or alibis for the consequences they engender. It is implicit in Dostoevsky’s 
various notions of ideological infection that the possession itself is a symptom betraying 
a vulnerability of moral negligence, apathy, or egotism; a somnambulistic state which 
individuals can awake from, but which, rather than being mitigated by ignorance and 
absolved by enlightenment, remains a sin of negligence for which the awake self 
remains culpable.
Dostoevsky’s hopes of anathematising and exorcising secular and individualistic 
idealism are carried by the isolation and suffering which his realities impose on 
individuals who depend on subjective compensatory convictions to offer the kind of 
external moral template provided by divine authority. It is often noted that while 
serving his moral intentions so well (intentions which are often abrupt and reactionary), 
the realities he depicts seem remarkably free from the disruptive affectation of 
doctrinaire or prescriptive characterisation; these are present but always subordinated in 
the close mechanics of the narrative to the ambiguities and inconsistencies which are so 
vital to engaging character building. Having taken Dostoevsky’s own moral intention 
into account, it is possible to react quite differently to the reality his argument is 
predicated on. Discounting his other predicate, that humanity must have an authority 
above it, his representations of individuals’ responses to uncertainty provide 
provocative examples of the burdens which habits of absolutism impose on individuals
be sacred and moral in the highest degree and, most of all, they seemed to be universal -  the future law of 
all humanity without exception” (A Writer’s Diary - Volume l, 1873-1876, 285).
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who seek authority in an essentially multifaceted moral scene. In so doing Dostoevsky 
becomes a subject also of the kind of dilemma he depicts: his characters’ attempts to 
approve credible authorities around which to order moral preferences and evaluate 
purpose follow paths his own reactionary affirmation of God had also travelled. In this 
sense, Dostoevsky’s ideological deportment resembles Myshkin’s: personal prejudices, 
weaknesses, ignorance and anxiety aside, both act in the name of something they 
believe to be higher than themselves, but are at the same time personally dependent on 
the vitality of the “something higher” which their belief alone vivifies.
When no common foundation for idealistic activism can be affirmed, scepticism, 
disinterested scrutiny of actual facts and beliefs, often appears the only credible means 
of advancing or validating (or even consummating) idealistic awareness. 160 Together, 
the two tendencies (idealism and scepticism) suggest faculties of proposition and 
criticism which attain a fertile partnership in each nullifying a certain quality in the 
other. The remains are the virtue of the attempt and the virtue of the veracity with 
which the attempt is qualified and absorbed by concerns that disparage it, but which, in 
the process, are marked by its impression and thereby assimilate the “attempt” into a 
broader discourse. The correction of wrongful enthusiasms suggests at least something 
of the nature of a positive moral position; for Dostoevsky all secular absolutes are 
wrongful enthusiasms and their corrective erosion, the sceptical impulse, implicitly 
recommends the logical necessity of divine faith, the one ideal he exonerates of finite or 
secular origins.
Frank defends Dostoevsky against charges that he had sought merely to vilify the 
radicals, claiming, “Dostoevsky was rather striving to warn them against the calamitous 
results he could foresee flowing from the ideas by which they were now being 
inspired” . 161 Dostoevsky’s striving, though, never loses sight of the insidious reality of 
these calamitous results; his warnings do not carry the complementary advocacy of a 
pragmatic idealism because secular idealism and the calamities of activism were, to his 
mind, two stages of the same ‘disease’. Dostoevsky is not, that is, suggesting a more
160 A good example of this kind of reaction is formulated in Hermann Broch’s The Guiltless, a novel 
which sorts through the moral disengagement of the German, and European, population, between the 
World Wars; and the feeling of existing in a vacuum of common authoritative values, a feeling which 
suited the rhetoric and implementation of fascism so well. “But now that man himself has been 
transposed into limitlessness, the good is losing, no, it has already lost the force that gave it direction; for 
in a multidimensional world there are no longer any goals to aim at and absolute direction can no longer 
be maintained by a turning toward, but only by a turning away from, that is to say, no longer by a turning 
toward the good, but only by a turning away from earthly evil” (The Guiltless, trans. Ralph Manheim; 
1974 (Evanston, Illinois: The Marlboro Press / Northwestern University Press, 2000); 264).
161 Frank, Dostoevsky: The Miraculous Years 1865-71, 60.
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cautious or proportioned implementation of secular ideologies, he is attempting to show 
that they are inherently inadequate to the needs which induce them. While he does not 
vilify idealism (which remains for him a natural tendency open to corrupting influences 
when separated from its divine governor) it seems clear that Dostoevsky does mean to 
denounce the negligent abstraction from reality and from others which individuals 
willingly consent to in maintaining their essentially self-solacing visions of order and 
authority. It is not only the active protests of secular idealists but also the denials - the 
compromises they impose on multifaceted and complex moral issues - which constitute 
the corrosive forces of secular absolutism. Dostoevsky’s vilifications are, nevertheless, 
conflicted by his own need to affirm the existence of the authoritative moral code on 
behalf of which, with a kind of forced certainty, he imposes these judgements as 
emblematic stays against chaos, and his uncertainty that this affirmation is warranted.
Dostoevsky wrote: “You see, in feeling sorry for the offender, you thus do not 
feel sorry for the offended, can’t you understand this simple thing”; forgetting the 
victim opens the way to the criminal’s exoneration. In The Brothers Karamazov 
Dostoevsky circumvents this consideration somewhat, in that Fyodor Karamazov’s own 
moral stance, so to speak, disregards moral obligations in such a way that he essentially 
courts the same values that bring about his own murder. In Crime and Punishment it is 
only Raskolnikov’s initial argument - the pawnbroker is a louse who is living at the 
expense of others -  that suggests any reason why our sympathy should not lie with her, 
regardless of her innocent sister. Dostoevsky seems caught between conveying to us 
that Raskolnikov really has committed a horrendous crime, and the necessity that 
Raskolnikov remains a character with which the reader can sympathise. Genuine
162 Dostoevsky, The Unpublished Dostoevsky: Diaries and Notebooks (1860-81), Volume II, 117.
163 Writing on Crime and Punishment in The Outsider (London: Pan Books, 1963), Colin Wilson gives a 
perfect example of the necessarily blinkered path to a ‘rational’ approval of Raskolnikov’s moral 
rebellion. Wilson champions Raskolnikov as a potent Übermensch dragged down by a sick society, and 
justifies ignoring the novel’s epilogue (where Raskolnikov finds God) by claiming an incompatibility 
between the virtues Dostoevsky bestows on Raskolnikov and the likelihood that he would then deem  
Raskolnikov’s idea “morally wrong” (182). Wilson seems unwilling to consider, it would seem, the 
possibility that ideological affinities and individual worth are not intrinsically linked, and that Dostoevsky 
might have reasons to sympathise with a character whose abstract politics and actions are abominably 
foolish and destructive. In Crime and Punishment fidelity to the letter of intellectually generated 
ideology ultimately shows naivete. Dostoevsky gradually reveals Raskolnikov’s ignorance of the 
motivations behind his usage of the rationalisations and abstractions with which he attempts to make 
desirable sense of himself.
Raskolnikov is not a vessel of genuine revolutionary force, misunderstood and weighed down by 
squeamish mediocrity (as Wilson suggests), but an individual who is frail and self-deluded, but ultimately 
capable, nevertheless, of coming to terms with the limited credibility of secular ideological absolutism 
(except as a metaphor dignifying individual commitments and responsibility). Wilson’s curious 
willingness to denounce the Epilogue as a compromised concession to the requirements of a tidy ending -  
thus discounting Raskolnikov’s ‘lapse’ into convention - exemplifies the partial and capricious reading
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victims are given short shrift in the novels though the perpetrator always remains before 
us as a criminal, and often as a victim also.164 Nevertheless, if the actual victims are so 
readily forgotten - fodder of the communal moral organism - the crimes are not. The 
abstract guilt of Dmitry, Ivan and Alyosha Karamazov, for instance, is even further 
abstracted through the emphasis on the sin of patricide, as opposed to any personal or 
more particular sense of a crime against a particular, prematurely deceased individual. 
Within that distinction, though, the criminals are rarely “finished” solely by the fact of 
their crime. Evil is rarely a character trait in Dostoevsky, though a vast array of 
insidious stupidities and strategic distortions of ambiguity seem to serve and further evil 
purposes.
Prior to the murder, Raskolnikov galvanises his resolve with an incantation to 
external determination, “If not reason, then the devil!”: either he has a rational right to 
his plan or he is the unwitting instrument and victim of an evil. 165 It seems rather that 
his dubiously rationalised self-interest, his pseudo-reason, consigns him to do the 
devil’s dirty work. In this instance “reason” and “the devil” are merely two possible 
names for the same susceptibility in Raskolnikov, either way the effect is the same: 
either the devil or reason possessed him and killed the old crone. Later he is more sure, 
reason has given way to the origin of its temptations, “it was the devil killed the old 
crone”, but his crime, he maintains, consists only in having unwittingly, through pride 
and ignorance, become the devil’s instrument. 166
In Dostoevsky’s work, children often serve as gauges of worldly corruption; their 
suffering, as both Ivan Karamazov and Raskolnikov testify, attests to an intolerable 
decay in mutual responsibility and communal nurture, while the impressions left on 
their plastic developing moral tendencies by the world offer concrete warnings both of 
present corruptions and the imminent social jeopardy inbred by development in a period 
of sweeping technological, social and spiritual transitions. The immature
necessary to see Dostoevsky as endorsing Raskolnikov rather than the reality of a wider moral discourse 
which his actions provoke and clarify.
164 Raskolnikov, like the self-obsessed father of Netochka Nezvanova, must be included in the list of his 
victims. An acquaintance of Netochka’s father warns: “You say, Prince, that he’s an interesting fellow. 
That may well be true, but he creates a most painful impression. In the first place, he’s mad, and in the 
second, he’s guilty of three crimes, for he’s ruined his wife’s and his daughter’s lives as well as his own” 
{Netochka Nezvanova, 50). Netochka’s father and Raskolnikov are no less culpable for also being victims 
of the tyrannies of their fixed ideas.
165 Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 72.
166 Crime and Punishment, 420. In a letter introducing, Mikhail Katkov, editor of the Russian Herald, to 
the subject of Crime and Punishment, Dostoevsky stressed that, “the murderer is an intelligent y[oung] 
man and even one of good inclinations]” (Complete Letters, volume 2, 1860-67, 175). This is hardly 
meant to temper the blow Raskolnikov strikes, it merely points up Raskolnikov’s moral disorientation as 
a product of abstraction rather than flawed intelligence or intrinsic personal limitation (his lack of genius,
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impressionability of children and “unfinished” adults, and their involvement both as 
victims and perpetrators of transgression, is used by Dostoevsky as a sign of the 
arbitrariness of secular or decentred moral conventions, and their inability to provide 
actual and general moral balances to counter subjective ideals and laws which, formed 
by individual desire or self-interest, seem to offer objective external authority. 
Nevertheless, like Myshkin, these individuals are not innocent of the mistakes their 
naivete or infatuations engender. This recognition of culpability is vital to the equally 
important capacity for redemption, residing in the ability to take responsibility, free of 
consoling delusions or external compulsion, for the disquiet and destruction which 
indicate moral transgressions. In essence this “taking” of responsibility makes the 
moral framework. It is the willingness to absorb a personal responsibility to make 
moral choices, which resuscitates Raskolnikov’s involvement with others. Raskolnikov 
had expected to keep his place among others, in spite of having wilfully killed another 
for his own ends, because this crime would be of no matter to his higher category of 
moral distinctions. He is brought, though, to recognise that only by admitting that it 
does matter will he be able to regain the place his isolating abstractions had cost him: by 
acknowledging himself a criminal he re-enters the community and the jurisdiction of its 
moral conventions for which his isolation has crystallised a desire. However 
reluctantly, by the end of the novel Raskolnikov has acquired the taste for participating 
in moral agreement.




I would like briefly to re-emphasise Clough’s and Dostoevsky’s common focus on the 
problems of merely human or secular transcendent ideals, and on the roles such ideals 
inherit (as opposed to being able to fulfil) in the coming down to earth of the ostensibly 
metaphysical (metaphysical literally, where belief in supernatural authority persists) or 
otherworldly essence of transcendent idealism. For Clough, this merely human focus 
(which seemed to be all that remained after the disruption of traditions that had ascribed 
the authority of transcendent ideals to their purportedly external or supernatural origins), 
is a perspective he cannot repudiate; nor does he take it upon himself to do so. For 
Dostoevsky this coming down to earth, the corporeality of secular ideals, is a 
corruption. Though this simplification understates the complex anxieties that are at play 
in Dostoevsky’s opposition to the philosophical and practical implications of secular 
idealism, it does do justice to his insistence that some transcendent structure must be 
recognised and approved as a resistance to formlessness (which he perceived to be an 
inevitable adjunct to the thriving and mutually nurturing moral values of secularism and 
material individualism). This simplification emphasizes, that is, how Dostoevsky, in 
comparison to Clough, finds the idea of ambivalent reality abhorrent because he refuses 
to accept (as he would have to in a merely human world) that there could be no moral 
stance from which to absolutely condemn injustice and its rationalisation, and because 
he cannot conceive of a ‘good’ community that is not bound by a mutual recognition of 
an absolute moral code that transcends mere worldly interests. Finding the idea of 
ambivalent reality unacceptable then, Dostoevsky opposes it in a way that, though 
common to Clough’s characters, can be seen in Clough’s depiction of these common 
characteristics to be quite capricious and idiosyncratic. In Clough’s work absolutism is 
revealed as merely anachronistic ideology; it reflects individuals’ desires, primarily 
unacknowledged, for a vantage from which the world can be treated as an orderly realm 
constructed along general and unchanging principles. The evasion or rejection of 
conclusive frameworks or resolution appears repeatedly in Clough’s later poems. It 
appears both as deliberate artistic strategy (as in Amours, where Claude drifts on in what 
remains predominantly a state of uncommitted uncertainty), and in his simple reluctance 
to affirm or elicit anything definitive from the circumstances any particular poem might 
engage with (his poems often have companion pieces which answer, and further vex, a 
common subject). Because Clough himself refuses to draw conclusions, to force 
closure, or to enter into the kinds of particular conventions which might have ratified his
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characters’ desires for embracing transcendent absolutes, he is able to suggest how 
unmoored such conventions are in the world of ambivalent fact.
To simplify again, in Dostoevsky’s works secular ideals are dangerous and 
intrinsically flawed because they are corrupted by individual interests and the fallibility 
of human awareness and motivations, while divine ideals are practically flawed, remote 
and untenable because the contemporary world is corrupt and the common values they 
appeal to have been obscured and diluted by the intrusions of secularization. For 
Clough, ideals which make a claim to some special origin or higher moral status, 
whether ascribed to a divine or secular source of authority, are merely reflections of 
individuals’ and groups’ desire to exist under the assurance of a moral template that 
allows them to feel they can live a meaningful and good life, and shows them how to do 
so. Clough’s position acknowledges the origin of these desires in the uncertainty which 
they seek to order, while Dostoevsky seeks to align them with a force of order 
inherently separate from the chaos it opposes. I have tried to show that this tendency or 
commitment, which Dostoevsky shares with many of his characters, is itself a symptom 
of uncertainty, and an ambivalent, morally unprivileged impulse akin to the kinds of 
dangerous and misleading desire for absolutism which forces Dipsychus to commit to a 
false ideal, and which, just as importantly, keeps him from recognizing and accepting 
the nature of moral templates which lead him consciously to struggle with uncertainty, 
and similarly to reject the kinds of compromises which are involved in committing to 
any secular construct of meaningful life-goals and moral values. I have tried to show 
that the refusal to admit the nature of these compromises - for instance, the refusal or 
inability to admit the impossibility of an absolutely unvexed moral stance in the midst 
of an ambivalent world - is a burden of absolutism. This burden is apparent in both 
Clough’s and Dostoevsky’s depictions of intellectual idealists struggling with 
metaphysical uncertainty and disorientation. In Clough’s work, though, it is shown to 
be not only a burden but also a chimera, while Dostoevsky’s work accepts and 
promotes, as a necessity of any meaningful existence, the independent reality of this 
burden (it is itself further shaped by its weight). Both authors were anxious to restore a 
sense of moral order but from Clough’s work we can see the prospect of a modem 
pragmatic idealism while in Dostoevsky’s we see the problems that persist from 
avoiding this disenchanted, merely human commitment to moral constructs.
In Dostoevsky’s work, individuals who esteem transcendent impersonal codes are 
effectively unable to see the confronting uncertainties of the natural world as anything 
other than the negation of an ideal. Perceiving the lived-in world as the corruption of an
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ideal, they are able to repudiate reality in the ideal’s name, indeed they feel it would be 
wrong not to, and to avail themselves of the psychological assurance provided by a 
feeling of holding an objectively justified moral grievance against the ambivalent reality 
which they find so disquieting.
A higher purpose or cause offers the semblance of meaningful moral templates 
with which to order the formlessness of a merely human existence, the kind of order 
that had previously been implicit and available in the notion of divine authority. Where 
these higher causes or ideals are, or are seen as, merely the inflation of subjective moral 
intuitions or partial truths (as is often the case depicted in these works), the individuals 
who depend on them are forced to resort to isolating selective affirmations, which 
reflect a kind of fanaticism for certainty as much as for any specific body of 
convictions.
With secularisation occurring in Russia intertwined with sweeping social changes 
(the disruption of autocracy at a variety of levels), the demand for absolute assurances 
and directives and the feeling of destitution and drastic vulnerability without them were 
no doubt considerable. These circumstances are precisely those in which an absolute, 
purveying a rigid moral template, might seem not merely desirable but necessary as a 
platform from which to distinguish meaningful actions and existence, and from which to 
resist the claims to authority of rival codes. For this reason Dostoevsky’s characters 
seek to form secular and subjective assurances into something more. Dostoevsky 
himself also seems compelled, or to force himself, to draw absolute conclusions from a 
reality he is aware does not support them. Nevertheless, the consequences of these 
flights into certainty (such as the persisting unrest that dogs Dostoevsky and his 
characters alike), make the uncertainty which Clough depicts with resilient ambivalence 
seem not unpregnant (which for an idealist or absolutist it is), but an un-panicked 
clarity. Consequently, absolute certainty can be seen to be a symptom of the mixture of 
confusion with a particular ideological profile. It is a symptom, furthermore, which 
masquerades as a cure, while obscuring the possibility of recognising that the sickness 
is rooted in ideology not fact.
Clough’s work, in contrast, represents as merely redundant the feeling that there 
are absolute moral values and life-goals: there is nothing to guard individuals from 
responsibility, not only for their actions but also for formulating or choosing the values 
on which they act.
The extremes of social and political unrest which, in conjunction with spiritual 
upheaval, played such an important part in forging Dostoevsky’s commitment to the
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burden of absolutism (a commitment which his representations of the natural world 
serve to advocate) are not entirely foreign to Clough’s characters but they exist for them 
as peripheral, abstract concerns. Free from domestic particularity and historical 
contingency, which stamp the crises in Dostoevsky’s work so markedly, Clough’s 
works offer accounts of individuals’ intellectual and idealistic engagement with the 
problematic heritage of absolutism. In so doing they approximate a kind of neutrality or 
objectivity, which still emphasises the human dimensions of this engagement.
History has borne out Dostoevsky’s pessimism in regard to the monstrosities that 
absolutism, isolated from external authority, will often encourage individuals and 
groups of individuals to commit and attempt to justify in the name of transcendent 
ideals, and it has shown also the persistent appeal of the kind of reactionary faith, an 
alternative but no less dangerous front of absolutism, with which Dostoevsky refuses 
the ambivalent factuality of uncertainty. But history has also left open the option of 
founding goals on something like Clough’s commitment to refuse the heritage of 
absolutism, secular and supernatural, and to accept uncertainty and compromise as the 
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